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Practices of governance and practices of freedom always go hand 
in hand. 
 
 
 (Griggs, S., Norval, A. and Wagenaar, H., Practices of Freedom: 
Decentred Governance, Conflict and Democratic Participation) 
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Abstract 
 
This research explores whether, and how, theoretical concepts from 
agonistic democracy could be operationalised in order to mediate 
conflict in multicultural, pluralist society.  It highlights three central 
themes of agonistic democracy: political contestation, contingency and 
necessary interdependency.  It subsequently demonstrates the various 
ways in which these themes are employed, delineating three distinct 
agonistic approaches: the ÔperfectionistÕ (as encapsulated by David 
Owen), the ÔadversarialÕ (as represented by Chantal Mouffe), and the 
ÔinclusiveÕ (as symbolised by William Connolly and James Tully).  The 
research then considers possible tensions between agonistic 
assumptions and further institutional consideration, and draws on new 
institutionalist literature to identify which kinds of institution could be 
compatible with agonistic democracy.  It explores these through an 
experiment, which employs three distinct discussion frameworks, each 
representing a different agonistic approach.  The research combines 
insights from the experiment and agonistic literature to gain a deeper 
insight into agonistic concepts and the potential for their 
operationalisation.  It suggests that perfectionism is valuable in 
encouraging unity, adversarialism is effective in reviving passions, and 
inclusivity is useful in enhancing interactions between conflicting 
citizens.  Finally, the research proposes an Ôagonistic dayÕ and 
demonstrates how a synthesis of all three approaches could mediate 
multicultural, pluralist conflict. 
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Introduction 
A Brief Overview of the Project 
 
This thesis considers whether, and how, concepts from agonistic 
democratic theory can be represented by practical mechanisms in order 
to help mediate conflict in multicultural, pluralist society.1 It considers 
three distinct approaches to agonistic democracy: the perfectionist (as 
represented by David Owen's work), the adversarial (as depicted by 
Chantal MouffeÕs account) and the inclusive (as symbolised by both 
William Connolly and James TullyÕs work).  It demonstrates how each of 
these approaches provides informal (and to some extent, formal) 
institutions, but lacks deeper consideration about how to operationalise 
these in practice.  Drawing on new institutionalist literature, the thesis 
argues that, in spite of resistance towards agonistic institutions, 
agonistic democracy is not necessarily at odds with certain types of 
institution, and that further consideration of these could enrich the field.  
Using the three agonistic approaches to provide three distinct 
discussion frameworks, the empirical component of the thesis draws on 
experimental design to explore ways in which agonistic concepts might 
be operationalised, as well as their potential effects.  Combining 
empirical and theoretical analysis, it evaluates the strengths and 
weaknesses of the theoretical concepts and their subsequent 
operationalisation.  The thesis concludes by offering an account of an 
Ôagonistic dayÕ in which all three approaches are synthesised to mediate 
conflict in multicultural, pluralist society. 
Background to the Project 
Context 
 
Before outlining the research question, it is important to first explain the 
need for a theory of conflict mediation, consider existing theories, and 
demonstrate the importance of this project. 
 
                                                
1 The thesis seeks to mediate (as opposed to, for instance, eradicate) conflict as a result of 
the importance of contestation to agonistic democracy.  The importance of political 
contestation will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter One. 
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The research, and its focus on conflict mediation, is contextualised 
within multicultural, pluralist conflict in Britain and the global realm.  
When discussing multiculturalism throughout the thesis, I use Bhikhu 
ParekhÕs definition in which Ômulticulturalism, then, is about cultural 
diversity or culturally embedded differences.Õ2  Additionally, I borrow 
Mark WenmanÕs understanding of pluralism, which entails Ôa very broad 
conception of the political (understood as the ineradicable element of 
antagonism in human and in human/non-human affairs) and of politics 
(understood as the articulation or the enactment of social identities).Õ3  
Such multicultural and pluralist conflict is evident, for instance, in 
terrorist attacks, such as September 11th and the London bombings; 
pro-life and pro-choice clashes, such as the murder of an abortion 
doctor in Wichita in 2009 and the bombing of a pro-life school bus in 
2012; and incompatible values between religious groups and gay rights 
advocates, as demonstrated by the recent legalisation of same-sex 
marriage in the UK.   
 
The thesis is also contextualised by perspectives, such as the one 
called for in David CameronÕs 2011 speech on radicalisation and 
Islamic extremism, which seek to unite society through consensus on 
shared values.  Cameron argues that liberalism Ôsays to its citizens: this 
is what defines us as a society…[and] each of us in our own countries 
must be unambiguous and hard-nosed about this defence of liberty.Õ4 
This focus on consensus is paralleled within the academy through 
liberal universalism, such as John RawlsÕ original position; 5 
cosmopolitan democracy, Ôwhose aim is to achieve a world order based 
on the rule of law and democracy;Õ6 and deliberative democracy, which 
asserts that Ônot optimal compromise, but unanimous agreement is the 
                                                
2 Parekh, B. (2005). Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 3. 
3 Wenman, M. (2003). What is politics? The approach of radical pluralism. Politics 23(1): 57Ñ
65, p. 63.   
4 Cameron, D. (05 Feb. 2011).  "New Statesman." New Statesman. Web. 30 May 2014. 
5 Rawls, J. (1973). A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 120. 
6 Archibugi, D., Held, D. and Koehler, M. (1998). Re-Imagining Political Community: Studies 
in Cosmopolitan Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press, p.198. 
 11 
goal of politics on this view.Õ7  Thus, in politics, both within and outside 
of academia, there has been a tendency to attempt to mediate conflict 
through the formation of consensus.  Such consensuses sometimes 
attach claims to neutrality, rationality and universality to their shared 
principles, as is evident, for instance in John RawlsÕ A Theory of 
Justice.8  The original position and the veil of ignorance provide tools to 
reach the principles required for the governance of society in a neutral 
and universal manner.  In so doing, these hypothetical concepts render 
citizens unaware of which values are significant to their society, and 
their own position and status within that society.  Hence, it is assumed 
that the values chosen under such conditions are neutral.  It is also 
assumed that such values are rational: Rawls states that justice and 
liberty are principles, which all Ôfree and rational persons concerned to 
further their own interests would accept.Õ 9  Further, Rawls attaches 
universality to these values, stating that Ôwe can view the agreement in 
the original position from the standpoint of one person selected at 
random.Õ10  Similar universality is inherent in cosmopolitan democracy, 
which is, as David Held and Anthony McGrew assert, Ôessentially liberal 
global governance since it promotes and advances the project of a 
liberal world order in which global markets, the international rule of law, 
liberal democracy and human rights are taken as the universal 
standards of civilization.Õ11  Cosmopolitan democrats thereby also grant 
universal authority to liberal principles.  Additionally, deliberative 
democrats have tended to advocate a style of conflict mediation in 
which dialogue occurs in an ideal situation,12 mirroring the emphasis 
which liberal universalists and cosmopolitan democrats place on both 
the neutrality and rationality of consensus.  Jon Elster underlines this in 
the affirmation that, Ôall agree that [deliberative democracy] includes 
decision making by means of arguments offered by and to participants 
                                                
7 Elster, J. in Bohman, J. and Rehg, W. (1997). Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason 
and Politics. Massachusetts: MIT Press, p.12. 
8 It should, however, be noted that RawlsÕ thinking moves away from neutrality, universality 
and rationalism in Rawls, J. (1993). Political liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 
9 Rawls, J. (1973). A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 10. 
10 Ibid., p. 120. 
11 Held, D. and Mc Grew, A. (2007). Globalization/Anti-Globalization: Beyond The Great 
Divide. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 62. 
12 Habermas, J. (1984). The theory of communicative action. Boston: Beacon Press. 
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who are committed to the values of rationality and impartiality: this is the 
deliberative part.Õ 13   Bruce Ackerman echoes this in describing 
deliberative democracy as a Ôneutral dialogue.Õ14  It should be noted, 
though, that more recent accounts of deliberative democracy, such as 
those offered by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, as well as John 
Dryzek, have moved away from emphasis on rationalism and 
impartiality.  Such accounts will be discussed in the section, ÔThe 
Influence of Deliberative Democracy.Õ 
 
Alternative theories of conflict mediation abandon these emphases on 
creating unity through neutrality, universality, and rationalism, aspiring 
instead to render politics more inclusive by protecting minority groups 
and communities.  This group is comprised of communitarians and 
group rights theorists.  Communitarians, such as Michael Sandel and 
Charles Taylor, argue that Ôneutrality is impossible because try as we 
might we can never wholly escape the effects of our conditioning.Õ15  As 
a result of experiencing diverse histories of conditioning, citizens will 
subscribe to a diversity of principles, according to Sandel.  Thus, 
rejecting claims of liberal universalists, cosmopolitan democrats and 
deliberative democrats, Sandel Ð along with other communitarian 
thinkers - argues that values are Ônot universally shared,Õ16 and any 
notion of a shared consensus is Ôa reflection of one hegemonic 
culture...[which means that]...only the minority or suppressed cultures 
are being forced to take alien form.Õ17  Hence, in order to avoid such 
suppression, communitarians strive to protect communal interests.  
Group rights theorists share this critique of neutrality, universality, and 
rationalism, favouring enhanced diversity instead, and employing 
                                                
13 Elster, J. (1998). Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 8. 
14 Ackerman, B. 1981. Social Justice in the Liberal State. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 
21. 
15 Sandel, M. (1998). Liberalism and the limits of justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, p. 11. 
16 Ibid., p. 27. 
17 Taylor, C. (1994). ÔThe Politics of RecognitionÕ In Taylor, C and Gutmann, A. (1994). 
Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. Chichester: Princeton University Press, 
p. 43. 
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additional group rights as a response.18  Will Kymlicka, for instance, 
demonstrates how treating values as neutral, universal or rational, 
forces minority groups to assimilate to dominant linguistic religious and 
customary norms 19 since Ôthe maintenance of a Òcolour-blindÓ 
constitution is taken to be the paradigm case of equal treatment.Õ20 
Parekh explains the dangers of this, affirming that Ôequal rights do not 
mean identical rights for individuals with different cultural backgrounds 
and needs might require different rights to enjoy equality in respect of 
whatever happens to be the content of their rights.Õ21  Neutral treatment 
does not necessarily result in equality, according to group rights 
theorists.  Therefore, they abandon attempts at neutrality, universality, 
and rationality in favour of diverse treatment shaped by the actors 
involved. 
Unity vs. Diversity  
 
Agonistic democracy problematises both camps of conflict mediation: it 
challenges those who aspire to promote unity through neutrality, 
universality, or rationalism by claiming that such language is 
exclusionary to those who do not subscribe to dominant values.  
Equally, though, it diverges from those who strive toward enhanced 
inclusion through the promotion of minority rights without considering 
the unity of society as a whole.  Of the first group, Owen refutes the 
notion of state neutrality.  He asserts that Ôif such [reasonable 
comprehensive] doctrines happen to agree on a particular issue, then, 
in the face of social agreement, it is not clear that the state should be 
neutral.Õ22  Following this rejection of state neutrality, Connolly highlights 
the dangers of labelling values as neutral or universal, stating that, 
doing so renders such values Ôincontestable.Õ23  Diversity cannot be 
valued, then, when such rhetoric Ôtranslates some of the very 
                                                
18 It is important to note that communitarianism and group rights theory are not two separate 
fields, with many thinkers, such as Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka, overlapping across the 
two camps. 
19 Kymlicka, W. (1996). Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, p. 2. 
20 ---. (1989). Liberalism, Community and Culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 4. 
21 Parekh, B. (2005), p. 240. 
22 Owen, D. (1995). Nietzsche, politics and modernity. London: Sage Publications, p. 158. 
23 Connolly, W. (1995). The Ethos of Pluralization. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota, 
p. 123. 
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intrasubjective and intersubjective differences…into modes of otherness 
to be assimilated, punished, or liquidated.Õ24   Theories that employ 
neutrality and universality can thereby exclude or marginalise minority 
citizens, aggravating tensions rather than mediating conflict.  Mouffe 
observes an additional difficulty with such labels, asserting that it Ôcan 
only reinforce a tendency, already too much present in liberalism, to 
transform political problems into administrative and technical ones.Õ25  
Therefore, not only is neutrality potentially exclusionary, it can also 
remove substance from politics, leading to apathy.  Mouffe also 
challenges the usage of rationality, affirming that Ôwhat is at a given 
moment deemed ÒrationalÓ or ÒreasonableÓ in a community is what 
corresponds to the dominant language games and the Òcommon senseÓ 
that they construe.Õ26  Thus, rationality derives from power, rather than a 
neutral set of values.  As a consequence, those who do not subscribe to 
such rationality could be excluded or marginalised.  It is my contention, 
then, that the first group of theories seek to mediate conflict by uniting 
society through a neutral, rational, or universal consensus, but in so 
doing, they have the potential to exclude those who do not adhere to 
the dominant values.  Through this exclusion and marginalisation, these 
theories have a fragmentary effect on society and could increase, rather 
than mediate, the tensions and conflict inherent in multicultural Britain 
and the global realm.                
 
On the other hand, group rights and communitarian theorists 
acknowledge the exclusionary potential of attaching neutrality, 
rationality, and universality to dominant values at the detriment of 
minority groups in society.  Their alternative consists of placing greater 
emphasis on protecting and promoting the rights and desires of small 
groups and communities in society.  This has included, for example, 
additional language rights in schools in Quebec, and the exemption of 
the Sikh population in Britain from wearing crash helmets on 
motorbikes. However, in focusing on diversity, such alternatives are 
                                                
24 Ibid., p. 89. 
25 Mouffe, C. (1993). The return of the political. London: Verso, p. 48. 
26 Ibid., p. 143. 
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also perceived as problematic with respect to promoting unity within 
society.  Andrea Baumeister explores this, expressing concerns that Ôan 
emphasis upon radical diversity will give rise to a process of 
fragmentation which may...ultimately undermine the very notion of 
democratic citizenship.Õ27  Iris Marion Young shares this apprehension, 
warning that placing focus on minority groups and communities might 
fail to unite society as a whole.  She states that, since ÔÓany category 
can be considered an arbitrary unityÓ, such a strategy ultimately gives 
rise to an infinite regress which dissolves Òall groups into individualsÓ.Õ28  
As a result of the emphasis group rights and communitarian thinkers 
place on the rights of diverse sectors of society, rather than society as a 
whole, Baumeister affirms that there is an Ôabsence of shared norms 
and standards,Õ which renders Ôunderstanding and co-operation across 
group lines...likely to prove difficult.Õ29  Thus, in spite of their efforts at 
overcoming the exclusionary potential of the former camp of theories, 
group rights and communitarian thinkers could fail to encourage the 
unity and unity emphasised by the first camp.  As a result, the latter 
theories could further individualism and social fragmentation, failing to 
mediate conflict.   
An Agonistic Alternative 
 
Agonists on the other hand, do consider how to promote social unity.  
Owen, for instance, promotes an Ôagonistic community in which our 
common political identities are tied to a process of argumentation.Õ30  
Thus, on his account, commonality between citizens arises from 
engaging in a shared agonistic contest.  Tully supports the assumption 
that participation in a common quest can unite diverse, and potentially 
conflicting citizens: 
Participation in dialogues and negotiations over how and 
by whom power is exercised over us constitutes our 
identities as ÒcitizensÓ and generates bonds of solidarity 
                                                
27 Baumeister, A. (2000). Liberalism and the 'politics of difference'. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, p. 23. 
28 Young, I. in Ibid., p. 23. 
29 Ibid., p. 23. 
30 Owen, D. (1995), p. 157. 
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and a sense of belonging to the political association (the 
ÒpeopleÓ) that comes into being and is sustained by this 
(game-like) activity.31 
Similarly, Connolly rejects attempts at promoting unity through 
universality, neutrality, or rationality, instead promoting agonistic 
respect and critical responsiveness as behaviours that Ômultiply lines of 
connection through which governing assemblages can be constructed 
from a variety of intersecting constituencies.Õ32  For Mouffe, unity is also 
important, however, she promotes this through different means.  On her 
adversarial account, citizens share, not only engagement in a common 
contest, but also a commitment to liberal-democratic values. 33  
However, she distinguishes this from the first camp of theorists by 
rejecting the possibility of a universal, neutral, or rational consensus, 
emphasising the conflict that arises between citizens when interpreting 
and implementing these values.34  Agonist thinkers thereby consider 
how to promote social unity without emphasising neutrality, universality, 
and rationality.  Both groups, then, demonstrate weaknesses in 
mediating value conflict: the former, in exhibiting an exclusionary 
potential and the latter, in exhibiting a fragmentary potential.  However, 
the work of agonistic democrats seeks to consider how to bridge this 
gap by overcoming exclusionary consensuses, whilst also encouraging 
social unity. 
 
In aiming to overcome both exclusion and fragmentation in multicultural, 
pluralist society, Connolly and Tully aspire to render society more 
inclusive through the promotion of principles of agonistic respect and 
mutual recognition, enhancing behaviour toward less dominant groups 
in society.35  Mouffe perceives exclusion as unavoidable and seeks to 
                                                
31 Tally, J. (1999). The agonic freedom of citizens. Economy and Society 28(2): 161Ñ182, p. 
170. 
32 Connolly, W. (1995), p. Xx. 
33 Mouffe, C. (2000). The democratic paradox. London: Verso, p. 102. 
34 This distinction between Mouffe and the other agonists is of great significance for this 
project.   Subsequent chapters will return to this issue, evaluating it alongside the other 
approaches. 
35 Connolly, W. (2005). Pluralism. Durham: Duke University Press. p. 123 and Tully, J. 
(1995). Strange multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 23. 
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render it less oppressive by acknowledging that any consensus Ôis, by 
necessity, based on acts of exclusion and that there can never be a 
fully inclusive ÒrationalÓ consensus.Õ 36   OwenÕs usage of Ôenlarged 
mentality,Õ in which Ôtoleration is the condition of oneÕs own integrity,Õ37 
similarly resonates with Connolly and TullyÕs emphasis on overcoming 
exclusion.38  Additionally, agonistic thinkers seek to avoid fragmentation 
by considering how to create unity between conflicting citizens.  For 
instance, Connolly and Tully focus on the interrelated nature of society 
whereby citizensÕ identities are constituted by a diversity of others.  As a 
result, they promote unity by requiring citizens to critically work on their 
selves in response to others through principles such as critical 
responsiveness and audi alteram partem [always listen to the other 
side].39   For Mouffe, unity is encouraged by the employment of a 
common enemy since, Ôto construct a ÒweÓ it must be distinguished from 
the ÒthemÓ, and that means establishing a frontier, defining an 
ÒenemyÓ.Õ40  Owen also promotes unity by engaging citizens in the 
collective ranking of values in which Ôsocial co-operation [i]s predicated 
on a common quest rather than on common agreement.Õ41 Thus, by 
considering how to overcome exclusion and fragmentation, it is my 
contention that agonistic accounts of democracy can help us to address 
the weaknesses of each of the two camps. 
The Need for Further Institutional Consideration 
 
In spite of the gap which agonistic democracy fills as a theory of conflict 
mediation, I argue that its operationalisation requires further 
consideration.  This argument resonates with a series of critiques, such 
as Andreas KalyvasÕ contention that agonist thinkers provide a 
Ôpredominantly abstract and normatively inclined understanding of 
                                                
36 Mouffe, C. (2000), p. 141. 
37 Owen, D. (1995), p. 162. 
38 Although, whilst this may render society more inclusive, its primary aim is to enhance 
society by encouraging citizens to strive to surpass one anotherÕs values.  This is another 
significant distinction between the agonistic approaches, and will be considered throughout 
the following chapters. 
39 Connolly, W. (2000). Why I am not a secularist. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
p.62, and Tully, J. (2008b). Public philosophy in a new key. Volume 2. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 110. 
40 Mouffe, C. (1993). The return of the political. London: Verso, p. 69. 
41 Owen, D. (1995), p. 162. 
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political conflict that equates the radical impulse of democracy with 
permanent contestation and social inclusion.Õ 42   Similarly, David 
Howarth claims that Mouffe and ConnollyÕs theories both suffer from an 
Ôinstitutional deficit,Õ43 whilst Ed Wingenbach tells us that they offer only 
Ôfrustratingly shallowÕ alternatives.44  Monique Deveaux demonstrates 
that, whilst exploring how citizens ought to interact, agonists do not 
suggest how to encourage such interactions to arise:  
The vision of Ôan intercultural engagement of agonistic 
respect and critical responsiveness between contending 
identities linked together by multiple bonds of interest, 
interdependence and memoryÕ says nothing about what 
agonistic institutions could help to inculcate and sustain 
such respect.45  
 
Yet, although several commentators have noted the lack of empirical 
consideration within the agonist field, attempts to address this have 
been limited and partial.  Referring to ConnollyÕs work, Owen offers 
some suggestions as to which institutions might supplement ConnollyÕs 
ethos.  These include mechanisms, such as PR voting, citizensÕ 
assemblies, and participatory budgeting.  However, by his own 
admission, this is limited to a  ÔsketchyÕ account, which demonstrates 
the need for further Ôspecification of some criteria for reflecting on, and 
intervening in, political practice from issues of local activism to policy 
orientation to institutional design.Õ 46   Further, WingenbachÕs recent 
book, Institutionalizing Agonistic Democracy: Post-Foundationalism and 
Political Liberalism, provides us with an effective critique, which 
highlights the underdeveloped nature of agonistic institutions, however 
                                                
42 Kalyvas, A. ÔThe Democratic Narcissus: The Agonism of the Ancients Compared to that of 
the (Post)ModernsÕ in Schaap, A. (2009). Law and agonistic politics. Aldershot: Ashgate, p. 
17. 
43 Howarth, D. (2008). Ethos, agonism and populism: William Connolly and the case for 
radical democracy. The British Journal of Politics & International Relations 10(2): 171Ñ193, p. 
189. 
44 Wingenbach, E. (2011). Institutionalizing agonistic democracy: Post-Foundationalism and 
Political Liberalism. Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, p. 85. 
45 Deveaux, M. (1999). Agonism and pluralism. Philosophy & social criticism 25(4): 1Ñ22, p. 
14. 
46 Owen, D. (1995), p. 224. 
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it does not offer ways in which agonistic concepts might be 
operationalised.   
 
Rather, as Martin Nonhoff asserts, Wingenbach does the opposite, 
since Ôit becomes clear in the course of the book that maybe a theory of 
institutions can never be the most convincing aspect of agonistic 
theories of democracy.Õ47  This is a significant observation, which will be 
considered in greater detail in Chapter Three, and will require continual 
reflection throughout the thesis.  As Wingenbach explains, Ôagonistic 
democracy does emerge from a tradition emphasizing resistance and 
disruption.Õ48  Chapter One elucidates this through discussion of the 
agonistic emphasis on contingency, which requires an account of 
democracy enabling change and unpredictability.  Additionally, agonistic 
democrats share a Ôprincipled desire to leave more up to politics in the 
sense that citizens should be free to contest the terms of public life and 
the conditions of their political association.Õ 49   Yet, Ôto propose 
institutions is to impose limits on contestation of some sort.Õ50  Thus, 
agonistic notions of contingency and contestation appear to be in 
tension with institutions and their constraints, leading many agonists to 
resist attempts at further institutional consideration.  One such example 
is WenmanÕs account of Ômilitant cosmopolitanism,Õ which criticises 
agonistic democrats for working within liberal democratic traditions and 
practices, calling instead for Ômore radical moments of innovationÕ to 
overcome domination.51   
 
However, this thesis argues that certain types of institution are not 
necessarily incompatible with the promotion of agonistic principles.  As 
Chapter Three explores, there are evident parallels between agonistic 
notions of contingency and contestation on the one hand, and the new 
                                                
47 Nonhoff, M. (2013) Institutionalizing agonistic democracy: Post-Foundationalism and 
Political Liberalism by Ed Wingenbach. Critical Policy Studies Review 6(4): 480-482, p. 480.   
48 Wingenbach, E. (2011), p. 80. 
49 Schaap, A (2006), Agonism in divided societies, Philosophy & Social Criticism 32(2): 255-
277, p. 257. 
50 Wingenbach, E. (2011), p. 80. 
51 Wenman, M. (2014). Agonistic Democracy: Constituent power in the era of globalisation. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 92.  
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institutionalist focus on more informal and fluid practices on the other.  
For instance, Michel FoucaultÕs assertion that, Õwithout the possibility of 
recalcitrance, power would be equivalent to a physical determinationÕ52 
demonstrates the way in which relations of power require acts of 
freedom.  This resonates with Vivien Lowndes and Mark RobertsÕ claim 
that, citizens are not only Ôrule takers,Õ they are also Ôcreative agents 
who interpret rules, assign cases to rules, and adapt or even resist 
rules.Õ 53   Hence, I suggest that, in addition to constraining actors, 
institutions can also empower them.  To protect and promote agonistic 
notions of contestation and contingency, then, I promote institutions, 
which enhance the autonomy of citizens, empowering them as a result.  
This entails involving citizens in institutional decisions, such as those 
surrounding content, timing, guidelines, mediation, and decision-making 
practices. 
 
In addition to arguing that certain institutions are compatible with 
agonistic theory, the thesis also affirms that such consideration of 
institutions could offer significant benefits to the field.  First, deeper 
consideration of agonistic institutions could enhance the extent to which 
alternative democratic theorists engage with agonistic theory.  Thomas 
Fossen supports this, affirming that institutional development is 
essential to allowing agonistic democracy to be perceived, not just as 
an effective critique, but also as a distinct alternative: 
The agonistic critique of liberal and deliberative views of 
politics is by now familiar.  To distinguish itself as a mature 
current of its own, rather than a footnote to liberal and 
deliberative accounts of politics, agonism needs to engage 
questions of law and institutions more thoroughly.54 
Furthermore, I contend that further institutional consideration could 
enhance the theoretical discussion of agonistic concepts.  As Chapter 
                                                
52 Foucault, M. (2003). Society must be defended. London: Penguin, p. 221. 
53 Lowndes, V. and Roberts, M. (2013). Why Institutions Matter: The new institutionalism in 
political science. London: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 104-105. 
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Three explains, further thought about complementary institutions might 
also encourage agonistic democrats to address issues raised by critics, 
such as how to motivate people to engage in agonistic practices, how to 
widen access to agonistic contestation, and how to encourage 
behaviours such as agonistic respect.  For example, by considering the 
implementation of deliberative democracy, Bruce Ackerman and James 
Fishkin are able to address questions about how to motivate citizens 
who are unwilling or unable to engage through monetary incentives.55  
Thus, further empirical consideration can provide additional insights into 
theoretical concepts and their critics. 
The Influence of Deliberative Democracy 
 
In considering how to operationalise agonistic concepts, my thesis has 
been influenced by the recent work of deliberative democrats, who have 
made considerable advances in operationalising deliberative concepts.  
The most significant of these for my research is Ackerman and FishkinÕs 
Deliberation Day. 56   Drawing on a series of deliberative polling 
experiments that seek to enhance participantsÕ knowledge of political 
issues, Ackerman and Fishkin propose a national holiday whereby 
citizens participate in deliberative democratic discussions, suggesting 
ways in which deliberative democratic theory could be 
operationalised.57  The significance of this work for my project derives 
from its focus on providing a practical model that brings deliberative 
concepts to life.  My research is thereby shaped by the transformation 
of theoretical concepts into practical mechanisms that propose 
discussion frameworks.  However, as the concluding chapter will 
discuss, there are two fundamental differences between the two 
projects, which reflect the differences between deliberative and 
agonistic accounts of democracy.  The first entails the aspirations of the 
two projects: whereas Deliberation Day primarily aims to educate the 
electorate,58 the overarching goal of my Ôagonistic dayÕ is to mediate 
                                                
55 Ackerman, B. and Fishkin, J. (2004). Deliberation Day. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
p. 4. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., p. 167. 
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conflict between diverse citizens.  The second refers to the context in 
which deliberative and agonistic behaviours exist.  Whereas Ackerman 
and Fishkin focus their efforts on promoting deliberative behaviours 
during Deliberation Day, I also consider additional ways in which 
agonistic behaviours and practices might be encouraged to supplement 
the Ôagonistic day.Õ  Whilst it is by no means identical, then, I draw on 
deliberative research in order to address FossenÕs concern that Ôto 
distinguish itself as a mature current of its own, rather than a footnote to 
liberal and deliberative accounts of politics, agonism needs to engage 
questions of law and institutions more thoroughly.Õ59   
 
Considering the extent to which deliberative projects have influenced 
this thesis, and given the parallels between Deliberation Day and the 
Ôagonistic dayÕ proposed in the conclusion, it is important to explain why 
this thesis is rooted in agonistic literature, rather than deliberative 
theory.  Let us first consider theorists, such as Jrgen Habermas, 
whose understandings of deliberative democracy place emphasis on 
both rationality and consensus.  As Elster asserts, Ôaccording to the 
theory of Jrgen Habermas, the goal of politics should be rational 
agreement rather than compromise, and the decisive political act is that 
of engaging in public debate with a view to the emergence of 
consensus.Õ60  This account of deliberative democracy is reflected by 
Joshua CohenÕs affirmation that Ôideal deliberation aims to arrive at a 
rationally motivated consensus.Õ 61   These deliberative democrats 
diverge from agonistic democrats through their focus on rationality and 
consensus.  As already mentioned (and as will de demonstrated in 
Chapter One), agonistic democrats have moved away from the concept 
of rationality.  Mouffe, for instance, claims that exclusion is inevitable in 
politics and therefore Ôit is very important to recognize those forms of 
exclusion for what they are and the violence that they signify, instead of 
                                                
59 Fossen, T. (2012), p. 331. 
60 Elster, J, ÔThe Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political TheoryÕ in Bohman, J. and 
Rehg, W. (1997). Deliberative democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics. Cambridge: MIT 
Press, p. 3. 
61 Cohen, J, ÔDeliberation and Democratic LegitimacyÕ in Ibid., p. 75. 
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concealing them under the veil of rationality.Õ62  Thus, in abandoning 
labels of Ôrationality,Õ agonists such as Mouffe, aim to expose political 
exclusions.  Linking to agonistic emphasis on contingency, unearthing 
exclusion can enable dominant norms and values to be challenged.  
The post-structuralist assumptions of this project Ð and its 
preoccupation with challenging power relations63 - reflect the agonistic 
emphasis on challenge and critique more than the tendency of some 
deliberative democrats to focus on rationality.  Additionally, in striving 
for consensus, deliberative democrats, such as Habermas and Cohen, 
differ from agonistic democrats.  Mouffe problematises the notion of 
consensus, asserting that Ôthere can never be a fully inclusive ÒrationalÓ 
consensus.Õ64  For her, conflict is omnipresent and, as a result, every 
consensus necessitates some form of exclusion.  This is echoed in the 
work of thinkers, such as Hannah Arendt, Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
Foucault, who, as Tully demonstrates, argue that Ôno agreement will be 
closed at a frontier; it will always be open to question, to an element of 
non-consensus, and so to reciprocal question and answer, demand and 
response, and negotiation.Õ65  Once again, then, agonistic emphasis on 
contingency, and the subsequent understanding of agreement as a 
partial and on-going process, separates agonists from certain types of 
deliberative democrats.  It also resonates with the post-structuralist 
assumptions underpinning this research by providing opportunities for 
minority citizens to play a larger part in the decision-making process.   
 
Yet, in spite of the evident differences between agonistic democrats and 
those deliberative democrats who focus on rationality and consensus, it 
is important to remember that there is no uncontested definition of 
deliberative democracy.  As Steven Macedo states, Ôthe phrase 
Òdeliberative democracyÓ does not signify a creed with a simple set of 
core claims.  Those who seek to advance the cause of democratic 
deliberation do not altogether agree about what the democratic ideal is 
                                                
62 Mouffe, C. (1993), p. 145. 
63 See the discussion on ÔThe Contingent Nature of PoliticsÕ in Chapter One. 
64 Mouffe, C. (1993), p. 141. 
65 Tully, J. (2008a). Public philosophy in a new key. Volume 1. Cambridge: Cambridge 
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or how it should be fostered.Õ66  Rather, I suggest that both deliberative 
and agonistic positions exist somewhere along a spectrum: whilst the 
promotion of rationality and consensus represents one end, agonistic 
emphasis on contingency represents the other, with a range of positions 
in between.  Gutmann and Thompson, for instance, provide a significant 
example of deliberative democrats who have moved away from 
rationality and consensus.  They challenge the notion of rationality, 
demonstrating that it cannot always guide citizens to a decision, since 
sometimes Ôthe best moral understanding that citizens can muster does 
not show them which position should be rejected from a deliberative 
perspective.Õ67   In asserting that rationality may not always enable 
decisions to be made, Gutmann and ThompsonÕs deliberative account 
resonates with the agonist abandonment of rationality.  Further, they 
reject the prioritisation of reaching a consensus, focusing instead on 
encouraging citizens to Ôrecognize that a position is worthy of moral 
respect even when they think it is morally wrong.Õ68  This concept, 
Ôeconomy of moral disagreement,Õ resonates with ConnollyÕs promotion 
of contestability in requiring citizens to Ôtry to accommodate the moral 
convictions of their opponents to the greatest extent possible, without 
compromising their own moral convictions.Õ 69   Additionally, just as 
Connolly claims that his agonistic respect Ôdiffers from its sibling, liberal 
tolerance, in affirming a more ambiguous relation of interdependence 
and strife between identities over a passing letting the other be,Õ70 
Gutmann and Thompson assert that their notion of mutual respect 
Ôdemands more than toleration.  It requires a favourable attitude toward, 
and constructive interaction with, the persons with whom one 
disagrees.Õ71  Hence, Gutmann and ThompsonÕs deliberative account 
shares the agonistic prioritisation of positive relations between citizens.  
Rather than emphasising the need to achieve consensus, Gutmann and 
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Thompson highlight the importance of reaching an understanding that 
all citizens can respect, even though they may disagree with it.  This 
resonates with agonistic emphasis on necessary interdependency, in 
which one purpose of engagement with others is to enhance 
relationships.72  As Gutmann and Thompson assert, Ôdeliberation is not 
only a means to an end, but also a means for deciding what means are 
morally required to pursue our common ends.Õ73  Hence, the focus is on 
the process of deliberation, rather than the outcome it produces.  This is 
similar to OwenÕs account of agonism, which claims that Ôour capacity to 
cultivate nobility is tied to our public culture.Õ74  Hence, in challenging 
rationality and consensus, and emphasising relations of respect, some 
versions of deliberative democracy, such as that advocated by 
Gutmann and Thompson, appear to be close to agonistic democracy, 
and reflect the assumptions behind this project. 
Situating my Research within Agonistic Democracy 
 
In spite of the parallels between agonistic democracy and deliberative 
democracy, I argue that this thesis is best situated within the agonist 
field.  The overarching reason for this is the emphasis agonists place on 
political contestation (which is explored in Chapter One).  As Steven 
Griggs et al. affirm in Practices of Freedom: Decentred Governance, 
Conflict and Democratic Participation, Ôwhile deliberative theories are 
interested in elaborating the norms that ought to govern such practices, 
agonistic democrats think about the historical conditions of possibility Ð 
to use a term from Foucault Ð of contestation, as a vital element of 
practices of democratic governance.Õ75  As Chapter One and Chapter 
Two demonstrate, political contestation holds a different significance for 
each agonistic approach, but is important to each. For Owen, political 
contestation is important in promoting competition between citizens, 
which subsequently strives to enhance societal virtues.  For Mouffe, 
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political contestation revives citizensÕ passions by provoking them to 
defend their interpretation and application of values against one 
another.  For Connolly and Tully, political contestation is important in 
enhancing inclusivity since it encourages citizens to respectfully contest 
the beliefs of others.  Political contestation is essential to this project 
because, in order to consider how democratic theory might be 
operationalised into practical mechanisms or supplementary institutions, 
one central question is how to encourage citizens to engage in 
democratic discussions.  Political contestation, implemented either 
through competition, provocation, or inclusivity, is important in exploring 
how to enable access and motivate engagement.  Aletta Norval 
highlights the importance of post-structuralist literature to this question 
of access, stating that one fundamental criticism of deliberative 
democracy is its tendency to Ôignor[e] the impact of material inequalities 
on the ability of participants to partake as equals in dialogue.Õ76  Thus, 
situating my work within the field of agonistic democracy enables me to 
supplement my consideration of institutions with thoughts about who 
might be included and excluded, and how to challenge such power 
relations and inequalities.  Yet, in spite of my focus on agonistic 
democracy, deliberative democrats have had a significant impact on the 
thesis and it is important to note the invaluable contribution of their 
Ôimaginative attempts to think through, in practice, what an emphasis on 
deliberation might imply for democratic institutions and norms.Õ 77  
Certain deliberative democrats, such as Gutmann and Thompson, have 
moved towards agonistic accounts of democracy and away from 
rationality and consensus, through placing greater emphasis on 
enhancing the relations between citizens.  However, focus on political 
contestation renders agonistic democracy the most appropriate source 
of literature for the consideration of how democratic theory might 
mediate conflict through practices.           
                                                
76 Norval, A., ÔBeyond deliberation: agonistic and aversive grammars of democracy: the 
question of criteriaÕ in Griggs, S., Norval, A. and Wagenaar, H. (2014), p. 67.  
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Research Questions 
 
This thesis asks whether, and how, theoretical concepts from agonistic 
democracy might be operationalised to help mediate democratic conflict 
in multicultural, pluralist societies.  In considering this question, it 
discusses the following six interrelated themes.  Firstly, it returns to the 
theoretical roots of agonistic democracy, identifying three core themes 
that resonate throughout the field.  It then outlines three distinct 
approaches to agonistic democracy, demonstrating that, in spite of their 
convergence on three core themes, different agonists use these to 
focus on different goals.  Subsequently, the thesis brings the 
approaches back together, suggesting that each approach lacks 
sufficient consideration of how theoretical concepts could be 
transformed into practical mechanisms.  Through a combination of 
empirical and theoretical research, it then considers ways in which 
agonistic concepts might be operationalised to mediate conflict.  In so 
doing, it evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of each approach by 
combining theoretical evaluation with insights from the empirical work.  
Finally, the thesis offers a synthesis of the three approaches, providing 
some ideas about what an Ôagonistic dayÕ might look like. 
Approach 
 
In exploring how agonistic democracy could be operationalised, my 
thesis comprises two parts.  Part One includes Chapters One to 
Chapter Three and entails the theoretical underpinnings of the 
research, whilst Part Two, from Chapter Four to Chapter Seven, 
focuses on the operationalisation of agonistic concepts and their 
subsequent analysis.   
 
The purpose of Chapter One is to return to the theoretical roots of 
agonistic democracy in order to outline the themes that unify agonistic 
thinkers.  I explore this through discussion of the work of Arendt, 
Foucault, Carl Schmitt and Friedrich Nietzsche.  In so doing, I illuminate 
three themes which both resonate throughout the work of these thinkers 
 28 
and influence the work of contemporary agonists: political contestation, 
contingency, and necessary interdependency.  The chapter suggests 
that these three themes encompass agonistic democracy, and are 
referred back to in the later analytical chapters. 
 
Chapter Two demonstrates how these three themes are implemented in 
different ways by contemporary agonists, demarcating three 
approaches to agonistic democracy: the Ôperfectionist,Õ as embodied by 
Owen, the Ôadversarial,Õ as represented by Mouffe, and the ÔinclusiveÕ as 
depicted by Connolly and Tully.  Whilst this list of thinkers by no means 
provides an exhaustive account of agonistic democracy, they constitute 
the focal point of my thesis for two reasons.  First, their work is situated 
within democratic politics, rendering them particularly useful for 
consideration of how agonistic concepts might be operationalised.  
Second, they have each had significant impact on the field of agonistic 
democracy and the work of secondary agonistic democrats, enabling 
them to each offer various influential accounts of agonistic democracy. 
 
The labels of these three approaches derive from the most prominent 
feature of their respective accounts.  The term ÔperfectionistÕ is 
borrowed from FossenÕs discussion of OwenÕs work in which he defines 
perfectionism as a concern for improvement and the ends of politics: 
Perfectionism here signifies a commitment to the 
cultivation and continuous improvement of citizensÕ virtues 
and capacities. Perfectionist agonism constitutes a more 
fundamental challenge to liberalism because it provides a 
competing account of the ends of politics, suggesting that it 
constitutes an external rather than internal challenge to 
liberal theory from a normative standpoint.78  
On MouffeÕs account, the role of the adversary is Ôthe central category 
of democratic politics,Õ since it restores passion to politics by creating 
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collective identities constituted in opposition to one another.79  Finally, 
whilst Connolly and Tully propose separate accounts of politics, they 
are both categorised as ÔinclusiveÕ because of their emphasis on 
creating a political ethos in which moral principles promote better 
interactions between conflicting citizens.80   
 
Having considered the core theory behind agonistic democracy and the 
different approaches to which these have led, Chapter Three then 
explores institutional consideration within the field.  Combining 
discussions of agonistic concepts and new institutionalist literature, it 
evaluates the extent to which agonistic institutions have already been 
developed.  It subsequently affirms the need for further thought whilst 
considering potential tensions between agonistic democracy and 
institutions.  Finally, the chapter contends that certain types of institution 
are not necessarily at odds with agonistic assumptions. 
  
Once the first part of the thesis has outlined the theoretical components 
of agonistic democracy and the need for further institutional 
consideration, Part Two discusses the empirical element of my 
research, followed by theoretical and empirical evaluations.  Chapter 
Four introduces the empirical component of the research, covering both 
methodology and methods.  After providing a brief overview of the 
empirical work, it explains why quasi-experimental methodology was 
employed, demonstrating how my empirical work differs from classical 
experimental research in order to complement the post-structuralist 
assumptions underpinning the thesis.  It explains and justifies the 
methods used in the participant recruitment and data collection 
processes.  It frequently reflects on the limitations of the empirical 
research and the extent to which these were overcome.   
 
Chapter Five details how theoretical concepts were operationalised into 
an experiment.  It discusses how each theoretical approach 
                                                
79 Mouffe C. (2013). Agonistics: Thinking the world politically. London: Verso, p. 7. 
80 See Tully, J. (1995) and Connolly, W. (1995). 
For a justification of including both Connolly and Tully in ÔinclusiveÕ agonism, see Chapter Two. 
 30 
(perfectionist, adversarial and inclusive), was represented by a different 
discussion framework during the experiment.  It then outlines the 
representation of agonistic concepts in participant questionnaires and 
observer sheets. 
 
The subsequent three chapters comprise the analytical part of the 
thesis by combining discussion of the relevant theoretical literature with 
insights gained from the experiment.  Chapter Six commences the first 
section of the analysis through reflection of OwenÕs perfectionist 
agonistic democracy.  The chapter discusses the potential for this 
agonistic approach to both enhance the autonomy of citizens and 
promote unity within democracy, whilst also expressing concerns that it 
may be less successful in preventing apathy or including a wide 
diversity of citizens. 
 
Chapter Seven focuses on MouffeÕs adversarial agonistic democracy.  It 
observes that adversarialism generally seems to be effective in 
motivating conflicting citizens into participation with one another and 
can be helpful in creating unity between ÔfriendÕ groups.  However, it 
contends that further thought might be necessary as to how to motivate 
less dominant citizens to remain engaged; account for diversity and 
contingency; and enhance interactions and encourage unity between 
adversaries.   
 
Chapter Eight addresses the inclusive approach of Connolly and Tully.  
It argues that their inclusive accounts offer important suggestions about 
how to improve interactions between conflicting citizens, and how to 
empower citizens to challenge domination.  Yet, it also calls for more 
discussion about how to account for antagonistic relations, overcome 
ressentiment, enable self-modification and change, and promote 
contestability without suppressing agonistic expression.  
 
The concluding chapter combines summaries of the analysis with 
insights from deliberative projects to outline my proposed Ôagonistic 
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day.Õ  In proposing this model, the thesis promotes a synthesis of the 
three approaches.  I argue that each approach has unique strengths 
and weaknesses and that these are reconcilable, demonstrating the 
importance of each to fulfilling the core aims of agonistic democracy. 
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Chapter One: The Theoretical Roots of Agonistic 
Democracy 
 
Post-structuralist thought, in particular the field of agonistic democracy, 
has been highly influenced by the work of several thinkers.  This 
chapter explores how the thought of Nietzsche, Foucault, Arendt and 
Schmitt has impacted upon the theory of agonistic democracy. Whilst 
these thinkers do not encapsulate all of those who have contributed to 
agonist thought, they resonate with my project as a result of their 
influence on the contemporary agonistic democratic thought of Owen, 
Mouffe, Connolly and Tully.  I suggest that three principal themes 
resonate throughout the work of the thinkers: the political contestation 
of conflicting values, the contingent nature of politics and the necessary 
interdependency of citizens.  I discuss the ways in which the thinkers 
converge and diverge on these themes, as well as demonstrating how 
these concepts are used in contemporary agonist literature and how 
they resonate with new institutionalist literature.  Finally, I will 
demonstrate how the most significant of these differences emanates 
from SchmittÕs work, which, in spite of endorsing these three themes, 
provides a very distinct account of society, which often sits less 
comfortably alongside the other thinkers.  This is echoed in MouffeÕs 
thought, which, as Chapter Two demonstrates, provides a very distinct 
account of agonistic democracy.   
The political contestation of conflicting values 
 
The notion of political contestation is evident throughout the work of the 
four thinkers.  The call for a revival of the ÔpoliticalÕ within the political 
realm is highlighted by Schmitt and FoucaultÕs emphasis on the 
necessity of merging the realms of politics and society, and blurring the 
boundaries between philosophy and politics.  Through the promotion of 
more situated, citizen-centred accounts of politics, the thinkers argue for 
a revival of politics and for individuals to become citizens rather than 
subjects.  For many thinkers (however, not for Schmitt), this is 
supplemented by emphasis on contestation as a public practice.  
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Contestation is perceived as a tool to render politics meaningful, 
prevent hegemony, expose domination, enhance individual autonomy 
and better society. 
The revival of the political 
 
Politics as a political practice constitutes the first component of political 
contestation, the first of three themes which unite thinkers associated 
with agonistic democracy.  For Schmitt and Foucault, emphasis on the 
political derives from their critiques of the liberal public/private 
separation which they deem largely confines conflict to the private 
sphere in an attempt to mediate diversity.  Arguing against this, Schmitt 
states that democracy ought to abandon Ôthe nineteenth-century 
antitheses and divisions pertaining to the state-society (= political 
against social) contrast.Õ 81   He explains that such a dichotomy is 
unattainable since liberalism Ôlike any other significant human 
movement… has failed to elude the political.Õ82  This notion is echoed 
by MouffeÕs agonism, which draws heavily on SchmittÕs philosophy: 
As current controversies about abortion clearly show, 
pluralism does not mean that all those conflicting 
conceptions of the good will coexist peacefully without 
trying to intervene in the public sphere, and the frontier 
between public and private is not given once and for all but 
constructed and constantly shifting.83   
Following this challenge to the divide between the political and the 
social, Schmitt argues against resolving conflict by consulting universal 
or rational norms on the one hand, or by turning to allegedly neutral 
arbiters, on the other.  Instead, he promotes a situated account of 
politics in which citizens themselves make decisions about values, 
thereby reviving the ÔpoliticalÕ element of politics: 
[Conflicts] can neither be decided by a previously 
determined general norm nor by the judgment of a 
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disinterested and therefore neutral third party.  Only the 
actual participants can correctly recognize, understand, 
and judge the concrete situation and settle the extreme 
case of conflict.84 
 
Foucault similarly rejects the separation between politics and 
society, however for him, this derives from an understanding of 
power in which Ôrelations of power, and hence the analysis that must 
be made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of the 
state.Õ85  He demonstrates that politics is inseparable from society 
since state power is entangled in power struggles inherent in Ôthe 
body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology, and so 
forth.Õ86  Thus, according to him, state power can only operate when 
it is Ôrooted in a whole series of multiple and indefinite power 
relations that supply the necessary basis for the great negative 
forms of power.Õ87  Drawing on FoucaultÕs work, Connolly affirms this 
in the claim that Ôthe expansion of diversity in one domain ventilates 
life in others as well.Õ88  Hence, both Schmitt and Foucault refute the 
strict separation between state and society, thereby promoting more 
situated, citizen-centred accounts of politics, which seek to restore 
the political element to politics.  Politics is necessarily political in the 
sense that it does not, and cannot, exist only in government 
institutions isolated from the everyday lives of citizens.  According to 
Foucault and Schmitt, these two spheres overlap, thus rendering 
politics a political practice.   
 
Different thinkers endorse the notion of politics as a political practice 
for a variety of reasons.  For Schmitt, for instance, the primary 
purpose of renegotiating the public/private divide is to overcome 
liberal depoliticisation and revive the meaning of political values.  He 
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claims that separating the two involves Ôsubjugating state and 
politics, partially into an individualistic domain of private law and 
morality, partially into economic notions.Õ89  As a result of attempts to 
divide politics into various arenas, Schmitt argues that it become 
meaningless and void of substance.90  Influenced by SchmittÕs work, 
Mouffe echoes this concern, stating that Ôit is indeed the political 
which is at stake here, and the possibility of its elimination.Õ91  Thus, 
for Schmitt, as for Mouffe, challenging the boundaries between the 
political and the social is not only inevitable, but also desirable since 
it helps to restore meaning and substance to politics. 
 
This emphasis on renegotiating the dichotomy between state and 
society resonates with new institutionalist critiques of traditional 
institutionalism, whereby, as Lowndes asserts, Ôthe focus was upon 
formal rules and organizations rather than informal conventions; and 
upon official structures of government rather than broader 
institutional constraints on governance (outside as well as within the 
state).Õ 92   This echoes SchmittÕs critique of liberal politics as 
performing a predominantly administrative function, and his 
subsequent promotion of a more political account.   
 
For Arendt, the emphasis on politics as a political activity in which 
citizens engage with one another is significant to her understanding 
of identity.  She states that, Ôthe public-political realm...[is 
where]...men attain their full humanity, their full reality as men, not 
only because they are (as in the privacy of the household) but also 
because they appear.Õ93  For her, oneÕs citizenship is dependent on 
engagement with others, thus her account of the political is also 
necessarily public.  Contemporary agonist, Tully, echoes this, 
explaining that Ôwhen these activities are unavailable or arbitrarily 
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restricted, the members of a political association remain ÒsubjectsÓ 
rather than ÒcitizensÓ because power is exercised over them without 
their say, non-democratically.Õ94   
 
Nietzsche also promotes the public realm in HomerÕs Contest where 
he demonstrates how Ancient Greek competition enhanced peopleÕs 
capacities.95  However, when discussing the ÔpublicÕ component of 
NietzscheÕs account, it is important to note that this is limited.  For 
instance, he prioritises the Overman (a non-conformist, who 
challenges norms and values and realises himself), over the herd 
(who unquestioningly follow their community).96  Unlike Foucault and 
Arendt, then, who promote an inclusive account of public politics, 
NietzscheÕs public sphere is restricted to particular individuals.  In 
spite of this, Owen is influenced by NietzscheÕs work, but adapts it 
for contemporary society, asserting that Ôcitizens strive to develop 
their capacities for self-rule in competition with one another.Õ 97  
Hence, drawing on NietzscheÕs valorisation of Ancient Greek 
competition, Owen promotes a public sphere of politics in which one 
betters oneself by striving to surpass other members of oneÕs 
community.  Thus, for Arendt and Tully, as for Nietzsche and Owen, 
citizens enhance their capabilities by engaging in a political 
contestation of values.  Yet, for Nietzsche, this public sphere 
constitutes a narrower definition, which prioritises those who are 
able to challenge current norms and values.  Schmitt, on the other 
hand, advocates public contest because of its ability to revive the 
political nature of politics. 
 
It is important to note, here, that whilst both Arendt and Schmitt 
evidently echo Foucault and NietzscheÕs calls for political accounts 
of politics, they do so in a different manner.  Whereas the latter 
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thinkers understand politics as interlinked with power relations, and 
therefore omnipresent, for Arendt, politics is a rare moment that 
Ôbursts into the context of predictable processes as something 
unexpected, unpredictable, and ultimately causally inexplicable Ð 
just like a miracle.Õ98  Her account of politics involves action, which 
she prioritises over the spheres of labour and work.99   
 
Schmitt, too, prioritises the political realm with an Ôardent emphasis 
on the political element of constitutional democracy.Õ100  Whilst it has 
previously been mentioned that SchmittÕs work resonates with 
FoucaultÕs in Ôentail[ing] this dissolution and blurring of the 
connections between order, state and politics,Õ101 this leads Schmitt 
to a very different conclusion about the nature of political contest.  
As Mouffe explains, this blurring of boundaries means that Ôevery 
concrete order can be transformed into a political conflict, and hence 
reduced to its very basis.Õ102  As a result, Schmitt demonstrates the 
overlap between the political and social realms in order to prioritise 
political conflict over social.  This is mirrored in MouffeÕs work in 
which she claims that Ôwhen there is a lack of democratic political 
struggles with which to identify, their place is taken by other forms of 
identification, of ethnic, nationalist or religious nature.Õ103 
Contestation 
 
The second element of political contestation of conflicting values is 
that of promoting politics as a contestation between citizens.  
However, the thinkers employ it in a variety of ways in order to 
achieve a diversity of ends.  For Schmitt, contestation involves 
intrastate conflict, which threatens the existence of each side, 
thereby rendering conflict meaningful.  For Nietzsche, contestation 
provides a means to challenging hegemonic values and allowing 
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new ones to emerge.  Foucault, too, perceives contestation as a tool 
to challenging hegemony, and demonstrates this through the 
continual oscillation between power and freedom, which prevents 
domination.  For Arendt, as for Nietzsche, contestation can also 
enhance the autonomy of citizens.  
 
Once again, SchmittÕs notion of contestation Ð and subsequently 
MouffeÕs - differs from the others here, focusing on the possibility of 
conflict between states.  He argues that Ôwhat always matters is only the 
possibility of conflict,Õ104 advocating the idea that it is the Ôvery possibility 
of war which creates a specifically ÔpoliticalÕ behaviour.105  Claiming that 
politics is dependent on such potential for conflict, he asserts that Ôa 
world in which the possibility of war is utterly eliminated, a completely 
pacified globe, would be a world without the distinction of friend and 
enemy and hence a world without politics.Õ 106   Drawing on this 
assumption in evaluating contemporary politics, Mouffe argues that Ôthe 
blurring of the frontiers between left and right, far from being an 
advance in a democratic direction, is jeopardizing the future of 
democracy.Õ107  For Schmitt, as for Mouffe, the constant potential for 
conflict poses Ôan existential threat to oneÕs own way of life.Õ108  As a 
result of this threat, meaning is assigned to oneÕs way of life, provoking 
citizens to defend it, and reviving politics as a consequence.  Thus, for 
Schmitt, perpetual contestation and the potential for conflict is the very 
essence of the political as it renders it meaningful.  
 
Focusing primarily on interactions between individuals, as opposed to 
the state-centred account of Schmitt, Nietzsche highlights the potential 
for conflict to render political values meaningful.  This is highlighted by 
Frank Cameron and Don Dombowksy, who describe the way in which 
Nietzsche initially perceives the Franco-Prussian war, as not entirely 
negative, but rather Ôin agonistic terms as a contest between French 
                                                
104 Schmitt, C. (2008), p. 39. 
105 Ibid, p. 35. 
106 Ibid, p. 35. 
107 Mouffe, C. (2000), p. 7. 
108 Schmitt, C. (2008), p. 49. 
 39 
and German culture.Õ109  Connolly infers that Nietzsche would view the 
conflict of modern warfare in the same ambiguous terms since Ôwar 
fosters great destruction, but it enables people to come to terms with 
what is important to them.Õ110  Nietzsche thus valorises the ambiguity 
that war and conflict produce, perceiving culture and the ability of 
people to understand what is important to them as significant elements 
of peace within war.  Connolly follows this, affirming that contest 
Ôenables people to come to terms with what is important to them.Õ111  
However, for Nietzsche, contestation is also significant in challenging 
hegemony and enabling new outcomes.  Alluding once again to the 
Franco-Prussian war, Nietzsche valorises the oscillation between 
French and German cultures, arguing for Ôan agonistic, anti-hegemonic 
conception of war that would benefit culture.Õ 112   On this account, 
contest enables society to challenge hegemonic values in order to 
reach better conclusions.  He illustrates this through the example of 
Greek ostracism, which was employed to ensure the perpetuity of 
contest, and to prevent a winner from closing it.  In HomerÕs Contest, 
the example of MiltiadesÕ demise illustrates the necessity of contest and 
demonstrates the danger of an absolute win.113   This idea is also 
present in ConnollyÕs agonism in which he states that Ôit is necessary to 
disturb and challenge Ð through publicity, exposs, and boycotts and 
through alliances with beleaguered states and nonstate peoples Ð a 
variety of presumptions, understandings, and loyalties inscribed in the 
nationstate.Õ114  Thus, through political contestation, dominant values 
can be challenged, thereby enabling new ones to come into being. 
 
FoucaultÕs work supports the need to contest power inherent in 
Ôinstitutions, economic inequalities, language and even the bodies of 
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individuals.Õ115  In so doing, he resonates with NietzscheÕs assertion that 
contestation enables hegemonies to be challenged.  He expresses this 
through reference to power and freedom whereby he explains that 
freedom is a prerequisite for power to emerge and then be sustained.  
He argues that Ôwithout the possibility of recalcitrance, power would be 
equivalent to a physical determination.Õ116  It is thus the tension between 
power on the one hand, and freedom on the other, which enables 
contestation to take place.  Foucault refers to the contestation between 
power and freedom as ÔÓagonismÓ...a relationship which is at the same 
time reciprocal incitation and struggle: less of a face-to-face 
confrontation which paralyzes both sides than a permanent 
provocation.Õ 117   Foucault informs us that this perpetual contest 
oscillates between the threat of an outbreak of conflict on one hand, 
and the enforcement of mechanisms of power on the other.118  Thus, 
such toing and froing is significant to preventing either freedom or 
power from becoming hegemonic.  Foucault explains that Ôit is precisely 
the disparities between the two readings [of freedom and power] which 
make visible those fundamental phenomena of ÒdominationÓ which are 
present in a large number of human societies.Õ 119   Hence, by 
encouraging a continual contest between power and freedom, Foucault 
asserts that it is possible to expose domination by particular values.  
This converges with NietzscheÕs assumption that contestation between 
contending entities prevents either one from forming a hegemony.  
 
For Arendt, contestation occurs in the political realm and is important in 
enhancing the autonomy of an individual.  She argues that Ôit is 
companionship with others that, calling me out of the dialogue of 
thought, makes me one again Ð one single, unique human being 
speaking with but one voice and recognizable as such by all others.Õ120  
Thus, for Arendt, the presence of others grants the individual the 
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autonomy to consolidate his otherwise complex and pluralistic beliefs.  
Furthermore, she demonstrates how contestation is a competitive 
process in which citizens strive to better one another, further enhancing 
their capabilities as a result.  Using Ancient Greece as an example, she 
asserts that, Ôthe polis, was permeated by a fiercely agonal spirit, where 
everybody had constantly to distinguish himself from all others, to show 
through unique deeds or achievements that he was the best of all (aien 
aristeuein).Õ121  She claims that such aspirations of excellence in the 
public realm cannot be equalled in the private realm since Ôfor 
excellence, by definition, the presence of others is always required.Õ122  
Drawing on Nietzsche and Arendt, Owen supports this, arguing that 
Ôpersons contest with themselves and each other to achieve 
excellence.Õ123  Thus, for Arendt, the public arena encourages citizens 
to consolidate, express and argue for, their personal truth, enhancing 
individual autonomy.  In short, Ôto be free and to act are the same.Õ124  
 
Nietzsche also promotes political contestation as a means to enhancing 
the capacities of citizens, but he goes further by arguing that the 
competitive process of contestation also improves society.  As Owen 
explains, ÔNietzsche argues that Hellenic education was based on the 
idea that our capacities only develop through struggle, whereby the goal 
of this agonistic education is the well-being of the polis.Õ125  As a result, 
contestation enhances individual capabilities, which in turn betters 
society.  This is demonstrated in the assertion that Ôthe public culture of 
Greek society cultivated human powers through an institutionalised 
ethos of contestation in which citizens strove to surpass each other and, 
ultimately, to set new standards of nobility.Õ126  Hence, in addition to 
motivating engagement between conflicting citizens and challenging 
hegemony, Nietzsche employs contestation to better the individual and 
enable societal progress.   
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All four thinkers thereby promote the notion of political contestation in 
some form.  Schmitt and Foucault demonstrate that the dichotomy 
between the public and private spheres is false and needs to be 
renegotiated.  Arguing against universality, rationality, and neutrality, 
Schmitt favours a situated account of politics in which citizens are 
participants.  Foucault also calls for the blurring of boundaries between 
state and society, claiming that power extends beyond the state.  He 
thereby also promotes a citizen-based, public account of politics.  This 
broader understanding of power and politics resonates with new 
institutionalist accounts of institutions which move away from typical 
actors and organisations and incorporate Ôsets of rules that exist ÒwithinÓ 
and Òbetween organizations, Òas well as under, over and around 
themÓ.Õ127  The various thinkers each emphasise the political nature of 
politics to different ends.  For Schmitt, this constitutes an attempt at 
reviving politics by restoring the meaning to political values.  For Arendt 
and Nietzsche, their public accounts of politics allow citizens to become 
citizens (rather than subjects) through participation.  Importantly, for 
Schmitt and Arendt, unlike Nietzsche and Foucault, the political realm is 
a distinct entity, which ought to be prioritised.   
 
In addition to providing a political account, the thinkers also highlight the 
importance of contestation to politics.  For Schmitt, contestation is 
essential to threatening the existence of oneÕs way of life, thereby 
enhancing its meaning.  For Nietzsche, it enables hegemonies to be 
challenged, and provides possibilities for the emergence of new values.  
Foucault, too, promotes contestation as a means to challenging 
hegemonic values, drawing on his understanding of power and freedom 
to demonstrate the importance of unearthing and challenging 
domination.  For Arendt, contestation is important in enhancing the 
autonomy of citizens, and for Nietzsche, it also serves the purpose of 
enhancing individual autonomy, which in turn betters society.        
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The Contingent Nature of Politics 
 
A second theme emphasised by all four thinkers is that of contingency, 
which asserts that societal values are, and must be, open to continual 
contestation.  As Norval explains, Ôonce we are on the terrain of 
contingency, Ònothing is guaranteedÓ, and everything is at stake: the 
question of the emergence of subjectivity is opened up and the contours 
and the boundaries of what can be regarded as Òcommon spaceÓ is put 
into question.Õ128  This concept contrasts with truth, which thinkers, such 
as Plato, affirm can be discovered by rational beings.129  Conversely, 
Arendt, Foucault, Nietzsche, and Schmitt reject this assumption, arguing 
that claims to truth are expressions of power, which are potentially 
dangerous as they threaten to negate or eradicate difference.  This 
resonates with the criticisms made in the introduction of neutral, 
universalist and rationalist approaches to liberalism.  The thinkers 
thereby call for ÔuntruthÕ and the continual critique and challenge of 
values and standards in order to prevent domination and enable new 
lines of thinking.  This resonates with new institutionalist thinkers, who 
argue that institutional analysis needs to evaluate not just the Ôrules of 
the gameÕ but citizensÕ capacities to modify and transform these.   
 
In The Human Condition, Arendt states that the Ôtraditional concept of 
truth...had rested on the twofold assumption that what truly is will appear 
of its own accord and that human capabilities are adequate to receive 
it.Õ 130   She rejects this assumption, likening any attempt at this to 
Ôjumping over our own shadows.Õ131  NietzscheÕs work parallels ArendtÕs 
in abandoning the belief that there is a truth discoverable by humans.  
Stating that humans have Ôno further mission that would lead beyond 
human life,Õ Nietzsche asserts that it is only humans who attach such 
importance to human intellect Ôas if the world pivoted around it.  But if we 
could communicate with the mosquito, then we would learn that he 
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floats through the air with the same self-importance, feeling within itself 
the flying center of the world.Õ132  Thus, contrary to thinkers such as 
Aristotle,133 Nietzsche asserts that humans are no more capable than 
animals at arriving at the truth.  Connolly reiterates this in Ethos of 
Pluralization, affirming that Ômy thinking denies a fundamental purpose, 
harmony, law, or plasticity of the world.Õ 134   Instead of promoting 
universalism or rationalism, then, Nietzsche advocates ÔperspectivismÕ 
whereby each individualÕs understanding of truth is a personal 
interpretation.  On this account, there is no universal truth or rational set 
of values, but rather a range of perspectives, each representing an 
individualÕs perception of truth.  Owen supports this in the claim that Ôall 
views are from somewhere, our perspectives are always already 
situated,Õ135 and, as such the idea of a Ônon-perspectival perspectiveÕ is 
contradictory.136  Nietzsche asserts that we can never view the world 
from outside of our perspectives, claiming that there is only the 
possibility that we Ômight one day have the power to peer out and down 
through a crack in the chamber of consciousness.Õ137  This is reflected in 
ArendtÕs work, which argues that Ôabsolute truth, which would be the 
same for all men and therefore unrelated, independent of each manÕs 
existence, cannot exist for mortals.Õ138  She states that we can only see 
the world by acknowledging that others perceive it differently, and we 
can only experience it by engaging with the diverse perspectives of 
others: 
If someone wants to see and experience the world as it 
ÒreallyÓ is, he can do so only by understanding it as 
something that is shared by many people, lies between 
them, separates and links them, showing itself differently to 
each and comprehensible only to the extent that many 
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people can talk about it and exchange their opinions and 
perspectives with one another, over against one 
another.139    
 
In addition to affirming that all truths are opinions and perspectives that 
vary between individuals, Nietzsche and Foucault also demonstrate that 
truth claims are problematic since they are entangled in power relations.  
Foucault affirms that Ôtruth isnÕt outside of power, or lacking in power.Õ140  
This is reflected in ConnollyÕs Identity/Difference, which asserts that Ôif 
there is no true identity, the attempt to establish one as if it were true 
involves power.Õ141  Foucault argues that each society establishes a 
Ôregime of truth,Õ consisting of what it chooses to accept as truths, how it 
chooses these, how these are then legitimated, and what/who has the 
power to decide upon these truths: 
The regime of truth...that is, the types of discourse which it 
accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and 
instances which enable one to distinguish true and false 
statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the 
techniques and procedures accorded value in the 
acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged 
with saying what counts as true.142 
As Leslie Paul Thiele asserts,  Ôit is the human condition to exist within a 
system of power.Õ 143   Foucault illustrates this by discussing the 
intellectual, who was often Ôacknowledged the right of speaking in the 
capacity of master of truth and justice.  He was heard or purported to 
make himself heard, as the spokesman of the universal.Õ 144   Yet, 
according to Foucault, the intellectual was not the bearer of the 
universal, but rather, a specific actor, behaving in accordance with the 
relevant regimes of truth.  He describes him as Ôthe person occupying a 
specific position Ð but whose specificity is linked, in a society like ours, 
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to the general functioning of truth.Õ145  Foucault demonstrates how the 
regime of truth impacts the intellectual in three primary ways.  First, his 
position in society influences whether he represents capitalist or 
proletarian interests.  Subsequently, his life-work conditions inform 
whether he primarily answers to the demands of his field or his 
university.  Finally, Ôthe specificity of the politics of truth in our 
societiesÕ 146  shapes and constrains the knowledge he produces.  
Employing this example, Foucault shows how Ô"truth" is linked in a 
circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, 
and to effects of power which it induces and which extends it.Õ147   
 
This notion that truth is enmeshed in power relations is mirrored in 
NietzscheÕs philosophy, which states that the human drive to discover 
commonalities and seal them in truth is dogmatic.148  Asserting that 
language is an expression of power, Nietzsche states that rulers Ôsay 
Òthis is such and such,Õ they put their seal on each thing and event with 
a sound and in the process take possession of it.Õ149   
 
All of the thinkers express, not only the power relations inherent in truth 
claims, but also the danger that these pose to difference.  Foucault 
demonstrates this through language by showing how the creation of a 
single, unified concept suppresses diversity.  He explicates that 
Ôlanguage must strip itself of its concrete content and leave nothing 
visible but those forms of discourse that are universally valid.Õ150  In The 
Order of Things, for instance, he questions whether it is legitimate to 
maintain separate categories for cats and dogs Ôeven if both are tame 
and embalmed, even if both are frenzied, even if both have just broken 
the water pitcher.Õ151  In demonstrating the overlapping characteristics 
of two animals that have been conceptualised as two distinct entities, 
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Foucault challenges universalism and truth.  He highlights that, by 
striving toward neat and convenient definitions or rules, we forget the 
messy reality and the ways in which truth needs to be challenged and 
modified.  This is potentially dangerous in society because in order to 
universalise things and present Ôtruths,Õ it is necessary to ignore 
disparities that exist and exceptions to the rule, or characteristics that 
do not fit the rule.  As a consequence, universalism has an exclusionary 
potential toward those who do not fall within the norm of each universal 
category.  This is echoed in TullyÕs work on pluralism, which 
demonstrates how if one group of society perceives itself as universal, it 
Ôcannot recognise and respect any plurality of narratives, traditions or 
civilisations as equal yet different, and enter into a dialogue with them 
on equal footing.Õ152    
 
This assertion that universalism is dangerous because of its 
exclusionary potential, is further explored in NietzscheÕs thought.  His 
essay, On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense, echoes FoucaultÕs 
concerns with the manner in which universalism abstracts from the 
essence of the thing.  Taking the example of a leaf, Nietzsche exposes 
how humans abstract from the difference between various objects (i.e. 
different types of leaves) in order to form a single concept (i.e. the leaf).  
However, he explains that, in so doing, we Ôoverlook what is individual 
and actual,Õ and as a result, the true essence of the leaf Ôremains 
inaccessible and undefinable for us.Õ153  This reminds us of FoucaultÕs 
analogy of cats and dogs whereby the clear-cut separation of the two 
categories prevents us from grasping the individual nature of the 
animals themselves.  Hence, both Foucault and Nietzsche assert that 
the categorisation of language ignores the unique characteristics of 
each entity, preventing us from grasping individuality, diversity and 
difference.  This surely begs the question of how we deal with a type of 
leaf Ð or indeed human - that does not fit neatly into one of the 
traditional categories?  Connolly explains how, for Nietzsche, every 
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individual Ôis at odds with the norm in some ways,Õ and that because of 
societal Ôtruths,Õ Ôdifference faces a struggle to create space for itself.Õ154  
Drawing on Nietzsche, Connolly highlights the exclusionary potential of 
universalism, stating that Ôto possess a true identity is to be false to 
difference, while to be true to difference is to sacrifice the promise of a 
true identity.Õ155     
 
Echoing concerns about the potential for truth to suppress diversity, 
Schmitt discusses this with reference to universal rhetoric.  He affirms 
that if one entity professes to encompass humanity, it confiscates those 
terms from the other by default.  He begins by emphasising the diversity 
of the global realm, referring to the political world as Ôpluriverse, not a 
universe.Õ156  Consequently, he states that Ôthe political entity cannot by 
its very nature be universal in the sense of embracing all of humanity 
and the entire world.Õ157  Moreover, he rejects the possibility of one 
group or set of values representing humanity, affirming that Ôhumanity is 
not a political concept, and no political entity or society and no status 
corresponds to it.Õ158  Mouffe reaffirms this assumption in her discussion 
of democratic politics, stating that Ôfor democracy to exist, no social 
agent should be able to claim any mastery of the foundation of 
society.Õ159  Schmitt highlights the power relations inherent in humanity 
claims, stating that Ôthe concept of humanity is an especially useful 
ideological instrument of imperialist expansion, and in its ethical-
humanitarian form it is a specific vehicle of economic imperialism.Õ160  
He subsequently brings our attention to the dangers of adopting the 
label humanity, concerned that, on the one hand the term is no longer 
available to the other side, and, on the other, any atrocity would be 
justified in the name of humanity: 
To confiscate the word humanity, to invoke and 
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monopolize such a term probably has certain incalculable 
effects, such as denying the enemy the quality of being 
human and declaring him to be an outlaw of humanity; and 
a war can thereby be driven to the most extreme 
inhumanity.161      
Schmitt contends that by using the labels ÔuniversalÕ and Ôhumanity,Õ 
politics would be transformed from a battle of politically opposed parties 
into a situation whereby the side operating under the cloak of humanity 
would be Ôforced to make of [the different Other] a monster that must 
not only be defeated but also utterly destroyed.Õ 162   Mouffe has 
employed this idea in her adversarial account of democratic politics: 
The aim of democratic politics is to construct the ÒthemÓ in 
such a way that it is no longer perceived as an enemy to 
be destroyed, but as an ÒadversaryÓ, that is, somebody 
whose ideas we combat but whose right to defend those 
ideas we do not put into question.163     
In addition to resonating with MouffeÕs adversarialism, SchmittÕs work 
also parallels that of Nietzsche, Foucault and Arendt in expressing the 
concern that universalism and truth threaten to suppress, exclude and 
destroy diversity.  
 
Thus, the various thinkers argue that truth is not a discoverable entity 
and that any claims toward truth are entangled in power.  They share 
the concern that claims of universality and truth are expressions of 
power and thus have the potential to suppress and exclude difference.  
Further, Arendt argues that universalism and truth pose barriers to 
contestation, since Ôstandards are based on the same limited evidence 
inherent in a judgment upon which we all have agreed and no longer 
need to dispute or argue about.Õ164  To prevent the suppression of 
difference and to enable continual contestation, the thinkers promote 
the principle of contingency, or what Nietzsche terms as ÔuntruthÕ and 
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what Foucault deems to be Ôgames of truth.Õ165  In Beyond Good and 
Evil, for instance, Nietzsche questions why humans do not traditionally 
prefer untruth and uncertainty from truth and certainty.166  Nietzsche 
condemns universalism for failing to Ôraise doubts here at the threshold, 
where doubts would be most necessary.Õ167  The necessity of raising 
such doubts is outlined in On the Genealogy of Morals, in which 
Nietzsche states that Ôwe stand in need of a critique of moral values, the 
value of these values itself should first of all be called into question.Õ168  
This notion is resonated in ConnollyÕs work, whereby he asserts that 
Ôevery thought is invested by the unthought serving simultaneously as 
its condition and its limitation.Õ 169   Nietzsche thereby rejects the 
universalism and truth, promoting instead the necessity of contingency 
in which all moral values must be critiqued and called into question.   
 
Drawing on the Ancient Greek employment of ostracism, Nietzsche 
illustrates the role of contingency in curtailing the power of the 
dominant.  He states that, to ensure that a powerful force does not halt 
contestation, ostracism Ôbanishes those strong enough to dominate the 
agon in order to keep the agon open.Õ 170   In emphasising the 
importance of keeping the agon open, NietzscheÕs philosophy suggests 
that contingency encourages the emergence of new lines of thinking.  
This is demonstrated through reference to the slave revolt, whereby the 
weak held feelings of ressentiment toward the Ôgood,Õ and, therefore, 
rendered themselves superior by inverting good and bad morality, 
thereby transforming good into Ôevil.Õ171  Nietzsche asserts that the slave 
revolt Ôhas a two-thousand-year history behind it and which has today 
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dropped out of sight only because it - has succeeded.Õ172  This thereby 
illustrates how absolute success poses a barrier to further explorations 
of - and challenges to - history.  In this case, it prevents people from 
challenging notions of good and evil.  For Nietzsche, genealogy is an 
important tool for exposing domination since it involves exposing the 
power relations inherent in current morality.173  Through genealogy, we 
are thereby encouraged to think of critique and challenge, not as 
something that can be won or lost, but as a perpetual contest, which 
must be endlessly subject to challenge.  This assumption that challenge 
and critique is vital to new possibilities is evident in ConnollyÕs work on 
pluralism: 
And I do suggest that the pluralist sensibility most 
compatible with generosity and forbearance between 
interdependent and contending identities is not anchored in 
the fictive ground of a transcendental command or universal 
reason.  It flows...from care for the protean diversity of life 
and from critical responsiveness to new drives of 
pluralization.174     
 
Foucault echoes NietzscheÕs calls for contingency and Ôuntruth,Õ 
suggesting a need to Ôproblematize traditional understandings of central 
concepts.Õ175  He asserts that this is imperative if we are to avoid being 
dominated by claims to truth and universality, proposing that, through 
genealogy, we criticise politics Ôwith a game of truth, showing what were 
the effects, showing that there were other rational possibilities, teaching 
people what they ignore about their own situation, on their conditions of 
work, on their exploitation.Õ176  In challenging the dominant discourses 
of truth, and consequently exposing viable alternatives, Foucault states 
that there is always the chance of overcoming domination through 
contingency.  Such critique creates opportunities for new discoveries, 
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as Foucault demonstrates in the assertion that Ôthere is always a 
possibility, in a given game of truth, to discover something else and to 
more or less change such and such a rule and sometimes even the 
totality of the game of truth.Õ177  This abandonment of universalism and 
truth is echoed by Tully in the claim that Ôour habitual forms of 
recognition are often stultifying forms of misrecognition which need to 
be upset and reversed from time to time.Õ178   In Truth and Power, 
Foucault exemplifies the importance of ensuring that societyÕs current 
ÔtruthsÕ remain contingent and open to challenge in order to enable the 
discovery of something new.  With reference to the medical society, he 
argues that progressions in knowledge, Ôare not simply new discoveries; 
there is a whole new ÒregimeÓ in discourse and forms of knowledge.Õ179  
This highlights the importance of perpetually challenging and critiquing, 
not just controversial ideas, but also dominant and taken-for-granted 
forms of knowledge that exist in order to progress.  Foucault thereby 
reveals how NietzscheÕs calls for contingency are important, stressing 
that the power relations inherent in societal ÔtruthsÕ oblige us to 
challenge dominant ideas in order to overcome domination and offer 
new ways of thinking.  Thus, both Foucault and Nietzsche value 
contingency for its ability to open up Ôalternative lines of thinking by 
scrambling the network through which it has been organized.Õ180   
 
Bonnie Honig explains how the promotion of contingency can alleviate 
oppression, affirming that critiques of universalism Ôcreate new values 
that are more viable and less impositional than the old ones.Õ181  This is 
demonstrated, for example, in NietzscheÕs recovery of Ôself-disciplineÕ in 
which he Ôvalorizes the particularity and multiplicity that make the self 
resistant to the formation of moral, responsible subjectivity.Õ182  As a 
result of recovering self-discipline, Nietzsche switches the emphasis 
from universality to the particularity and multiplicity of each human 
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being, thereby rendering it less oppressive.  This example of 
contingency shows that, by abandoning universalism, concepts can 
avoid marginalising those who fall outside of the norm. 
 
Arendt also advocates the importance of contingency in creating 
something new.  She affirms this through the introduction of labour into 
the ÔpublicÕ realm, demonstrating that this has Ôliberated [the life] 
process from its circular, monotonous recurrence and transformed it 
into a swiftly progressing development whose results have in a few 
centuries totally changed the whole inhabited world.Õ 183  Tully 
demonstrates this in his work through the notion of Ôacting differentlyÕ in 
which Ôthe on-going conversation and conduct among the partners can 
modify the practice in often unnoticed and significant ways.Õ184   
The focus placed on contingency and the ability to modify the Ôrules of 
the gameÕ resonates with the new institutionalist emphasis on exploring 
how such rules are changed as a means to understanding institutions: 
We need also to consider how Òordinary peopleÓ can 
develop capacities and seize opportunities to change the 
rules of the game, albeit with the constant threat of the re-
imposition of dominant institutional constraints.185 
 
Thus, the four thinkers advocate the importance of both rejecting 
universality and truth, and focusing on contingency and challenge.  
Nietzsche and Arendt abandon traditional understandings of truth 
as something that is discoverable by humans.  Instead, they argue 
that there are only perspectives, and that the more of these we 
engage with, the richer our own perspective becomes.  Foucault, 
Nietzsche, and Schmitt show that claims to truth are expressions of 
power, and agree that, as such, notions of truth and universality 
threaten to suppress and exclude difference.  As a result, 
Nietzsche and Foucault call for ÔuntruthÕ and continual challenge 
and critique.  Along with Arendt, they argue that through such 
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contingent politics we can prevent domination and encourage the 
emergence of new lines of thought.  The emphasis these thinkers 
place on contingency reflects new institutionalist literature which 
highlights the importance of considering, not just the Ôrules of the 
game,Õ but also the capacities of citizens to modify such rules.  As 
a result, the kinds of institutions that are compatible with 
contingency are those that allow for change and grant citizens with 
the autonomy to contest them. 
The Necessary Interdependency of Citizens 
 
The four thinkers all assume and promote the necessary 
interdependency of citizens in society.  They demonstrate how we 
understand concepts in relation to other, connected concepts.  
Subsequently, they blur the boundaries between ÔoppositionalÕ 
concepts, by demonstrating how such concepts often work together and 
even evolve into one another.  They each argue that humans cannot 
fully exist outside of their society.  For Schmitt, however, this 
assumption takes on a binary and collective understanding of identity in 
which opposing groups necessarily define themselves in relation to one 
another.  For the other thinkers, interdependency resembles more of a 
web of relationality between diverse and plural individuals.   
 
Nietzsche understands necessary interdependency to be a necessary 
component of our understanding of concepts in On Truth and Lies in an 
Extra-Moral Sense.  Illustrating this through the example of nature, he 
explains how our understanding of one thing is reliant upon 
comprehension of several related concepts:  
We are not acquainted with it in itself, but only with its 
effects, which means in its relation to other laws of nature 
Ð which, in turn are known to us only as sums of relations.  
Therefore all these relations always refer again to others 
and are thoroughly incomprehensible to us in their 
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existence.186 
Nietzsche explains how, in spite of our inability to know the Ôthing in 
itself,Õ we can comprehend it if we understand other related concepts.  
This is elucidated in Beyond Good and Evil through the example of 
thinking, which we are said to understand through its divergence from 
willing or feeling.  He states that Ôsaying ÒI thinkÓ assumes that I am 
comparing my present state with other states that I experience in 
myself, thereby establishing what it is.Õ187  Thus, we cannot understand 
the notion of thinking as an isolated concept; we only comprehend it by 
observing that which differentiates it from willing or feeling.  Connolly 
also assumes this notion of relationality in his account of agonism, 
explaining that Ôto define a concept is necessarily to connect it with 
several others that need clarification.Õ188   
 
Foucault similarly echoes NietzscheÕs emphasis on interdependent 
concepts in Man and His Doubles.  He illustrates relationality and 
collectivity through the painting of Las Meninas, in which Ôall the interior 
lines of the painting, and above all those that come from the central 
reflection, point towards the very thing that is represented, but 
absent.Õ189  Thus, by demonstrating the paintingÕs ability to convey the 
meaning of one absent idea through related ideas, Foucault shows the 
interconnected nature of concepts, demonstrating that we can enrich 
our knowledge of one concept by understanding another.  This mirrors 
NietzscheÕs claims that comprehension of the term Ôto thinkÕ is derived 
from comparing that state to other states we experience.190  This idea 
also resonates in ArendtÕs work, in which she states that difference is 
Ôthe reason why all our definitions are distinctions, why we are unable to 
say what anything is without distinguishing it from something else.Õ191  
Influenced by Foucault, Nietzsche and Arendt, Connolly uses necessary 
interdependency as a tool to emphasise the value of different 
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individuals in society, claiming that his identity Ôis further specified by 
comparison to a variety of the thing I am not.Õ192   As a result, by 
demonstrating the way in which conflicting citizens are necessarily 
interconnected, his approach encourages unity.   
 
This relationality is also discussed with reference to morals, which is 
made apparent by NietzscheÕs emphasis on the ambiguity between 
ÔgoodÕ and ÔbadÕ moralities in On the Genealogy of Morals.  Refuting the 
dichotomy between ÔgoodÕ and ÔbadÕ values, Nietzsche rejects these 
concepts as entities which exist in isolation from one another.  Instead, 
he explains the necessary relationship between them in which we could 
not recognise one without the other.  In demonstrating this, he asks the 
reader, Ôwhat would the meaning of ÒbeautifulÓ be, if contradiction had 
not first become conscious of itself, if the ugly had not first said to itself:  
ÒI am uglyÓ?Õ193  He then shows how necessary interdependency can be 
promoted to encourage new positive possibilities to emerge from the 
bad, employing bad conscience as an example.  He describes it Ôas an 
illness…but an illness in the same way that pregnancy is an illness.Õ194  
Thus, using this allegory, Nietzsche affirms that negative entities can 
have the potential to enable new and positive possibilities.  He refers to 
this as the Ôactual maternal womb of ideal and imaginative events.Õ195 
This notion of necessary interdependency can be a powerful tool in 
blurring the boundaries between two opposites, rejecting, for instance, 
the distinction between good and bad, thereby preventing the dominant 
drive (i.e. the good), from suppressing the subordinate drive (i.e. the 
bad).196   Employing euthanasia as an example, Connolly promotes 
necessary interdependency in Why I am not a Secularist, demonstrating 
how those in favour may initially be met with shock and perceived as 
acting cruelly toward the dying.  However, he then shows how this 
supposed ÔbadÕ morality might be considered ÔgoodÕ when perceived, 
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instead, as concern for the dying.197  Thus, for Connolly, the concept of 
necessary interdependency can be useful in blurring the boundaries 
between seemingly oppositional entities, thereby promoting respect 
between conflicting citizens.  
 
Just as Nietzsche demonstrates the interrelated nature of concepts, so 
does Foucault in his reference to nature and human nature:  
Despite this opposition, however, or rather, through it, we 
see the positive relation of nature to human nature 
beginning to take shape.  They act, in fact, upon identical 
elements…both reveal against the background of an 
uninterrupted fabric the possibility of a general analysis 
which makes possible the distribution of isolable identities 
and visible differences over a tabulated space and in an 
ordered sequence.  But they cannot succeed in doing this 
without each other, and it is there that the communication 
between them occurs.198  
Hence, just as Nietzsche highlights the interrelationality between 
ÔbeautifulÕ and Ôugly,Õ and ÔgoodÕ and Ôevil,Õ199 Foucault underlines the 
relationality between man and nature.  Arendt echoes this In The 
Human Condition, affirming that Ôthings and men form the environment 
for each of manÕs activities, which would be pointless without such 
location; yet this environment, the world into which we are born, would 
not exist without the human activity which produced it.Õ 200   Such 
interrelationality and necessary interdependency between diverse (and 
often conflicting) concepts is mirrored in TullyÕs Strange Multiplicity: 
Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity whereby he states that Ôthe 
strength of the constitutional fabric consists in the interweaving of 
different threads Ð a crazy quilt rather than a crazy house.Õ201  Through 
the metaphor of the quilt, then, Tully demonstrates how, in spite of their 
differences, diverse ÔthreadsÕ - or cultures - work together.  As in 
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ConnollyÕs work, then, Tully promotes necessary interdependency to 
highlight the importance of diverse others to society.  Given the 
importance of difference and diversity, Foucault explicates that 
relationality requires us to focus on difference and Otherness: 
Modern thought is one that moves no longer towards the 
ever-to-be-accomplished unveiling of the Same.  Now such 
an unveiling is not accomplished without the simultaneous 
appearance of the Double, and that hiatus, miniscule and 
yet invincible, which resides in the ÒandÓ of retreat and 
return, of thought and the unthought, of the empirical and 
the transcendental, of what belongs to the order of 
positivity and what belongs to the order of foundations.202 
In this way, Foucault mirrors NietzscheÕs acknowledgement of the 
interdependency of concepts as a necessary feature of society in which 
all entities are interconnected.   
 
As a result of the necessary links between these related concepts, 
morals and values, interdependency inevitably extends to the conduct of 
human beings.  Connolly explains that, for Nietzsche, Ôhumans are 
incomplete outside of social form.Õ 203   Therefore, just as good is 
necessarily related to bad, one human is also dependent on various 
others.  Arendt shares this assumption, stating that Ôno human life, not 
even the life of the hermit in natureÕs wilderness, is possible without a 
world which directly or indirectly testifies to the presence of other human 
beings.Õ204   She claims that if we try to ignore the interdependency 
between us and other (either similar or different) humans, and attempt to 
live in isolation, then our life Ôis literally dead to the world; it has ceased 
to be a human life because it is no longer lived among men.Õ205  Tully 
reiterates this assumption in The Agonic Freedom of Citizens in which 
he equates participation in politics with becoming a citizen.206  Thus, in 
addition to assuming interdependency as naturally emerging, Arendt, 
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followed by Connolly and Tully, uses it as a tool to help cultivate 
relations between diverse citizens.  
 
Schmitt also places emphasis on the necessity of diverse citizens to one 
anotherÕs identities, however his friend/enemy philosophy discusses 
relationality in collective and binary terms, rather than understanding it 
as an entangled web of difference.  Instead of seeking to blur the 
boundaries between oppositional identities, as Nietzsche and Foucault 
do, Schmitt values polarised positions.  He states that politics Ôexists only 
when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a 
similar collectivity.Õ207  This is explained in MouffeÕs The Return of the 
Political in which she claims that Ôthe condition of existence of every 
identity is the affirmation of a difference, the determination of an ÒotherÓ 
that is going to play the role of a Òconstitutive outsideÓ.Õ208  Thus, for 
Schmitt, followed by Mouffe, the friend-enemy relationship, and thereby 
politics, can only occur if two collective state entities are present and 
define themselves in relation to each other.  This echoes the emphasis 
Foucault, Nietzsche and Arendt place on the relationality of concepts.  
Hence, just as Nietzsche and Foucault emphasise the need to focus on 
difference, SchmittÕs politics also claims that the Ôother,Õ enemy group is 
imperative to politics.  However, for him, rather than highlighting their 
necessity to one another, he underlines their differences in order to 
enhance unity between one side in opposition to the other.  Group unity 
thereby requires emphasis on the different other.  He explains that Ôit 
would be a mistake to believe that a nation could eliminate the distinction 
of friend and enemy by declaring its friendship for the entire world,209 
affirming that those who allege to have no enemies cannot be part of the 
political community and must exist only as private individuals.210  Instead 
of perceiving different identities as diverse but interconnected threads, 
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then, he perceives identities as necessarily oppositional and collective.  
Thus, to some extent, he echoes Nietzsche and FoucaultÕs calls for us to 
focus on difference and oppositions.  However, he does this in order to 
create unity within one state against another, rather than blurring the 
boundaries in order to promote respect between all individuals. 
 
Hence, Nietzsche, Foucault and Arendt all demonstrate the way in which 
concepts can only be understood in relation to other related concepts. 
Nietzsche then problematizes the dichotomy between ÔgoodÕ and ÔbadÕ 
morals by demonstrating how they often work together, and sometimes 
even produce one another.  Similarly, Foucault and Arendt demonstrate 
how diverse Ð and sometimes oppositional or conflicting Ð entities can 
work together.  Drawing on these assumptions, Nietzsche, and Arendt 
claim that humans are incomplete outside of social form, and are thereby 
necessarily interdependent to one another.  Schmitt supports this 
assumption, but employs it in a collective manner whereby one group 
identity can only be defined in relation to another group.  He states that 
politics requires conflicting others, and those who only have similar 
ÔfriendsÕ cannot be part of the political community. 
Conclusion 
 
In sum then, the four thinkers endorse political contestation, contingent 
politics and the necessary interdependency of citizens.  However, this is 
employed in distinct ways throughout their work, particularly in SchmittÕs 
state-focused, oppositional, collective account.  In discussing political 
contestation, they renegotiate the dichotomy between public and 
private, problematise universality, rationality and neutrality, offer more 
situated, citizen-centred accounts of politics, and advocate contestation.  
Political contestation provides a tool for reviving the political, giving 
meaning to politics, challenging hegemony, and exposing domination.  
Such attempts at overcoming domination are also evident in the 
thinkersÕ endorsement of contingency, which emphasise the need for 
contestable, open-ended institutions.  In advocating this principle, the 
four thinkers reject universalism and truth, suggesting that claims to 
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truth are expressions of power, which subsequently need to be critiqued 
and challenged.  They demonstrate how contingency can prevent 
domination and encourage new lines of thinking to emerge.  They also 
promote necessary interdependency by highlighting our understanding 
of concepts as relational, and, for Arendt, Foucault and Nietzsche, 
showing how interrelated citizens work together, enabling each otherÕs 
existence and rendering one another incomplete outside of their 
society.  For Schmitt, interdependency takes on a collective form 
whereby opposing groups define themselves in relation to one another, 
whereas for the others, interdependency resembles more of an 
entangled web of individuals.  I will demonstrate the significance of 
political contestation, contingency and necessary interdependency 
throughout this thesis, since they emerge in the work of contemporary 
agonist thinkers, resonate - to varying degrees - with new institutionalist 
literature and provide the basis for analysing a range of agonistic 
approaches and their operationalisation.  
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Chapter Two ‐ Three Approaches to Agonistic Democracy 
 
Exploring how contemporary agonists employ the three themes of 
political contestation, necessary interdependency and contingency to 
different ends, this chapter outlines three agonistic approaches: the 
Ôperfectionist,Õ the Ôadversarial,Õ and the Ôinclusive.Õ  Owen represents 
perfectionist agonism, with Mouffe representing adversarial agonism, 
and both Connolly and Tully representing inclusive agonism.211  Just as, 
in the previous chapter, Schmitt sat less comfortably alongside the 
other thinkers, MouffeÕs adversarial approach Ôrepresents something of 
an outlierÕ212 when compared to the other approaches.  Whilst these 
thinkers are not exhaustive of the agonist tradition, I focus on their work 
because of the impact it has had on the rest of the field213 and because 
of its relevance to democratic theories of conflict mediation.  However, 
other post-structuralists working within the agonist field, such as 
Andrew Schaap and David Howarth, are significant to my project and 
enrich my insights into these thinkers.  I should also note that, although 
I discuss Connolly and Tully together, as representatives of the 
inclusive approach, I do not seek to conflate their work.  This chapter 
highlights, for instance, how Connolly focuses on preventing 
ressentiment, whereas Tully focuses on overcoming domination.  
However, they exhibit important similarities which both fall into an 
inclusive understanding of agonistic democracy.  Given the significance 
of both thinkers to institutional discussions within agonistic democracy, 
consideration of both of their work is necessary.  Taking each approach 
in turn, the chapter discusses ways in which each thinker employs the 
three themes of political contestation, necessary interdependency, and 
contingency.   
Perfectionist Agonistic Democracy: 
 
The aims of OwenÕs agonism differ greatly from those of either 
MouffeÕs, or Connolly and TullyÕs.  Rather than focusing on political 
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contestation as a means to reviving politics or rendering it more 
inclusive, OwenÕs approach offers us a perfectionist account of agonism 
in which political contestation is seen as essential to the continual 
improvement of virtues.  Assuming that each belief is perspectival and 
situated, he endorses a competitive public arena in which citizens 
enhance their own virtues by striving to surpass one another.  As a 
result, individual capacities are strengthened, and society is bettered.  
 
OwenÕs perfectionist agonism assumes that society is characterised by 
Ôa plurality of conflicting conceptions of the good,Õ214 and that each of 
these conceptions is Ôthe product of a complex history of the 
entwinement of judgement and agency in the life of a community.Õ215  
On this view, the range of societal beliefs emerges out of our diverse 
interactions with the world, rendering our perspectives necessarily 
Ôembodied.Õ  Owen thereby rejects KantÕs categorical imperative for 
assuming the existence of universal morals: 
I cannot reasonably demand (as KantÕs categorical 
imperative would have us do) that all persons should act in 
the way that I acted because other people may be 
committed to different evaluations (i.e., have different 
characters) which they experience as necessity under the 
aegis of eternal recurrence.216 
Rather, Owen acknowledges the situated nature of perspectives, 
claiming that Ôthere can be no determinate judgement as to how, for 
example, education is to be best conducted; such judgements are 
necessarily perspectival.Õ 217   This assumption that each belief is 
necessarily perspectival resonates with the way in which Mouffe, 
Connolly and Tully promote contingency over universalism.  However, it 
leads Owen to a distinct conclusion about which form agonistic 
democracy should take.   
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Owen promotes political contestation as a means to enhancing both the 
individual and society.  For him, this entails collective consideration of 
Ôwhich cultural practices and virtues should be cultivated and which 
should be discouraged (i.e. what should we do?) as well as related 
questions such as the degree to which we, as a public should 
collectively facilitate or hinder particular cultural practices.Õ 218   In 
promoting the contestation of such questions, Owen draws on 
NietzscheÕs concept of eternal recurrence.  In Nietzsche, Politics and 
Modernity, Owen discusses eternal recurrence at length, demonstrating 
its meaning and significance in various contexts,219 yet for the purpose 
of considering OwenÕs perfectionist agonism, I focus on its function as 
an ethical imperative which tells us to Ôact always according to that 
maxim which you can at the same time will as eternally recurring.Õ220  
This aspect of eternal recurrence is of particular significance to OwenÕs 
account of political contestation since it links to his concepts of self-
mastery and integrity (as I will now demonstrate).  Thus, in requiring 
citizens to act according to principles that they will continue to advocate, 
OwenÕs primary question to those engaged in political contestation 
surrounding their perspectives is Ôdo you desire this once more and 
innumerable times more?Õ221  Owen claims that citizens gain nobility (or 
self-mastery) when they strive toward eternal recurrence during 
engagement with others.  He states that Ôit is apparent that one exhibits 
oneÕs nobility (self-mastery) publicly by acting in accordance with the 
commitments one espouses.Õ222  Owen then demonstrates how self-
mastery encompasses two concepts of integrity: personal and ethical.  
He explains that we Ôuse Òpersonal integrityÓ to refer to someoneÕs life 
possessing a coherence and Òethical integrityÓ to refer to someoneÕs life 
exhibiting a coherence in terms of his or her substantive ethical 
commitments.Õ223  As a result, political contestation provides a platform 
for citizens to develop integrity through publicly affirming ethical 
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consistency and a coherent value set.  As Owen explains, self-mastery 
requires integrity since ÔoneÕs capacity to keep promises to oneself is 
dependent on oneÕs mastery of oneÕs self at this time and is also the 
ethical work one does on oneself to develop oneÕs capacity for self-
mastery.Õ224  He affirms that forming such personal ethical commitments 
involves considering oneself, not just as an individual, but also as a 
member of a community.  Linking this to concepts of shame and 
honour, he states that Ôas a member of humanity I am accountable for 
the actions of humanity because these actions are also constitutive of 
what I am.Õ225  This holds, not just for present and future actions, but 
also refers to how one relates to the past.  Owen thus promotes political 
contestation as a means of redemption in which the shame of the past 
motivates citizens to strive towards a better society: 
NietzscheÕs point is that rather than being consumed and, 
perhaps, paralysed by the remorse (nausea and pity) 
which attends our shame at humanity by committing such 
genocidal atrocities, we must struggle to redeem humanity 
by reflecting on such events in order to motivate us both to 
act with nobility ourselves and concomitantly, to pursue the 
goal of a humanity characterised by nobility (in which such 
expressions of ressentiment are impossible).226    
As a consequence of this need to redeem ourselves of the past, Owen 
states that the principle of eternal recurrence is Ôa public activity in the 
sense of being subject to public criteria and exhibited through the 
consonance of actions and commitments, and as such is subject to 
public testing.Õ227  Thus, Owen asserts that to argue for the eternal 
recurrence of a perspective is to claim that it represents Ôthe maximal 
expression of the virtues which characterise the practice in which the 
actor is engaged.Õ228  In so doing, Owen demonstrates how citizens 
gain integrity and self-mastery by Ôtesting these perspectives against 
each other in coming to an honest judgment concerning the degree to 
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which they satisfy the interests (exhibits the virtues) of the practice.Õ229  
In addition to enhancing the capacities of citizens, such contestation 
also aims to better society.  As Fossen states, Ôthe aim [of self-mastery] 
is not only the achievement of greater excellence according to some 
specific measure, but to set a new measure of excellence to overcome 
the old.Õ230  In this way, integrity and self-mastery enhance society by 
continually challenging norms.     
 
In an attempt at further encouraging a better society through the virtues 
of self-mastery and integrity, Owen employs the Nietzschean notion of 
competition.  On this account, citizens ensure the well-being of the state 
by striving to surpass one another.  Owen states that Ôthe public culture 
of Greek society cultivated human powers through an institutionalised 
ethos of contestation in which citizens strove to surpass each other and, 
ultimately, to set new standards of nobility.Õ231  He demonstrates how 
citizens will gain more authority if they are seen to both exhibit integrity 
and gather support for their perspectives: 
While NietzscheÕs position seems to entail equal access to 
the arena of political debate, the authority of a citizenÕs 
voice within this arena of contest will depend on both the 
degree to which the citizen is publicly recognised as 
recommending a substantive doctrine (the question of 
integrity) and the degree to which the recommendation of 
this substantive doctrine can generate public support (the 
question of truth).232 
Owen affirms that political contestation enhances society, not only 
through the development of self-mastery and integrity, but also through 
competition, which encourages citizens to surpass the capacities of 
others in order for their voice to be heard. 
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In addition to rejecting universalism in favour of contingency (through 
the concept of perspectivism), and promoting a political contestation 
seeking to enhance citizens and society, Owen also employs the notion 
of necessary interdependency.  Influenced by NietzscheÕs valorisation 
of nobility, he endorses this political contestation as the optimum 
expression of humanity: 
Politics is revealed on this civic humanist account as the 
highest form of human activity, the privileged locus of the 
good life, since it is the arena of politics that we are 
concerned with the character of nobility in arguing about 
which virtues and values should be communally 
cultivated.233   
In entering this contestation, he calls on us to adopt an ÔÒenlarged 
mentalityÓ (to borrow Hannah ArendtÕs use of KantÕs phrase), that is, our 
capacity to entertain a plurality of competing perspectives within the 
process of coming to a judgement.Õ234   Thus, we are expected to 
tolerate the diversity of plural perspectives in society.  Owen argues 
that, unlike ConnollyÕs agonistic respect and TullyÕs mutual recognition, 
Ôone does not tolerate the views of others because this is the condition 
of reciprocal toleration of our views by them, one tolerates the views of 
others because this toleration is the condition of oneÕs own integrity.Õ235  
As a result of protecting our integrity, Owen asserts that the virtues of 
truthfulness, or honesty, and justice will be further cultivated through the 
principle of toleration.  He affirms that Ôprecisely because oneÕs integrity 
is tied to tolerance, this position commits citizens to a form of society 
which is characterised by the cultivation of the conditions of honest and 
just argument between free and equal citizens.Õ236  Thus, Owen argues 
that through the competitive process of ranking our perspectives 
against one anotherÕs, and in tolerating others as a result, the virtues of 
truthfulness and justice are cultivated.   
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For Owen, truthfulness and justice are vital to the unity of a diverse 
society since these Ôare the prerequisites for reconciling contestation 
and community in a sense of solidarity, of being engaged in a common 
quest.Õ237  As a result, OwenÕs aims of a perfectionist agonism are 
twofold: first, he employs NietzscheÕs notion of competition Ôstriving for 
distinction and excellence in social practices, for ever greater words and 
deeds,Õ238 and second, he aspires to bring society together, not through 
shared values, but through a shared process of virtue cultivation.  He 
illustrates this aim by demonstrating how his theory attempts to 
Ôcultivate the virtues appropriate to political argument rather than 
attempting to elide such argument; it views social co-operation as 
predicated on a common quest rather than a common agreement.Õ239    
 
OwenÕs perfectionist theory of agonistic democracy thus seeks to 
improve society through a competitive process of contestation.  It 
assumes that all beliefs are perspectival and formed through an 
individualÕs interactions with their community.  As a result, it promotes 
continual engagement with the community in order to enable citizens to 
fulfil their capacities for integrity and self-mastery.  It advocates a 
competitive style of engagement to motivate citizens to surpass one 
another, thereby improving individual virtues and bettering society 
through the process. 
Adversarial Agonistic Democracy 
 
MouffeÕs adversarial approach offers us an account of agonistic 
democracy, which focuses upon reviving democracy through the 
creation of contending identities.  According to Mouffe, citizens become 
apathetic when there is an excess of consensus, turning to extremist 
ideologies when they are lacking a range of clearly distinct identities to 
which they can relate.  She thus refutes attempts at eradicating conflict 
through universalism or rationalism, insisting instead upon the 
importance of continual conflict for the preservation of democracy.  For 
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Mouffe, this conflict is achieved through the creation of contending 
positions with which people identify, enabling us to distinguish ÔusÕ (the 
friend) from ÔthemÕ (the enemy).  She argues that it is the existence of 
this friend/enemy divide, which encourages a collective identity to 
develop amongst friends, thereby promoting unity.  The aim is 
subsequently to transform the enemy into an adversary, which entails 
acknowledging the legitimacy and worthiness of oneÕs opponent whilst 
continuing to argue against them.  In so doing, Mouffe aspires to 
Ôtransform antagonism into agonism.Õ 240   This adversarial theory of 
agonistic democracy differs from those of Tully, Connolly and Owen as 
it places primary emphasis on creating a distinction between contending 
collective identities in order to offer citizens positions with which they 
can identify.   
 
MouffeÕs understanding of political apathy is of great significance to her 
agonistic approach as it outlines her view of both the problematic nature 
of the current political arena of political contestation, and the potential 
danger it poses.  Like Schmitt, Mouffe condemns the depoliticisation of 
liberal democracy.  In The Return of the Political she informs us that Ôit 
is indeed the political which is at stake here, and the possibility of its 
elimination.Õ 241   Mouffe attributes two principal reasons for such 
depoliticisation: Ôthe current blurring of political frontiers between left 
and rightÕ242 and Ôan apparent excess of consensus.Õ243  Of the former, 
she explains that when a clear boundary between political identities is 
lacking, citizens are unable to strongly identify with a given collective 
identity.244  As a result of this, Mouffe illustrates two potential problems 
which signify that Ôthe blurring of the frontiers between left and right, far 
from being an advance in a democratic direction, is jeopardizing the 
future of democracy.Õ 245   First, she affirms that, when citizens are 
unable to identify with any one political position, a lack of collective 
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identity arises, threatening political unity.  Mouffe states that Ôthis in turn 
fosters disaffection towards political parties and discourages 
participation in the political process.Õ 246   Thus, according to 
adversarialism, democracy is threatened when its citizens are not 
provided with clearly distinct political positions with which to identify.  As 
a result, hostility arises toward political parties, and political contestation 
Ð and thereby democracy - is hindered.  
 
In addition to decline in political participation, Mouffe suggests another 
threat to democracy that stems from the blurring of political boundaries: 
extremism.  She explains that this occurs when citizens lack unity 
through a collective political identity, and thereby seek alternative 
collective identities, such as ethnic, religious or nationalistic. 247  
According to Mouffe, Ôif [a vibrant clash of political positions and an 
open conflict of interests are] missing, it can too easily be replaced by a 
confrontation between non-negotiable moral values and essentialist 
identities.Õ248  In order to overcome this, Mouffe suggests the creation of 
Ôdiverse conceptions of citizenship which correspond to the different 
interpretations of the ethico-political principles: liberal-conservative, 
social-democratic, neo-liberal, radical-democratic, and so on.Õ249  Thus, 
for Mouffe, forming collective political identities is essential to reviving 
democracy by enhancing unity - and thereby democratic participation Ð 
and preventing identification with extremist parties.   
 
In addition to the dangers of blurring political boundaries, Mouffe also 
discusses the dangers, which arise from an excess of consensus.  She 
explains that this excess arises out of the mistaken belief by both 
democratic theorists and politicians that conflict can be eradicated, and 
that consensus ought to be achieved.250  However, for Mouffe, aspiring 
towards an all-inclusive consensus leads to a democratic deficit.  
Importantly though, her adversarialism differs from the other 
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approaches, since she does not altogether reject aspirations of arriving 
at a consensus.  Instead of abandoning the ideal of consensus, she 
calls on society to acknowledge the power relations inherent in 
consensus, affirming that Ôevery consensus exists as a temporary result 
of a provisional hegemony, as a stabilization of power, and…it always 
entails some form of exclusion.Õ251  For Mouffe, democracy is enhanced, 
not through denying these power relations and exclusions, but rather in 
acknowledging and challenging them: 
By constantly challenging the relations of inclusion-
exclusion implied by the political constitution of Óthe 
peopleÓ Ð required by the exercise of democracy Ð the 
liberal discourse of universal human rights plays an 
important role in maintaining the democratic contestation 
alive.252   
On the contrary, if we fail to challenge these power relations and 
exclusions, then, rather than keeping the democratic process alive, Ôtoo 
much emphasis on consensus and the refusal of confrontation lead to 
apathy and disaffection with political participation.Õ253  Hence, Mouffe 
highlights the importance of acknowledging that any consensus Ð 
including those surrounding liberal-democratic institutions Ð is 
exclusionary.  This additionally prevents apathy by emphasising the 
need to fight for a given consensus or institution in order to preserve its 
very existence.  Providing us with an example of this Mouffe states that 
Ôliberal-democratic institutions should not be taken for granted: it is 
always necessary to fortify and defend them.Õ254  This fortification and 
defence is rendered essential when we acknowledge that the 
consensus surrounding them is partial.  Mouffe asserts that it is our 
awareness of the impossibility of achieving a full consensus that Ôforces 
us to keep the democratic contestation alive.Õ255   
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Hence, Mouffe argues that, not only do the blurring of political 
boundaries lead to apathy, but so does an excess of consensus.  Both 
of these factors can cause a depoliticisation of society, on the one 
hand, by posing a barrier to political participation and encouraging 
identification with religious, ethnic, or nationalistic extremism; and on 
the other, by encouraging hostility toward political institutions.  For the 
former, MouffeÕs theory calls for a distinct range of political identities 
with which citizens can identify.  For the latter, Mouffe requires 
acknowledgment that every consensus is exclusionary, and 
subsequently the continual challenging of each consensus.  In order to 
provide citizens with a choice of distinct set of political identities, and to 
enable continual challenge, Mouffe adopts an agonistic approach that 
differentiates between friends, enemies, and adversaries. 
 
Drawing on Schmitt, and echoing Owen, Mouffe also abandons 
universalism in her theory of agonistic democracy, advocating instead 
the principle of contingency.  Just as Owen claims that perspectives are 
always situated, Mouffe asserts that Ôwe have to break with rationalism, 
individualism and universalism,Õ 256  and acknowledge that all 
consensuses are Ônecessarily plural, discursively constructed and 
entangled with power relations.Õ 257   She insists that conflict, or 
antagonism, is inevitable in diverse societies, and thereby condemns 
rationalists who Ôinstead of acknowledging the ineradicability of this 
tension, tr[y] to find ways of eliminating it.Õ 258   Employing RawlsÕ 
approach to justice as an example of rationalism,259 Mouffe argues that 
such a view Ôleads to the closing of the gap between justice and law that 
is a constitutive space of modern democracy.Õ 260   Democracy is 
therefore suppressed when political contestation (in this case, of justice) 
is eradicated.  She also demonstrates how such rationalism suppresses 
pluralism by rendering the dominant institutions incontestable.  She 
affirms that Ôto present the institutions of liberal democracy as the 
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outcome of a pure deliberative rationality is to reify them and make 
them impossible to transform.Õ261  As a result, Mouffe explains that Ôall 
forms of pluralism that depend on a logic of the social that implies the 
idea of Òbeing as presenceÓ and see ÒobjectivityÓ as belonging to the 
Òthings themselvesÓ necessarily lead to the reduction of plurality and to 
its ultimate negation.Õ262  This is because if we claim the dominant 
ideals to be Ôobjective,Õ then it renders them incontestable by diverse 
others.  As a result, pluralism is unsustainable because it cannot exist 
alongside the dominant ideals.  This echoes SchmittÕs concern that if a 
given group in society hijack the term ÔhumanityÕ to justify their ideals, 
then it renders the opposing side ÔinhumaneÕ and thereby negates 
diversity.   
 
Hence, Mouffe advocates the principle of contingency, stating that Ôthe 
frontier that [a liberal democratic consensus] establishes between what 
is and what is not legitimate is a political one, and for that reason must 
remain contestable.Õ263  She states that the fact that this process is an 
unending quest should not be a cause for concern because it ensures 
that the democratic contestation is kept alive.264  This thereby allows for 
a diversity of views to promote their legitimacy, subsequently 
overcoming the suppression and negation of pluralism.  In this way, 
rather than eradicating difference, Ôdemocratic politics requires us to 
bring [traces of power and exclusion] to the fore, to make them visible 
so that they can enter the terrain of contestation.Õ265        
 
Echoing Schmitt, once again, Mouffe states that collective identities Ôare 
ensembles whose configurations are always something more than the 
addition of their internal elements.Õ266   She explains that Ôcollective 
identities can only be established on the mode of an us/them.Õ267 This 
resonates with Sigmund FreudÕs claim that Ôit is always possible to bind 
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together a considerable amount of people in love, so long as there are 
other people left over to receive the manifestation of their 
aggressiveness.Õ268  Therefore, without the Ôthem,Õ or the Ôconstitutive 
outside,Õ no ÔusÕ could exist.  Additionally, Mouffe affirms that this 
interrelationality is neither static, nor permanent, but that each 
contending identity continually affects the other.  Mouffe argues that Ôin 
order to avoid any misunderstanding, let me point out that the 
Òconstitutive outsideÓ is not simply the outside of a concrete content but 
something which puts into question ÒconcretenessÓ as such.Õ269  This 
notion of identity thereby leaves Mouffe with two conclusions regarding 
her theory of agonistic democracy:  first, that if each identity cannot 
exist without its contending other, then no identity can claim to be a 
totality; and second, that if each identity is continually shaped and 
reshaped by an incommensurable other, then conflict and antagonism 
are ineradicable.270      
 
This notion of interlinked identity leads Mouffe to adopt an adversarial 
approach to agonistic democracy.  Such an approach entails dividing 
society into friends, enemies, and adversaries.  Employing the notion of 
ÔenemyÕ to label those who are excluded from the political arena, Mouffe 
is clear that her position is distinct from Ôthe type of extreme pluralism 
that emphasizes heterogeneity and incommensurability and according 
to which pluralism Ð understood as valorization of all differences Ð 
should have no limits.Õ271  This, again, separates her from alternative 
agonistic approaches.  Connolly, for instance, has been criticised for 
failing to sufficiently consider fundamentalism.272  By contrast, Mouffe 
argues that Ôlimits to pluralism…are required by a democratic politics 
that aims at challenging a wide range of relations of subordination.Õ273  
She explains this by stating that total pluralism makes us blind to the 
construction of relations of subordination, thereby rendering us unable 
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to challenge them.274  Moreover, she argues that, if we do not define an 
enemy to be excluded, then we cannot create a collective unity to 
challenge that enemy, and thus depoliticisation occurs.275  As a result, 
the agonistic contest between ÔusÕ and ÔthemÕ refers, not to that which 
takes place between the friend and the enemy, but to that of the friend 
and the adversary.  Mouffe demonstrates, then, that the struggle 
between the friend and the adversary occurs within a shared political 
space.  She asserts that Ôin the case of liberal-democratic politics this 
frontier is an internal one, and the ÒthemÓ is not a permanent 
outsider.Õ276  This is in direct contrast to the enemy who is an outsider 
(however, this outsider status is not permanent since Mouffe affirms 
that what is and is not legitimate is to be continually challenged).   
 
In distinguishing between the enemy and the adversary Mouffe also 
distinguishes between antagonism and agonism.  She states that the 
former Ôtakes place between enemies, that is, persons who have no 
common symbolic space,Õ277 whereas the latter Ôinvolves…persons who 
are friends because they share a common symbolic space but also 
enemies because they want to organize this common symbolic space in 
a different way.Õ278  Mouffe explicates this further in On The Political by 
defining Ôlegitimate conflict.Õ  She asserts that legitimate conflict entails 
preservation of the political association.  For this to occur, Mouffe 
argues that somehow a common bond must exist between the 
contending parties in order to prevent them from perceiving the other as 
an illegitimate enemy to be destroyed.279  This is significant because, by 
assuming that legitimacy is derived from common values, it renders 
adversarialism distinct from both perfectionism and inclusivism.  Owen 
rejects the possibility of sharing allegiance to a set of values, arguing 
instead that cooperation arises from participation in a common quest.280  
Similarly, for Connolly, agonistic politics does not entail establishing 
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common values, but rather Ônegotiat[ing] oblique connections across 
multiple lines of difference,Õ281  and for Tully, a sense of belonging 
comes from interdependency between different sets of values: Ôthe 
strength of the constitutional fabric consists in the interweaving of 
different threads Ð a crazy quilt rather than a crazy house.Õ282  However, 
for Mouffe, we must perceive the adversary as Ôa legitimate enemy, one 
with whom we have some common ground because we have a shared 
adhesion to the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy: liberty 
and equality.Õ283  Therefore, in spite of our ongoing disagreement with 
the adversary, we perceive them as legitimate because we share their 
framework of values.  In order to transform antagonistic relationships 
into agonistic ones Ð or enemies into adversaries - then, Ômodern 
democracyÕs specificity lies in the recognition and legitimation of conflict 
and the refusal to suppress it by imposing an authoritarian order.Õ284     
 
MouffeÕs approach to agonistic democracy offers us a very different 
theory, emphasising the importance of continual conflict between 
legitimate adversaries within a shared framework of values.  Her 
approach condemns the blurring of political boundaries and emphasis 
on consensus.  Arguing that this leads to the depoliticisation of society, 
Mouffe calls for a range of clearly distinguishable collective identities in 
order to help revive democracy through vibrant debate within a shared 
framework of ethico-political values.  Rather than seeing conflict as 
something to be eradicated, Mouffe perceives it, not only as inevitable, 
but also as essential to ensuring democratic engagement.  MouffeÕs 
central thesis is that democracy should aspire to transform antagonism, 
or Ôenemies,Õ into agonism, or Ôadversaries.Õ 
Inclusive Agonistic Democracy 
 
It is my contention that Connolly and Tully can be separated from Owen 
and Mouffe as they promote inclusive approaches which strive toward 
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engaging a wider diversity of citizens in democratic participation.285  
Connolly concentrates on ensuring that Ôressentiment does not seep 
into the inner core of our being, dividing us too profoundly against 
ourselves, and encouraging us to search too actively for collective 
enemies,Õ286 whilst Tully seeks to ensure that practices of governance 
Ôdo not become closed structures of domination under settled forms of 
justice.Õ287  Yet in spite of offering two different angles, they have been 
coupled together because of their focus on inclusivity.  Both thinkers 
converge on emphasising the interdependency of all citizens in society 
in which each gives meaning to another.  As a result, both suggest 
more inclusive forms of political contestation, such as ConnollyÕs ethos 
of pluralization and TullyÕs advocation of grass-roots politics.  In 
promoting necessary interdependency, ConnollyÕs agonistic respect 
resonates with TullyÕs mutual recognition, whereby both challenge the 
power relations between majority and minority groups.  Similarly, 
agonistic respect and audi alteram partem share goals of critique and 
self-modification in encouraging future pluralisation.  The focus of these 
concepts diverges, with Connolly striving to enhance interactions 
between citizens, and Tully aiming to overcome domination.  However, 
both of them ultimately adopt these concepts in an attempt at rendering 
democratic politics more inclusive.  Both thinkers also endorse 
contestability as a means to ensuring inclusivity through contingency.  
For Tully, contestability enables domination to be exposed and 
challenged, and for Connolly, it enables citizens to express doubts Ð 
and subsequently generosity and forbearance Ð about their positions.   
 
First, the emphasis which Connolly and Tully place on inclusivity is 
evident through the way in which they perceive identity relations in 
political contestation.  Following Nietzsche and Foucault, both thinkers 
discuss the importance of other identities to consolidating oneÕs own.  
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For instance, Connolly states that his personal identity Ôis further 
specified by comparison to a variety of the thing I am not.Õ288  This 
thereby highlights the necessity of diverse others in enabling and 
enriching the meaning of a given entity.  ConnollyÕs emphasis, here, on 
the importance of pluralism to any single entity resonates with 
FoucaultÕs discussion of the Las Meninas painting that was highlighted 
in the previous chapter.  Tully attaches similar importance to the role of 
diverse identities in forming oneÕs own.  Echoing Nietzsche and Arendt, 
he affirms that one cannot be a citizen without engagement with others, 
stating that citizenship is Ônot a status given by the institutions of the 
modern constitutional state and international law, but negotiated 
practices in which one becomes a citizen through participation.Õ 289  
Thus, just as Nietzsche claims that humans are incomplete when 
isolated from others and Arendt states that oneÕs humanity arises 
through publicly appearing to others, Tully asserts that engagement 
with others is vital to acquiring citizenship.  Hence, both Connolly and 
Tully agree that diversity constitutes a necessary component of political 
contestation by enabling people to consolidate their identities as 
citizens.  
 
Although both thinkers promote inclusivity by emphasising the need for 
diversity and pluralism, they do so to achieve different ends.  For Tully, 
the primary aim of promoting diversity and inclusivity is to overcome 
domination, whereas for Connolly, it is to enhance relations between 
conflicting citizens.  Tully endorses the notion of Ôrule by and of the 
peopleÕ, which seeks to overcome domination by requiring Ôthat citizens 
have a participatory say over the laws to which they are subject.Õ290  
Employing the example of EU negotiations, Tully asserts that citizens 
ought to be involved in the process of norm formulation, rather than 
simply voting on pre-drafted positions.  He argues that this would render 
democracy more inclusive by ensuring citizensÕ voices were heard 
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during democratic discussion, rather than being confined to the 
outcome, thereby overcoming domination.291   In supporting a more 
inclusive politics which aims to overcome domination, Tully also 
advocates grass-roots politics, involving the comparing and contrasting 
of local languages and practices; critical dialogues between diverse 
citizens; continual negotiation of pre-existing norms; interplay and 
interaction with the governed; questioning and challenging power 
relationships; negotiating or transforming modifications; implementing 
changes; reviewing these changes; and reopening negotiations.292  He 
emphasises these as mechanisms by which more voices can be heard, 
thereby overcoming domination and promoting a more inclusive 
approach to agonistic democracy.  Connolly similarly promotes a more 
inclusive politics whereby citizens engage in an ethos of pluralization in 
which Ôalternative perspectives support space for each other to exist 
through the agonistic respect they practice toward one another.Õ293  
Through this ethos - which will be discussed in more depth in the 
following Ônecessary interdependencyÕ section - Connolly strives to 
prevent ressentiment by enhancing respectful conflict, rendering 
democratic politics more inclusive as a result.  Although Connolly 
focuses predominantly on behavioural aspects of this ethos (something 
which the following chapter will discuss), Owen suggests that the 
following practices would be compatible with ConnollyÕs theory: 
participatory budgeting, citizens assemblies and juries, PR voting and 
preferenda. 294   These practices strive to encourage a diversity of 
citizens to engage with conflicting others, providing opportunities to 
practice agonistic respect. 
 
Both Connolly and Tully highlight the importance of interdependent 
identities in rendering political contestation more inclusive, agreeing that 
oneÕs political significance is reliant upon engagement with diverse 
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others.  Yet, in promoting a more inclusive politics, their aims diverge 
slightly: for Connolly, the primary purpose is to prevent ressentiment 
between conflicting citizens, whereas for Tully, the overarching goal is 
to overcome domination.  In striving toward these goals, both thinkers 
promote practices that enable wider participation of everyday citizens.  
This is evident, for instance, in ConnollyÕs notion of agonistic respect.  
Comparing agonistic respect to liberal toleration, Connolly states that 
Ôliberal tolerance is bestowed upon private minorities by a putative 
majority occupying the authoritative, public center.Õ295  Highlighting the 
dangers of this, he argues that Ôyou may have noticed that people 
seldom enjoy being tolerated that much.Õ296  Thus, Connolly favours 
agonistic respect, instead, for its attempts at Ôaffirming a more 
ambiguous relation of interdependence and strife between identities 
over a passing letting the other be.Õ297  He suggests that agonistic 
respect can challenge ressentiment by Ônegotiat[ing] oblique 
connections across multiple lines of difference, negotiating agonistic 
respect between constituencies who embrace different final faiths and 
do not comprehend each other all that well.Õ 298   Hence, by 
acknowledging the mutual nature of interdependency and promoting a 
web of respect, agonistic respect strives to challenge feelings of 
ressentiment between conflicting citizens.  In so doing, it constitutes an 
attempt at overcoming the suppression of minority identities by 
challenging the taken-for-granted nature of majority identities, thereby 
enhancing possibilities for greater inclusion. 
 
This challenging of identity relations resonates with TullyÕs concept of 
mutual recognition, which aims to avoid the temptation to formally 
recognise anotherÕs culture or way of life Ôas something already familiar 
to us and in terms drawn from our own traditions and forms of thought...  
Rather, recognition involves acknowledging [someone] in [their] own 
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terms and traditions as [they] want to be and as [they] speak to us.Õ299  
Tully demonstrates this notion, termed Ômutual recognition,Õ through Bill 
ReidÕs sculpture of a canoe, The Spirit of the Haida Gwaii, explaining 
that we are unable to see it as a single entity, and therefore must 
perceive it from each of the angles of the individual passengers.  The 
sculpture symbolises mutual recognition, encouraging us to see Ôas if 
we are being asked to see and hear them for the first time,Õ 300 
subsequently requiring us to suspend our prior understandings and 
assumptions.  In promoting mutual recognition, Tully seeks to prevent 
the majority from imposing their interpretations on minority groups, 
thereby providing a further attempt at enhancing inclusivity by 
overcoming domination.  Again, the fundamental goal of this is to 
enhance inclusivity through challenging domination, preventing 
minorities from being Ôsilenced or [being] recognised and constrained to 
speak within the institutions and traditions of interpretation of the 
imperial constitutions that have been imposed over them.Õ301  Just as 
Connolly rejects the assumption that interdependency is a one-way 
street in which a dominant majority tolerates an inferior minority, Tully 
rejects understanding as something, which a majority culture imposes 
on a minority culture.  Thus, both thinkers strive to render politics more 
inclusive by preventing majority groups from dominating minority ones.  
For Connolly, emphasis is on improving interactions between citizens, 
whereas for Tully, the focus is on enabling more voices to be heard.  
 
Both thinkers extend these ideas into mechanisms of critique and 
challenge, creating possibilities for the challenging of future dominant 
norms; something termed by Connolly as ÔpluralisationÕ.  For Tully, this 
is through the notion of audi alteram partem, and for Connolly, this is 
through the notion of critical responsiveness.  Audi alteram partem, 
offering an additional means of overcoming domination, encourages us 
to approach with Ôa willingness to listen to its culturally diverse spirits.Õ302  
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Listening to others is of great significance to Tully, who deems it to be 
Ôthe first and perhaps only universalisable principle of democratic 
deliberation.Õ303  He stresses that this is of particular significance for 
those who Ôare silenced or misrepresented by the official rules or by the 
most powerful critics.Õ 304   Thus, for Tully, audi alteram partem is 
important in encouraging a more inclusive society by preventing 
minority groups from being marginalised.  It also encourages norms to 
be challenged and reformulated since Ôthis difficult form of critical 
multilogue enables the participants to see the limited and partial 
character of their self-understandings; to begin to move around to a 
broader view of the relevant considerations; and so open the possibility 
of reaching a fair judgment.Õ305  In Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism 
in an Age of Diversity, Tully echoes these calls to challenge and modify 
norms through the symbol of Xuuya, a raven who continuously changes 
his identity.  Using this metaphor, he demonstrates that Ôour habitual 
forms of recognition are often stultifying forms of misrecognition which 
need to be upset and reversed from time to time.Õ306   Thus, Tully 
advocates challenge and critique in order to overcome domination and 
promote inclusivity in both the present and future.  He calls on citizens 
to adopt a Ôfurther enhance a critical attitude to oneÕs own culture and a 
tolerant and critical attitude towards others.Õ307   
 
TullyÕs endorsement of challenge as a means to promoting future 
inclusivity resounds heavily in ConnollyÕs critical responsiveness.  
Critical responsiveness asks us to adopt a more open attitude towards 
others, in order to Ôrender yourself better able to listen to new and 
surprising movements in the politics of becoming without encasing 
them immediately in preset judgments that sanctify the universality or 
naturalness of what you already are.Õ308  This echoes TullyÕs calls for us 
to approach different cultures (including our own) with a critical attitude 
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in order to enable future pluralisation.  Just as Tully states that audi 
alteram partem is essential to acknowledging the limitedness and 
partiality of our ideas, Connolly believes self-modification is essential to 
Ôshak[ing] up something in the established world…  Propel[ling] a fork in 
political time, throw[ing] a wrench into the established code of 
obligation, goodness, identity, justice, right, or legitimacy.Õ309   Thus, 
both thinkers deem it necessary to disturb current thinking through audi 
alteram partem and critical responsiveness.  Yet, once again, whereas 
Tully promotes self-modification as a means of overcoming domination, 
for Connolly, the emphasis is upon preventing ressentiment: 
To cultivate critical responsiveness to a new movement in 
the politics of becoming is at once to work tactically on gut 
feelings already sedimented into you, to readdress refined 
concepts previously brought to these issues, and to work 
on the circuits through which the former connect to the 
latter.310   
 
Hence, both Connolly and Tully employ inclusive approaches to 
necessary interdependency through endorsement of agonistic respect 
and mutual recognition.  These principles enable greater inclusivity by 
promoting respectful relations between conflicting citizens and asking 
citizens to recognise one another in their own terms.  They also 
encourage future drives of pluralisation by encouraging self-
modification through audi alteram partem and critical responsiveness, 
which ask citizens to listen to others (particularly those who are 
marginalised), and to be more open to diversity.  Again, both thinkers 
promote inclusivity, but on ConnollyÕs account it aims to improve 
interactions between conflicting citizens, whereas for Tully it seeks to 
prevent the domination of minority citizens.   
 
In promoting contingent politics, both Connolly and Tully also advocate 
the principle of contestability.  Drawing on Foucault, Nietzsche and 
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Arendt, their emphasis on contestability derives from the assumption 
that truth is entangled in power relations and their subsequent rejection 
of universalism.  Echoing Chapter OneÕs discussion about the dangers 
of universalism, Tully asserts that those who attach universality to their 
own ideals Ôcannot recognise and respect any plurality of narratives, 
traditions or civilisations as equal yet different, and enter into a dialogue 
with them on equal footing.Õ311  He explains that diversity is threatened 
by universalism, which Ôalready captures other peoples (and their legal 
and political civilisations) in its own presumptively universal 
categories.Õ312   Tully thereby perceives universalism as a barrier to 
achieving mutual recognition whereby citizens understand others as 
they wish to be understood.  He illustrates this with the example of EU 
rhetoric, showing how the employment of universal terminology, such 
as Ôpeace and freedom,Õ are used in contrast with labels, such as 
Ôbarbarism,Õ providing a barrier to understanding people in their own 
terms.313  This resonates with NietzscheÕs calls for ÔuntruthÕ to blur the 
boundaries between ÔgoodÕ and ÔbadÕ moralities.  Tully explains that 
when diversity is measured against universal principles in this way, 
citizens Ôcannot approach another peopleÕs way of life as an alternative 
horizon, thereby throwing their own into question and experiencing 
human finitude and plurality, the beginning of insight and cross-cultural 
understanding.Õ314   Thus, to prevent such domination and enhance 
inclusivity, Tully employs contestability through Ôacting differently,Õ which 
attempts to Ôshow what were the effects, show that there were other 
rational possibilities, teach people what they ignore about their own 
situation, on their conditions of work, on their exploitation.Õ315  Thus, 
TullyÕs emphasis on contestability focuses on exposing and overcoming 
domination through showing people alternative actions.  TullyÕs acting 
differently requires that we perceives the rules of politics as having Ôan 
element of Ònon-consensualityÓ,Õ thereby always allowing room for their 
questioning, challenging and modification.  It is this ability to question, 
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challenge and modify which enables citizens to overcome the 
domination brought about by current norms which attach universality to 
their ideals.316  
 
ConnollyÕs account of contestability draws influence from NietzscheÕs 
pathos of distance in which, whilst affirming a belief, citizens Ôcome to 
terms viscerally and positively with the extent to which it must appear 
profoundly contestable to others inducted into different practices, 
exposed to different events, and pulled by different calls to loyalty.Õ317  
By acknowledging that others may contest our own beliefs, Connolly 
asserts that citizens Ôconnect positively through reciprocal confession 
that those in each group confront doubts, forgetfulness, or uncertainties 
in themselves that may invert those confronted by others.Õ318  Thus, as 
a result of acknowledging contestability, relations are enhanced 
between diverse citizens who interact with Ôgenerosity and 
forbearance.Õ319  Thus, once again, Connolly promotes a more inclusive 
politics which aspires to prevent ressentiment and encourage more 
positive relations between conflicting citizens.  Hence, both Connolly 
and Tully endorse the principle of contestability as a means of 
encouraging a more inclusive society.  For Connolly, contestability 
entails preventing ressentiment by reducing the threat which one poses 
to the identity of another.  For Tully, this entails exposing and 
overcoming domination by teaching citizens what could have been 
different about their situations, and consequently encouraging 
challenging, questioning and modification.   
 
Thus, Connolly and Tully represent the Ôinclusive approachÕ to agonistic 
democracy, which strives to involve a wider diversity of citizens in 
democratic engagement.  They both share an assumption of identity as 
interdependent, in which citizens cannot fully exist without one another.  
As a result, they both promote democratic practices which encourage 
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wider participation of everyday citizens.  They also both advocate the 
challenging of dominant power relations through agonistic respect and 
mutual recognition.  Additionally, they share a commitment to future 
drives to pluralisation through critical responsiveness and audi alteram 
partem.  Finally, they both adopt the concept of contestability in which 
the existence of alternate beliefs is emphasised.  For Connolly, these 
concepts attempt to produce more positive interactions, whereas for 
Tully, they seek to overcome domination.  Yet, both thinkers converge 
on the overall goal of promoting political contestation, necessary 
interdependency and contingency to render democratic politics more 
inclusive. 
Conclusion 
 
The chapter has outlined three distinct approaches to agonistic 
democracy, which employ political contestation, contingency and 
necessary interdependency to different ends.  Drawing on Nietzsche, 
OwenÕs account of political contestation focuses on enhancing society 
through the provision of a collective competition in which citizens strive 
to surpass one another.  It promotes contingency through eternal 
recurrence and self-mastery whereby citizens challenge their own 
values, those of others and the standards against which these values 
are measured.  It also emphasises necessary interdependency by 
engaging citizens in a common quest, thereby promoting cooperation.   
 
Significantly influenced by Schmitt, MouffeÕs adversarial approach 
proposes a political contestation, which draws on citizensÕ passions and 
provides an outlet for the expression of conflict.  Her adversarial 
approach promotes contingency by ensuring that any consensus is 
Ôconflictual,Õ enabling the adversarial group to continually challenge the 
hegemonic values. It promotes necessary interdependency through two 
means.  First, each ÔfriendÕ group is constituted in relation to an 
oppositional, adversarial group, thereby creating unity between Ôfriends.Õ  
Second, the existence of a common ÔenemyÕ group strives to 
demonstrate adversarial legitimacy to conflicting groups.   
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Finally, Connolly and Tully, drawing on Foucault, Nietzsche and Arendt, 
offer inclusive accounts of agonistic democracy.  Their political 
contestation involves an ethos in which an entangled web of citizens 
comes together to contest their values.  For them, contingency provides 
a tool to render society more inclusive by, on ConnollyÕs account, 
asking citizens to demonstrate the arguable nature of their position, and 
on TullyÕs, requiring citizens to listen to one another in their own terms, 
and exposing alternate possibilities.  They also promote necessary 
interdependency through normative behaviours, such as agonistic 
respect and critical responsiveness (for Connolly), and mutual 
recognition and audi alteram partem (for Tully), seeking to enhance 
inclusivity by challenging domination and overcoming ressentiment. 
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Chapter Three: Exploring the Need for Further 
Institutional Consideration 
 
Having outlined three distinct approaches to agonistic democracy, each 
seeking to employ agonistic concepts to different ends, I now suggest 
that they all converge on one component: underdeveloped institutional 
consideration. I will begin by discussing existing critiques of agonistic 
institutions, before analysing the extent to which agonists have 
considered institutions.  Here, I draw on agonist literature as well as 
insights from the new institutionalist field.  The work of Vivien Lowndes 
is particularly important to this thesis, not only because of its influence 
on new institutionalism, but also because of its ability to bridge a gap 
between post-structuralism and new-institutionalism (see, for instance, 
ÔDesigning democratic institutions for decentred governance: the 
Council of Europe's acquisÕ in Practices of Freedom: Decentred 
Governance, Conflict and Democratic Participation).320   In exploring 
new institutionalism alongside agonism, I argue that agonists do offer a 
variety of informal institutions, but that there has been little thought 
about how to operationalise these.  Considering resistance toward 
agonistic institutions, I propose that thinking through the realisation of 
these concepts could enrich, rather than undermine the field.  I suggest 
that certain types of institution could enable contingency, and would, 
therefore, not necessarily be incompatible with agonistic principles.   
 
Claiming that agonistic democracy requires further institutional 
development is not a new critique.  Young, for instance, highlights the 
ÔabstractnessÕ of ConnollyÕs work, charging it with a Ôlack of political 
recommendations.Õ 321  Schaap expresses a similar sentiment toward 
MouffeÕs work, arguing that Ôher theory lacks an adequate account of 
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the institutionalisation of agonistic democracy.Õ 322   Furthermore, Ed 
Wingenbach asserts that both Connolly and Mouffe provide only 
Ôunderdeveloped suggestions for conceptualizing democratic 
institutions,Õ 323 which offer Ôfrustratingly shallowÕ 324 alternatives.  
Significantly, such criticism is not confined to Connolly and Mouffe, with 
Kalyvas describing the field of agonistic democracy as a Ôpredominantly 
abstract and normatively inclined understanding of political conflict.Õ325  
Thus, several critics highlight the abstract, normative emphasis of 
agonistic democracy, which I will now discuss. 
 
In arguing for an account of agonistic democracy that considers how 
seemingly abstract, normative concepts might be operationalised, it is 
necessary to analyse the extent to which institutions have already been 
considered within the field of agonistic democracy.  It is helpful here to 
draw upon new institutionalist understanding of institutions in which, in 
spite of variation across the field (Guy Peters notes that Ôthere are at 
least six versions of the new institutionalism in current useÕ326), Ôthere 
seems to be a general agreement that, at their core, political institutions 
are Òthe rules of the gameÓ.Õ327  This resonates with the post-structuralist 
assumptions of agonistic democracy in which Ôaccording to Foucault, 
the study of any game will involve, first, the analysis of the rules in 
accordance with which the game is routinely played.Õ328  Fundamentally, 
for agonists, these rule-governed games Ð and therefore institutions Ð 
constitute formal and informal relationships, are constantly in flux, and 
have the potential to be shaped and transformed by actors: 
Rather than restricting ÒagonismÓ to formal games and 
face-to-face contests, [Foucault] extends its application to 
any form of activity of language game in which the co-
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ordination of action is potentially open to dispute, as a 
Òpermanent provocationÓ, and, within these manifold 
games, to any form of reciprocal interplay, or Òincitation 
and struggleÓ, disputation takes, from sedimented games 
of domination where free play is reduced to a minimum at 
one end, through all the forms of negotiation and 
provisional agreements and disagreements, up to direct 
confrontations that break up the game at the other end.329   
 
This parallels new institutionalist thought in which institutions can be 
both formal and informal, have the ability to change, and not only shape 
actorsÕ behaviour but are also shaped by actors themselves: 
Ô[Institutions] shape actorsÕ behaviour through informal as 
well as formal means; they exhibit dynamism as well as 
stability; they distribute power and are inevitably contested; 
they take a messy and differentiated form; and are mutually 
constitutive with the political actors whom they influence, 
and by whom they are influenced.Õ330 
 
Unlike classical accounts of institutionalism, which focused upon Ôformal 
government institutions, constitutional issues, and public law,Õ331 new 
institutionalism discusses habitual and cultural rules, such as Ôbeliefs, 
paradigms, codes, cultures, and knowledge.Õ332  More specifically, on 
the normative account of new institutionalism, institutions are sets of 
rules which Ôguide and constrain the behaviour of individual actors.Õ333  
Lowndes and Mark Roberts inform us that institutions constrain 
behaviour either by formal and recorded rules; informal and 
demonstrated practices; or semi-formal and spoken narratives.334  Thus, 
when examining the extent to which agonistic democracy provides us 
with institutions, I consider rules, practices and narratives relating to 
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informal habits and culture as well as formal rules, organisations and 
government bodies which guide and constrain behaviour.   
 
Despite emphasising the need for further institutional consideration in 
his book Institutionalizing Agonistic Democracy: Post-Foundationalism 
and Political Liberalism, Wingenbach does acknowledge that agonists 
provide Ôscattered reflections on the political implementation of an 
agonistic vision.Õ 335   This section of the chapter examines such 
reflections, demonstrating the institutional thought that has already 
occurred within the field of agonistic democracy.  For instance, OwenÕs 
perfectionism depicts an agonistic politics in which citizens engage with 
one another in a collective ranking of values.  Drawing on Ancient 
Greece, he explains that democratic citizens strive to surpass one 
anotherÕs values, bettering society as a result.  In this way, Owen 
promotes political contestation through the institution of informal and 
demonstrated practices.  As Lowndes and Roberts explain, such 
practices constrain behaviour, not through recorded rules but through 
demonstration in which actors repeat the behaviour of others: 
Unlike rules, these are not formally recorded or officially 
sanctioned.  Their mode of transmission is, rather, through 
demonstration: actors understand how they are supposed to 
behave through observing the routinized actions of others 
and seeking to recreate those actions.336    
 
The ranking of values Owen advocates is also guided by certain 
behavioural rules, for instance, the truthfulness and justice components 
of integrity.  These require citizens to follow the rules of the game and 
refrain from cheating (truthfulness) whilst also reflecting honestly on 
oneÕs own performance (justice).  This resonates with new institutionalist 
discussion of Ôa logic of appropriateness which tells [citizens] which 
practices they should follow in any given situation, and third party 
enforcement is the Òbinding expectationsÓ of other actors in the 
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immediate context.Õ337  Hence, in perfectionist agonism, the rules of the 
game inform citizens of how they ought to act, and other citizens ensure 
that they adhere to these guidelines.  However, I suggest that the 
informal rules in OwenÕs account are slightly less concerned with 
enforcement, emphasising instead, the need to encourage these 
behaviours through collective competition and engagement in a 
common quest.  This nuance between enforcement and encouragement 
is important when considering how to operationalise agonistic concepts. 
      
Linked to this is OwenÕs normative notion of Ôenlarged mentalityÕ in which 
actors are required to tolerate a diversity of perspectives in order to be 
considered integral citizens.  Once again, in employing this concept, 
Owen provides an informal institution on what William Scott terms as 
institutionalismÕs Ônormative pillarÕ whereby Ônorms specify how things 
should be done; they define legitimate means to pursue valued ends.Õ338  
In this case, requiring an enlarged mentality specifies citizens to tolerate 
one anotherÕs opinions in order to attain integrity, thereby enhancing 
individual autonomy and society as a result.  The behaviour of citizens is, 
again, guided and constrained toward how they ought to act.  They are 
encouraged to follow such norms in order to be seen by others as 
having integrity. 
 
MouffeÕs adversarialism also employs institutions, but, rather than 
focusing on informal practices as a means to guide and constrain 
behaviour, she makes use of what James Martin labels a Ômotivational 
narrative.Õ339  Lowndes and Roberts state the importance of narratives 
in constraining action: 
The most effective political institutions are characterized by 
resonant stories.  Although governments will always pass 
laws and seek to shape practices, a great deal of politics is 
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about more subtle processes of explanation and 
persuasion.340 
Hence, by dividing the world into Ôfriends,Õ ÔadversariesÕ and Ôenemies,Õ 
adversarialism resonates with the narrative approach to constraining 
action.  Lowndes and Roberts state that the importance of the narrative 
approach derives from its ability to Ôprovide an account not just of how 
we do things around here, but also why we do things the way we 
do.Õ 341   This is significant when we consider the way in which 
ConnollyÕs work is criticised for inadequate consideration of how to 
motivate citizens to engage in an ethos of respect.342  Since Mouffe 
explains the motivation to engage as resulting from a provocation to 
win over the adversary, her narrative accounts for why citizens should 
engage with one another.   
 
Just as citizens in a perfectionist society would be constrained by 
informal practices, which demonstrate the logic of appropriateness, and 
held accountable to these by the expectations of others, MouffeÕs 
adversarialism also employs informal and demonstrated practices.  In 
creating a frontier between those who are to be included (citizens who 
endorse liberty and equality, and do not threaten the democratic process) 
from those who are to be excluded, Mouffe establishes a logic of 
appropriateness in which citizens demonstrate to one another what is 
acceptable, and hold each other accountable to this. 
 
Both Connolly and TullyÕs work employ similar informal and 
demonstrated practices as that of OwenÕs value ranking.  Agonistic 
respect and audi alteram partem, for instance, provide informal rules, 
which guide and constrain behaviour.  As Owen asserts of TullyÕs work, 
Ôthe diverse normative structures of different types of constitutional order 
have implications for what it is to engage in political contestation within 
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and over the terms of those orders.Õ343  Agonistic respect, for instance, 
requires us to respect views which conflict with our own, asking us to 
contain our anger or frustration toward a particular point of view in order 
to show respect for the person holding it.  Whereas audi alteram partem 
requires us to hold back from expressing our own view in order to 
encourage minority voices to be heard.  Hence, such normative 
principles guide and constrain behaviour, thereby shaping the political 
contestation.  According to Norval, normative rules, such as agonistic 
respect and audi alteram partem may be particularly effective in 
ensuring cooperation.  She states that rules and practices which best 
encourage compliance Ômay be those that cultivate trust and embody Òa 
direct appeal to moral principlesÓ.Õ344  This is significant when discussing 
ConnollyÕs normative accounts since they have been charged with 
insufficient consideration of how to ensure such normative principles are 
adhered to.  Deveaux, for example, states that the normative principles 
of agonistic respect and critical responsiveness require institutions:  
The vision of Òan intercultural engagement of agonistic 
respect and critical responsiveness between contending 
identities linked together by multiple bonds of interest, 
interdependence and memoryÓ says nothing about what 
agonistic institutions could help to inculcate and sustain 
such respect.345 
Yet on NorvalÕs account, DeveauxÕs claim is unwarranted because 
respect is inculcated and sustained through social norms and logics of 
appropriateness.  
 
Further, both Connolly and Tully provide links between these informal 
rules and practices, and ones that are more formal.  Tully, for instance, 
Ôsituates his agonism explicitly within the framework of 
constitutionalism,Õ 346  and discusses how the European Union might 
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become more agonistic.  Additionally, as Howarth asserts, Connolly 
outlines six dimensions of the political: micropolitics; a politics of 
disturbance; a politics of enactment; a politics of representational 
assemblages; a politics of interstate relations; and a politics of non-
statist, cross-national movements. 347   Thus, both thinkers discuss 
informal institutions alongside more formal institutions.  
 
It is evident that agonistic democracy does offer some important 
institutional insights.  Each thinker develops agonistic concepts, which 
guide and constrain the behaviour of actors.  Hence, I fully endorse 
WingenbachÕs assertion that Ô[providing a critique of agonistic 
institutions] is not to imply agonist theorists have been wholly inattentive 
to the implications of their theoretical approach.Õ348  Yet, as Howarth 
affirms, Ôthough these accounts allude to the importance of democratic 
rules and procedures, there is still something of an Òinstitutional deficitÓ 
in their respective theories, both in terms of their critiques of existing 
arrangements and in terms of their more positive alternatives.Õ349  For 
the purpose of addressing my central question, I consider the latter of 
these two ÔdeficitsÕ: providing a more positive alternative.  It is my 
contention that, in spite of suggesting informal institutional concepts, 
agonistic democrats have given little suggestion as to ways in which 
such concepts might be operationalised.  
 
If, for instance, we analyse OwenÕs account of a public value ranking, it 
is not obvious what such a public ranking might look like, or how norms, 
such as enlarged mentality, truthfulness and justice might be 
established.  As Anthony Arblaster affirms, Ôa spirit of citizenship is seen 
to imply a willingness to think and act as members of the community as 
a whole, not solely as self-interested individuals or as members of 
particular interest groups.Õ350  James March and Johan Olsen term this 
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the Ôlogic of appropriatenessÕ351 in which citizens learn how they ought 
to act from following the behaviour of others, and are encouraged to act 
in this way by the expectations of others.  However, it remains unclear 
in OwenÕs theory as to how this spirit of citizenship emerges, or how 
citizens are made aware of the logic of appropriateness.  Further 
thought about supplementary institutions might be helpful in answering 
this, since as Lowndes and Lawrence Pratchett assert, Ôinstitutional 
design is an attempt to get meanings to ÒstickÓ.Õ352  Given the historical 
roots of his work, Peter Wagner and Nathalie Karaginannis highlight the 
crucial question: Ôhow can this [Ancient Greek] model be translated to 
contemporary circumstances?Õ353   Perhaps, then, further institutional 
consideration could help to answer such questions, and help OwenÕs 
meanings to stick. 
 
Similarly, in spite of suggesting a series of informal narratives which 
constrain the behaviour of actors, MouffeÕs adversarialism is unclear as 
to how the Ôfriend,Õ ÔadversaryÕ and ÔenemyÕ distinctions should be 
demonstrated to citizens.  Lowndes and Roberts state that Ôfor the 
narrative mode of constraint, the bases for compliance are frequently 
rehearsed shared understandings which lead to Òtaken-for-
grantednessÓ.Õ354   However, in MouffeÕs adversarialism, there is an 
absence of discussion about how such a shared understanding of the 
friend/adversary/enemy narrative might arise.  
 
Finally, in spite of their evident institutional consideration, Connolly and 
Tully, like Owen and Mouffe, offer little suggestions as to how an ethos 
of agonistic respect might encourage respect and critical 
responsiveness, or how audi alteram partem and mutual recognition 
might render institutions such as the European Union more agonistic.  
As Schaap highlights, Ôit is not clear how (or why) citizens come to have 
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the Òagonistic respectÓ for each other that would ensure that their 
conflict remains non-violent.Õ355  As Lowndes and Pratchett affirm, in 
order for institutional rules to be effected they need to be created, 
recognised and embedded.356  Yet, whilst Connolly and Tully suggest 
both informal and formal agonistic institutions, they do not offer much 
insight as to which forms these might take, or how these could be 
recognised and embedded in order to take effect.  Owen demonstrates 
this of ConnollyÕs work, arguing that consideration of the types of 
institutions and practices that support ConnollyÕs ethos is Ôa topic which 
has been rather under-elaborated in ConnollyÕs recent work.Õ357  
 
Thus, in spite of providing a range of informal and formal institutions, 
which guide and constrain behaviour, it is my contention that more 
thought is needed about how to supplement Ôpredominantly abstract, 
normatively inclinedÕ358agonistic concepts with ideas about which forms 
agonistic democracy might take in society.  As Norval affirms, Ôthe 
criteria for thinking critically about democracy that may be gleaned from 
[poststructuralist theoristsÕ] work are often left implicit in their accounts, 
and may have to be formulated explicitly by those interested in drawing 
them out.Õ 359   However, this contention is not uncontroversial and 
Wingenbach highlights the potential for tensions between agonistic 
democracy and institutional consideration.  He asserts that some 
agonists are resistant toward Ôthe effort to sketch plausible institutional 
parameters for agonistic practices,Õ360 stating that Ôagonistic democracy 
does emerge from a tradition emphasizing resistance and disruption, so 
it is important to explain clearly why an agonistic theory of institutions is 
not oxymoronic.Õ361  
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First, then, let us return to the agonistic rejection of rationalism and 
universalism, as outlined in depth in Chapter One.  Agonists highlight 
the dangers of attaching these labels to political values, claiming that 
the tendency to do so negates diversity and suppresses pluralism.  
Foucault thus asserts that Ôthe role of philosophy is also to keep watch 
over the excessive powers of political rationality.Õ362  As a result, Griggs 
et al. explain that, far from focusing on institutional exploration, most 
agonistic democrats are more concerned with Ôthe modalities of 
subjectivity that are endangered by both practices of government and of 
freedom; in the manner in which norms come to be established and 
ÒnormalisedÓ; and the ways in which such hegemonic norms become 
and remain subject to contestation.Õ363  Following this, Lida Maxwell 
affirms that it is not institutions per se toward which agonists are hostile, 
but rather, they are Ôcritical of a juridical view of institutions, which seeks 
to quarantine them from the unpredictability of political action.Õ 364  
Hence, when discussing institutions, it is important to consider 
opportunities for change and unpredictability.   
 
In turning away from normalising or juridical institutions in favour of 
those which allow for challenge and transformation, the concept of 
contingency (which was outlined as one of the primary agonistic themes 
in Chapter One) is particularly useful.  This concept is significant for 
agonistic democracy since it rejects rationalism and universalism in 
favour of challenge and critique.  For Owen, this is important in 
enhancing individual autonomy and bettering society; for Mouffe, this is 
vital to keeping citizens engaged and overcoming apathy; and for 
Connolly and Tully, this is essential to enhancing interactions and 
challenging domination, thereby promoting inclusivity.  However, as 
Foucault outlines in Subject and Power, the theme of contingency 
appears to be at odds with further institutional consideration.  He argues 
that Ôthe fact that an important part of the mechanisms put into 
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operation by an institution are designed to ensure its own preservation 
brings with it the risk of deciphering functions which are essentially 
reproductive.Õ365  Hence, by employing elements that guarantee their 
own preservation, institutions typically encourage reproduction and 
prevent critique and challenge, thereby posing an obstacle to the 
contingency that is fundamental to agonistic democracy.   
 
However, as Foucault also demonstrates, actors also play a role in 
shaping institutions since Ôat the very heart of the power relationship, 
and constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the 
intransigence of freedom.Õ366  This resonates with OwenÕs assertion that 
normative commitments are not, as Kant argues, a set of determinate 
external constraints placed on our political agency, but rather, Ônon-
determinate (not indeterminate) internal conditions of such political 
agency.Õ367  This also resonates with Lowndes and RobertÕs view that 
ÔÒrule takersÓ are not passive implementers, but creative agents who 
interpret rules, assign cases to rules, and adapt or even resist rules.Õ368  
They describe rule takers as Ôalso rule benders and rule breakers,Õ 
supporting March and OlsenÕs claim that, in addition to constraining 
citizens, Ô[rules] increase action capabilities and efficiency.Õ369  Thus, 
just as institutions hold power over citizens, so too do citizens hold 
power over their institutions.  As Wolfgang Streeck and Kozo 
Yamamura affirm, Ôinstitutions remain dependent on actors for their 
maintenance, defence, revision and rediscovery.Õ370   Hence, on this 
understanding whereby citizens are the constrainers as well as the 
constrained, institutions might not always be successful in reaffirming 
and reproducing their own position.  Discursive institutionalism is helpful 
here, since on this account, institutional change occurs alongside a shift 
in the ideas and values that constitute the discourse: 
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In discursive institutionalism institutional change is defined 
through changes in the ideas and values that are the core 
of the discourse.  Given that these ideas and values are 
created through discussion, that is discourse, among the 
members then institutional change much also reflect that 
change in that discourse.371   
 
Thus, fundamental to preventing such unquestioned reaffirmation and 
reproduction Ð thereby enabling the principle of contingency Ð is the 
provision of institutions that limit the power of institutional structures and 
emphasise the autonomy of agents.  Owen affirms that Ôthe normative 
commitments intrinsic to political membership cannot be fully specified 
in and through any set of determinate legal principles.Õ372  Instead, 
citizens ought to play a part in shaping the institutions which guide and 
constrain their behaviour, since as Norval asserts, Ôwhat is important is 
our ability to criticize Ð so as to animate  - our institutions, and the 
imagination to change and challenge them, as crucial to the 
maintenance of our democratic institutions.Õ373  In order to enable the 
ideas and values of citizens to shape and reshape institutions, citizens 
might, for instance, become involved in decisions over which content 
should be discussed, how much time is required, which rules and 
practices should be followed, and which decision-making techniques to 
employ for each political contestation.  Or, perhaps institutions could 
grant autonomy to citizens by establishing a set of rules or practices 
and requiring citizens themselves to implement and negotiate these as 
a group, rather than enforcing them through an outside mediator. 
Institutions that increase the autonomy of agents seem compatible with 
FoucaultÕs rejection of power, which Ôcategorizes the individual, marks 
him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a 
law of truth on him which he must recognize and which others have to 
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recognize in him.Õ 374   By restricting the amount of power held by 
institutions, whilst providing citizens with autonomy, institutions may be 
compatible with Ôagonism…a relationship which is at the same time 
reciprocal incitation and struggle, less of a face-to-face confrontation 
which paralyzes both sides than a permanent provocation.Õ375  In this 
way, then, Ôpractices of governance and practices of freedom always go 
hand in hand.Õ376          
 
I have sought to argue, then, that certain institutions that limit the power 
of the ruler and enhance the autonomy of the individual may be 
compatible with the agonistic principle of contingency.  It is now 
important to demonstrate why further institutional consideration is 
important and how it might, not only compatible with - but also 
significant to - enriching theoretical insights into agonistic democracy.  
In suggesting this, I return to the critics of agonistic democracy, who 
question what form agonistic democracy will take.  Endorsing the 
agonistic notion of challenge, Howarth asserts, Ôbut this in turn raises 
further questions about how this can be brought about: queries 
concerning the strategies, tactics and conditions of such projects and 
assemblages.Õ 377   Critics also suggest the dangers that potentially 
emerge from failing to address the question of Ôhow.Õ  Deveaux, for 
instance, emphasises how Ôagonistic democrats have so far had little to 
say about citizens who may refuse to cooperate with other citizens, or 
about groups that have an entrenched interest in having a conflict 
continue unresolved.Õ378   Hence, by offering little insight into which 
forms a political contestation might take, agonistic democrats do not 
discuss how to resolve potential problems, such as a reluctance, or 
refusal, to engage.  Deveaux and Young also raise concerns that 
ConnollyÕs ethos may Ôrequire the relative social privilege enjoyed by 
political theorists,Õ379 or that access to political institutions; leisure time; 
                                                
374 Foucault, M. (1982), p. 781. 
375 Ibid., p. 790. 
376 Griggs, S., Norval, A. and Wagenaar, H. (2014), p. 31. 
377 Howarth, D. (2008), p. 179. 
378 Deveaux, M. (1999), p. 5. 
379 Young, I. (1992), p. 514. 
 102
education; judgment and participation skills; and the impact of the mass 
media 380 are all factors which affect the ability to participate.  
Consequently, by exploring supplementary institutions, agonists could 
gain deeper insights into such questions and concerns.  
 
It is my contention, then, that if agonistic democrats were to offer further 
suggestions about how to operationalise existing agonistic institutions, 
they would be better able to consider how to address potential 
problems.  As Lowndes and Roberts inform us, institutions empower as 
well as constrain,381 and thus, perhaps further institutional consideration 
could provide mechanisms which encourage reluctant citizens to 
engage with others, or which enable socially disadvantaged or 
uneducated citizens to participate.  In Ackerman and FishkinÕs 
Deliberation Day project, by thinking about how deliberative theory 
might be operationalised into an annual day, they also offer solutions to 
problems, for instance by addressing barriers to motivation through 
monetary incentives.382   I argue that agonistic democracy could be 
enriched through further institutional consideration since this would 
provide further insight into how potential theoretical tensions might be 
navigated.  As Fossen clarifies, Ôto distinguish itself as a mature current 
of its own, rather than a footnote to liberal and deliberative accounts of 
politics, agonism needs to engage questions of law and institutions 
more thoroughly.Õ383          
 
In sum, then, I contend that, agonist accounts do provide informal 
institutions, which shape behaviour through demonstration, normative 
guidelines and motivational narratives, and that these are sometimes 
supplemented with consideration of more formal supplementary 
institutions, as in ConnollyÕs six dimensions of the politics.  Yet, I argue 
that these are predominantly abstract recommendations, and beg the 
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question of what their practical application might look like, or how such 
practices come to be recognised or embedded.  I argue that, whilst 
there is a tension between institutions and agonistic concepts, this can 
be balanced by proposing institutions that ensure unpredictability, 
reflecting changing ideas and values, and engage citizens in decisions.  
In this way, I contend that institutions can provide space for contingency 
and contestability, empowering citizens, rather than simply constraining 
them.  Finally, I suggest that further thought into the realisation of 
agonistic concept might also feed back into the theory itself, by 
providing further insight into questions raised by critics.   
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Conclusion to Part One 
 
Part One of the thesis has provided the theoretical underpinnings of the 
research.  It began by returning to the theoretical roots of agonistic 
democracy, demonstrating how Arendt, Foucault, Nietzsche, and 
Schmitt share three themes that resound across agonistic democratic 
theory.  These include the political contestation of conflicting values, the 
necessary interdependency of citizens and the contingent nature of 
politics.  Despite their convergence on these themes, the thinkers differ 
on their employment of these themes.  This is most noticeable in 
SchmittÕs work, which constructs society on collective, adversarial 
identity relations between states, demarcating a specific arena of Ôthe 
political.Õ  Chapter Two demonstrated the importance of these 
differences to contemporary agonistic approaches.  It outlined three 
distinct approaches: the Ôperfectionist,Õ the ÔadversarialÕ and the 
Ôinclusive.Õ  It explained how each approach employs the three themes 
derived from the thinkers, but they often do this in different ways to 
arrive at different ends.  It suggested that the purpose of OwenÕs 
perfectionist agonism is to better society through collective competition, 
whilst Mouffe aims to provoke engagement between conflicting groups 
of citizens through passion and competition, and Connolly and Tully 
seek to render society more inclusive by challenging ressentiment and 
overcoming domination.  Chapter Three is the crux of the thesis, 
arguing that agonistic concepts are largely abstract and that more 
thought needs to be given as to how they could be operationalised.  
Combining a discussion of agonistic theory with new institutionalist 
literature, it demonstrated that, whilst agonists have explored informal 
(and sometimes informal) institutions, more thought needs to be given 
to their practical application.  Exploring the tension between agonistic 
principles and institutions, it suggested that certain types of institutional 
mechanisms would be compatible with agonistic notions of contingency.  
Further, it contended that more thought about the operationalisation of 
principles might enrich agonistic democracy by enabling it, first, to offer 
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an alternative theory of democracy and, second, to gain a deeper 
insight into how to overcome potential problems.   
 
The next part of the thesis will supplement the theoretical exploration 
with an empirical component.  It will begin by shifting the focus away 
from theoretical discussion toward questions of method and 
methodology.  Drawing on experimental methodology, it will explore 
how agonistic concepts could be operationalised and the effects these 
might have on conflict mediation.  Taking each approach in turn, it will 
analyse perfectionist, adversarial and inclusive approaches to agonistic 
democracy.  Finally, it will draw on summaries from the theoretical and 
empirical evaluation together to propose an Ôagonistic day.Õ   
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Part Two!
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Chapter Four: Methodology and Methods384 
 
This chapter outlines how the empirical element of my thesis enables 
further consideration of ways in which agonistic concepts might be 
operationalised.  Beginning with the rationale for the empirical research, 
it outlines the assumptions, which render an empirical component 
helpful.  It subsequently distinguishes my experimental design from 
classical positivist approaches, highlighting the exploratory nature of my 
empirical research.  It then explains why an experimental approach - 
rather than, for instance, participant observation Ð was most suitable in 
answering the research question.  It outlines the participant selection 
process, justifying the use of various sampling methods and noting the 
limitations of each.  It then discusses the range of data collection 
methods, including participant questionnaires, video-analysis, and 
observer analysis, demonstrating the advantages of these methods 
whilst also discussing limitations.  Finally, it considers ethics, showing 
which techniques were implemented to treat participants with sensitivity 
and respect. Throughout the chapter I aim to justify the choices I have 
made, depict the obstacles I had to overcome and reflect on the 
limitations of the study.385  
A Brief Overview of the Empirical Research 
 
In an attempt at gaining further insights into agonistic concepts, I 
supplemented my theoretical research with empirical explorations.  This 
empirical work draws on experimental design by engaging participants 
in three value discussions, each representing concepts from one of the 
                                                
384 I would like to thank Professor Cees van der Eijk for all of his help with designing the 
experiment.  His expertise has been invaluable in supplementing the theoretical work with an 
empirical dimension. 
 
See videos on USB stick to watch each of the discussions: 
Values discussion = video 1a (from 01:00) and video 1b (until 00:11) 
Abortion discussion = video 2a (from 14:01) and video 2b (until 29:27) 
Gay marriage discussion = video 3a (from 02:23), 3b, and 3c (until 05:48). 
 
385 Please note, this chapter comprises a discussion of the methods used, it does not aim to 
show how the theoretical concepts of the three approaches were operationalised into three 
separate discussion frameworks for the Experiment Day, nor does it seek to give an overview 
of the Experiment Day.  For an explanation of how the theoretical concepts were 
operationalised, please see chapter four.  For an overview of the Experiment Day, please see 
chapter four.   
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three agonistic approaches outlined in Chapter Two.  The experiment 
generates insights through participant questionnaires, observer insights 
and my own analysis throughout the day and from video footage.  In 
April 2013, I conducted a pilot study with ten students from local 
universities in order to practice, evaluate and refine my empirical tasks.  
Then, in May 2013, the main experiment was carried out with nine 
participants, both students and non-students.  In December 2013, I co-
led six 2 hour seminars with my supervisor, Professor Lucy Sargisson, 
which were informed by the three experimental discussion frameworks.  
In combining theoretical discussion with empirical insights, the thesis 
primarily draws on observations from the main experiment, but also 
uses the pilot study Ð and to a lesser extent Ð student seminars.386   
Rationale for the Empirical Research 
 
As Chapter Three explains, agonistic democrats tend to prioritise 
theoretical exploration over empirical consideration.  Given this, it is 
necessary to justify how the inclusion of an empirical dimension is 
important to a thesis grounded in agonistic democratic theory.  I begin 
with two assumptions from which the empirical work arises.  First, I 
assume (as argued in Chapter Three), that further consideration of how 
to operationalise agonistic concepts could enrich the field of agonistic 
democracy.  Second, I assume (also outlined in Chapter Three), that 
agonist literature offers relatively little thought about how such concepts 
might be operationalised.  As a result, the empirical component of the 
research serves to generate unique and innovative insights into how 
theoretical concepts might be operationalised.  In so doing, it draws on 
experimental methods to explore practical representations of agonistic 
concepts through a series of controversial discussions. 
 
In outlining the aims of the empirical work, it is useful to clarify what it 
does not aspire to do.  David Gray affirms that Ôexperimental 
                                                
386 The pilot study is drawn on more than the seminar discussions because very few changes 
were made between the pilot study and the main experiment.  I am also able to refer to 
particular individuals and incidents since consent forms were completed for this event.  This 
was not the case for seminar discussions and I thereby can only discuss patterns and trends 
which occurred.   
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methodology usually involved truth-seeking (as opposed to perspective- 
or opinion-seeking).387  As a consequence, it has predominantly been 
used as a tool to either prove or disprove theory.  In order to fulfil this 
purpose accurately and effectively, Ôexperiments are frequently viewed 
as prime examples of quantitative research and are evaluated against 
the strengths and weaknesses of statistical, quantitative research 
methods and analysis.Õ388  As such, researchers strive to ensure that 
experiments can produce results that are Ôobjective, valid and 
replicable.Õ 389   This involves isolating the experiment from external 
factors, such as history, testing and maturation.390   
 
This is not what I am doing.  Adopting such a positivist approach to my 
empirical work would be at odds with the epistemological assumptions 
of the thesis.  I follow Nietzsche, Foucault, Arendt, and Schmitt in 
rejecting the possibility of discovering the truth.391  As Arendt asserts, all 
attempts at seeing the objective truth are like Ôjumping over our own 
shadowsÕ392  since we can never escape our own assumptions and 
subjectivities.  As a result, I abandon all attempts at conducting an 
experimental framework, which is created by objective practical 
mechanisms and evaluated objectively in order to prove or disprove 
agonistic theory.  Rather, I assert that the practical mechanisms 
employed in the experiment arise from my personal and subjective 
interpretation of agonistic concepts,393 just as the findings I draw from 
experiment observations are interpretations, which are shaped by my 
subjectivity as well as the intersubjectivities between participants, 
observers and myself.  This echoes Uwe FlickÕs affirmation that Ôthe 
subjectivity of the researcher and of those being studied becomes part 
                                                
387 Gray, D. (2004). Doing research in the real world. London: Sage Publications, p. 67. 
388 De Vaus, D. (2001). Research design in social research. London: SAGE, p. 10. 
389 Gray, D (2004), p. 67. 
390 Cook, T. and Campbell, D. (1979). Quasi-experimentation. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, p. 51. 
391 See Chapter One ÔThe Contingent Nature of PoliticsÕ for a more detailed discussion of this.  
See Chapter Two for a discussion of how such contingency has been employed by 
contemporary agonistic democrats. 
392 Arendt, H. (2013), p. 12. 
393 See Chapter Four for an explanation of how the theoretical agonistic concepts were 
represented by practical mechanisms 
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of the research process.Õ394  Whilst aiming to reduce the effects of 
external factors, I acknowledge the limitations of this and reflect on the 
impact such effects might have had on the findings.  As a consequence, 
in spite of drawing on experimental methods, I adapt these for 
exploratory purposes.  In seeking to glean deeper insights into theories 
of agonistic democracy, rather than to test them, my empirical research 
resonates with qualitative research whereby Ôresearch questions are 
tentative and most often not framed in terms of hypotheses (looking for 
Òcause and effectÓ).Õ395  Thus, it is imperative that the empirical research 
abandons attempts to prove or disprove theoretical approaches, but 
instead aims to gain further insights.   
Drawing on Quasi‐Experimental Designs 
 
When deciding which methods would be most appropriate to exploring 
how agonistic concepts might be operationalised, I considered a range 
of options.  For instance, I had initially planned to conduct participant 
observation at the intentional community of The Findhorn Foundation.  
The community emphasises principles such as respect, listening and 
integrity, whilst also promoting non-hierarchical decision-making 
procedures, and implementing steering mechanisms to maximise 
inclusivity.396  These elements of the community resonate with Owen, 
Mouffe, Connolly, and TullyÕs emphasis on the political, citizen-centred 
account of politics, which promotes necessary interdependency 
(through listening, respect and integrity) and values critique and 
challenge.  Hence, in these respects The Findhorn Foundation seemed 
to offer an appropriate case for exploring how agonistic theory might be 
operationalised.  However, one issue prevented Findhorn from 
providing a representative case for agonistic democracy: it is an 
intentional community, in which members share a set of core values 
                                                
394 Flick, U. (1998). An introduction to qualitative research. London: Sage, p. 16. 
395 Hesse-Biber, S. and Leavy, P. (2006). The practice of qualitative research. Thousand Oaks: 
SAGE Publications, p. 35. 
396 See Common Ground Statement of Values: 
http://www.findhorn.org/aboutus/community/nfa/common-ground/#.UaYMRtLYjTo and 
community organisation: http://www.findhorn.com/nfa/NFA/AboutUs 
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and attempt to realise these by living and working together.397  This is 
problematic because agonistic democrats typically concern themselves 
with mediating conflict between those who do not share the same set of 
values.  ConnollyÕs ethos includes Ôcarriers of another creed,Õ398 Tully 
asks us to adopt Ôa willingness to listen to its culturally diverse spirits,Õ399 
and Owen states that Ôour shared identities relate not to shared 
perspectives but to a shared process of contestation.Õ400  It is important 
to note that Mouffe is the exception to this, requiring citizens to endorse 
liberty and equality, and excluding those who do not from the political 
community.401   Yet, in spite of the parallels between Findhorn and 
MouffeÕs adversarialism, the emphasis placed by other agonists on 
conflicting value systems prevents Findhorn from providing a suitable 
case study.   
 
Since I was unable to find a representative case study, I rejected the 
participant observation method in favour of a quasi-experimental 
approach.402   By drawing on experimental methods, I was able to 
develop theoretical agonistic concepts into representative discussion 
frameworks, enabling me to consider how such concepts might be 
operationalised.  I could then engage participants in such discussion 
frameworks, and glean insights into ways in which different practical 
mechanisms might affect conflict.  Thus, drawing on experimental 
methods resonates with the aims of my research by providing a 
platform to Ôcontrol and manipulate aspects of a situation in order to 
observe the effects.Õ 403   Donald Campbell asserts that one of the 
primary limitations of using this method is that the artificial conditions it 
                                                
397 See Sargisson, L. (2000). Utopian bodies and the politics of transgression. London: 
Routledge and Metcalf, W. (2004). The Findhorn book of community living. Forres: Findhorn 
Press. 
398 Connolly, W. (2005), p. 125. 
399 Tully, J. (1995), p. 23. 
400 Owen, D. (1995), p. 146. 
401 Mouffe, C. (2000), p. 9. 
402 The following chapter explains why quasi-experimental method was used, rather than the 
classical experimental design 
403 Brown, G., Cherrington, D. and Cohen, L. (1975). Experiments in the social sciences. 
London: Harper and Row, p. 9. 
403 Ibid., p. 9. 
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requires results in participants changing their behaviour.404  However, I 
attempted to minimise the effects of this by making participants feel 
more comfortable, for instance, by getting to know them throughout the 
day, providing time before the discussions for participants to get to 
know one another, and by providing regular food and drink breaks.  
Again, I did not aim for an objective experimental design, but sought to 
minimise external effects and reflect on the limitations of these.   
 
The reason for drawing on quasi-experimental approaches (rather than 
classical experimental ones) is that they Ôdo not use random 
assignment to create the comparisons from which treatment-caused 
change is inferred.Õ 405   In a classical experiment, participants are 
randomly ascribed to one of two (or more) groups; one, which acts as a 
control group, and the other(s) which receive treatment(s).  This 
constitutes an attempt at preventing external factors from influencing 
the results of the experiment, thereby promoting the objectivity and 
validity typically valued by experimental researchers.  Thus, if my 
experiment were to fall into the classical category, it would require three 
groups of participants who were randomly assigned to one of three 
discussion frameworks.  On the classical understanding, this would 
enable me to observe the effects of different agonistic frameworks on 
the interactions between participants.   
 
However, I decided to use the same group for all three discussion 
frameworks.  The reason for this reflects my research question, which 
emphasises diversity and multicultural, pluralist conflict.  In order to 
reflect this, participants were selected from diverse (and often 
conflicting) religious, ideological, ethnic and political groups.  As a 
result, randomly assigning participants to groups would have been 
problematic since it would not ensure a representative level of diversity 
in each group.  One alternative is the ÔmatchingÕ method in which 
participants are selected to ensure that each group is comparable in 
                                                
404 Campbell, D. (1969). Reforms as experiments. American psychologist 24(4): 409-439, p. 
414. 
405 Cook, T. and Campbell, D. (1979), p. 6. 
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terms of its religious, ideological, ethnic, and political components.406  
However, comparability is also difficult since Ôit is difficult to find 
experimental and control groups that are closely matched in terms of 
key variables (such as age, gender, income, work, grade, etc.).Õ407  
Additionally, a further problem with both random assignation and 
ÔmatchingÕ - which resonates with the distinction between positivist and 
more exploratory approaches Ð is that these two techniques treat 
participants as objective entities, largely ignoring their subjectivities and 
intersubjectivities.  This is evident from my experiment, for instance, 
when we consider Fiona and Arabella. 408   In spite of their similar 
religious, political, and ideological views, Fiona was a quieter 
participant, who listened to and respected others, whilst Arabella was 
more dominant, often asserting her opinions as the truth, angering other 
group members.  In spite of their similarities, then, each participant had 
a very different impact on the discussions.  Thus, in order to best 
explore relations of potential conflict between participants and if/how 
these were affected by the three discussion frameworks, using the 
same participants appeared most appropriate.   
 
The limitations of using the same group for all three experiments 
include effects from history, testing, and maturation.  In the first, any 
effects which I observe during different discussion frameworks Ômight be 
due to an event which takes place between the pre-test and post-test, 
when this event is not the treatment of research interest.Õ409  Thus, I 
need to be mindful when evaluating the findings of the empirical work 
that the behaviour and interactions of participants might be affected by 
events which occurred in the breaks rather than the discussions 
themselves.  In order to limit this, I did consider isolating participants 
during the breaks, however I decided that, as well as being impractical, 
it might also prevent participants from feeling comfortable enough with 
the group to express conflicting views.  ÔTestingÕ refers to the way in 
                                                
406 Babbie, E. (1992). The practice of social research. Belmont: Wadsworth Pub. Co, p. 238. 
407 Gray, D. (2004), p. 25. 
408 Please note that all names have been changed to protect the anonymity of participants. 
409 Cook, T. and Campbell, D. (1979), p. 51. 
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which Ôthe effect might be due to the number of times particular 
responses are measured.Õ 410   It is thereby important to note that 
changes in relationships between participants during the final 
discussion about gay marriage, for instance, might be a spill over effect 
of the multicultural values discussion, or the abortion discussion.  
Finally, the notion of ÔmaturationÕ refers to Ôchanges within individuals 
that result from natural, biological, or psychological development.Õ411  
For example, during the pilot study, several participants appeared to 
become bored and disengaged just before lunch.  In the main 
experiment, steps were taken to reduce this by reducing discussion 
times, providing more frequent breaks, adding a question to the 
questionnaires asking why participants felt either bored or engaged, 
and asking participants about their interest in the topics prior to the 
experiment.  However, it is important to bear in mind the way in which 
these factors may contribute toward the behaviour of participants.   
Participant Recruitment 
 
Nina Hallowell et al suggest that empirical research tends to look as if it 
Ôrun[s] like clockwork, that researchers enter Òthe fieldÓ, collect masses 
of interesting data, encounter no problems (of any kind) en route, return 
to their offices and churn out a range of fascinating papers, get 
promoted and live happily ever after.Õ412  However, this was certainly not 
the case during the participant selection stage of my research, which 
posed the largest obstacle to undertaking my empirical work.  
 
The typical size of a focus group discussion is between six and ten 
participants.413  This seemed an appropriate number for my research 
since I needed to strike a balance between offering a diversity of 
opinions, without having so many voices that the discussions could not 
be mediated effectively.  The first stage of participant selection entailed 
purposive sampling, which John Creswell describes as the sampling of 
                                                
410 Ibid., p. 52. 
411 Fink, A. (1995). How to design surveys. Thousand Oaks: Sage, p. 57. 
412 Lawton, N., Gregory, J. and Hallowell, S. (2005). Reflections on research: the realities of 
doing research in the social sciences. Berkshire: Open University Press, p. 2. 
413 Bryman, A. (2008). Social research methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 351. 
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those who Ôcan purposefully inform an understanding of the research 
problem and central phenomenon in the study.Õ414   Since agonistic 
democracy explores conflict between diverse citizens, it was imperative 
to find participants from a diversity of conflicting political, religious, 
ethnic/national groups, causal, and class groups. 415   Additionally, 
participant selection was informed by existing criticisms of agonistic 
theory.  Both Young and Deveaux, for instance, state that education is a 
necessary prerequisite for behaviour such as agonistic respect. 416  
Hence, to explore this, I attempted to find both non-student and student 
participants.  The importance of this was underlined during the pilot 
study, which primarily sought to evaluate tasks, discussion frameworks 
and timing, and therefore used the convenience sampling of students 
from universities in Nottingham and Leicester.  Throughout the 
discussions, it was evident that, in spite of their diverse religious and 
ethnic backgrounds, students held relatively homogenous views on 
discussion topics.  Thus, the importance of diverse educational 
backgrounds appeared significant to the study.  As a result, participant 
selection for the main experiment focused on contacting groups outside 
of the student body.      
 
Purposive sampling began in January 2013 and involved sending 
emails to different political, religious, ethnic/nationality, causal, and 
class groups; the majority of whom were listed under Nottingham City 
Council Community Centres. 417   To achieve maximum diversity, I 
emailed 25 different religious, political and ethnic groups.  This email 
contained information about myself, my research, the purpose of the 
experiment, and details of the event. 418   As Alan Bryman states, 
Ôprospective respondents have to be provided with a credible rationale 
for the research in which they are being asked to participate and for 
                                                
414 Creswell, J. (2007). Qualitative inquiry & research design. Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications, p. 125. 
415 See Appendix One for a list of these groups. 
416 See the previous chapter for a discussion of this. 
417 See: http://www.nottinghamcity.gov.uk/communitycentres   
418 See Appendix Two for the participant selection email. 
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giving up their valuable time.' 419   I received only three positive 
responses from these initial emails (of which two later dropped out due 
to other commitments) so it was essential to follow up these emails.   
 
The second phase of participant selection entailed writing letters to 
groups on university headed paper.  These letters also included a 
poster, constituting an attempt at targeting a wider audience because I 
feared that members of some groups Ð ethnic community centres, for 
example Ð might be less accessible by email.420  However, these letters 
did not lead to any responses, highlighting CreswellÕs assertion that 
Ôconvincing individuals to participate in the study, building trust and 
credibility at the field site, and getting people from a site to respond are 
all important access challenges.Õ421   
 
As Earl Babbie states, Ôwhenever you wish to make more formal contact 
with the people, identifying yourself as a researcher, you must establish 
a certain rapport with them.Õ422  In order to build rapports, my third 
phase of recruitment involved visiting groups, explaining about my 
research and myself, and distributing posters and leaflets.  As Bryman 
explains, it is easier to build a rapport in person because otherwise the 
researcher Ôis unable to offer obvious visual cues of friendliness like 
smiling or maintaining good eye contact, which are also frequently 
regarded as conducive to gaining and maintaining support.Õ423  At this 
stage, I also tackled low response rates by increasing the sample, 
placing posters in shops, job centres, and post offices around 
Nottingham and Beeston.  Catherine Marshall and Gretchen Rossman 
support such adaptations, affirming that Ôsampling can change during a 
study and researchers need to be flexible.Õ424   However, only one 
participant responded to one of these posters, (and, after completing 
                                                
419 Bryman, A. (2008), p. 117. 
420 See Appendix 3 to view the poster. 
421 Creswell, J. (2007), pp. 138-139. 
422 Babbie, E. (1992), p. 289. 
423 Bryman, A. (2008), p. 119. 
424 Marshall, C. & Rossman, G. (2006) in Creswell, J. (2007), p. 126. 
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the participant recruitment questionnaire, did not attend the 
experiment).   
 
During the final phase of participant selection, a participant from the 
group ÔSociety for the Protection of Unborn ChildrenÕ (SPUC) emailed to 
say that two of her friends (also from SPUC) would like to participate.  
Initially, I was hesitant about agreeing to this since prior relationships 
between the three would affect social interaction.  However, I agreed for 
two reasons.  First, I was concerned by low response rates since I still 
only had four recruits (three of whom did not end up attending the 
experiment).  Second, and more importantly, since the two prospective 
participants had asked to attend, I was guaranteed two more people 
who were willing to engage with the issues for discussion.  This is an 
example of snowball sampling whereby the researcher Ôcollect[s] data 
on the few members of the target population [he or she] can locate, and 
then ask[s] those individuals to provide the information needed to locate 
other members of that population whom they happen to know.Õ425  As 
Babbie informs, this method of sampling Ôis appropriate when the 
members of a special population are difficult to locate.Õ426  Given both 
the diversity of individuals I sought, and the low response rates during 
participant recruitment, snowballing was a useful technique.   
 
Later, I employed two further cases of snowball sampling when one of 
my colleagues recommended two participants: one of whom had 
previously been detained in Iran for promoting womenÕs rights, and the 
other who was a member of the Greek Orthodox Church and also 
identifies as a homosexual.  Whilst these two participants limit the study 
since they already knew each other, they were invaluable in enhancing 
the diversity of the group. 
 
The final phase of participant selection involved contacting the student 
body.  I had decided to leave this closer to the event since I was close 
                                                
425 Babbie, E. (1992), pp. 195-196. 
426 Ibid., p. 195. 
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to them and they were near to the event, making it easier to establish 
and maintain contact, whilst also reducing barriers of time and access.  
Since other participants had already completed recruitment 
questionnaires,427 I was aware of the diversity of the evolving group, 
and so emailed the student union versions of the wider society groups 
from whom I had no participants.  I also emailed similar societies at 
local universities, including Loughborough, Leicester, Nottingham Trent 
and Lincoln.  At Nottingham, I followed the emails up with lecture and 
seminar announcements to establish a rapport with the students.  I also 
followed up with emails to the academic departments.  One student 
belongs to the humanities department; one is a member of the 
university LGBT network, Buddhist Society, WomenÕs Network and 
Amnesty International; another is a member of the universityÕs Czech 
and Slovak Society; and a final one is an active member of the 
Nottingham University Conservative Association and also identifies as a 
homosexual.  The final participant was one of my former students; 
whilst I was not his seminar tutor at the time of the experiment, I had 
taught him the previous semester.  When evaluating the experiment 
findings, I will need to be reflective on the intersubjectivities that arise 
from my prior knowledge of this participant.   
Limitations to Participant Recruitment 
 
One factor that might have contributed to low response rates is the 
decision not to pay participants for their involvement in the experiment.  
Since participants were not paid, it suggests that they attended because 
they were both willing and able to share their views.  In order to reduce 
barriers of time and cost, I reimbursed expenses and organised the 
experiment on a Saturday.  However, access was perhaps more of a 
difficulty for parents or those working in certain professions (such as 
emergency service workers), as well as those who were unable to pay 
for transport.  Had I offered monetary incentives to participants (which I 
did consider when the response rate was low), it may have broadened 
my sample to include those who were unwilling or unable to share their 
                                                
427 See Appendix 4 for the participant recruitment questionnaire. 
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views.  For instance, in spite of students comprising only four of the 
nine participants, the majority of participants had previously had 
university educations.  Thus, it is evident that my experiment attracted 
educated people.  Perhaps if I had provided monetary incentives, I 
could have broadened this sample by motivating people to attend who 
might otherwise be unwilling to share their beliefs.  Given concerns 
expressed by critics that agonistic democracy might be unable to 
mediate conflict between those who are unwilling to share their views, 
attracting such people could have enriched the research.  However, I 
chose not to offer monetary incentives in order to attract participants 
who were genuinely interested in the topics of discussion, and could 
enrich the discussion with a diversity of views.   
 
Returning to the opening quote, it is evident that, far from Ôrunning like 
clockwork,Õ my participant selection process posed numerous 
obstacles.  I suffered from low response rates and had to be flexible 
and modify my approach several times.  Some of my participants were 
recruited through snowballing, some knew one another prior to the 
experiment, and one knew me beforehand.  All of these factors will 
affect the way in which I explore their interactions and interpret the 
experiment.  Yet in spite of these limitations, participants provided a 
diversity of views, which is necessary for the consideration of agonistic 
democracy.   
Data Collection 
 
First, I discuss the use of questionnaires, which were employed 
throughout the experiment to gather data about the participantsÕ views 
of the discussions.  Subsequently, I examine the usage of video-
recording in enabling my analysis of the discussions.  Next, I explain 
how the two above methods were combined with the employment of 
observers who completed both predesigned observation sheets and 
qualitative notes on the discussions.  Finally, I aspire to bring all of the 
methods together through an exploration of triangulation, discussing 
how this sought to reduce the limitations of each method.   
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Questionnaires 
 
Questionnaires were administered at the beginning and the end of the 
day in order to assess whether participantsÕ perceptions had changed 
as a result of the discussions.428   These two questionnaires were 
identical aside from two features: the first included a question asking 
participants how strongly they felt about abortion and gay marriage, two 
of the three discussion topics.429  During the pilot study, it was evident 
that levels of conflict were considerably higher during the abortion 
discussion than that of gay marriage, so the question was added to 
explore whether the initial interest levels of participants might influence 
the level of conflict.  The other difference between the ÔbeforeÕ and 
ÔafterÕ questionnaires, was that the latter asked participants to name the 
discussion in which: they felt most engaged; they were best able to 
express their opinions; their beliefs were most challenged; the quality of 
the opinions were the best; they developed an understanding towards 
others; they felt most passionate; and group unity was strongest.  
These questions were added to allow triangulation between the 
participantsÕ reflections of the process with my analysis of their 
behaviour during the discussions and their other questionnaire 
responses.  I also asked them to fill in one at the end of each of the 
three discussions.  The construction and content of these will be 
discussed in depth in the following chapter.430  
Employing an Adaptation of Q Method to Create Questionnaires 
 
An adaptation of Q method was implemented when constructing the 
participant questionnaires from agonistic theory.  This entailed breaking 
down each complex and abstract concept into multiple sentences, each 
of which defines a particular element of the concept.  The concept is 
only wholly represented when all of the sentences are combined.  Q 
method has primarily been associated with quantitative research, 
                                                
428 See Appendix 5 for a sample of each. 
429 It was not possible to ask a similar question about participant interest in multicultural 
values because the discussion about this included a whole host of values which participants 
were asked to rank during the first discussion.  Had the participants individually ranked their 
interest in these prior to the discussion, it would have affected the collective discussion.   
430 See Appendix 6 for each of these. 
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however it is now 'considered particularly suitable for researching the 
range and diversity of subjective experiences, perspectives and 
beliefs.Õ431 Geraint Ellis states that Q method 'attempts to combine the 
qualitative study of attitudes with the statistical rigour of quantitative 
research techniques.'432  However, given my exploratory approach, my 
research focuses on the qualitative goal of conducting a study of 
attitudes, rejecting the latter of employing statistical rigour.  My research 
draws from this study of attitudes by providing participants with several 
statements representing a variety of views.433  This was achieved by 
creating questionnaires comprised of statements, which reflect agonistic 
behaviours as well as some alternative beliefs.  Q method requires that 
statements derive from sources such as interviews, academic literature 
and the media,434 and my research draws on literature from each of the 
three agonistic approaches as the basis for the statements.  When 
employing this technique for 'integrity', for instance, I listed all definitions 
given by Owen.  Next, in order to eliminate overlap, I ignored phrases 
that provided duplicate meanings.  However, this is where my research 
diverges from typical applications of Q method.  As Thomas Webler et 
al demonstrate, ÔQ participants are people with clearly different opinions 
who are asked to express opinions about the Q statements by sorting 
them, i.e. Òdoing a Q sortÓ.Õ435  Rather than providing participants with 
the full range of phrases and asking them to rank these, I provided them 
with a limited selection, which focused on the aspects of the theory I 
most wanted to explore.  This reflected the time constraints of the 
experiment and aspired to keep participants engaged.  Thus, I modified 
and, as a result of the pilot study, remodified these phrases in order to 
provide clear, concise statements for participants.436  The goal was to 
maintain the accuracy of the theory, whilst also creating statements that 
                                                
431 Shinebourne, P. (2009). Using Q Method in Qualitative Research. International Journal of 
Qualitative Methods 8(1): 93-97, p. 94. 
432 Ellis, G. REDO Welcome | The Research. (online). 
433 Shinebourne, P. (2009), p. 2.   
434 Ibid., p. 2. 
435 Webler, T., Danielson, S. and Tuler, S. (2009). Using Q method to reveal social 
perspectives in environmental research. Greenfield: Social and Environmental Research 
Institute, p.5. 
436 See Appendix 7 for an example of this through consideration of TullyÕs principle of audi 
alteram partem. 
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participants could understand, and decide whether or not they identified 
with these.  In drawing on Q method in this way, I was able to provide a 
nuanced account of agonistic concepts since I could explore which (if 
any) elements of a concept were present.  For example, it might be that 
participants listened to others, but did not respond to explain their 
disagreement.  
Limitations of Using Questionnaires 
 
Primarily, questionnaires were implemented as they enabled me to 
trace perspectives across the day, and after the day, and to compare 
responses between participants.  As Floyd J. Fowler Jr. asserts, 
Ôproviding respondents with a constrained number of answer options 
increases the likelihood that there will be enough people giving any 
particular answer to be analytically interesting.Õ437  Thus, standardised 
questionnaires were deemed more appropriate than interviews, for 
instance.  However, in spite of aspiring toward standardisation, Ôit is 
nave to believe that standardized questions will always received 
standardized, rational responses.Õ 438   This raises the concern that 
different participants interpret questions in a variety of ways.  Yet, as 
Alan Buckingham and Peter Saunders affirm, we can reduce the 
dangers of this by ensuring that questions are Ôworded simply and kept 
short and unambiguous.Õ439  In order to evaluate whether my questions 
fulfilled such criteria, participants of the pilot study were asked to inform 
me of any unclear questions, and such questions were reshaped for the 
main experiment.440  The pilot study was thereby invaluable in helping 
me to Ôeliminate or at least reduce questions that are likely to 
mislead.Õ 441   In addition to this, I remained in the room with the 
participants whilst they completed their questionnaires and regularly 
reminded them to ask for clarification at any point.  I also tried to aid 
participantsÕ understanding by employing a clear format.  In so doing, I 
                                                
437 Fowler Jr., Floyd, J. (2008). Survey Research Methods, 4th Edition. London: Sage, p. 101. 
438 Ibid., p. 189. 
439 Buckingham, A. and Saunders, P. (2004). Survey Methods Workbook: From Design to 
Analysis. London: Polity Press, p. 77. 
440 See Appendix 8 for an example of a questionnaire used in the pilot study. 
441 Ibid., p. 189. 
 123
ensured that questionnaires were double-line spaced, consistently 
employed box ticking (with the exception of the interest questions which 
used a continuum scale), and avoided negatives.  Gray explains that, 
by consistently employing a single response method such as box 
ticking, we receive clearer responses,442 and Babbie informs us that by 
avoiding the use of negatives, we reduce the likelihood that people will 
misread the question.443 
 
There is an additional limitation to questionnaires, which is particularly 
poignant when requiring participants to choose between several 
options.  The danger is, that if they cannot choose, Ôrespondents may 
give flippant, inaccurate or misleading answers, but the researcher is 
not in a position to detect this.Õ 444   I tried to overcome this by 
encouraging participants to ask me questions, and telling them to note 
on their questionnaire instances where they were unsure of which box 
to tick.445  Another attempt at overcoming this was by leaving a space at 
the end of each questionnaire for additional comments in which 
respondents could note their uncertainty.  Although this creates a larger 
and more complicated data set for analysis, it enriches the findings by 
allowing for nuanced positions. 
 
A further issue is my comprehension of participantsÕ answers.  Just as 
respondents face the problem of unclear questions, the researcher 
faces the problem of unclear answers.  As Gray states, Ôthere is no 
opportunity to ask questions or to clear up ambiguous or ill-conceived 
answers.Õ 446   This became evident after the pilot study when the 
questionnaires demonstrated that several participants were bored 
during the abortion discussion, however the reason for the boredom 
was unclear.  This was a significant weakness in the questionnaire 
since MouffeÕs claim that clearly defined, oppositional identities motivate 
people into engagement with diverse others was a significant point for 
                                                
442 Gray, D. (2004). Doing research in the real world. London: Sage Publications, p. 93. 
443 Babbie, E. (1992), p. 188. 
444 Ibid., p. 189. 
445 See Appendix 9 for a sample questionnaire which notes the respondentÕs uncertainty . 
446 Ibid., p. 189. 
 124
exploration.  The questionnaires informed me that for many participants 
this was not the case during the abortion discussion, yet they did not 
inform me why this was not the case.  The questionnaires were 
subsequently modified for the main experiment to probe why 
participants felt either engaged or bored.   
 
Using questionnaires as a source of comparison also raises concerns 
over whether initial questionnaires are affected by previous ones; a 
factor I have previously referred to as Ôhistory.Õ  As Thomas Cook and 
Donald Campbell state, Ôfamiliarity with a test can sometimes enhance 
performance because items and error responses are more likely to be 
remembered at later testing sessions.Õ 447   Hence, as Arlene Fink 
explains, Ô[participants] may become alert to the kinds of behaviors that 
are expected or favored.Õ448  In order to prevent this, I sought to avoid 
answers deemed as Ôcorrect.Õ  For instance, I decided not to employ the 
Likert scale whereby participants state the extent to which they agree or 
disagree with a statement.  I had initially designed my questionnaires in 
this format, but felt that this encouraged leading questions, inferring 
ÔcorrectÕ and ÔincorrectÕ answers.  Fowler Jr. supports this concern, 
claiming that Ôstudies show that some respondents are particularly likely 
to agree (or acquiesce) when questions are put in this form.Õ449  Instead, 
I used the list approach, providing participants with two or three 
statements and asking them to tick the one which most applied.  In 
constructing these statements, I avoided extreme responses since it is 
less likely that participants would tick these options.  Babbie endorses 
this, affirming that researchers should avoid including responses that 
they themselves would not feel comfortable admitting to. 450   For 
instance, I was careful to word those responses which participants 
might find difficult to admit to in a sensitive manner.   
 
                                                
447 Cook, T. and Campbell, D. (1979), p. 52. 
448 Fink, A. (1995), p. 59. 
449 Fowler, F. (1993), p. 104. 
450 Babbie, E. (1992), p. 153. 
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Further, Gray observes that, Ôwhat we choose not to ask about, may just 
as easily reflect our world view as what we include in the 
questionnaire.Õ451  By using the list style rather than the Likert scale, 
participants were provided with a diversity of statements, which 
prevented the questionnaire from focusing solely on agonistic concepts 
of my research.  It is still important to note that, in spite of this, the 
questionnaires focused on social behaviour, such as respect and 
understanding, and this will have affected the responses.  However, I 
hope that this was somewhat countered by the exploratory nature of my 
research in which I did not seek to prove or disprove one of the three 
theories.  This might reduce the likelihood that participants will aim to 
predict the ÔcorrectÕ answers since it was explained to them that I was 
exploring how different frameworks of discussion may or may not affect 
social interactions.  
Video Analysis 
 
The rationale for the usage of video-recording is that observation adds 
a fundamental element in perceiving social interactions: it enables 
verbal communication and behaviour to be captured and analysed.  The 
presence of a video-camera adds to such observation as, without it, my 
account of the day would be impeded by the ÔuntrustworthyÕ nature of 
memory. 452   By contrast, however, Ôvideotaping allows for repeat 
observation of fleeting situations.Õ453  This was particularly important for 
my experiment as the discussions moved quite quickly, and flippant 
responses or subtle behaviours (such as eye-rolling) might have been 
missed without reference to video-recordings.  However, there are 
some limitations to the use of videos, which I will outline alongside an 
explanation of how I sought to reduce these.   
Limitations of Using Video Analysis 
 
Creswell alerts us to the practical limitations of using a video-camera, 
which have methodological implications.  He states that the researcher 
                                                
451 Gray, D. (2004), p. 189. 
452 Babbie, E. (1992), p. 293. 
453 Flick, U. (1998), p. 251. 
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must give some thought to the reduction of background noise, whether 
a close-up or distance shot is required, and the prime location for the 
camera.454  After the pilot study, I noticed that participants seemed to 
feel more relaxed, and were more talkative when there was more 
background noise.  Thus, I had considered playing the radio throughout 
the main experiment in order to create a comfortable environment in 
which the participants felt at ease to express their opinions.  However, a 
preliminary test showed that if background music was on then 
participants would not be heard on the video.  Hence, this introduced a 
potential limitation to the study.  I tried to keep this limitation to a 
minimum, however, by introducing other factors which aspired to create 
a warm environment, such as multiple coffee breaks; an ice-breaker 
exercise; getting to know the participants; and encouraging participants 
to leave for toilet breaks and refreshments as they pleased.   
 
The decision to provide close-ups or distance recording was also a 
factor to which I devoted much attention.  Close-up recording would 
have been useful in enabling an in-depth exploration of the behaviour 
and manner of individual participants.  This would have been 
particularly useful in analysing the behaviour of one or two dominant 
members of the group.  However, since my research focuses on 
interactions between people, I decided that distance recording would be 
the most appropriate method for capturing relations.  In employing this 
technique, recording is not simply restricted to the individual who is 
currently speaking, but captures (albeit to a lesser extent) the 
expressions and behaviours of the others in the group too.  The 
limitation of this method is that the camera captured data about some 
participants better than others, depending on their position in the room.  
I tried to combat this by the participant questionnaires and observer 
sheets and notes, yet this must be taken into account during the 
evaluation of experiment data.   
 
                                                
454 Creswell, J. (2007), p. 141. 
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Finally, the prime location for the camera was also significant, since 
Ôyou should take care that the camera and recording equipment do not 
dominate the social situation.Õ455  This was paramount in reducing the 
extent to which participantsÕ behaviour changed as a result of the 
camera.  In an attempt at preventing the camera from dominating the 
discussions, it was placed in the corner of the room on a maximum 
zoom setting in order to maintain the greatest possible distance 
between the camera and the participants.  Additionally, a tripod was 
used as this seemed less invasive than a person holding the camera.  
Other measures, such as switching the camera on during the morning 
ice-breaker exercises and leaving it set up (but not recording) during 
breaks, were implemented to enable participants to become familiar 
with its presence.  Indeed, as Gray acknowledges, Ôpeople may change 
their behaviour when being observed,Õ456 and this is perhaps further 
heightened with the employment of a camera.  However, I hope to have 
somewhat lessened the effects of the camera on the participantsÕ 
behaviour through the discussed measures. 
Observers 
 
An additional limitation to video-analysis is that it only includes the 
interpretation of the researcher.  As discussed in the previous sections, 
my interpretation will be influenced by factors, such as prior knowledge 
of the participants, intersubjectivities between participants and myself, 
and the clarity of questionnaire responses.  Thus, to enrich the study 
and provide multiple interpretations, I combined questionnaires and 
video-analysis with data collected from three observers.  These 
observers were colleagues from my department who, although aware of 
the general questions of my research, were unaware of the literature in 
my field.  To enhance efficiency and comparability, each observer was 
given a quantitative observer sheet for each discussion. 457   This 
included potential behaviours during the discussion, such as Ôlots of 
people involved in the discussionÕ and Ôpeople staring into space.Õ  
                                                
455 Ibid., p. 251. 
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457 See Appendix 10 for a sample of each of these. 
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These were derived from the statements produced in the Q 
methodology process.  Observers were then required to write either 
never (N), rarely (R), sometimes (S), often (O) or always (A) for each 
characteristic every ten minutes.  After ten minutes, observers began 
the evaluation again.  However, I felt that these were quite limited, and 
so each observer was also provided with plain paper on which to 
provide a more in-depth account of interactions.  This was particularly 
significant in instances whereby one or two people dominated, as the 
observers produced lots of qualitative data about specific individuals 
whose behaviour did not reflect that of the general group.  The 
standardised format was employed in order to guide the focus of 
observers toward my research questions, enhance efficiency, and allow 
for comparison.  It also provided observers with space to write their own 
observations on the plain paper, since Ôspeedy handling of anticipated 
observations can give you more freedom to observe the 
unanticipated.Õ458   
 
The reason for employing three observers arose from the pilot study in 
which I had only used two.  In analysing the content of their 
observations, I noticed a significant discrepancy between the two 
observers.  However, I was uncomfortable choosing between two polar 
observations, as if one was ÔrightÕ and the other was Ôwrong,Õ since this 
rendered the observers meaningless.  I thereby decided to employ an 
additional observer in order to combat this problem.  By adding an 
additional perspective to combine with participant reflections and my 
video-analysis, I aspired to present a richer picture of the experiment 
day.   
Limitations to Observer Sheets 
 
Given what has already been said about the tendency to change oneÕs 
behaviour under observation, the experiment was limited by the fact 
that four people were watching the discussions.  Although it was not 
appropriate to get involved in the discussions (as our views might have 
                                                
458 Babbie, E. (1992), p. 293. 
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influenced the views or behaviour of others), we attempted to reduce 
the effects of observation by Ôbuild[ing] rapport, established on 
Òrelationships that are emotional and personal, not formal and 
hierarchicalÓ.Õ 459   In order to build relationships which overcame 
formality and hierarchy, we dressed in a smart-casual manner, engaged 
with participants between discussions, and gave participants control of 
their space by encouraging them to have toilet breaks and take 
refreshments as they wished.  Such attempts were limited by formal 
components, such as topics for discussion, time constraints, and our 
status as observers.  However, by employing these measures, I aimed 
to reduce the impact of observation.  In addition to adopting these 
measures, I also attempted to locate the observers at a distance from 
the discussion, since Ôpeople are likely to behave differently if they see 
you taking down everything they say or do.Õ460  Additionally, just as 
participants are affected by the process of testing and retesting, so too 
are researchers Ð and in my case, observers. Cook and Campbell 
affirm that Ôinstrumentation is involved when human observers become 
more experienced between a pre-test and post-test.Õ461  Thus, changes 
between the discussions may also be affected by the observersÕ 
familiarisation with the observer sheets as well as their increased 
knowledge of the participants.  However, I attempted to limit the first by 
using the same sheets during the pilot study, and the same observers 
(except the additional one), thereby providing observers with an 
opportunity to practice completing the sheets.  I met with all three 
observers before the main experiment, showing them the sheets and 
encouraging them to ask me about any questions they should have.  
Furthermore, the process of triangulation Ð both between the three 
observers, and across participants, observers and the video recordings 
Ð enabled me to dilute this limitation. 
Triangulation 
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There are two different types of triangulation of which my research has 
made use: investigator triangulation and methodological triangulation.  
Investigator triangulation is when Ôdifferent observers or interviewers are 
employed to reveal and minimize biases coming for the individual 
researcher,Õ462 and this was employed to gather data sets which can be 
combined with my analysis of the video-recordings.  In so doing, I 
attempt to provide alternative interpretations, which were not affected 
by the same assumptions as mine.   
 
On the topic of methodological triangulation, Webb et al claim that all 
research methods are biased, and thereby Ôargued for the use of a 
collection of methods, or multiple operationalism, which, they believed, 
would reduce the effect of the particular biases of each one.Õ463  In this 
way, triangulation can add richness to the empirical data because, as 
Norman Denzin asserts, Ôthe flaws of one method are often the 
strengths of another, and by combining methods, observers can 
achieve the best of each, while overcoming their unique deficiencies.Õ464  
In my research, for instance, video-analysis and observer analysis allow 
for in-depth accounts of participant behaviour, an element that 
questionnaires do not enable.  On the other hand, questionnaires allow 
for first-hand reflections by those involved in the discussions; something 
which is missing from observations and video analysis.  Thus, 
triangulation offered richer understanding, Ôperhaps by providing 
different perspectives.Õ465  On this view, my research offers a deeper 
understanding by combining the perspectives of those encountering 
conflictual situations with those of several observers who witness the 
situations and those of a researcher seeking to link such situations with 
theoretical perspectives.  Therefore, by employing the two types of 
triangulation, I attempted to enrich my research, reducing its limitations 
by offering multiple perspectives. 
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Ethics
466
 
 
So as not to cause harm to my participants, the research implemented 
several ethical measures in addition to obtaining ethical approval from 
the University of Nottingham.  These include consent forms, careful 
wording of questionnaires, sensitive behaviour toward participants, and 
strategic timing of discussions.   
 
The process of achieving informed consent was a lengthy one, 
beginning at first contact with participants.  The posters and emails to 
which participants initially responded outlined the purpose of the 
research and gave information about the day.  When contact was 
subsequently established with individual participants, they were then 
provided with a timetable of discussion topics, given details about the 
composition of the group, and informed about recording and 
observers.467  As much information as possible was provided to ensure 
that consent was fully informed.  Following this, participants were 
required to initial and sign two copies of a consent form (one which I 
collected), outlining the details and purpose of the research. 468  
Participants had the chance to ask questions throughout this process, 
and were encouraged to email after the event, should they have any 
questions. 
 
The next ethical issue was the wording of questionnaires, in which I 
attempted to avoid prejudiced or loaded terms that might offend 
participants.  Similarly, it was essential that the observers and I were 
sensitive to participantsÕ opinions.  Since the group held a diversity of 
views, it was important to avoid openly agreeing or disagreeing with 
participants.  This was of particular significance given the personal 
nature of the discussion content in which one participant revealed that 
she had had an abortion, two participants revealed that they were 
homosexual and another revealed that he was bisexual.   
                                                
466 See Appendix 11 for my accepted Ethical Review form. 
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In addition to showing sensitivity toward participants, it was also 
imperative to ensure that conflict between participants did not get out of 
control.  This meant being aware of rising levels of conflict and being 
prepared to intervene if necessary.  Fortunately, intervention was not 
needed during my discussions, and one participant commented that 
they enjoyed the day because, unlike other events they had attended, 
they did not feel that people were Ôshouting downÕ her views. 
 
Finally, the experiment was designed so that the discussions were 
ordered in an ethical way.  After the pilot study, it was evident that the 
adversarial discussion reflecting MouffeÕs politics had the highest levels 
of conflict and tension.  On the other hand, people seemed to be more 
respectful and understanding during the inclusive discussion 
representing Tully and ConnollyÕs politics.  As a result, I decided to put 
the adversarial framework as the second discussion of the day, and the 
inclusive framework as the final discussion.  I felt it would be unethical 
to finish the day with a very conflictual discussion in which relations 
were hostile.  Instead, by placing it in the middle of the day before a 
calmer discussion, I aspired to allow relations to improve between 
participants before they left the day.  
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that further empirical consideration is important 
to agonistic democracy, and is restricted by existing literature.  Thus, 
my empirical research aimed to generate new data, aspiring to enrich 
such consideration.  Whilst drawing on experimental design, I rejected 
the classical positivist approach, instead adopting an exploratory 
approach.  As such, my method is less concerned with providing 
internal and external validity, and more interested in providing reflection 
on the subjectivities and intersubjectivities that provide potential 
limitations to the study.  I demonstrated the necessity of flexibility during 
sampling; showed how the combination of several methods offers a 
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range of perspectives; discussed steps taken to reduce the limitations 
of each method; and outlined ethical concerns. 
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Chapter Five: Operationalising Agonistic Concepts
469
 
 
This chapter demonstrates how agonistic concepts drawn from the 
three strands of agonistic democracy shaped the three discussion 
frameworks in the experimental research.  OwenÕs perfectionist 
agonism was represented by a discussion about the ranking of certain 
values; MouffeÕs adversarial agonism was brought to life during a 
discussion about abortion; and Connolly and TullyÕs inclusive concepts 
were mirrored in a discussion on gay rights.  I will discuss each in turn, 
explaining how each discussion framework was developed from 
theoretical concepts belonging to a particular strand of agonistic 
democracy.   
Introducing the Perfectionist Framework: Revisiting Perfectionist 
Concepts 
 
The first core concept of Owen's perfectionist agonism is perspectivism, 
which emphasises that each perspective is one amongst many.  Owen 
asserts that each diverse perspective is constituted by its historical 
community, following Nietzsche in assuming that individual questions, 
such as 'who am I?' and 'what should I do?' are closely linked to 
communal questions, such as those concerning our culture; 'who are 
we?' and those concerning our politics; 'what should we do?'470  Thus, 
for Owen, 'politics is the practice through which the community reflects 
on and constituted itself as a community.Õ471  Additionally, he affirms 
that citizens acquire autonomy and agency from engaging in communal 
discussion surrounding diverse perspectives.  He claims that 'it is in and 
through the history of politics as a practice that we become members of 
a historical community characterised by standards of excellence and 
the contestation of these standards.'472 Thus, perspectivism involves 
acknowledgment that all perspectives are shaped by - and also shape - 
their historical community, and that through engaging with others about 
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these perspectives, citizens become autonomous agents.   
 
An additional perfectionist concept is eternal recurrence, which entails 
Ôact[ing] always according to that maxim which you can at the same 
time will as eternally recurring.Õ473  This concept links to self-mastery 
and integrity since Ôone exhibits oneÕs nobility (self-mastery) publicly by 
acting in accordance with the commitments one espouses.Õ474  Self-
mastery requires personal integrity in developing a coherent set of 
principles, and ethical integrity in ensuring that these principles reflect 
oneÕs ethical commitments.475  One acquires such integrity communally 
since eternal recurrence is Ôa public activity in the sense of being 
subject to public criteria and exhibited through the consonance of 
actions and commitments, and as such is subject to public testing.Õ476  
Thus, perfectionism develops the self-mastery and integrity of citizens 
by requiring them to test their Ôperspectives against each other in 
coming to an honest judgment concerning the degree to which they 
satisfy the interests (exhibits the virtues) of the practice.Õ477   
 
The next concept constituting a fundamental part of perfectionism is 
Nietzschean competition.  Employing Nietzsche's analogy of the two 
Erises, Owen informs us that competition can channel envy into virtue 
and the resultant well being of the state.478  He explains this, asserting 
that competition encourages citizens to 'str[i]ve to surpass each other, 
and, ultimately, to set new standards of nobility.' 479   Through this 
collective modification of standards of nobility, Owen affirms that 'we 
develop our human powers,'480 and consequently, society is bettered by 
'striving for distinction and excellence in social practices, for ever 
greater words and deeds.' 481   Owen affirms that competition is 
heightened because, in spite of equal access to political engagement, 
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citizens who exhibit more integrity and generate more support for their 
recommendations will gain more authority.482   
 
The final concept intrinsic to Owen's perfectionism is 'enlarged 
mentality.'  Borrowing this term from Arendt, Owen explains it as our 
capacity to entertain a plurality of competing perspectives within the 
process of coming to a judgement.'483  Owen asserts that this principle 
arises from integrity, stating that 'this position commits citizens to a form 
of society which is characterised by the cultivation of the conditions of 
honest and just argument between free and equal citizens.'484  As a 
result of adopting an enlarged mentality, according to Owen two 
consequences will arise: solidarity and self-mastery.  Of the first, Owen 
explicates that behaving honestly and justly 'are the prerequisites for 
reconciling contestation and community in a sense of solidarity, of being 
engaged in a common quest.'485  Thus, by exhibiting integrity through 
honest and just engagement, citizens become involved in a common 
quest of perspective testing, thereby developing solidarity.  Second, 
Owen states that dialogue with diverse others encourages self-
mastery.  This concept encompasses the formulation of new standards, 
thereby resonating with Connolly's critical responsiveness.  Fossen 
describes self-mastery as 'not only the achievement of greater 
excellence according to some specific measure, but to set a new 
measure of excellence to overcome the old.'486  Hence, Owen argues 
that, by engaging with a plurality of perspectives, citizens are not only 
able to improve existing standards, they can also challenge the criteria 
of ÔimprovementÕ itself.  Thus, adopting an enlarged mentality toward 
conflicting views is fundamental to Owen's theory, promoting both 
solidarity and the critique of existing values.   
A Brief Overview of the Perfectionist Framework 
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Prior to the perfectionist discussion, the chairs had been left in a 
standard classroom format.  I asked participants to rearrange the 
furniture as they thought best.  Participants were given five cards, each 
one with the name of a different fictional charity, alongside a description 
of the charity and the values it sought to embody.487  Participants were 
given £15000 of replica money and were asked to divide this between 
the five charities, with the first charity receiving £5000, second £4000, 
third £3000, fourth £2000 and fifth £1000.  They were not told how they 
should come to a decision on the order of rank but were informed that 
this was to be their collective decision.  They were also asked to base 
their ranking, not on whom the charities benefit, but on the values they 
embody. 
Creating a Discussion Framework Informed by Perfectionist Concepts 
 
The primary difference between the content of this discussion and the 
subsequent adversarial and inclusive ones is that the perfectionist 
discussion incorporates a whole host of values.  The reason for 
choosing several values for the basis of discussion, is to reflect Owen's 
view that 'modernity is characterised by an irreducible pluralism 
concerning the character of the good life.'488  Hence, values such as 
universality, duty and excellence were employed to demonstrate how 
values often conflict with one another.  Thus, in including a diverse 
range of values in the discussion, I sought to represent the numerous 
conflicting values in society. 
 
The introduction of several values into the discussion enabled the task 
to echo perfectionist agonist concepts.  In asking participants to rank 
the charities according to which values they embodied, I aspired to 
explore eternal recurrence.  By requiring participants to allocate sums of 
money according to the order of rank, I aimed to provide opportunities 
for them to enter into 'honest deliberation on the plurality of political 
perspectives,' in which the first value 'exhibits the best ordering of the 
                                                
487 See Appendix 14 for a description of each charity. 
488 Owen, D. (1995), p. 159. 
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virtues for the community and that one exhibits is ordering of virtues as 
a citizen, that is, that one's political perspective expresses the ordering 
of one's soul.'489  The task of ranking charities thereby encouraged 
participants to test their perspectives against one another, requiring 
them to reflect on which value best satisfied 'the maximal expression of 
the virtues.Õ490   All of the charities belonged to the same category 
(sports) in an attempt at preventing participants from focusing on the 
content and beneficiaries of the charities, instead encouraging them to 
consider the values they encompass.  This was further aspired toward 
through the fictional element of each charity, since it prevented aimed 
participants from drawing on prior assumptions about existing charities.   
 
In so doing, the task promotes four elements of perfectionism.  First, the 
notion of an enlarged mentality is explored, since forming a collective 
order of rank necessitates engagement between plural 
perspectives.  Second, self-mastery is enabled since the task requires 
participants to critically challenge existing values.  Additionally, 
competition is given the opportunity to arise through the testing of 
perspectives.491  Finally, the group is given autonomy over parts of the 
task in order to explore solidarity.   
 
Giving participants autonomy over the room layout also resonated with 
Owen's perfectionist theory.  This reflects Owen's perspectivism in 
which he emphasises the importance of autonomy, which 'requires that 
one experience one's self as unified.' 492   According to Owen, this 
unification arises through engagement with diverse others.  In order to 
offer participants the opportunity to work together, they were granted 
autonomy with respect to the room layout.  Additionally, the room layout 
aspired to promote 'enlarged mentality' in which solidarity forms 
                                                
489 Ibid., p. 145. 
490 Ibid., p. 145. 
491 The usage of replica money, which participants had to physically assign to each charity, 
was introduced following the pilot study to increase competition.  Owen states that once 
citizens become competitive about their values, they will strive to surpass one another, and 
society will be enhanced as a result.  It was my contention that by asking participants to place 
money on each charity (as opposed to communicating their decision verbally), the 
implications of the ranking order would be more evident, increasing the feeling of competition. 
492 Ibid., p. 101. 
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between citizens engaging in a common quest.  By requiring 
participants to organise their physical space together, they became 
involved in a common quest. This also resonates with the new 
institutionalist notion of demonstrated practices, since providing 
collective autonomy encourages participants to follow one anotherÕs 
behaviour.  Finally, giving participants responsibility for their room 
layout promoted participation since they were required to reach a 
collective decision. 
 
Similarly, participants were informed that it was their decision as to how 
they should arrive at an order of rank.  Just as the room layout aspired 
to promote autonomy, so did granting participants power over the 
decision-making process.  This also furthers solidarity in which, again, 
participants are involved in a common quest.   
Creating Questionnaires Informed by Perfectionist Concepts493 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the questionnaires were created 
using Q method.  They represented perspectivism through a variety of 
statements.  One, for instance provides a choice between 'we mainly 
discussed which values were important to us as individuals' and Ôwe 
mainly discussed which values were important to us as a group.Õ  This 
aims to explore the perspectivist view that the question of who I am (for 
instance, which values I endorse) is closely linked to who we are 
(cultural values).  Another asks whether participants criticised certain 
values and practices (juxtaposed with whether they saw all values and 
practices as having equal worth).  This reflects the perspectivist notion 
that political communities should be interested in 'the question of which 
cultural practices and virtues should be cultivated and which should be 
discouraged.'494  An additional pair of statements asks whether or not 
participants' values were reflected by the final decision, relating to the 
perspectivist understanding of value discussion as a communal and 
collective practice.  Two final pairs of phrases ask participants whether 
                                                
493 See Appendix 6 for the Values Discussion Questionnaires. 
494 Ibid., p. 145. 
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the discussion made them reconsider who they are (or whether they 
were already aware of this), and whether reasons for their views 
developed through the discussion (or whether they already held these).  
These options aspire to explore the perspectivist idea of autonomy as 
something that arises through discussion with others.   
 
An additional concept I sought to embody through the questionnaires 
was eternal recurrence.  First, statements asking whether participants 
thought about which values were important to them relate to Owen's 
belief that who we are and what we should do are interlinked with who I 
am and what I should do.  The next asks participants whether there was 
disagreement about the order of rank, which explores OwenÕs emphasis 
on the existence of a plurality of perspectives.  Following this, 
statements ask whether participants considered what makes a values 
'good' or 'bad,' and whether they disagreed on ÔgoodÕ and ÔbadÕ values.  
This relates to Owen's notion of self-mastery in which citizens are to, 
not only evaluate values according to current standards, but to 
challenge the standards themselves.  The subsequent statements 
consider whether participants responded or ignored those with whom 
they disagreed.  This represents OwenÕs view that Ôbecause oneÕs 
integrity is tied to tolerance, this position commits citizens to a form of 
society which is characterised by the cultivation of the conditions of 
honest and just argument between free and equal citizens.Õ495   An 
additional pair of statements asks whether participants felt more or less 
respected after expressing their views, linking to OwenÕs understanding 
of an integral citizen as one who participates with others.  Finally, the 
questionnaire asks whether those with the most authority were those 
whose views were expressed most clearly, shared most widely, or 
those who said very little.  This provides an insight into Owen's 
assertion that authority arises through the clear expression of views and 
the harnessing of support for such views.  
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One pair of statements asked whether participants felt competitive 
about their values.  In so doing, this question highlights Owen's 
emphasis on competition as the driver for productive engagement.  
According to him, competition is of great significance because it 
encourages citizens to strive toward better values, thereby enhancing 
their standards of nobility - and those of society.  This question will also 
be used to cross-reference with the adversarial discussion, which views 
a different type of competition as imperative to political engagement.496  
 
Further statements aspired to provide insight into OwenÕs concept of 
enlarged mentality.  For instance, statements explore whether 
participants tolerated all views or whether they found some hard to 
tolerate.  Likewise, another pair asked whether they tolerated all views 
or whether some were difficult to tolerate.  These statements represent 
Owen's view that toleration 'for other views, a willingness to engage 
with them in an open and fair-minded way, is a condition of claiming 
one's own beliefs to be true.'497 Additional statements ask participants 
whether they felt like part of the group or whether they felt isolated from 
it, exploring Owen's notion that bonds of solidarity are formed through a 
common quest, rather than common values.  This will, again, cross-
reference with the adversarial discussion, which promotes unity through 
shared values.  A further pair of statements asks if the group felt like a 
single, united ÔgroupÕ and, if so, whether this arose through adherence 
to shared values or engagement in a common quest.  This echoes the 
previous statements in exploring OwenÕs promotion of a common quest 
to create unity. 
 
The questionnaires also explored issues, such as the impact of other 
beliefs on one's own; whether or not the discussion was dominated by 
one or two individuals; whether interest levels increased or decreased 
during conflict; whether participants were able to set aside prior 
judgments; and whether the ranking order was temporary or permanent.  
                                                
496 This is discussed in more detail in the following section.  
497 Ibid., p.161. 
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The inclusion of these themes enabled comparison with the second and 
third discussions. 
Creating Observer Sheets Informed by Perfectionist Concepts498 
 
In the observer sheets, perfectionism is embodied through the 
behavioural description Ôpeople become more sure of their own beliefs 
after hearing the arguments of others (i.e. they argued more strongly for 
their side),Õ and simultaneously by the affirmation that participants 
changed their views after hearing the other side.  This resonates with 
OwenÕs notion of autonomy in which citizens are shaped by 
engagement with their community.  It is also depicted by phrases 
stating that participants discussed which values should be encouraged 
(or included), and which should be discouraged (or banned).  This 
reflects the communal nature of perspectivism in which a community 
constitutes and reconstitutes itself through the engagement of plural 
perspectives.   
 
Eternal recurrence is symbolised in the observer sheets, first, by the 
assertion that people shared their beliefs with one another, representing 
the requirement that citizens publicly test their perspectives against 
those of others.  Similarly, the statement indicating the sharing of a 
range of beliefs mirrors OwenÕs calls for citizens to engage with a 
plurality of perspectives.  This is echoed by a sentence claiming that 
participants engaged with those they disagreed with, explaining their 
disagreement.  Further, phrases state that those with the most authority 
were those who expressed their views most clearly, or gained the most 
support, representing OwenÕs understanding of authority which the 
promotion and support of a particular doctrine.499   Additionally, the 
observer sheets described participants discussing which values should 
be prioritised, and what constitutes a good value, symbolising OwenÕs 
concept self-mastery whereby citizens challenge societal standards.  
 
                                                
498 See Appendix 10 for the Perfectionist Observer sheets. 
499 Ibid., p. 161. 
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Competition was evident in the description Ôpeople became very 
competitive about their beliefs (i.e. they showed passion and frustration, 
they compared their beliefs to those of others, they criticised views of 
others, they showed how their views were better).Õ  Further, the 
statement that conflict enabled participants to arrive at new conclusions 
- Ôi.e. modifying their original arguments to reach new conclusions Ð not 
simply to side with dominant membersÕ Ð resonates with OwenÕs 
emphasis on striving to surpass one another.  
 
Enlarged mentality was reflected in the observer sheets by the notion of 
respectful behaviour, whereby people listened to one another, 
empathised, and did not interrupt, swear, shout or turn the discussion 
personal.  It also involved reflecting on what people had previously said 
when considering their own beliefs.  For Owen, the toleration of diverse 
beliefs is essential to oneÕs own integrity.  Conversely, the sheets 
indicated that interrupting, shouting, swearing, not listening, rolling of 
eyes and sniggering all infer a lack of respect and thereby an absence 
of enlarged mentality. 
 
Additionally, descriptions encompassing a large/limited number of 
participants involved in the discussion; and whether people changed 
their mind according to the dominant beliefs all seek to act as cross-
references with the latter discussions. 
Introducing the Adversarial Framework: Revisiting Adversarial 
Concepts 
 
The first concept of great significance to Mouffe is that of the ÔpoliticalÕ.  
For Mouffe, the realm of the political Ôrefers to this dimension of 
antagonism which can take many forms and can emerge in diverse 
social relations.  It is a dimension that can never be eradicated.Õ500  
Claiming that citizens share value sets, but disagree on how to interpret 
and implement these, Mouffe states that antagonism, or disagreement, 
                                                
500 Mouffe C. (2013), p. 2. 
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Ôprovides the stuff of democratic politics,Õ 501  and should not be 
eradicated through consensus.  Mouffe affirms that when an excess of 
consensus occurs, Ôpassions cannot be given a democratic outlet,Õ and 
citizens then turn to national, religious, or ethnic conflict.Õ502  Thus, for 
Mouffe, conflict and antagonism are essential in ensuring democratic 
engagement.   
 
In seeking to prevent citizens from apathy and non-democratic 
identification, Mouffe promotes a Ôvibrant clash of democratic political 
positionsÕ503 centred around the concept of collective identities.  Unlike 
Tully and Connolly, who discuss identity in terms of interdependency 
between individuals, Mouffe focuses on interactions between two 
opposing groups.  Her assumption is that Ôthe very condition for the 
constitution of an ÒusÓ is the demarcation of a ÒthemÓ.Õ504   Hence, 
MouffeÕs concept of collective identity involves two opposing groups 
who are each constructed in relation to the other and is vital to 
maintaining the political element of democratic politics. 
 
In motivating engagement, Mouffe promotes agonistic struggle through 
passion, which she labels as Ôthe driving force in the political field.Õ505  In 
order to harness passion, she proposes politics as a battle or war-like 
process in which Ôadversaries fight against each other because they 
want their interpretation of the principles to become hegemonic.Õ506  
MouffeÕs emphasis on passion constitutes a fundamental element in 
promoting agonistic struggle since it is used to encourage motivation 
between conflicting citizens.  
 
An additional component of agonistic struggle is the Ôcommon enemyÕ 
group, which is distinguished from adversarial groups through the 
concept of legitimacy.  Mouffe asserts that our adversaries are people 
                                                
501 Mouffe, C. (2000), p. 114. 
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503 Mouffe, C. (2000), p. 104. 
504 Ibid., p. 6. 
505 Ibid., p. 8. 
506 Mouffe C. (2013), p. 7. 
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Ôwhose ideas we combat but whose right to defend those ideas we do 
not put into question.Õ507  According to her, the legitimacy of adversarial 
ides arises from acknowledgement that Ôwe have a shared adhesion to 
the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy: liberty and equality.  
But we disagree concerning the meaning and implementation of those 
principles.Õ508  By contrast, the demands of the enemy Ôneed to be 
excluded because they cannot be part of the conflictual consensus that 
provides the symbolic space in which the opponents recognize 
themselves as legitimate adversaries.Õ509   For Mouffe, the common 
enemy Ð or the excluded group - is imperative to maintaining effective 
democracy.510  Drawing on Jacques DerridaÕs notion of the Ôconstitutive 
outside,Õ she demonstrates how friends and adversaries perceive one 
another as legitimate, not just by recognising their shared principles, but 
also by contrasting them to the ÔexcludedÕ group; the enemy.511  Hence, 
the common enemy is essential to enabling friends and adversaries to 
perceive one another as legitimate.   
A Brief Overview of the Adversarial Discussion Framework 
 
The adversarial discussion centred around the topic of abortion.  Prior 
to the discussion, tables were arranged in two rows, facing one another, 
and participants were asked to sit at one table if they think that abortion 
can be morally justified, and the other if they think that it cannot be 
morally justified.  Each table was then asked to discuss which things 
they share i.e. values, views, characteristics; which things separate 
them from the other group; and how they feel about the other group and 
their views.  Participants were then required to discuss a variety of 
abortion cases with the other group, including: 
¥ A 30 year old couple have just found out at 26 weeks that their 
child will be born with DownÕs Syndrome, 
¥ A 14-year-old girl is pregnant as a result of being raped.  She is 
20 weeks into her pregnancy, 
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¥ A 33-year-old single career woman is 12 weeks pregnant.  She 
wants to focus on her career and does not want children. 
Halfway through the discussion, I showed participants a video that 
depicted pro-life and pro-choice extremism and emphasised how 
extremism invalidates the arguments of both sides.512  At the end of the 
discussion, participants were asked to vote (through a public show of 
hands) on whether abortion could be morally justified in each of the 
three cases. 
Creating a Discussion Framework Informed by Adversarial Concepts 
 
The topic of abortion was chosen for two reasons.  First, abortion 
provides a controversial issue for discussion.  Participant recruitment 
questionnaires from both the pilot study and main experiment indicated 
that participants held strong Ð and diverse - views on abortion. In 
providing a discussion topic about which participants feel passionate 
and hold different views, I sought to represent agonistic struggle and 
the political.513  This constituted an attempt at preventing apathy and 
political dissatisfaction and maintaining democratic engagement.514   
 
The second reason for discussing abortion was to encourage the 
formation of strong collective identities.  This is contrary to other 
controversial topics, such as gay marriage, which enable more nuanced 
opinions.  For instance, several participants were in favour of civil 
partnerships and gay adoption, but not gay marriage, thus it might be 
difficult to create strong collective identities around gay marriage.  
However, participant recruitment questionnaires indicated that several 
participants held more essentialist positions in which they were either 
for or against abortion, whatever the situation.  The topic of abortion 
thereby appeared more compatible with MouffeÕs calls for strong 
collective identities.515   
                                                
512 See Appendix 15 to see the images shown in this video. 
513 Mouffe C. (2013), p. 4. 
514 Mouffe, C. (2000), p. 114. 
515 An additional reason for choosing abortion as the discussion topic was that extremism 
exists on both the pro-life and pro-choice sides of the argument.  This enabled me to present 
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The specific cases of abortion, which participants were asked to discuss 
were also designed to promote adversarialism.  By using three different 
cases, I sought to provide the opportunity for nuanced views to surface.  
Mouffe explains the importance of this, affirming that Ôdifferent forms of 
unity can be established among the components of the ÒusÓ.Õ 516  
Additionally, the introduction of these instances constituted an attempt 
at representing the practical emphasis Mouffe places on her 
adversarialism, as opposed to asking participants to discuss abortion in 
an abstract manner.  In employing three practical cases, I also aspired 
to personalise the discussion to encourage participants to enter into a 
passionate contest surrounding the implementation of their values.  
 
In addition to the topic and the associated questions, the adversarial 
room layout also played a part in bringing MouffeÕs motivational 
narrative to life.  By requiring participants to sit with their Ôgroup,Õ the 
room layout constituted an attempt at promoting strong collective 
identities.  In addition to striving for unity within each group, the room 
layout also sought to provoke the collective identities into a passionate 
engagement with one another.  The oppositional arrangement of the 
tables aspired to represent MouffeÕs references to adversaries, combat, 
fighting and struggle and operationalise her motivational narrative.517  
The omission of an ÔunsureÕ group, for instance, resulted from the desire 
to create distinctly different positions, as MouffeÕs theory requires.  
Thus, the decision to construct two polarised identities reflects MouffeÕs 
adversarial understanding of collective identity.   
 
The two groups were phrased as ÔforÕ and ÔagainstÕ in an attempt at 
preventing rhetoric in which participants would feel as if they were 
identifying with an external group.  For example, during the pilot study 
one quote was placed on each table, one drawn from the pro-life 
                                                                                                                            
participants with a common enemy.  This will, however, be discussed in more detail when the 
decision to use an extremist video is explored. 
516 Ibid., p. 50. 
517 See Mouffe, C. (1992), (2000) and (2013). 
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association, the other from the pro-choice.  However, many participants 
whose questionnaires had stated that they were generally against 
abortion identified more with the pro-choice citation.  Thus, rather than 
attempting to represent an entire side of the debate in just one 
argument, I decided to phrase the positions in less nuanced, more 
concrete terms of ÔforÕ and Ôagainst.Õ  In arranging participants in this 
way, I aimed to ignite passion and create an agonistic struggle.  As a 
result of this, the room arrangement also tried to ensure the existence 
of MouffeÕs understanding of the political.  The war-like set-up strived to 
encourage continued antagonism, preventing an excess of consensus 
and the subsequent disengagement.          
 
ÔForÕ and ÔagainstÕ positions were also created through the pre-
discussion task., which asked participants about what brought them 
together as a group; how they differed from the other group; and what 
their opinions were of the other group and their values.  The first 
question aimed to promote collective identity, whilst the latter two 
questions sought to enhance competition.  By increasing competition 
between adversaries, I sought to render the discussion passionate and 
political. 
 
The final adversarial element of the framework was the video of 
extremists shown halfway through the abortion discussion.  This feature 
of the discussion aspired to promote two concepts: common enemy and 
agonistic struggle.  By showing participants examples of extremism, I 
aimed to expose those who threaten democratic politics and are 
excluded from adversarial politics.  This thereby defines the limits of the 
political space by Ôimpl[ying] the establishment of frontiers, the 
determination of a space of inclusion/exclusion.Õ518  By subsequently 
claiming that they undermine and invalidate the arguments of each 
group, I strived to create an ÔenemyÕ group.  The introduction of the 
enemy group sought to separate adversaries from Ôenemies to be 
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destroyedÕ 519  in order to encourage adversaries to perceive one 
another as legitimate. 
Creating Questionnaires Informed by Adversarial Concepts520 
 
One concept represented in the questionnaires is MouffeÕs concept of 
the political.  The statements relating to this theme asked participants 
whether they believed disagreements with the other group were on-
going or temporary, exploring MouffeÕs understanding of conflict as 
continual.  For Mouffe, antagonism and disagreement are of great 
significance since it is their existence that prevents the apathy that 
leads to disaffection with democracy.   
 
The theme of collective identity also comprised a significant part of the 
questionnaires.  One pair of statements, for instance, asks participants 
whether it was easy or difficult to choose which group to join, exploring 
MouffeÕs promotion of strong, collective identities.  Similarly, the 
questionnaire explored whether participants felt a strong sense of 
identification with their group.  Further questions asked whether 
participants felt any belonging to the other group.  The significance of 
this became evident during the pilot study in which some participants 
appeared to understand the other group better than their own.  This 
explores MouffeÕs claim that identities are created in opposition to 
another.  Finally, statements on whether participants felt that their 
values were similar to those of their group are significant to MouffeÕs 
assertion that ÔfriendÕ groups form through a shared interpretation and 
implementation of liberty and equality.   
 
The next theme I sought to embody in the participant questionnaires 
was agonistic struggle. Participants were asked whether they found the 
discussion more or less interesting during high levels of conflict linking 
to MouffeÕs claim that an excess of consensus causes apathy whilst 
conflict engages citizens.  Other claims explore whether participants 
                                                
519 Ibid., p. 7. 
520 See Appendix 6 for the Questionnaire for the Abortion Discussion. 
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saw the other groupÕs values as having equal worth to theirs, resonating 
with MouffeÕs emphasis on adversarial legitimacy.  Subsequently, 
phrases asking whether participants felt competitive reflects MouffeÕs 
claim that adversaries are provoked into contestation with one another.  
Further, the questionnaire asks participants whether it is the values 
themselves or their implementation about which the groups disagree.  
This reflects MouffeÕs assumption that adversaries share a set of values 
(liberty and equality) but disagree as to how to implement these.  This is 
significant for the previous concept of legitimacy too, since, according to 
Mouffe, it is this awareness of common ground that allows each group 
to perceive the other as legitimate.  It is important because it contrasts 
with agonists, such as Owen, who perceive unity as arising from 
participation in a common quest, rather than endorsement of common 
values.  The final question relating to agonistic struggle is why 
participants found the discussion either boring or engaging.  This was 
introduced after the pilot study where several participants had stated 
that the discussion was boring without explaining why.  The reasons 
could be significant since interest and engagement are fundamental 
components of adversarial agonistic democracy. 
 
A range of questions explored the concept of common enemy during 
the questionnaire.  The questionnaire was split into three sections: with 
the first referring to the overall discussion, the second to pre-video 
discussion, and the third post-video discussion.  The questions for the 
former and latter parts of the discussion were identical in order to allow 
for direct comparison.  In arranging the questionnaire in this way, I 
aspired to analyse the effect of introducing a common enemy. 
 
There were also several questions that were not directly associated with 
adversarialism, but were included to cross-reference with the other two 
discussions.  These included reflection on whether or not oneÕs views 
became stronger as a result of engaging with others, whether the two 
groups worked together or separately, and whether a variety of people 
spoke in the discussion, or just a couple.   
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Creating Observer Sheets Informed by Adversarial Concepts521 
 
On the observer sheets, Ôlots of people involved in the discussionÕ 
explores MouffeÕs notion of the political as a rich democratic arena.  
Negative indicators of this include times when only a couple of people 
are involved in the discussion, or when people are not taking the 
discussion seriously (for instance, they are laughing, rolling their eyes 
or not listening) since these may indicate apathy and disaffection.   
 
Collective identity is indicated by behaviour such as agreement 
between members of a group; participants supporting opinions of others 
in their group (either verbally or by smiling or nodding); participants 
saying positive things about their group; competition between the two 
groups (for instance, using language such as Ôwin,Õ ÔbestÕ and ÔworstÕ); 
and behaving positively toward oneÕs own group (such as smiling, 
laughing, listening to, sitting close to).  Conversely, behaviour such as 
sitting apart from oneÕs own group; arguing with members of oneÕs own 
group; and hostility towards oneÕs own group (interrupting, not listening, 
swearing, shouting, turning the discussion personal) indicate a lack of 
collective identity. 
 
Agonistic struggle is indicated by behaviour such as people bursting to 
speak; fast pace of conversation (lots of back and forth discussion); 
people listening to one another (looking at the speaker, nodding, 
thinking); positive behaviour towards other group (smiling, laughing, 
listening to them); relating to the experiences of the other group; trying 
to understand the opinions of the other group; and both groups trying to 
work together as a whole.  The first two indicators suggest the 
passionate element of agonistic struggle, whilst the latter phrases imply 
perceptions of the other group as legitimate.  Contrarily, if participants 
are seen to be having private conversations; staring into space; 
experiencing awkward silences; and interacting at a slow pace, it 
implies that they are not acting passionately.  Likewise, if they are 
                                                
521 See Appendix 10 for the Abortion Discussion Observer Sheet.  
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saying negative things about the other group; or showing hostility to the 
other group (for instance, interrupting, not listening, swearing, shouting, 
turning the discussion personal), we may infer that participants do not 
perceive the other as legitimate, a fundamental feature of agonistic 
struggle.   
 
Finally, the affect of a common enemy is measured, not by additional 
behaviour indicators, but by referring to the same ones before and after 
the video.  One exception to this was that an additional negative 
indicator was included in the post-video observer sheet: whether 
participants associated members of the other group to the extremists in 
the video. 
Introducing the Inclusive Framework: Revisiting Inclusive Concepts 
 
The first concept which Connolly and Tully both advocate is that of 
intersubjectivity.  For Connolly, this arises through the notion of identity, 
which Ôis always connected to a series of differences that help it be what 
it is.Õ522  Hence, on ConnollyÕs understanding, the existence of alternate 
identities is imperative to the existence of oneÕs own identity.  Tully 
shares this view, affirming that identities are Ôoverlapping, interacting 
and negotiated over time,Õ523 claiming that intersubjectivity is intrinsic to 
citizenship.  Thus, intersubjectivity is significant to rendering society 
inclusive since citizens cannot fully exist without others.  
 
The next concept of great significance to Connolly and Tully is that of 
citizens as simultaneously the rulers and the ruled.  Tully calls for the 
rule by, and of, the people,524 which entails Ôa conversation of reciprocal 
elucidation and co-articulation with the demoi.Õ525  ConnollyÕs work also 
implies with a society in which citizens are involved in their own rule.  
Owen, for instance, suggests that ConnollyÕs theory would coalesce 
with Ôthe deepening of formal democratic practices through recourse to 
                                                
522 Connolly, W. (1991), p. xiv. 
523 Tully, J., (2008a), p. 160. 
524 Ibid., p. 227. 
525 Ibid., p. 242. 
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forms of democratic innovation (e.g. participatory budgeting, citizensÕ 
assemblies, citizensÕ juries, uses of direct democracy).Õ 526   The 
involvement of citizens in self-rule is thereby significant to rendering 
democracy a more inclusive process.  
 
An additional concept endorsed by both thinkers is that of overcoming 
domination.  This is evident in TullyÕs notion of mutual recognition, 
which requires citizens to recognise others as individuals, rather than 
understanding them through prior assumptions and prejudices.  It asks 
them to encounter others Ôas if we are being asked to see and hear 
them for the first time.Õ 527   This strives to enhance inclusivity by 
overcoming the domination of the majority.  ConnollyÕs notion of 
agonistic respect echoes this attempt at greater inclusion through the 
prevention of ressentiment.  He challenges liberal toleration, claiming 
that it resembles a one-way street whereby a dominant majority 
chooses whether or not to tolerate an inferior minority.  Rather, he 
promotes agonistic respect in an attempt at challenging power relations 
and associated ressentiment, by promoting respect that is Ôreciprocal 
between chastened constituencies who find themselves entangled in 
the pleasures, tensions, and risks of identity\difference relations.Õ528  
Thus, by challenging domination and working to enhance interactions, 
Connolly and Tully seek to promote a more inclusive agonistic 
democracy.  
 
A subsequent inclusive concept in Tully and ConnollyÕs thought is self-
modification and challenge.  In TullyÕs work, this arises through audi 
alteram partem in which citizens are asked to ÔÓalways listen to the other 
sideÓ, for there is always something to be learned from the other 
side.Õ529  He claims that citizens have a duty to Ôlisten attentively for 
voices that are silenced or misrepresented by the official rules or by the 
                                                
526 Owen, D. (2008), p. 224. 
527 Ibid., p. 23. 
528 Connolly, W. (1991), p. xxviii. 
529 Tully, J., (2008a), p. 110. 
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most powerful critics.Õ530  In ConnollyÕs work, this concept is apparent in 
the notion of critical responsiveness, which combines critical thinking 
(whereby citizens challenge whether the new ideas enable pluralism) 
with responsiveness (whereby receptivity to new ideas is required).  
Thus, Tully requires citizens to listen and learn from others, enhancing 
inclusion by challenging domination.  Connolly calls on citizens to work 
on their selves in relation to the other, once again challenging 
ressentiment and rendering society more inclusive.  
 
Finally, both thinkers endorse the concept of contestability.  For 
Connolly, this entails acknowledgement that oneÕs own views will not 
necessarily be shared Ôwhile working hard not to convert that 
acknowledgement into a stolid or angry stance of existential 
resentment.Õ 531  He argues that, by expressing doubts about oneÕs 
position, it may Ôinject generosity and forbearance into public 
negotiations between parties who reciprocally acknowledge that the 
deepest wellsprings of human inspiration are to date susceptible to 
multiple interpretations.Õ532  Hence, contestability may enhance relations 
between citizens, encouraging enhanced inclusivity.  For Tully, 
contestability falls under his concept, Ôacting differently,Õ which enables 
people to challenge domination.  This involves demonstrating the 
effects of a particular course of action; considering rational alternatives; 
and alerting people to elements of their situation, their working 
conditions and their exploitation of which they are unaware.533  Tully 
informs us that this conversation enables citizens to overcome their 
domination and realise new ways of being.534   Thus, both thinkers 
advocate contestability to improve relations between conflicting citizens 
and overcome domination.  
A Brief Overview of the Inclusive Framework 
 
                                                
530 Ibid., p. 170. 
531 Connolly, W. (2000), p.8. 
532 Connolly, W. (2005), p. 125. 
533 Bernauer, J. and Rasmussen, D. (1988), p. 15. 
534 Tully, J. (2008a), p.  144. 
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The inclusive phase of the experiment consisted of a discussion about 
gay rights.  This entailed a sixty-minute discussion followed by a vote 
on the following questions:  
¥ Should gay couples be able to enter into civil partnerships (as 
brought into the UK in 2005)? 
¥ Should gay couples be allowed to marry? 
¥ Should gay couples be allowed to adopt?  
¥ Should churches, vicars and other religious places/ persons be 
obliged to marry gay couples in a church or other religious 
place?   
Participants were instructed to use these specific questions as a 
starting point for the discussion, but to feel free to discuss other issues 
relevant to gay rights.  Prior to the discussion, chairs were arranged in a 
circle and each participant was given ten tokens for the discussion.  
Participants were asked to put a token in the middle of the circle each 
time they spoke, and to stop contributing to the discussion once they 
had used all of these tokens.  Additionally, they were provided with 
discussion guidelines, consisting of:  
¥ Try to respect others even if you disagree with their opinion, 
¥ Try to set aside prior prejudices about peopleÕs religions or 
cultures, and listen to the individual in front of you 
¥ Try to listen to other peopleÕs beliefs and reflect upon yours 
accordingly, and, 
¥ Try to accept, and show others, that you are aware that not 
everyone will share your view. 
Creating a Discussion Framework Informed by Inclusive Concepts 
 
The rationale for asking participants to talk about gay rights is that it 
constitutes a controversial subject for the participants.  Through the 
aforementioned participant selection process, 535  I sought to recruit 
volunteers who held passionate, and often conflicting, views on gay 
rights.  This is of great significance to Connolly and TullyÕs work, since it 
                                                
535 As outlined in Chapter Four. 
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is situated within the context of diverse, and potentially conflictual, 
societies.  The topic was therefore chosen to reflect such difference.  
Had participants held homogenous beliefs about the topic, the critical 
dialogue for which Connolly and Tully call would not be possible.  The 
questions surrounding this discussion topic were also instrumental in 
seeking to provide a topic that would allow for a diversity of viewpoints.  
Unlike MouffeÕs understanding of difference as that which separates ÔusÕ 
from Ôthem,Õ536 Connolly and Tully perceive difference to pervade Ôlines 
of difference.Õ537  Hence, a range of questions surrounding gay rights 
was chosen in order to ensure a plurality of viewpoints.  I sought to 
avoid a framework that encouraged participants to identify with either 
for or against positions.  Since both Tully and Connolly emphasise the 
importance of diversity and pluralism, rather than dichotomy and 
adversarialism, I aspired to provide questions that enabled such 
nuanced diversity to arise.   
 
In spite of providing a set of questions for discussion, I also suggested 
that participants use these as a foundation and then let the discussion 
evolve in alternate directions.  In providing participants the autonomy to 
shape the content and focus of the discussion, I sought to promote 
Connolly and TullyÕs calls for citizens to act as the rulers and the ruled.  
Tully explains that self-rule involves Ômembers of the association 
hav[ing] some sort of say in the way political power is exercised over 
them through the laws.Õ538  In granting participants autonomy to modify 
content and questions, they became involved in exercising power over 
themselves.  Hence, in transferring power to participants in this way, I 
aspired to represent Connolly and TullyÕs notion of self-rule. 
 
In addition to selecting a topic that lends itself to an inclusive framework 
(while also granting participants power over this content), the layout of 
the room also strove to encourage inclusivity.  During the previous 
discussion, tables were arranged into two lines opposite one another to 
                                                
536 Mouffe, C. (2000), p. 13. 
537 Connolly, W. (1991), p. xxvi. 
538 Tully, J. (2008a), p. 163. 
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encourage passion and rivalry between two contending groups.  
However, in this discussion, the chairs were arranged in a circle to 
promote intersubjectivity, overcome domination (through the principles 
of mutual recognition), and encourage challenge and self-modification 
(through audi alteram partem and critical responsiveness).  As Jenny 
Kitzinger states, Ôsitting in a circle will help to establish the right 
atmosphere…to encourage people to talk to each other.Õ539  Unlike the 
adversarial discussion, the circular layout attempted to reflect identity as 
something that is Ôdefined through the collective constituencies with 
which I identify or am identified by others…[and] it is further specified by 
comparison to a variety of the thing I am not.Õ540  
 
In addition to aspiring to reflect the emphasis Connolly and Tully place 
on intersubjectivity, the circular layout also seeks to operationalise the 
informal normative institutions of mutual recognition and agonistic 
respect.  It lent itself to an environment in which participants set aside 
their prior prejudices and recognised each other as individuals since, 
unlike the previous discussion, it did not encourage participants to 
affiliate themselves with a particular group or draw on prior assumptions 
about the other group.  As a result, the circular layout enables 
participants to act as individuals, rather than a representation of either 
side of the argument, thereby fostering an environment that facilitate 
recognition of each individual in oneÕs Ôown terms and traditions as 
[they] want to be and as [they] speak to us.Õ541  Further, the circular 
design encouraged self-modification through promotion of audi alteram 
partem and critical responsiveness.  This layout reduces physical 
barriers to interaction, such as the inability to see or hear those who are 
further away, ensuring that participants all had equal opportunities to be 
involved in the discussion.  The critical nature of audi alteram partem 
and critical responsiveness was also facilitated by the circular layout of 
the discussion since, unlike the previous discussion, participants were 
not required to attach themselves to a particular identity for the duration 
                                                
539 Kitzinger, J. (1995). Introducing focus groups. BMJ, 311: 299-302, p. 299. 
540 Connolly, W. (1991), p. xiv. 
541 Tully, J. (1995), p. 23. 
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of the discussion.  This might, therefore, enhance possibilities for 
participants to reflect and modify their beliefs, without feeling the need 
to represent a particular side of the debate.  
 
As well as the content and the room layout, inclusivity was also sought 
through usage of tokens, which sought to prevent one or two individuals 
from dominating the discussion.  This element of the discussion 
framework aspired, first, to operationalise calls for citizens to overcome 
domination by practicing agonistic respect and audi alteram partem 
toward a diversity of viewpoints.542  Just as the circular layout of the 
discussion sought to ensure that participants could be seen and heard, 
so too did the usage of tokens.  In requiring participants to place a 
token in middle of the circle before they spoke, the framework aspired 
to prevent several participants from speaking at once.   
 
In addition to providing participants with tokens, I also presented them 
with a list of guidelines for the discussion.  These were given to 
transform a range of theoretical concepts from Connolly and TullyÕs 
work into practical measures that could shape participantsÕ behaviour.  
These guidelines promoted: agonistic respect by asking participants to 
respect others, even when their views conflicted; mutual recognition by 
asking people to set aside prior prejudices and listen to the individual; 
critical responsiveness and audi alteram partem by asking participants 
to listen to others and reflect upon oneÕs own beliefs; and finally, 
contestability by asking participants to accept and demonstrate 
acknowledgement that not everyone will share oneÕs own view. 
Creating Questionnaires Informed by Inclusive Concepts543 
 
In exploring the notion of intersubjectivity, the questionnaire asked 
whether participants could still relate to those with radically opposing 
                                                
542 During the pilot study, the tokens also included one which was a different colour.  This 
token had to be used by the end of the discussion, signifying that each participant must 
verbally partake.  However, I felt uncomfortable with forcing people to speak and concluded 
that, whilst Connolly and Tully sought to encourage minority voices to be heard, they would 
not necessarily insist on their participation.    
 
543 See Appendix 6 for the Gay Marriage Questionnaire. 
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views.  This sought to gain an insight into whether interdependency is 
possible between conflicting citizens.  It subsequently questioned 
whether participants felt like individuals or part of the group during the 
discussion, exploring whether participants felt interdependency toward 
the group.   
 
The questionnaire then considers the notion of participation as 
significant to attaining oneÕs citizenship, exploring whether participants 
saw their ideas as formed during the discussion, or as previously 
formed.  It also asked whether participants told others they disagreed 
with them and why, or whether they preferred not to respond, as well as 
the related question of whether the discussion showed that it was better 
to ignore or discuss conflicting others.  These explorations represent 
Connolly and TullyÕs assertions that engagement with conflicting others 
enhances interaction.   
 
The questionnaire then asked about respect and recognition within the 
discussion by exploring how many people were involved in the 
discussion, how worthy and validity views were, whether quieter 
participants were encouraged to speak, and whether participants were 
able to set aside their prejudices and stereotypes about others.  These 
questions sought to represent Connolly and TullyÕs attempts at 
overcoming domination.   
 
The next group of questions aimed to gain insights into self-modification 
and challenge by providing statements about the predictability of 
opinions, whether it was easy or difficult to understand conflicting views, 
whether the discussion helped participants to understand othersÕ views, 
and if there was any impact of listening to other opinions on oneÕs own 
views.  
 
Finally, an exploration of contestability entailed asking participants 
whether they were more motivated to engage with those who accepted 
that not everyone would share their beliefs, whether or not is was easier 
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to engage with those who shared oneÕs own views, and whether or not 
the participants could accept that other people could not share their 
views.  They thereby asked participants to reflect on whether they were 
able to acknowledge their own contestability.   
 
As with the previous questionnaires, there were statements that cross-
referenced with the other discussions in order to allow for direct 
comparison. 
Creating Observer Sheets Informed by Inclusive Concepts544 
 
First, then, the concept of intersubjectivity was represented by the 
phrase Ôthere was unity within the groupÕ and this was accompanied by 
suggested behaviour such as members of the group smiling at one 
another, nodding when someone put forward an argument, and 
referring back to previous points in the discussion.   
 
Next, participation was indicated in phrases stating that there was a 
wide range of beliefs given in the discussion; lots of people involved in 
the discussion; people were made more aware of their own beliefs after 
hearing those of others (for instance, they argued more strongly); and 
people engaged with beliefs they disagreed with explaining why they 
disagreed.  Conversely, negative indicators for participation were that 
one or two people dominated the discussion, and that only a couple of 
different views were given.   
 
The next concept, overcoming domination, was reflected in several 
phrases combined with accompanying behaviour.  The first phrase 
asked whether everyoneÕs views were respected, and this was 
supplemented by relevant behaviour, such as people listening to others, 
empathising with them, not interrupting them, not swearing, shouting or 
turning the discussion personal.  An additional positive indicator was 
that quieter members of the group were being encouraged to speak.   A 
                                                
544 See Appendix 10 for Gay Marriage Observer Sheets. 
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final phrase supporting the overcoming of domination is that participants 
were listening to others as individuals, rather than relying on prior 
assumptions and stereotypes.  On the contrary, negative phrases 
encompassed those who did not respect others and entailed 
interruption, swearing, shouting, not listening or rolling their eyes; as 
well as those who relied upon cultural stereotypes and generalisations 
to form their argument.   
 
Next, the observer sheets encompassed challenge and self-
modification.  Phrases indicating that this concept was evident in the 
discussion were people reflecting on their own beliefs after hearing 
those of others; people changing their beliefs after hearing alternate 
ones; and the group challenging current moral standards.  Finally, the 
notion of contestability was represented in the phrase that suggested 
people acted positively to those who did not share their beliefs.  This 
was accompanied by suggested behaviour, such as smiling, listening 
and responding positively.  
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explained the ways in which agonistic concepts were 
represented by practical mechanisms during the experiment.  This 
entailed incorporating agonistic concepts into the discussion 
frameworks, creating a common quest in which participants 
competitively rank their values against one anotherÕs; an adversarial 
debate in which each side seeks to defend their arguments against one 
another; and an inclusive view-sharing discussion in which citizens 
challenged one another whilst trying to respect and listen to one 
another.  I demonstrated how agonistic concepts were then explored in 
questionnaires and observer sheets through an adaptation of Q 
method. 
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Chapter Six: Analysing David Owen’s Perfectionist 
Agonistic Democracy 
 
In this chapter, I analyse OwenÕs perfectionist agonism by combining 
theoretical exploration with consideration of the operationalisation of 
perfectionist concepts during the values discussion.  First, I suggest that 
perspectivism encourages a diversity of views, and could enhance 
opportunities for challenge and contestation, whilst also increasing the 
agency and autonomy of each individual.  However, it may also fail to 
address the potential for apathy.  I consider eternal recurrence, 
suggesting that it could encourage integrity, but abandoning the 
possibility to exhibit honesty when testing perspectives.  I discuss the 
distinction between Owen and MouffeÕs usage of competition, exploring 
perfectionist competitionÕs effectiveness in motivating citizens to 
participate. I then argue that enlarged mentality could enhance group 
unity and encourage tolerance between conflicting citizens, but discuss 
the potential limits of this. Finally, I explore OwenÕs concept of self-
overcoming, demonstrating its potential to enhance society by 
encouraging citizens to challenge standards of excellence. 
Perspectivism 
 
In OwenÕs notion of perspectivism, the diversity of views in society 
represents Ôa plurality of conflicting conceptions of the good.Õ545  We 
saw in Chapter Two that Owen claims that the diversity between these 
conceptions arises from the different history that belongs to each 
community.546  He, like Connolly, Tully and Mouffe, rejects the notion of 
universal values, arguing that the ranking of values is necessarily 
perspectival, and each individualÕs preferences arise as a consequence 
of their particular historical community.547  As a result, Owen argues 
that Ôpolitics as a practice is concerned with the ranking of cultural 
practices and virtues, that is, politics is the practice through which the 
                                                
545 Owen, D. (1995), p. 154. 
546 Ibid., p.138.  
547 Ibid., p. 139. 
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community reflects on and constitutes itself as a community.Õ548  Thus, 
just as the values of each individual are a product of their historical 
community, the political community is also a product of such values.  
Furthermore, Owen claims that, since participation in this ranking 
encourages the re-articulation of communities, it provides each 
individual with agency and autonomy.549  This parallels TullyÕs assertion 
that one cannot fully exist in isolation, and that Ôone becomes a citizen 
through participation.Õ550  In the experiment, I sought to reflect OwenÕs 
perspectivism by providing participants with a range of charities Ð each 
representing a different set of values - and asking them to reach a 
collective decision about how a sum of money should be distributed 
between them.  In framing the discussion in this way, I aspired to 
encourage a range of perspectives surrounding the differing values to 
surface.   
 
Interestingly, participants themselves raised the issue of perspectivism 
during the experiment.  For instance, Sam states that Ôeveryone has 
different, sort of, right and wrong, donÕt they?Õ  This echoes OwenÕs 
notion that oneÕs value sets are Ôembodied perspectives, that is, our 
ways of knowing are tied to our ways of being-in-the-world.Õ551  As such, 
Sam supports OwenÕs understanding of values as perspectival.  
Significantly, this differs from MouffeÕs understanding, in which citizens 
disagree over their employment but crucially share allegiance to 
particular values.  However, the discussion suggests that, in addition to 
disagreement over which values to endorse, disagreement over how to 
implement these was also a factor in arriving at a value ranking.  For 
example, towards the end of the discussion, Katayoun asserts that Ôduty 
is a very abstract conceptÕ making it a bit Ôtricky in this situationÕ whilst 
Sam explicitly states that ÔweÕll all disagree on what responsibility isÕ 
before demonstrating how people use moral arguments for their own 
gain.  These comments resonate with OwenÕs emphasis on 
                                                
548 Ibid, p. 145. 
549 Ibid., p.138. 
550 Tully, J. in Peters, M., Britton, A. & Blee, H. (2008), p. 3.  
551 Owen, D. (1995), p. 147. 
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perspectivism in which Ôa perspective is not just a complex of beliefs, it 
is a complex of beliefs which are rooted in common practical 
interests.Õ552  As a result, citizens not only disagree on which values to 
endorse, but also on how these should be defined and subsequently 
implemented.  Further, participants seemed to promote their ideas, not 
as truths (as in the following adversarial discussion on abortion), but as 
perspectives throughout the discussion.  Arabella, for example 
expresses her view on equality as ÔthatÕs how I would see [it],Õ Katayoun 
argues that Ôfrom my perspective,Õ and Sam explains that ÔthatÕs why 
IÕve put it, personally, at the bottom of the list,Õ and other participants 
continually use ÔI thinkÕ to share their views.553  This resonates with the 
gay marriage discussion, in which citizens used vocabulary, such as ÔI 
feelÕ and posed questions to those they disagreed with, rather than 
accusations.  It also suggests that the provision of a value ranking is 
useful in demonstrating perspectivism and thereby encouraging citizens 
to express their views in a non-essentialist manner.  Thus, by asking 
citizens to rank a number of options against one another, rather than 
choosing one over the other (as in the following discussion), OwenÕs 
perspectivism can be operationalised through a demonstrated practice, 
which encourages citizens to value a range of views. 
 
Behaviour between participants appeared to constitute the view-
sharing, collective quest that Owen discusses.  This is contrary to the 
abortion discussion whereby participants appeared to strive to Ôwin the 
debate,Õ through the usage of statistics to prove their points, and the 
adoption of sarcastic, mocking tones and dismissive behaviour.  
Instead, participants nodded when others were speaking, referred back 
to one anotherÕs points, and appeared to work together to come to a 
decision.  At one stage, the focus moved away from the values and 
became about the charities and whom they benefited.  Ben tried to get 
                                                
552 Ibid., p. 36. 
553 It is important to be mindful, here, of the order of the discussions.  The perfectionist 
framework came first and, perhaps, encouraged participants to behave in a less essentialist 
nature since participants had only just met.  However, the seminar discussions reflected the 
same perspectivist behaviour and those students had already had significant prior relations 
with one another.   
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the group back on track by suggesting Ôwhat you could do is actually 
think…Õ  This was met with several nods and Sam responded, ÔI think 
youÕre right, I suppose we could get too carried awayÕ before asking the 
group whether they were happy to return the focus to the values.  The 
way in which Ben respectfully guided the discussion, the positive 
reaction to his interjection, and SamÕs decision to check with the other 
members of the group, demonstrate the way in which participants 
worked together.  This suggests OwenÕs assertion that Ôit is in and 
through agonistic engagements within and over the terms of democratic 
citizenship that citizens exercise and develop the capacities and 
dispositions that compose democratic nobilityÕ554 and that, as a result, 
respect and tolerance arise because Ôgiving other speakers their due is 
integral to becoming what (politically) one is.Õ555   
 
In addition to enabling, and indeed requiring, positive relations between 
participants, the exchanging of various perspectives throughout the 
discussion also promoted challenge.  This challenge was evident in the 
way in which participants would use questions to probe one another on 
perspectives they themselves were not convinced by.  For example, 
Sam said to Katayoun, ÔI donÕt disagree but IÕm just going to play devilÕs 
advocate here.  Some people argue that…Õ  Additionally, Arabella 
responds to NikolaosÕ views on duty as Ôyes, but isnÕt that your 
responsibility as well…?Õ  However, such probing, questioning and 
challenge generally appeared to take the form of ÔproductiveÕ conflict, in 
which it was evident from phrasing and tone that participants sought to 
gather more information from others to reconsider their own 
perspectives, and to strive for the most preferable allocation of sums.  
For example, when Erin challenged Sam on his assumption of poverty 
as an African issue, he built on her argument, rather than dismissing or 
disagreeing with it.  In one instance Ben was critical of welfare benefits, 
and Sam responded with statistics about how many benefits recipients 
are Ôactually scroungers,Õ with Erin adding that the Ôvast majority of 
                                                
554 Owen, D. (2002), p. 128. 
555 Owen, D. (1999). Cultural diversity and the conversation of justice: Reading Cavell on 
political voice and the expression of consent. Political theory 27(5): 579Ñ596, p. 594. 
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benefits are spent on state pensions.Õ  However, Sam quickly moved 
onto KatayounÕs point, diffusing any potential arguments.  This was 
contrary to the subsequent discussion in which participants attempted 
to ÔwinÕ the debate to the extent that an observer described it as 
Ôdecend[ing] into chaos.Õ  This is demonstrated in the following chapter, 
which will discuss the way in which participants frequently interrogated 
one another and asked questions in an accusing or aggressive manner 
without challenging their own positions.   
 
Further, the values discussion avoided back and forth exchanges 
between two or three dominant participants.  Instead, participants 
appeared to work together in order to challenge one anotherÕs views - 
alongside their own - in an attempt at reaching the most preferable 
order of rank.  This supports FossenÕs understanding of OwenÕs 
perfectionist agonism, which Ôsignifies a commitment to the cultivation 
and continuous improvement of citizensÕ virtues and capacities.Õ 556  
Thus, it is evident that, in emphasising the need to create an order of 
rank amongst competing perspectives, engagement between citizens 
can become more positive and productive.  This appears to converge 
with perfectionist aspirations of employing political contestation in order 
that Ôpublic debates gain in perspective and quality.Õ557  Perspective 
derives from participants listening to one another, and quality comes 
from working together.  This is also echoed by the reflective 
questionnaires, which demonstrated that five of eight558  participants 
stated that their reasons developed throughout the discussion as 
opposed to being consolidated beforehand.  This supports OwenÕs view 
that autonomy and agency develop through the process of contestation.  
As Fossen illustrates, Ôperfectionist agonism values political 
contestation not for its capacity to challenge violence and exclusion, but 
for its capacity to enhance citizensÕ virtues and capacities Ñ for its 
                                                
556 Fossen, T. (2008), p. 377. 
557 Maclure, J. (2003). The politics of recognition at an impasse? Identity politics and 
democratic citizenship. Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science 
politique 36(01): 3Ñ21, p. 7. 
558 One participant wrote that some reasons were developed before and some were developed 
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Bildung of better citizens.Õ559  Thus, this discussion suggests that, when 
citizens are required to decide between competing perspectives, conflict 
may become more productive and positive, encouraging relations of 
respect between participants and bettering both the individual and the 
political community. 
 
However, during the exploration of perspectivism in the values 
discussion, one observation arose which suggests a tension with 
encouraging continual challenge: the notion of apathy.  When asked to 
compare the three discussions in a reflective questionnaire, none of the 
nine participants named this discussion as the Ômost engaging.Õ  It is 
important to take into consideration that the vast majority of participants 
were attracted by either the abortion or gay marriage discussions, and 
not the topic of multicultural values, and hence this might have affected 
interest levels.  However, when this discussion was repeated during 
student seminars (in which participants were, importantly, not 
volunteers motivated to engage by the discussion topics), several of 
them commented that, by the end of the discussion, they had reached a 
decision simply because they had wanted to complete the task.  This 
was also supported by the pilot study in which the group had finished 
their discussion after 30 minutes, despite the other discussions lasting 
between 70 and 90 minutes.  This suggests, then, that the discussion 
framework may have played a part in encouraging apathy to arise.   
 
I suggest that apathy might arise for two reasons.  First, perhaps 
inclusivity and diversity are in tension with the motivation to engage.  
Throughout the values discussion, the more dominant participants were 
particularly effective at providing space for quieter participants to speak 
and ensuring that they were content with any decisions made on how to 
proceed,560 and participants continually challenged their own views and 
those of other participants.  For example, when deciding how to go 
about the task, Arabella suggests Ôshall we read them all out, one by 
                                                
559 Fossen, T. (2008), p. 388. 
560 See the section on enlarged mentality for a more detailed discussion of this. 
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one, how about that?Õ then later Nikolaos verifies Ôdoes anyone want to 
change the [money allocations]?Õ  The suggestions of participants were 
then modified as a result of othersÕ opinions, making the discussion 
appear inclusive.  I am concerned that striving to arrive at a decision 
that satisfies the whole group risks the threat of futility.  As Morris 
Rosenberg informs us in Some Determinants of Political Apathy, Ôone 
general factor contributing to political apathy is the feeling that activity is 
futile.Õ561  One potential reason for this feeling, according to Rosenberg, 
is that Ôan individual may feel that he is but one among so many.Õ562  
Thus, perhaps by promoting greater diversity and inclusivity, apathy 
arises since the direction of the group constantly evolves to 
accommodate more perspectives.  Certain restrictions, then, such as 
providing shorter time limits or reducing the size of discussion groups, 
may need to be incorporated into this discussion framework in order to 
strike a balance between encouraging diversity and inclusivity, whilst 
also retaining citizen engagement. 
 
The second reason I suggest for participant apathy relates to Mouffe 
and her emphasis on passion.  According to her adversarialism, politics 
ought to Ômobilize…passions towards democratic designs.Õ 563   As 
previously mentioned, most participants were attracted to the 
discussions because of either the topic of abortion or gay marriage, 
rather than a discussion about multicultural values.  As a result, passion 
was more evident in the following discussions, as depicted by stories, 
heated exchanges, and a faster pace whereby participants were 
Ôbursting to speak.Õ  Thus, perhaps a lack of passion also played a role 
in rendering this discussion less engaging than the others.  Maybe, 
then, MouffeÕs adversarialism could be helpful, here, in considering how 
to ignite passion prior to beginning the value ranking.    
Eternal Recurrence 
 
                                                
561 Rosenberg, M. (1954). Some determinants of political apathy. Public Opinion Quarterly 
18(4): 349Ñ366, p. 354.  
562 Ibid., p. 360. 
563 Mouffe, C. (2000), p. 103.  
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Another primary concept of perfectionist agonism is that of eternal 
recurrence.  As outlined in Chapter Two, Owen explains the principle of 
eternal recurrence as Ôtesting these perspectives against each other 
coming to an honest judgement concerning the degree to which they 
satisfy the interests (exhibit the virtues) of the practice.Õ 564   The 
perspective deemed to represent the maximum expression of virtues of 
the practice is said to exhibit Ôeternal recurrence.Õ 565   As a result, 
perfectionism requires citizens to defend their values by ranking them 
against others, according to the extent to which they satisfy societal 
interests.  A significant component of eternal recurrence is integrity, 
which asks citizens to consider the coherence of their own ethical 
principals whilst making such evaluations.  Further, integrity requires 
that citizens, not only tolerate a diversity of beliefs, but also enter into 
Ôhonest and just argumentÕ with conflicting others. 566   Here, this 
resonates with ConnollyÕs agonistic respect and MouffeÕs legitimacy, 
both of which call for richer versions of liberal tolerance, which 
necessitate engagement.  Further, eternal recurrence signifies that 
oneÕs authority depends on the extent to which one is publicly seen to 
promote a particular doctrine, as well as the extent to which one is 
successful in generating public support for it.567  In order to explore 
whether participants exhibited eternal recurrence, integrity and authority 
during the ranking process, I asked participants to allocate differing 
sums of money to a variety of charities.   
 
Let us first examine the notion of Ôhonest and just argumentÕ in which 
Ôone does not cheat by abrogating the standards (i.e., rules and/or 
norms) which govern engagement in a practice,Õ whilst simultaneously 
Ôreflect[ing] honestly on the merits (degree of mastery) of our own 
performance.Õ568   The rules of the game Ð as represented by the 
guidelines for the values discussion Ð entailed allocating sums of replica 
money to a range of charities, making this judgment based on the 
                                                
564 Owen, D. (1995), pp. 143-144. 
565 Ibid., p. 143. 
566 Ibid., p. 162 and discussion in Chapter Two. 
567 Ibid., p. 161. 
568 Ibid., p. 142. 
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values represented by each charity (rather than based on who benefits), 
reaching this decision in a collective manner, and arriving at a decision 
in the allotted time period.  These four rules of the game were followed 
throughout the discussion.  First, participants remained focused on the 
task of ranking values and allocating sums of money accordingly.  As 
previously mentioned, Ben interjected to remind others that the 
emphasis should be on the values of the charities rather than the 
beneficiaries.  Furthermore, participants worked collectively by taking it 
in turns to read the charity descriptions, entering into dialogue about the 
values in question, and ultimately combining individual orders of rank 
into a collective decision.  Finally, participants reminded one another 
about timekeeping: Nikolaos, for instance said Ôtwo minutesÕ towards 
the end.569  This is in contrast to the second discussion, in which I had 
to intervene to stop the discussion and the third discussion, in which 
some participants broke the rules of the token regulation. 570   By 
contrast, the group appeared to work together during the values 
discussion in order to adhere to discussion guidelines.  This resonates 
with the ÔhonestÕ component of engaging in Ôhonest and just argumentÕ 
in which participants kept to the rules and did not cheat.  This differs 
from both the adversarial discussion, in which participants did not keep 
to time, and the inclusive discussion, in which some participants refused 
to abide by the token guidelines, continuing to participate when their 
tokens had gone.571  This supports OwenÕs affirmation that citizens act 
honestly when they are involved in a collective quest since Ôthe simple 
virtues of truthfulness and justice are the prerequisites for reconciling 
contestation and community in a sense of solidarity, of being engaged 
in a common quest.Õ572  Thus, perhaps, by uniting participants in a 
collective task, they felt more responsible for the group, and as a result, 
                                                
569 It is important that the discussion about values came at the start of the day, and thus, 
another explanation for participants acting in accordance with the rules is that they were new 
to the experiment and the other participants.  However, at the end of the day the effects of 
maturation might have encouraged participants to act differently.  Thus, in future, it would be 
interesting to explore these discussions in a different order to gain further insights into this. 
570 It is important to consider that an additional factor in timekeeping might have been the 
interest levels of participants Ð as previously acknowledged, most participants were attracted 
to the discussion either by the topic of abortion or gay marriage.  Thus, perhaps passion for 
the topic plays a role in whether or not time was adhered to. 
571 These will be discussed in more depth in the following two analysis chapters. 
572 Ibid., p. 146. 
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behaved honestly.  As Chapter Seven explores, this is in contrast to the 
Connolly and Tully discussion in which there were participants during 
both the pilot and main experiment that did not follow the rules.  
Perhaps, then, it is the provision of a common quest Ð and the resultant 
responsibility for other members of the group Ð which promotes the 
principle of honesty in politics. 
 
In addition to following the rules and not cheating, both the video 
analysis and reflective questionnaires supported the notion that 
participants also exhibited integrity through honest reflection on their 
own performance.  For instance, several participants, such as Arabella 
and Chris, even changed their beliefs after reflecting on the reasons 
others gave for their ranking orders.  Arabella said to Nikolaos, Ôyou 
said it would change your mind and I have.Õ  Additionally, seven out of 
the nine participants noted in their questionnaires that listening to others 
had some impact on their beliefs, either modifying or cementing them, 
with only two participants stating that engagement with others had no 
impact on their beliefs.  Thus, it appears as though participants did Ôtest 
these perspectives against each other in coming to an honest 
judgement concerning the degree to which they satisfy the interests 
(exhibit the virtues) of the practice.Õ573  Hence, it appears as though 
participation in a common quest can be effective in challenging citizensÕ 
beliefs; whether this results in strengthening or transforming them.   
 
In exploring the concept of integrity, I have considered honesty; I now 
consider whether justice - or participation and proficiency574 - arose 
throughout the discussion.  First, this discussion appeared to encourage 
participation, with every participant engaging in the value ranking.  This 
is in contrast to the following discussion on abortion, which was 
frequently dominated by two or three participants.  Thus, this discussion 
suggests that the collective nature of the task encouraged the first 
element of justice; participation.  Additionally, six out of the nine 
                                                
573 Ibid., p. 143. 
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participants stated that they would prefer to respond to those they 
disagree with, providing reasons for their views, rather than remain 
silent.575  Furthermore, all participants evidently recognised the value of 
participation in this discussion Ð irrespective of the quality or content of 
such participation Ð since they unanimously claimed that other 
participants gained respect for them when they expressed their views.  
It appears, then, that the values discussion enabled and encouraged 
the participatory element of justice in which virtuous citizens engage in 
the practice of ranking.   
 
In addition to the participatory element of justice, the discussion also 
explored the proficiency component.  Owen states that oneÕs authority 
is derived from two elements: first, the proficiency with which one 
participates, and, second, the extent to which oneÕs views are reflected 
by others.576  This view of authority was mirrored in the participant 
questionnaires in which seven participants claimed that those with the 
most authority were those who expressed their views most clearly, and 
the remaining two participants stated that those with the most authority 
were those who held the most widespread views.  This was supported 
by video analysis and observer sheets, which demonstrate that those 
who had most authority, and thereby guided the decision-making 
process (Sam, Katayoun, Arabella and Nikolaos), were those who 
illustrated their views to others and gained support for these views.  On 
the other hand, quieter members who appeared less confident in 
sharing their views (such as Fiona and Chris) were also less involved in 
guiding the discussion, thereby suggesting less authority.  This supports 
OwenÕs view that the authority of oneÕs voice is dependent upon being 
Ôpublicly recognized as recommending a substantive doctrine,Õ and 
oneÕs ability to Ôgenerate public supportÕ for such a doctrine.577  The 
proficiency element of justice in which it is vital to generate support for 
                                                
575 However, we should note that this may be skewed by two factors: on the one hand, it may 
be enhanced by the fact that all participants volunteered to engage in a series of discussions 
with the knowledge that there would be conflicting others.  On the other, it might be 
diminished by the fact that the discussion was the first of the series, perhaps preventing 
participants from engaging in controversial discussions as a result.    
576 Ibid., p. 161. 
577 Ibid., p. 161. 
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the doctrine was perhaps best demonstrated in the following discussion 
on abortion.  One participant, Erin, was a very vocal participant, 
enabling her to meet the ÔparticipationÕ criteria of justice.  However, she 
was unable to gather support for her perspectives, noting in her 
adversarial questionnaire that she felt isolated from her group.  She was 
also not seen to have much authority during the discussion with 
participants describing her as ÔaggressiveÕ in the questionnaires.  
Hence, it appears as if eternal recurrence emerged throughout the 
discussion through both honesty and justice, and that authority 
belonged to those who best fulfilled the latter principle.  Thus, perhaps a 
collective notion of competition offers a significant incentive for citizens 
to strive towards better values, since doing so proficiently appears vital 
for their authority.    
 
However, after observing the latter two discussions on abortion and gay 
marriage, one concern arises regarding the ÔhonestyÕ component of 
integrity.  Although participants named the values discussion as the one 
in which their beliefs were most challenged, I argue that the notion of 
honestly testing oneÕs beliefs is problematic and potentially paradoxical.  
To explain this, let us return to OwenÕs claim that Ôthinking about truth 
as independent of all possible activities of knowing is incoherent.Õ578  On 
this account of the impossibility of independent truth, the question 
arises whether it would be possible to conduct an ÔhonestÕ examination 
of oneÕs own beliefs?  As Owen demonstrates, oneÕs beliefs Ôexpress 
the ordering of oneÕs soul.Õ579  Hence, surely any examination of such 
beliefs would be unable to escape the influence of communal values 
and practices that inform them?  Honesty appears to connote objectivity 
or the very Ôthing-in-itselfÕ that Owen claims to be Ôincoherent.Õ580  Since 
most participants were attracted to the discussions because of the 
topics of abortion and gay marriage, perhaps participants were better 
able to analyse their value beliefs honestly during the Owen discussion 
because their perspectives were less engrained.  However, this begs 
                                                
578 Ibid., p. 30. 
579 Ibid., p. 145. 
580 Ibid., p. 31. 
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the question of whether participants would be able to practice honesty, 
and thereby modify their beliefs accordingly, if the discussion required 
them to discuss engrained and incompatible perspectives Ð such as 
those in the subsequent discussions.   
Perfectionist Competition 
 
An additional concept identified in Chapter Two as central to OwenÕs 
perfectionist agonism is competition.  It is important to note that the 
notion of competition endorsed by Owen differs from the collective one 
employed by Mouffe.  Whereas, for Mouffe, 'vibrant confrontation 
provides an avenue through which the mobilized passions of 
democracy can be channelled toward adversarial rather than 
antagonistic outlets,'581 OwenÕs understanding of competition derives 
from NietzscheÕs discussion of the second Eris, in which competition is 
employed to transform negative qualities into positive ones.  Owen 
explains that the presence of contest turns the negative concept of envy 
into the positive notion of cultivating virtue, thereby assuring the 
wellbeing of the state.582  Following this, he draws from the Greek public 
culture of contestation in which Ôcitizens strove to surpass each other 
and, ultimately, to set new standards of nobility.Õ583  Thus, for Owen, 
competition encourages citizens to challenge one another, which in turn 
challenges and enhances society.  In order to represent OwenÕs notion 
of competition, I asked participants to rank a range of competing values 
in order to promote the notion of contestation, and to explore whether 
this encouraged participants to strive to surpass one another, thereby 
reaching better conclusions.   
 
What struck me about this discussion was the form contestation took on 
between participants.  At first glance, it appears as though the 
discussion did not promote a competitive element.  Five out of nine 
participants claimed in the reflective questionnaires that they did not 
                                                
581 Wingenbach, E. (2011), p. 75. 
582 Owen, D. (1995), p. 139. 
583 Ibid., p. 139. 
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feel competitive about their views during this discussion. 584  
Additionally, the lack of competitive behaviour noted in the observer 
sheets appeared to echo that this was the case.  This contrasted with 
the subsequent abortion discussion, in which participants employed 
competitive behaviour - such as using statistics to prove their point and 
employing sarcastic or mocking tones toward those with conflicting 
opinions.  Yet, during the values discussion, participants appeared to 
listen to one another, reflecting on their own perspectives after 
considering conflicting viewpoints.  However, in spite of the absence of 
an obvious form of competition, it appears as though a more subtle form 
of contestation could have been at play.  First, in their qualitative notes, 
observers commented that several participants (Arabella, Ben, Sam, 
Fiona and Erin) held Ôstrong viewpointsÕ throughout the discussion.  
Next, as discussed in the previous section on perspectivism, the 
observer sheets and video analysis demonstrated that participants 
frequently challenged the opinions of those with whom they disagreed.  
 
Such competition appeared to intensify toward the end of the discussion 
during the allocation of funds.  One observer noted that during this 
process Ôpersonal views became more visibleÕ and all observers noted 
that competition increased between participants at this final stage.  This 
suggests, then, that perhaps competition (in a collective contestation 
sense, rather than in an adversarial sense) may be more likely to occur 
through the decision-making process, rather than at the discussion 
stage since that is the point at which peopleÕs perspectives are at stake.  
As a result, in order to cultivate virtue through competition, it may be 
necessary to require citizens to arrive at a collective decision, instead of 
simply sharing views with one another.  This emphasis on action and 
decision-making resonates with the work of John Forrester, who affirms 
that Ôyes, conflicts of constitutive identities will abide, and inequalities of 
power will virtually always provide a setting for and partially constitute 
relationships at hand, but nevertheless democratic actors will have 
                                                
584 One of these participants did, however, indicate on the questionnaire that he did not feel 
very competitive, rather than not feeling competitive at all. 
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choices to make and take.Õ585  This is of particular significance when we 
consider his claim that agonist theorists tell us little about Ôthe 
performative ways in which real democratic participants, who raise 
claims of rights or entitlement, for example, might ever do more than 
Òbe heardÓ, or worse, Òexpress themselvesÓ.Õ586  Given this, I contend 
that the decision-making element of OwenÕs common quest is a 
significant element to combatting the threat of futility.   
 
In spite of competition heightening during the decision-making process, 
it is important to emphasise that such competition still did not reflect the 
confrontational, heated competition that occurred during the abortion 
discussion. 587  Instead, competition during the values discussion 
appeared to constitute a productive and collective entity in which 
participants challenged one another in order to reach the best possible 
ranking order.  This mirrors the suggestions of perspectivism in which 
Ôcitizens strive to develop their capacities for self-rule in competition with 
one another.Õ588   Thus, the ends encouraged by OwenÕs notion of 
competition appear to differ from those of MouffeÕs adversarial 
competition.  In MouffeÕs understanding of adversarial contestation, 
Ôstruggle among adversaries is a struggle in order to establish a 
different hegemony,Õ589 and thereby a battle to implement oneÕs own 
perspectives at the cost of those of the other side.  Whereas for Owen, 
competition is not about ÔwinningÕ the debate, it is more about cultivating 
and expressing oneÕs own nobility throughout the exchange.  Hence, 
adversarial agonism encourages citizens to focus on the ends of the 
discussion, whereas perfectionist agonism encourages citizens to focus 
on oneÕs conduct throughout the discussion. Perhaps then, this 
discussion suggests that by engaging citizens in a collective task, 
(rather than, for instance, forming contending groups who identify 
themselves in opposition to one another), we may encourage 
                                                
585 Forester, J. Learning Through Contested Governance: The Practice of Agonistic 
Intersubjectivity in Griggs, S., Norval, A. and Wagenaar, H. (2014), p. 150. 
586 Ibid., p. 141. 
587 See chapter six for a detailed overview and analysis of adversarial competition. 
588 Owen, D. (2002), p. 126. 
589 Worsham, L. and Olson, G. (1999). Rethinking political community: Chantal Mouffe's liberal 
socialism. JAC 19(2): 163--199, p. 180. 
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competition to take on a different form.  The competitive element of the 
values discussion fulfilled a productive purpose in which participants 
challenged one another in order to arrive at the best possible collective 
decision.  This is quite contrary to the competitive element of the 
adversarial discussion in which participants appeared to attempt to 
prove to conflicting others the truth of their own view.  As a result, the 
former enabled positive relations of cooperative engagement to form. 
 
The decision-making during this discussion can be compared with that 
of the pilot study in which the same task was given to participants but 
they were not provided with any replica money.  The participants in the 
pilot study seemed more apathetic to the allocation of funds, as 
demonstrated by the slow pace of discussion and the speed of the 
decision.  This contrasts with the main experiment in which participants 
discussed one anotherÕs ranking orders extensively and some changed 
their minds as a result.  Nikolaos even linked his ranking order to the 
money allocation, explaining ÔthatÕs the reason why I placed £5000 to 
B.Õ  This resonates with RosenbergÕs argument that Ôin most cases a 
precondition for political activity is the conviction that what one does will 
make a difference, will have an effect of some sort.Õ590  She explains 
that usually Ôpolitical participation beyond the level of discussion 
probably has the aim of getting oneÕs will translated into political 
action.Õ591  Of course, the experiment money was not real and political 
action did not happen as a result, however, I suggest that the usage of 
replica money heightened the feeling of action to some extent, 
rendering the discussion more meaningful.  Yet, taking into account the 
previous discussion on apathy, I argue that my discussion framework 
could overcome apathy by incorporating more action into the 
discussion.  This parallels ArendtÕs focus on action, which she states 
Ôcorresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, 
not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world.Õ592  Hence, in addition 
to promoting engagement, Arendt demonstrates that action also creates 
                                                
590 Rosenberg, M. (1954), p. 354. 
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unity between citizens.  This might, perhaps, suggest that citizens 
become more engaged and more unified if the collective quest is, not 
simply discussion but action.  As a result, perfectionist agonism might 
be strengthened by choosing relevant and topical discussion topics, and 
following TullyÕs calls for civic practices that encourage more 
participation, such as norm formulation. 
 
Although OwenÕs less confrontational understanding of competition 
might be helpful in avoiding destructive conflict to occur between 
citizens,593 it does raise the concern of how to motivate citizens into 
engagement with conflicting others. Whereas MouffeÕs notion of 
competition provokes citizens to defend their values against those of 
their opponent, Owen presumes that Ôcitizens strive to develop their 
capacities for self-rule in competition with one another.Õ594  This begs 
the question of what happens to those citizens who are not motivated to 
strive toward better virtues.  My experiments included well-educated 
individuals who were interested in discussing the topics at hand, but I 
am concerned about how to engage those who are either less willing or 
less able to participate.  Perhaps this is less of a cause of concern for 
Owen than, for instance, the inclusive approaches of Connolly and 
Tully.  In Equality, Democracy, and Self-Respect: Reflections on 
Nietzsche's Agonal Perfectionism, Owen states that  Ôif democracy is to 
meet its own best aspirations, it requires citizens who cultivate those 
political virtues (e.g. independence of mind) which are necessary to this 
task.Õ595  Thus, perhaps perfectionist agonistic democracy is willing to 
forfeit a certain amount of inclusion in exchange for the participation of 
those with enhanced capacities.   
 
Yet, if we reconsider the agonistic themes outlined in Chapter One, it is 
evident that this potential for exclusion in OwenÕs work may be 
detrimental to the aims of agonistic democracy.  For instance, a primary 
aspiration of promoting political contestation is to overcome the 
                                                
593 See chapter six for an exploration of the effect of adversarial competition on participants. 
594 Owen, D. (2002), p. 126. 
595 Ibid., p. 126. 
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domination596 of hegemonic cultures.  However, if certain voices are 
excluded from the societal contestation (either because they are unable 
or unwilling to participate), does this not pose a barrier to overcoming 
hegemony?  Likewise, can contingency be assured if voices are 
excluded from the discussion?  Finally, can bonds of necessary 
interdependency emerge between citizens if some are prioritised over 
others?  Indeed, on TullyÕs account, listening to others in their own 
terms, especially those who are marginalised or suppressed (and 
perhaps less able to cultivate virtues such as independence of mind), is 
a significant factor in promoting necessary interdependency.  These 
questions reminds us of NorvalÕs earlier claim that agonistic democrats 
criticise deliberative democrats for Ôignoring the impact of material 
inequalities on the ability of participants to partake as equals in 
dialogue.Õ 597   Hence, in order to address both domination and 
fragmentation, more thought ought to be given to the inequalities which 
exist, as well as how to motivate people to engage in a discussion 
which cultivates virtues and capabilities.  If we do not give further 
thought as to how to engage citizens in this virtue cultivation, I am 
concerned that an operationalisation of perfectionist agonism has the 
potential to exclude certain sectors of society from democratic politics, 
such as those who are less educated, or those who are not already 
engaged in political discussions.  Wingenbach shares this concern that 
OwenÕs perfectionist agonism might pose an exclusionary potential, 
stating that it promotes Ôelitism.Õ598  
Enlarged Mentality 
 
An additional element of OwenÕs perfectionism is his calls for citizens to 
employ an Ôenlarged mentalityÕ toward other participants.  This concept 
encapsulates oneÕs ability to consider a range of contending 
perspectives when deciding upon an order of rank.599  Owen asserts 
that the ability to engage with a range of perspectives is vital to oneÕs 
                                                
596 See Chapter One. 
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own integrity since, on his account, we cannot reach an honest and just 
judgment about the best values if we are unable to explore a diversity of 
conflicting perspectives.600   Thus, here, unlike Connolly and TullyÕs 
account, the toleration of diverse beliefs does not seek to enhance 
inclusivity; rather it constitutes a necessary component of virtue 
cultivation.  It follows then, as Fossen highlights, that eternal recurrence 
does not simply require citizens to challenge the perspectives of others 
but also Ôinvolves a commitment to continuous re-examination of oneÕs 
standards through an engagement with other perspectives.Õ 601   In 
addition to providing for the cultivation of truthfulness and justice, 
employing an enlarged mentality also encourages bonds of solidarity to 
form, whereby Ôour shared identities relate not to shared perspectives 
but to a shared process of contestation.Õ602  This differs from MouffeÕs 
work, in which solidarity between conflicting citizens is promoted 
through acknowledgement of a shared set of values.  In order to explore 
whether OwenÕs notion of Ôenlarged mentalityÕ became evident through 
the emergence of tolerance and unity, the task of ranking a range of 
values was posed to participants as a collective exercise.   
 
The discussion appeared to overwhelmingly suggest that an enlarged 
mentality was present between participants and that social unity arose 
as a result.  First, it has already been established that, unlike the 
following discussion whereby participants often spoke over one another, 
raised their voices, and used sarcastic tones, participants were 
generally respectful of one another.  When one participant was 
speaking, the others stayed quiet, listened to them and often reflected 
on Ð and sometimes even modified - their own views.  When 
participants did disagree with one another, they used questions to 
probe further, thus giving the impression that they sought to understand 
one anotherÕs reasoning and challenge one another.  This suggests, 
then, that participants were tolerant towards others, and adopted a 
respectful attitude toward alternate perspectives in order to honestly 
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and justly assess the eternal recurrence of their own perspectives.  This 
is contrary to the latter abortion discussion in which participants 
appeared to seek to prove that they were correct, and, as a result, were 
either dismissive of, or aggressive toward, incompatible arguments. 
However, this is not to say that there was no disagreement during the 
values discussion.  Five out of eight participants603 indicated in the 
reflective questionnaires that there was disagreement about which 
values were most important.  Similarly, observer sheets and video 
analysis demonstrated that there was often disagreement over the 
ranking of the values.  Yet in spite of evident disagreement, observer 
sheets and video analysis also noted that there was not much heated 
behaviour or tension between participants.  This thereby suggests that 
participants were able to entertain a plurality of perspectives, as OwenÕs 
enlarged mentality requires.604   
 
This leads to the second element of enlarged mentality: promoting 
social cooperation by engaging citizens with a diversity of values in a 
common quest.  It is important, first, to note that this common quest was 
steered by naturally emerging leaders throughout the discussion.  The 
video analysis and observer sheets demonstrated participants such as 
Sam, Arabella, Katayoun and Nikolaos guiding the discussion by 
keeping others focused on the purpose of the discussion, suggesting 
decision-making procedures, and reminding others of the time.  Yet, 
unlike the following discussion in which two or three participants 
dominated, the leaders of the values discussion created opportunities 
for other participants to engage.  As one of the observers noted, Ôthe 
more dominant members gave the others a chance to speak.Õ  These 
participants also repeatedly checked that others were happy with the 
agreed proposals.  This resonated with the gay marriage discussion in 
which Sam was described by observers as Ôregulating the queue to 
speak.Õ  It is significant that, even when rules and institutions do not 
                                                
603 The ninth participant noted that both of these were the case, writing that Ôwe all agreed on 
a few, but initially disagreed on some others.Õ 
604 Once again, it is important to bear in mind that this discussion was the first of the three 
and, therefore, might have been less affected by maturation than the other discussions, 
thereby encouraging more positive interactions. 
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impose a leader, groups appear to self-regulate, and leaders emerge.  
Interestingly, each time that the values discussion was repeated, 
several participants would manage the task, guiding the others through 
the process.  Yet, there were no instances where one or two individuals 
took advantage of the situation and dominated the discussion.  This 
supports Gulshan Ara KhanÕs view, which is expressed through her 
promotion of ConnollyÕs work as a Ôlargely self-regulatingÕ account of 
society in which Ôthere is no account of the necessity of the leader that 
stands in for or represents the whole.Õ605  Hence, the way in which 
several participants emerged as leaders, whilst providing opportunities 
for others to participate, suggests that participants did self-regulate 
during the common quest.  As a result, this also appeared to enhance 
unity between participants.  In the reflective questionnaires, for 
instance, participants chose this discussion as the one in which they felt 
the most group unity.  Similarly, the values questionnaire concluded that 
eight of the nine participants felt like part of the group during this 
discussion.  Furthermore, just as Owen claims that unity arises through 
participation in a common quest (rather than the sharing of common 
values), the majority of participants also ascribed group unity to their 
engagement in a collective decision.  Hence, it appears as though unity 
between conflicting citizens is encouraged through the provision of a 
common quest, supporting OwenÕs affirmation that unity arises through 
a common quest.  This appears more effective than demonstrating to 
citizens that they share common values (as in the subsequent abortion 
discussion) since participants did not acknowledge such 
commonality.606  It also seems more effective than promoting respect 
and understanding between conflicting citizens (as in the gay marriage 
discussion) since, in spite of enhancing participantsÕ conduct towards 
one another, it did not appear to challenge their assumptions about one 
another.607 
                                                
605 Khan, G. (2008). Pluralisation: An alternative to hegemony. The British Journal of Politics & 
International Relations 10(2): 194Ñ209, p. 205 
606 See Chapter Six. 
607 See chapter six for a more comprehensive discussion of how Ôthe common enemyÕ 
impacted upon group unity.  See chapter seven for a more in-depth exploration of ÔinclusiveÕ 
notions of respect and understanding. 
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Although the collective nature of the discussion appeared to promote 
unity between the group, there is also the possibility of exclusion.  As 
mentioned earlier, one of the participants stated that they did not feel 
like part of a group, but, instead, felt isolated from it.  I am concerned 
that, once a group has formed, it could constitute the dominant majority, 
subsequently posing a barrier, which prevents those outside of the 
majority group from challenging decisions.  Unlike the gay marriage 
discussion, where those who felt isolated from the group were provided 
with mechanisms to encourage participation, the values discussion 
relied on participants themselves.  Perhaps, then, there is a possible 
tension between unity on the one hand, and inclusion on the other.  
This relates back to the discussion in the introduction which 
problematises those theories, which promote unity and consensus.  
Mouffe highlights the tension between encouraging diversity and 
inclusion on the one hand and promoting unity on the other: 
A pluralist democracy is constantly pulled in opposite 
directions:  towards exacerbation of differences and 
disintegration on one side; towards homogenization and 
strong forms of unity on the other...  It is a tension that we 
should value and protect, rather than try to resolve, 
because it is constitutive of pluralist democracy.608   
Thus, perhaps this tension between encouraging diverse participation 
on one hand, whilst promoting unity and cooperation on the other, is a 
necessary tension that cannot and should not be eradicated.  However, 
I argue that it is important to be aware of this exclusionary potential, in 
order to consider ways in which the balance between inclusion and 
unity can be maintained. 
Self‐mastery 
 
The final aim of OwenÕs perfectionism is self-mastery, or self-
overcoming.  Self-mastery involves contestation, regarding, not only 
which values constitute excellence, but also what excellence itself 
                                                
608 Mouffe, C. (1993), p. 150. 
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should be comprised of.609  Owen claims that, by challenging the criteria 
on which excellence is based, not only will societal virtues change, but 
so will citizens themselves.  During the discussion, participants were 
encourage to contest the values Ð and not the charities Ð in order to 
explore whether participants would challenge, not only to what extent 
each value fulfilled the excellence criteria, but also what constitutes an 
ÔexcellentÕ society.  Although the majority of the discussion was focused 
on ranking the values against current understandings of excellence, i.e. 
liberal values of liberty and equality, there were rare moments in which 
self-mastery appeared to surface.  One of the charity descriptions, 
ÔSport for Soldiers,Õ for instance, stated that soldiers have Ôsacrificed so 
muchÕ for us that it is our duty to repay them, thereby implying that a 
soldierÕs work is noble and admirable.  However, Nikolaos challenged 
this assumption, explaining that as a soldier he killed Cypriot soldiers, 
asking Ôwhy should I give £5000 to that?Õ  By challenging the core 
assumption that a soldierÕs work is noble and admirable, he challenges 
the criteria of excellence which society has provided.610   Similarly, 
Arabella attempts to categorise the values into those which prioritise the 
society as a whole, such as ÔSport for All,Õ and those which prioritise the 
individual, such as ÔThe Sporting Excellence Trust.Õ  She claims that 
oneÕs ranking order will be affected by the decision to focus more on 
individual or societal values.  In so doing, self-mastery arises as 
participants are encouraged to consider whether it is the protection of 
the individual or the society that constitutes excellence in a society.  
Thus, it appears as though, by encouraging citizens to rank values 
against societal standards of excellence, we also encourage citizens to 
challenge existing current standards of excellence.611  
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has drawn on insights from the experiment as well as 
consideration of agonistic theory in order to analyse OwenÕs 
                                                
609 Fossen, T. (2008), p. 389. 
610 Of course, the chosen content impacted on the discussion; particularly in NikolaosÕ case 
since he had personal experience of the discussion topics. 
611 This is explored in Chapter Seven, which discusses how the challenge that occurred 
appeared to only occur on a superficial level.   
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perfectionist agonism.  I suggest that OwenÕs perspectivism could 
enable citizens to perceive democratic discussions as view-sharing 
exercises, rather than as competitive debates to be won.  This is 
significant to promoting political contestation and contingency through 
continual challenge and perfectionist competition.  Yet, I endorse 
perspectivism with one hesitation: its admirable focus on diversity might 
also carry the potential for apathy. Further, I demonstrate how eternal 
recurrence could promote honest engagement; encourage citizens to 
challenge their own beliefs; and enhance participation through respect.  
However, I reject OwenÕs emphasis on an ÔhonestÕ testing of 
perspectives, arguing that this principle is in tension with the passionate 
Ð and often antagonistic Ð manner in which citizens hold their beliefs.  I 
affirm that perfectionist competition offers an effective tool for 
harnessing strong views and encouraging citizens to challenge one 
another, but that its most significant element is the decision-making 
process, which can help to combat apathy.  However, I propose that 
more consideration ought to be given about to how to include and 
motivate a greater diversity of citizens to engage in perfectionist 
democracy.  I suggest that OwenÕs concept of enlarged mentality could 
promote positive relations of cooperation between citizens through 
emphasis on a common quest, encouraging self-regulation to emerge 
through non-dominant leaders.  However, I highlight possible tensions 
between group unity and the potential for exclusion, arguing for a 
careful balance between unity and inclusion.  Finally, I argue that the 
provision of a common quest could encourage citizens to challenge the 
criteria of excellence according to which they are being measured.   
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Chapter Seven: Analysing Mouffe’s Adversarial Agonism 
 
MouffeÕs adversarialism comprises four primary concepts introduced in 
Chapter Five: Ôthe political'; collective identities; agonistic struggle and 
the common enemy.  In this chapter, I endorse Ôthe politicalÕ as a tool to 
prevent apathy, whilst also considering whom this might fail to engage.  
I challenge adversarial legitimacy, suggesting that this is undermined 
when commonality is not apparent to citizens.  I then demonstrate the 
possible tension between advocating a collective understanding of 
identity, whilst also accounting for diversity and contingency.  
Additionally, I question how we can ensure that emphasis on conflict 
encourages productive relationships, rather than destructive ones.  I 
subsequently propose that the attempt to separate politics from the 
political could be problematic due to the existence of conflictual, and 
potentially antagonistic, relations.  Finally, I challenge the notion of the 
common enemy, contending that it might only unite adversaries if each 
adversarial group is made aware of the distinction between the other 
group and the enemy.    
'The Political’
 
We saw in Chapter Two that Mouffe argues against an excess of 
consensus, claiming that the 'tendency to downplay the importance 
of the persistence of political oppositions is dangerous because it 
tends to hamper the proper workings of the political sphere.'612  She 
asserts that citizens become disaffected with, and resultantly turn 
away from, democratic politics when there is an absence of 
conflict.  As a consequence, her argument is that 'if established 
parties do not offer agonistic alternatives, less democratic 
movements will offer alternatives that will mobilize passions of 
disconnected citizens.'613  Thus, for Mouffe, an excess of consensus 
threatens democratic politics as it can render citizens apathetic and 
encourage them to turn towards non-democratic outlets.  Hence, 
                                                
612 Rummens S. (2009). Democracy as a Non-Hegemonic Struggle? Disambiguating  
Chantal Mouffe's Agonistic Model of Politics. Constellations 16(3): 377-391, p. 377.  
613 Wingenbach, E. (2011), p. 125. 
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conflict and passion are intrinsic to both democratic participation and 
preventing citizens from turning to extremist alternatives.  Mouffe 
parts company with Ôinclusive agonists,Õ Tully and Connolly, by 
claiming that Ôradical pluralist democratic politics has to discriminate 
between demands that must be excluded and the demands that will 
be seen as part of the agonistic debate.Õ614  She thereby promotes a 
Ôconflictual consensus,Õ which encourages continual conflict whilst 
also drawing a frontier between those included in the consensus and 
those excluded from it.  According to Mouffe, conflict still exists 
amongst those included in the consensus since they contest one 
anotherÕs interpretations of liberty and equality, whilst continuing to 
endorse the values.615  Those who are excluded, then, either do not 
adhere to the values of liberty and equality, or threaten the existence 
of democratic institutions.  
 
Let us first consider MouffeÕs assumption that by ensuring conflict 
between opposing positions we retain citizens' interest in democratic 
engagement.  As Wingenbach explains, 'Mouffe insists that affect 
and passion are essential elements of agonistic pluralism, emerging 
inevitably in the relations of antagonism ever lurking below 
politics.'616  As a result, she affirms that democracy must reflect such 
affect and passion in order to engage citizens in democratic politics.  
The abortion discussion appeared to support MouffeÕs assumption 
that heightened levels of conflict encourage interest.  In the reflective 
questionnaires, eight of the nine participants stated that the 
discussion was more interesting during periods of increased conflict.  
Furthermore, when asked why they found the discussion interesting, 
participants wrote, for example: Ôto see how passionate people are 
about the topic,Õ  Ôthe enthusiasm people defended their positions 
with,Õ and Ôvery strong opinions.Õ  Since many participants attributed 
their interest to the passion, enthusiasm, and strength of alternate 
                                                
614 Grszl, F. (2009). Debate: Agonism and DeliberationÑRecognizing the Difference. 
Journal of Political Philosophy 17(3): 356-368, p. 357 
615 Howarth, D. (2008), p. 178. 
616 Wingenbach, E. (2011), p. 61. 
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views, the discussion appears to support MouffeÕs thesis that 
passion is the Ôdriving force in the political field.Õ617  This is important 
since her motivational narrative Ð which employs adversarial rhetoric 
in order to provoke citizens into engagement Ð begins with the 
assumption that passion and the potential for conflict are motivating 
factors.  As Chapter Two outlines, this fundamentally separates her 
from agonists, such as Connolly and Tully, who provide little insight 
into how to motivate citizens into engagement.  This is significant 
since critics, such as Young and Schaap take issue with Connolly 
and TullyÕs insufficient consideration of how to motivate 
engagement.618  Hence, the abortion discussion may support the 
contention that employment of a motivational narrative, which draws 
on citizens passions, can motivate citizens into political contestation 
with conflicting others.      
 
However, this begs the question of who might not be motivated by 
passion and conflict.  This is important since, as Mouffe herself 
asserts, although exclusions are inevitable, it is essential Ôto 
recognize those forms of exclusion for what they are and the 
violence that they signify, instead of concealing them under the veil 
of rationality.Õ619  Hence, if passion and conflict motivate certain 
citizens to engage whilst excluding others, it is vital that we unearth 
such exclusions.  First then, since citizens Ôfight against each other 
because they want their interpretation of the principles to become 
hegemonic,Õ620we might challenge whether passion will continue to 
motivate citizens whose interpretations never become hegemonic.  
This notion was explored during the experiment in ErinÕs behaviour.  
She was a dominant character throughout the discussion, with 
observers noting that she Ôis taking over othersÕ arguments,Õ 
Ôcorrecting [SamÕs] opinionsÕ and Ôdominating the group.Õ  However, 
during the discussion about aborting a foetus with DownÕs 
                                                
617 Mouffe C. (2013), p. 6. 
618 See Chapter Three for a discussion of this. 
619 Mouffe, C. (1993), p. 145. 
620 Mouffe C. (2013), p. 7. 
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syndrome, several members of the group who were against 
abortion, made a succession of comments such as Ôthat is just like 
so selfish,Õ Ôyou have to be a bit of a monster,Õ and Ôit is driven by 
self-centredness.Õ  Nobody in the opposite group responded to 
these.  Immediately following this, one of the observers noted that 
Erin Ôstopped participating [in the] debate.Õ  Later, she wrote in her 
questionnaire that she had felt isolated from her group and that it 
was Ôfunny how many people are pro-life.Õ  One observer noted that 
she Ôappears as if she is disappointed with her group.Õ  Thus, 
perhaps ErinÕs temporary withdrawal from the discussion could 
reflect feelings of isolation and disappointment, arising from surprise 
at how many people were ÔagainstÕ her.621  Thus, I contend that 
passion could fail to motivate citizens who are continually defeated 
by the hegemonic contest.  Supporting this, Howarth asks about the 
'plight of those demands, claims and identities...[of] those who are 
perpetually defeated in the cut and thrust of agonistic politics, and 
who may turn away from an agonistic politics towards a more 
antagonistic stance.'622  Like Howarth, my concern is that, even if 
conflict generally motivates engagement, its presence may be 
unsuccessful in engaging those who are constantly defeated by the 
dominant hegemony.  This follows MouffeÕs usage of warlike 
rhetoric in which adversaries enter into a ÔfightÕ or ÔbattleÕ with one 
another in order that their interpretation or implementation of liberty 
and equality ÔwinsÕ.  Mouffe assumes that a lack of conflictual 
positions turns citizens away from democratic politics.  However, if 
one position is continually beaten by a hegemonic opponent, then 
its interpretation and implementation of values might never come 
into play.  As a result, even though citizens might have a formal 
choice between contending positions, in practice there might only be 
one position of significance to democratic politics.  Thus, I am not 
                                                
621 It is important to note, here, that later in the discussion, Erin informed the group that 
she had had an abortion and, therefore, perhaps this personal experience intensified her 
behaviour.  However, this was reflected in the pilot study, whereby one participant (who 
was the only participant to argue against abortion) withdrew from the discussion. 
622 Howarth, D. (2008), p. 179. 
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convinced that the provision of conflicting identities necessarily 
prevents citizens from turning away from democratic politics.  For 
those who constantly ÔloseÕ democratic contests, democratic 
disaffection and non-democratic expression may still pose a 
problem.  It may, therefore, be useful to consider possibilities for 
providing forms of contestation that encourage participation through 
passion and conflict, but adopt a less hegemonic form. 
 
In addition to those who feel beaten by the contest, I am also 
concerned about whether conflict will succeed in engaging those 
who do not find high levels of conflict engaging.  This concern was 
first highlighted during the pilot study discussion.  Out of the ten 
participants, only five stated that they found the discussion more 
interesting during high levels of conflict.  In the main experiment, 
this was less evident since only one participant, Jakub, wrote that 
high periods of conflict rendered the discussion less engaging.  This 
is perhaps due to the differences in participant recruitment: during 
the pilot, for instance, I primarily used postgraduate students, many 
of whom stated that their primary purpose for participation was to 
help out a fellow researcher.  However, the recruitment 
questionnaires for the main experiment indicated that participants 
volunteered as a result of their personal interest in the discussion 
topics.  The second group generally felt more passionate about the 
discussion topics, and were perhaps more ready to share conflicting 
opinions, which might thereby explain why they found high levels of 
conflict more interesting.  In spite of this, Jakub claimed that the 
discussion was less engaging during high levels of conflict.  The 
position of this participant and those of the pilot study challenge the 
notion that conflict necessarily motivates engagement and prevents 
apathy.  For some, it appears as though high levels of conflict can 
actually be more likely to encourage democratic disaffection.  
Hence, not only am I concerned that Mouffe's theory may not 
motivate the participation of those who are continually defeated, but 
also that it may fail to motivate those who are less engaged during 
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periods of heightened conflict.  Schaap supports this concern in 
questioning Mouffe's view that 'conflict will necessarily have an 
integrative function within a democratic polity.Õ623   Again, this is 
significant for MouffeÕs agonistic account because she emphasises 
the necessity of exposing exclusions.   
 
Perhaps yet more worrying, is that there seems to be some 
consistency between how vocal participants were during the 
discussions, and how much they were motivated by high levels of 
conflict.  For instance, Stuart, Iris, Ben, and Alan were noted to be 
the dominant members of the pilot study, and all of these indicated 
that discussion becomes more engaging during high levels of 
conflict.  On the other hand, the one participant in the main 
experiment who claimed to be less interested during these periods 
was Jakub, who was noticeably one of the quieter members of the 
discussion, commenting in his questionnaire that Ôit was more 
interesting for me to just watch people debating than to share my 
own view.Õ  This parallels my concerns about OwenÕs perfectionism 
in that emphasis on passion and conflict might prioritise the 
participation of particular citizens; namely those who are more 
dominant.  If MouffeÕs adversarialism prioritises those citizens who 
are already willing to share their views with conflicting others, I am 
concerned that less dominant citizens could be excluded from 
democratic politics.  This is mirrored by one participantÕs reflective 
questionnaire, which stated that, 'whilst there were views listened to 
by a variety of speakers - it was evident that there were stronger 
members of the group that dominated discussion.'  This domination 
was also echoed by observers, who repeatedly wrote about the 
interactions between Arabella and Erin that constituted a large part 
of the discussion.  Encouraging dominant voices at the detriment of 
less dominant ones seems to be in tension with agonistic principles 
of contestation, contingency and necessary interdependency which 
                                                
623 Schaap, A. (2007), p. 68. 
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aim to overcome domination and render politics more inclusive.  In 
The Return of the Political, Mouffe asserts that, since Ôour values, 
our institutions and way of life constitute one form of political order 
among a plurality of possible ones,Õ624 each consensus must be 
open to continual contestation.  However, if by focusing on passion 
and conflict we fail to engage quieter, less-dominant citizens, it is 
difficult to see how a consensus formed by the majority could be 
contested.  As Howarth affirms, MouffeÕs adversarialism 'must also 
make room for the passionate expression of differences and 
disagreements between citizens thus furnishing the conditions for a 
deep and meaningful pluralism.'625  In order to encourage a deep 
pluralism by enabling contestation and contingency, perhaps 
MouffeÕs motivational narrative needs to give more thought about 
how to motivate, not just the dominant citizens (who might not be 
lacking motivation to engage in any case), but also those less-
dominant citizens. 
  
The second component of Mouffe's notion of the political is that of 
providing a common symbolic space in which competing 
adversaries argue about how to interpret and implement their 
shared values.  Following Schmitt, Mouffe employs this notion of 
commonality in order to promote unity between conflicting 
citizens.  For her, it is imperative that participants perceive one 
another as 'legitimate' and 'worthy' opponents, rather than as an 
'enemy to be destroyed.'626   Several aspects of the experiment 
suggested that participants did perceive the opposite group as 
worthy.  For instance, Arabella referred back to the arguments of the 
other group, saying ÔyouÕre absolutely right,Õ participants listened 
without interrupting when Nikolaos and Katayoun told personal 
stories, Fiona acknowledged perspectivism, saying ÔitÕs how you 
look on things,Õ and Sam made attempts at understanding the roots 
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of the conflict, saying Ôthe crux of it always is…Õ  The questionnaires 
also demonstrated that six of the nine participants perceived all 
views as respect-worthy during this discussion. 
 
Conversely, during the discussion, Arabella stated that the whole 
day was about values, and that the two sides endorsed different 
values.  Additionally, when asked in the questionnaire whether 
conflict arose from a disagreement about which values to endorse, 
how to implement these, or a combination of the two, only two 
participants perceived conflict as arising only from their 
implementation (as MouffeÕs conflictual consensus affirms).  The 
rest saw a disagreement about which values to advocate, either as 
playing a role, or solely responsible for the conflict between the two 
groups.  Thus, I challenge MouffeÕs assumption that adversaries 
always recognise one another as legitimate, worthy opponents 
distinct from the enemy to be destroyed.  She argues that legitimacy 
arises between citizens who view one another as sharing a common 
allegiance to the values of liberty and equality whilst arguing over 
the implementation of these.  Yet, it is my contention that, if citizens 
are unaware of the commonalities between them, legitimacy will not 
be apparent and there is no way to distinguish between an 
adversary and an enemy to be destroyed.  This reminds us of the 
emphasis agonists place on contingency and perspective, as 
opposed to universality and truth.  As Nietzsche rhetorically asks, 
Ôwhat does man actually know about himself?  Is he, indeed, ever 
able to perceive himself completely, as if laid out in a lighted display 
case?Õ627  For Nietzsche, as for each of the agonist thinkers, the 
answer is no; one only knows oneÕs perception.  On this account, 
then, commonality is only significant when each contending party 
perceives it as commonality.  Stefan Rummens supports this 
concern over whether citizens will recognise their space as 
common.  He explains that 'democratic adversaries share a 
                                                
627 Nietzsche, F. Oregonstate.edu, (2011). The Nietzsche Channel: On Truth and Lie in an 
Extra-Moral Sense. [online], p. 2 
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common symbolic space only if their common reference to the core 
values of liberty and equality is indeed understood by all parties as a 
common reference.'628 Hence, the significance of a common space 
only arises when citizens themselves recognise it as so.   
 
This is of fundamental importance to the primary aim of adversarial 
agonism: to channel antagonistic, and often destructive, conflict into 
agonistic, or productive, engagement.  As Schaap informs, 
'everything depends precisely on whether participants view their 
conflict as communal ('agonism') or non-communal 
('antagonism').' 629   Whereas, if participants are unaware of a 
common space and therefore perceive their conflict as antagonistic, 
this poses a challenge to the conversion of destructive conflict into a 
positive entity.  As a result, it is difficult to see how antagonism can 
be transformed into agonism if there is no perceived distinction 
between the adversary to be fought, and the enemy to be 
destroyed.  The assumption Mouffe makes here about the ability of 
citizens to view one another as legitimate appears paradoxical with 
her critique of ConnollyÕs inclusive agonism in which she states that 
Ôit is only when division and antagonism are recognized as being 
ineradicable that it is possible to think in a properly political way.Õ630  
Yet, it seems to me that MouffeÕs presumption that adversarial 
contenders will necessarily acknowledge their commonalities is at 
odds with this emphasis on division and antagonism.  Perhaps, her 
work could be supplemented with OwenÕs common quest approach, 
which promotes commonality by actively involving citizens in a 
ranking activity.  Or, perhaps, it could be enhanced by engaging 
more with the normative principles of Connolly and Tully, which 
might actively encourage feelings of legitimacy to arise through 
respect and recognition.   
Collective Identities
                                                
628 Rummens S. (2009), p. 383. 
629 Schaap, A. (2007), p. 68.  
630 Mouffe, C. (2013), p. 15. 
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Mouffe's adversarialism states that, in order to ensure the existence 
of the 'political', citizens must be offered strong contending political 
positions with which to identify.  This follows her assertion that 
democratic disaffection results from 'a lack of democratic forms of 
identification.Õ631   Conversely, she argues that in order to retain 
interest in democratic politics and prevent the apathy that could lead 
to extremist identification, citizens Ôneed to have the possibility of 
choosing between parties offering real alternatives.'632  In forming 
these alternative identities, Mouffe follows Schmitt in asserting that 
the construction of each is dependent on that which makes it 
different from another.  Claiming that it is impossible for any identity 
to exist without a different other, she states that 'the very condition 
for the construction of an "us" is the demarcation of a "them".Õ633  
MouffeÕs notion of collective identities thereby builds on her concept 
of Ôthe politicalÕ in seeking to prevent apathy.  Where Ôthe politicalÕ 
strives to motivate engagement through passion and conflict, the 
notion of collective identities aspires to provide strong positions with 
which diverse citizens can identify.  Once again, MouffeÕs notion of 
collective identities aims to promote unity between citizens.  Rather 
than focusing on the unity of the entire ÔinsideÕ as her common 
symbolic space does, however, the creation of collective identities 
constitutes an attempt at forming unity within each ÔfriendÕ group.  
Such unity arises through the way in which each group identifies 
itself in relation to an opposing group.  As Rummens affirms, Ôthe 
identity and unity of a ÒweÓ can be established and guaranteed only 
by the demarcation of a ÒtheyÓ.Õ634  Echoing this, Paulina Tambakaki 
explains that Ôa Òwe consciousnessÓ arises through the agonistic 
lens the moment that frontiers are drawn and ÔweÕ become 
separated from ÒthemÓ.Õ635   
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 196
During the experiment, unity within each group was evident in the 
way participants often supported the arguments of those in their 
group.  For instance, participants frequently referred back to points 
others in their group had previously made, they helped one another 
out with arguments, and they nodded in agreement when others in 
their group spoke.  Similarly, six of the nine participants wrote that it 
was easy to decide which group to join for the discussion, in 
addition to six of the nine participants noting that they felt a sense of 
belonging to their group.636  
 
Yet, in spite of seeking to enable democratic identification, Mouffe's 
notion of collective, oppositional identities could be problematic.  
The tension between representing polar positions whilst still 
accounting for diversity became evident at several points in both the 
pilot study and the main experiment.  First, then, let us consider the 
pilot study.  The participant recruitment questionnaires prior to the 
discussion had asked participants whether they were generally 'for' 
or 'against' abortion.  The data from these suggested that there was 
an even split between those who were for abortion and those who 
were against it.  However, during the abortion discussion, only one 
participant affiliated himself with the 'pro-life' table.  In order to 
distinguish one table from the other, I had provided one quotation 
taken from Pro Life UK about the injustice and discrimination of 
terminating a human life on one table, and one citation from 
Abortion Rights UK about making abortions safe and legal for 
women on the other.  Participants were then asked to sit by the 
quote with which they identified the most.  There was a clear 
discrepancy between those who identified as 'against' abortion prior 
to the discussion but 'pro-choice' during the discussion.  Upon 
reflection, there were several possible reasons behind the apparent 
shift in opinion.  First, it is possible that participants wanted to 
distance themselves from members of the pro-life campaign and, 
                                                
636 Two others said that they felt isolated from their group, and one participant did not 
feeling a sense of belonging to either group. 
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perhaps I had encouraged participants to change sides by 
employing Ôpro-lifeÕ and Ôpro-choiceÕ labels and adding relevant 
quotes.  Therefore, they might have held similar views to pro-life 
advocates but rejected the label.  Alternatively, it is possible that 
participants were against abortion but for reasons other than the 
one given by the pro-life quotation (that terminating a human life is 
immoral).  Thus, they might have belonged to the same umbrella 
group, but held a more nuanced position which they did not feel was 
represented by the citation.  Additionally, there is the possibility that 
participants were generally against abortion as a personal choice, 
but they also agreed with the alternative statement that abortion 
should be legal in order to make it safer.  All of these explanations 
highlight the potentially diverse and complex nature of forming 
contending identities.  This suggests that there may be a tension 
between making space for the diversity of multicultural, pluralist 
society, whilst also providing strong, collective identities.  Whilst 
Mouffe does mention a range of positions (for instance, liberal-
conservative, social-democratic and neo-liberal), her dichotomous 
understanding of identity, in which collective groups are constructed 
in relation to one another, poses a barrier to such pluralistic 
positions.  As Schaap explains, stating that 'Mouffe's hope to 
employ the Schmittian conception of the political in a way that is 
compatible with plurality appears problematic unless it can account 
for the emergence of more than two perspectives out of a conflict 
that is initially dichotomous.'637   
 
In addition to their complexity and diversity, perspectives are also 
fluid and changeable.  Indeed, perhaps participantsÕ opinions on 
abortion had changed between the pre-experiment questionnaires 
and the pilot study.  As Martin Beckstein demonstrates, identity is Ôa 
porous and somewhat phantasmatic projection, even if it is indicated 
by reference to a human collective. As such, it is constantly being 
                                                
637 Schaap, A. (2007), p. 64. 
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re-negotiated from within.Õ638  Connolly supports this, affirming that 
Ôeven the dense, unconscious coding of personhood shifts over 
time.Õ639 Thus, this final explanation emphasises the way in which 
each identity is fluid and open to change, thereby echoing agonistic 
emphasis on contingency, in which challenge and critique 
encourage values to evolve.  Whatever the case(s) for the 
discrepancy of participantsÕ positions, the pilot study highlights the 
importance of acknowledging that each strong position is constituted 
by a spectrum of views.  The views do not exist in isolation, but may 
overlap with one another, nor do they provide fixed, unchangeable 
positions with which citizens will always identify, but, rather, they are 
fluid entities that citizens will sometimes identify with and sometimes 
reject.  As a result, it might be useful to rethink MouffeÕs 
understanding of identity in order to account for diversity and fluidity.    
 
As a result of the pilot study, the labels 'pro-life' and 'pro-choice' 
were removed during the main experiment, as were their supporting 
quotes.  Participants were instead asked to decide between 'for' and 
'against' positions.  Yet again, though, the response to the initial 
identification demonstrated the diversity within each of the two 
contending positions.  Erin was immediately uncomfortable with the 
label Ôfor.Õ  Additionally, rather than identifying easily with either of 
the strong positions, one participant, Nikolaos, took a significantly 
long time to decide between the two groups.  Two of the nine 
participants also noted in the questionnaire that they had had 
difficulty deciding between the two groups in spite of stating their 
position in the pre-experiment questionnaire.  It is thereby evident 
that under the umbrella terms 'for' and 'against,' a whole range of 
positions exists, sometimes rendering it difficult to identify with 
either.  Such diversity was also evident in the composition of the 
                                                
638 Beckstein, M. (2011). The dissociative and polemical political: Chantal Mouffe and the 
intellectual heritage of Carl Schmitt. The Dissociative and Polemical Political, 16(1): 33-
51, p. 42.  
639 Connolly, W. (2000), p. 69. 
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groups.  The ÔforÕ group comprised of one participant who expressed 
uncertainty about the given scenarios, stating at the end of the 
discussion that either decision would have been understandable.  
Additionally, it included two womenÕs rights campaigners who were 
pro-choice under all circumstances.  The ÔagainstÕ group was more 
homogenous, but still offered a range, with some participants 
actively campaigning against abortion, and others against it as a 
personal choice.  Thus, I suggest that there may be more diversity 
within each position than MouffeÕs adversarialism allows.  As 
Wenman affirms, MouffeÕs configuration of collective identities is Ôthe 
obverse of TullyÕs depiction of the creative power of the horizontal 
citizen-citizen relations between glocal citizens.Õ640  Promoting an 
oppositional account of identity, as opposed to Connolly and TullyÕs 
more pluralistic one, has meant that concern with challenging 
domination Ôhas receded into the background in her agonistic 
writings, to be replaced by a persistent emphasis on the underlying 
threat of hostility.Õ641  As Howarth explains, 'the encouragement of 
diversity can be jeopardised by an endeavour to build common 
identities.Õ642  Hence, I am concerned that MouffeÕs understanding of 
identity might fail to fulfil agonistic aspirations of challenging 
domination and encouraging diversity.  A unified understanding of 
each identity could suppress or marginalise diverse positions within 
each group.  This is significant for adversarialism since it might fail 
to prevent apathy and fundamentalist identification.  Yet it is also 
significant to the overarching agonistic aims of necessary 
interdependency, contingency and contestation.  If Mouffe were to 
acknowledge the plurality within each position, adversarial agonism 
might be better able to challenge domination, encourage wider 
inclusion, thereby promoting democratic engagement and 
enhancing necessary interdependency, contingency and 
contestation.  
  
                                                
640 Wenman, M. (2014), p. 190. 
641 Ibid., p. 200. 
642 Howarth, D. (2008), p. 183. 
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Additionally, the third participant to claim a feeling of isolation 
toward her own group noted that she felt her values were different to 
those of her group.  This resonates with RummensÕ earlier 
observation that commonality is only significant if it is acknowledged 
as commonality by citizens.  In ErinÕs case, she wrote that she did 
not perceive commonality between her and the other participants, 
nor did she feel a sense of unity to them.  Perhaps, then, Mouffe's 
notion of collective identity can help to achieve unity but on two 
conditions: first, that citizens must identify strongly with a particular 
position, and, second, that they feel as if they share similar values 
with the other members of their group.  If this is the case, MouffeÕs 
adversarialism may be enhanced by considering those who do not 
identify strongly with polarised positions, or those who are unaware 
of the common values they share with members of their own group.  
I am concerned that without further consideration, MouffeÕs agonism 
could oppress the diversity of positions within society and isolate 
those who do not easily identify with a group.   
Agonistic Struggle 
 
Mouffe requires the relationship between the collective identities of 
friends and adversaries to take the form of an 'agonistic struggle'.  
As previously touched on in the discussion of Ôthe political,Õ the 
rationale behind emphasising the need for 'an open-ended political 
power struggle between competing political collectivities'643  is to 
provide a motivational narrative which provokes citizens to engage 
in democratic contestation.  This is based on MouffeÕs assumption 
that passion is the 'driving force in the political field',644 and that, as 
a result, passions should not be eliminated from democratic politics 
but should be channelled instead into adversarial competition.  
Driven by their passions, Mouffe contends that 'adversaries fight 
against each other because they want their interpretation of the 
                                                
643 Rummens S. (2009), p. 378. 
644 Mouffe C. (2013), p. 6. 
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principles to become hegemonic.'645   In employing passion and 
competition to encourage engagement, Mouffe's theory is 'more [of] 
a provocation to adversarial conflict than a polite invitation to a 
dialogue that respects the integrity of faith.'646  Hence, in provoking 
citizens to protect their understanding and implementation of values 
from those of their adversary, MouffeÕs adversarialism does not ask 
citizens to engage in democratic politics, it provokes them to.  If they 
wish to defend their beliefs against the competing ones of their 
adversaries, then they will participate.  As a result, the Ôagonistic 
struggleÕ component of adversarial agonism strives to provide 
citizens with a motivation to engage with conflicting others.  This is 
of particular importance when we consider Connolly and Tully, who 
have been criticised for failing to explain why citizens would (or 
should) partake in their agonistic contestations.  As Wenman claims, 
ÔMouffe presents her realism as an alternative to what she reads as 
a certain nave optimism inherent in the other contemporary 
theorists of agonism.'647 Rather than relying on citizensÕ willingness 
to participate, Mouffe provides a motivational narrative to provoke 
engagement.    
 
During the abortion discussion, participants were evidently provoked 
into engagement with the other side.  The observers noted that the 
discussion had a fast pace, and people were Ôbursting to speak,Õ 
reflecting the passion inherent in this discussion.  They also wrote 
that negative behaviour, such as staring into space or having private 
conversations were rare, demonstrating the engagement of all 
participants.  Such high levels of engagement were reflected in both 
the pilot study and subsequent student seminars.  The latter 
discussions are particularly significant because the theme of 
abortion was swapped for topics, such as whether students should 
automatically get a 2.1 if the university library burnt down, and 
                                                
645 Ibid., p. 7. 
646 Martin, J. ÔA post-secular faith: Connolly on pluralism and evilÕ in Finlayson, A. (2012), 
p. 12. 
647 Wenman, M. (2014), p. 217. 
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whether or not to support the lecturer strikes.648  Thus, by using 
various discussion topics whilst working with a similar discussion 
framework, it suggests that high levels of passion and engagement 
are at least partially affected by the discussion framework (and not 
just attributed to the discussion content).  In addition to the evident 
passion and engagement during the main experiment, it was also 
apparent that some members felt competitive about their views.  
Arabella and Erin, for instance, repeatedly used evidence, facts, and 
figures to support their arguments.  Erin responded to a comment 
about Down's Syndrome with 'I know, I work with people with 
Down's Syndrome,' whilst Arabella often incorporated facts into her 
argument such as Ôat 21 days the heart beats,Õ and Fiona asked 
everyone if they knew what happened to a 16 to 20 week old foetus, 
stating that abortion Ôsuctions out the brain and crushes the skull 
then removes the remaining body parts.Õ  Additionally, several 
participants claimed to find the discussion engaging because it 
provided Ôthe chance to answer as well as I could the arguments 
presented by the other group,Õ and Ôa good challenge to argue 
against 8 different people.Õ  It appears as if some participants 
perceived this discussion as a debate to be won through evidence.  
This contrasts with the following discussion, which, as the 
subsequent chapter demonstrates, was seen by many a view-
sharing exercise to understand one another better.  Hence, it 
appears as though participants were provoked into engagement in 
order to defend their beliefs.   
 
However, although a framework influenced by agonistic struggle 
appears effective in provoking engagement through the promotion 
of passion and competition, I am concerned that it does not 
demonstrate adversarial legitimacy, which Mouffe deems as 
imperative to transforming antagonistic relations into agonistic ones.  
                                                
648 I decided not to set abortion as a discussion topic for student seminars because of its 
emotive, and potentially personal, nature.  Unlike the participants of the pilot study and 
main experiment, students in seminars had not signed informed consent forms and, thus, 
I felt it unethical to use the theme of abortion. 
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Legitimacy entails perceiving conflicting others as 'political 
competitor[s] we should acknowledge and respect.' 649   Mouffe 
stresses how this builds on liberal tolerance, claiming that 'this is the 
real meaning of liberal-democratic tolerance, which does not entail 
condoning ideas that we oppose or being indifferent to standpoints 
that we disagree with, but treating those who defend them as 
legitimate opponents.' 650  Hence, agonistic struggle encourages 
citizens to see one another as legitimate, in spite of their 
disagreements.  Legitimacy thereby aspires to promote respect 
between conflicting citizens, striving to render disagreement 
productive by 'mobilizing [passions] towards democratic designs.'651  
This understanding of respect thereby appears richer than liberal 
tolerance, which has been challenged for its one-directional, 
dominant nature whereby it Ôis bestowed upon private minorities by 
a putative majority occupying the authoritative, public center.Õ652  As 
a result, acknowledgment of legitimacy constitutes an attempt at 
preventing violent antagonism, thereby enhancing relationships 
between democratic citizens.   
 
However, I suggest that there is the potential for tension to arise 
when we draw on passion and conflict to provoke citizens into a 
competition with one another, whilst also requiring them to perceive 
one another as legitimate adversaries.  Schaap supports this in the 
affirmation that 'it is questionable whether legitimating political 
grievances by providing greater scope for their expression serves to 
sublimate rather than intensify antagonism.'653   These concerns 
were reflected during the abortion discussion, which constituted the 
most heated discussion during both the pilot study and the main 
experiment. 654   Hostility was demonstrated by observer sheets, 
                                                
649 Rummens S. (2009), pp. 378-379.   
650 Mouffe, C. (2000), p. 102. 
651 Mouffe C. (2013), p. 9. 
652 Connolly, W. (2005), p. 123. 
653 Schaap, A (2007), p. 68. 
654 It is important to bear in mind factors such as maturation and history, here since 
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which noted that Ô[Erin] interrupted [Ben] in a really rude way.Õ  
Additionally, Erin often used sarcasm, employing phrases such as 
Ôoh, wonderful!Õ and Ôjolly good!Õ whilst Ben accused Erin of 
Ôbend[ing] what IÕm saying.Õ  Several participants also appeared 
accusatory, stressing the ÔyouÕ when responding to the opposite 
side.  They also largely abandoned the ÔI thinkÕ and Ôfrom my 
perspectiveÕ of the previous discussion, replacing them with 
essentialist vocabulary, such as Ôit isÕ and Ôyou have to.Õ  At the end 
of the discussion, participants were shouting over one another and it 
took several attempts to stop break up the discussion.  As one of 
the observers noted, Ôit descended into chaos.Õ  In the 
questionnaires, participants described others as 'very aggressive' 
and Ôtrying to hurt other people or degrade them morally/ethically,Õ 
affirming that the discussion 'was not very productive since we were 
looking at the issue from very different angles.'  This behaviour 
therefore suggests that more needs to be done to demonstrate 
adversarial legitimacy to citizens in order to reduce hostility, and 
transform antagonistic, negative conflict into agonistic, productive 
conflict.  I share WenmanÕs view that ÔMouffeÕs overriding concern 
with the problem of antagonism means that she is in danger of 
losing sight of the positive goods of agonistic democracy.Õ 655  
Perhaps, then, Connolly and TullyÕs normative principles would be 
useful to giving further thought about how to, not only mediate 
potentially antagonistic relations, but also to enhance improve 
relations of respect and recognition.  
 
This behaviour links to an additional aspect of agonistic struggle, the 
distinction between politics, and the political.  Mouffe draws on 
SchmittÕs assertion that the 'political enemy need not necessarily be 
morally evil or aesthetically ugly.' 656   She states that the 
confrontation between 'we' and 'them' must be conceived of 'in 
                                                                                                                      
from the previous discussion.  However, the heated nature of the discussion was echoed 
in both the pilot study and the subsequent seminar discussions. 
655 Wenman, M. (2014), p. 23. 
656 Schmitt, C. (1976), p. 26. 
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political, not ethical, terms.' 657   Indeed, by focusing on political 
conflict, she aspires to channel conflict into political, democratic 
outlets, rather than non-political, non-democratic expressions.   
 
However, this seems in tension with MouffeÕs own assertion that Ôas 
current controversies about abortion clearly show…the frontier 
between public and private is not given once and for all but 
constructed and constantly shifting.Õ 658   Since the separation 
between public and private is fluid, I contend that, so too, is the 
distinction between the realms of the political and the ethical.  
Howarth raises similar concerns, asking 'how, for instance, does 
Mouffe's concept of agonism manage to mediate her sharp 
distinction between politics and the political, when the latter is 
closely identified with the inherent dimension of antagonism, which 
is then taken to be "constitutive of human societies".'659   Since 
Mouffe relies on passion, competition and conflict to motivate 
democratic participation, I am unconvinced that she can 
unproblematically separate politics from the political.  The overlap 
between the two arenas was reflected in the experiment in which 
several participants labelled those who have abortions as Ôself-
centred,Õ Ôselfish,Õ and Ômonstrous.Õ  Evidently, here, the distinction 
between the political act of discussing abortion merged with the 
personal ethics and morals of those expressing such views.  As a 
result of drawing from oneÕs own personal morals and normative 
principles, and forming opinions of those held by others, it appears 
problematic to perceive the adversary as a political, but not moral, 
competitor.  One participant acknowledged this, writing that 
participants were 'trying to hurt other people or degrade them 
morally/ethically.'  As a result of the fluidity between the political and 
politics, it appears somewhat paradoxical to provoke political 
discussion by drawing on personal beliefs and associated emotions, 
whilst refraining from entering the realms of politics and ethics.  
                                                
657 Mouffe C. (2013), p. 17. 
658 Mouffe, C. (1993), p. 51. 
659 Howarth, D. (2008), p. 179. 
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Perhaps, then, in transforming antagonistic conflict into agonistic 
conflict, Mouffe might need to acknowledge the inability of some (if 
not all) citizens to engage with others in purely political terms.  Here, 
her theory could be enriched by insights from ConnollyÕs attempts at 
overcoming ressentiment, which acknowledge negative feelings 
toward conflicting others and aims to overcome these by promoting 
normative concepts such as agonistic respect and critical 
responsiveness. 
Common enemy 
 
The final adversarial concept I seek to analyse is that of the common 
enemy.  Mouffe's definition of the 'common enemy' involves those who 
are excluded from society.  Against many liberals, Mouffe argues that 
no consensus can be formed without some act of exclusion,660 hence 
rendering the enemy imperative to democracy.  Fat Grszl asserts 
that, in demarcating an enemy, Mouffe's agonism 'has to discriminate 
between demands that must be excluded and the demands that will be 
seen as part of the agonistic debate.'661  This discrimination involves 
consideration of the legitimacy of the demands, both in terms of their 
content, and whether or not they threaten the existence of democratic 
institutions.  By insisting upon the necessity of exclusion, Mouffe's 
adversarialism separates itself from Connolly's inclusive agonism.  
Connolly includes fundamentalists by stating that we 'merely call on 
[them] to acknowledge the contestability of [their] claims to intrinsic 
moral order and to affirm self-restrictions in the way [they] advance 
[their] agenda in the light of this admission.'662  In turn, this enables 
Mouffe to avoid the criticisms charged toward Connolly, which deem his 
theory 'nave' and 'woefully inadequate' in the face of 
fundamentalism.663  Thus, by creating a frontier between the included 
and the excluded, Mouffe's theory provides an alternative -and perhaps 
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less naive and thereby more adequate - account of how agonistic 
democracy is to resist domination by fundamentalists.  
 
In addition to separating itself from Connolly's inclusive agonism, 
Mouffe's concept of the enemy also seeks to distinguish itself from 
liberalism.  Liberals too, see the necessity of drawing frontiers between 
the included and excluded.  However, two significant factors demarcate 
adversarial frontiers from liberal ones: legitimacy and contingency.  
Liberals such as Rawls, often employ the labels 'reasonable' and 
'unreasonable' to distinguish between the included and the excluded, 
whereas Mouffe uses the terminology 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate.Õ  She 
criticises 'reasonable' and 'unreasonable' descriptions, asserting that 
anything included in this category simply 'corresponds to the dominant 
language games and the "common sense" they construe.'664  Mouffe 
thereby acknowledges that, whether or not a demand is perceived as 
legitimate 'is established through a given hegemonic configuration of 
power' 665  and must thereby remain 'a political, contestable one; it 
should never be justified as dictated by a higher order and presented as 
the only legitimate one.'666  In employing legitimacy and contingency, 
then, Mouffe seeks to acknowledge the power struggle underscoring 
the frontiers of the included and the excluded.  As a result, her theory 
aspires to avoid the oppression of the enemy by emphasising that 'the 
frontier that separates the people from their enemies [is] an internal one 
whereby the "them" is not a permanent outsider.Õ667  
 
In addition to distinguishing between those who can and cannot 
participate in democratic politics, whilst affirming the contingent nature 
of this, Mouffe's common enemy also aims to encourage unity between 
friends and adversaries.  Just as Mouffe uses the existence of the 
oppositional other to constitute a collective identity within the political 
arena, she also uses the notion of the outside in order to unite friends 
                                                
664 Mouffe, C. (1993), p. 143. 
665 Mouffe C. (2013), p. 17. 
666 Ibid., p. 17. 
667 Rummens S. (2009), p. 382. 
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and adversaries.  Rummens explicates that 'the creation of a political 
unity always requires an antagonistic opposition.'668  Hence by alerting 
citizens to those who do not adhere to liberty and equality, or who 
threaten the existence of democratic institutions, Mouffe's 'enemy' 
strives to demonstrate the legitimacy of adversaries to one another. 
 
During my experiment, I employed the notion of the common enemy 
midway through the abortion discussion.  In so doing, I showed 
participants a video entailing photographs and audio clips that depicted 
a history of abortion violence stemming from both the pro-life and pro-
choice groups.  The video concluded by informing participants that their 
enemies were not each other, but rather, extremists on both sides who 
invalidate their arguments and turn people away from the cause.  
Immediately after the video, the focus of participants moved away from 
each other and toward the extremists.  For instance, Sam expressed an 
understanding of how extremism could develop on either side: ÔI mean I 
see why people do feel so strongly about this to kill people.Õ  Similarly, 
Arabella sought to distinguish pro-life groups from extremists, saying 
that Ôthe vast majority of pro-life individuals are silent and prayerful and 
thatÕs all they are.Õ  Empathising with the opposite group, Nikolaos 
added that it is Ôsimilar with pro-choice.Õ  Thus, the initial behaviour of 
the participants appears to suggest that the concept of the common 
enemy provides a useful tool in forming unity between two adversarial 
groups. 
 
Yet, just as MouffeÕs concept of legitimacy relies on citizens to perceive 
the similarities between them, surely her concept of the common enemy 
also relies on citizens to acknowledge the differences between 
adversaries and enemies.  This consideration is raised during the 
abortion discussion, which, following the initial period of respite, quickly 
turned controversial, with Erin asking Ôdo you know about the pro-life 
extremist protest that was on campus here a couple of months ago?Õ  
                                                
668 Ibid., p. 382. 
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This time, the discussion became more heated with Arabella and Erin 
talking over each other.  The observers noted that negative behaviour 
happened ÔoftenÕ following the video, whereas it had only occurred 
ÔrarelyÕ or ÔsometimesÕ until this point.  Several participants also wrote in 
their questionnaires that the discussion became more heated after 
watching the video.  Thus, just as I question whether adversaries are 
always able to perceive one another as legitimate competitors sharing a 
common, symbolic framework, I also question whether they can 
separate one another from the common enemy.  This is echoed in 
Rummens' concern over the enemy distinction in which, drawing on 
Jacques Derrida, he affirms that 'what is other strange or inimical 
always already haunts what is proper, familiar or friendly.  Therefore, 
the enemy is not an identifiable outside but is always present inside my 
own brother or friend, and, ultimately, always already present inside my 
own self.'669  Hence, the separation between included adversaries and 
those who are excluded from the democratic contest might not be as 
easily identifiable as Mouffe implies.  Perhaps some citizens will 
perceive a group to be advocating shared liberal democratic values, 
whereas other citizens will see them as either going against these 
values, or threatening democratic politics.   
 
This ambiguity between the inside and the outside was evident in 
Arabella and ErinÕs debate over Abort 27 following the video, in which 
Erin branded them as extremists and Arabella supported them, saying 
that they Ôare trying to educate people what abortion is.Õ  The way in 
which Arabella supported the pro-life group whilst Erin condemned 
them resonates with Rummen's assertion that the identity of the enemy 
is not entirely separable from the identity of citizens.  In the case of the 
common enemy, unity between adversaries is only achieved if the 
enemy is perceived as distinct from the adversary.  If one side conflates 
the adversary with the enemy then they will be unable or unwilling to 
grant legitimacy to them.  Yet, on the other hand, to employ a strict 
                                                
669 Ibid., p. 386. 
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demarcation between values to be included and those to be excluded 
appears at odds with the agonistic emphasis on contestation and 
contingency.  For Mouffe, the liberal consensus governing Ôthe insideÕ 
must remain partial and contestable, which would be undermined by a 
narrower definition of the enemy.  Perhaps, then, we need to rethink 
how to promote unity without encouraging further antagonism or 
threatening contestation and contingency.  Here, Connolly and TullyÕs 
ÔinclusiveÕ approach might be helpful in thinking about how to encourage 
unity through normative principles, such as agonistic respect and 
mutual recognition. 
Conclusion 
 
I suggest that MouffeÕs emphasis on passion and competition is 
generally successful in provoking engagement between conflicting 
citizens.  However, I am concerned about those who might be excluded 
from this contest, such as those who are continually beaten by the 
contest, and those who are not fuelled by their passions or competition.  
As a result, I propose that Mouffe rethink the hegemonic rhetoric of her 
account by abandoning ÔwinnerÕ and ÔloserÕ terminology.  I also contend 
that we give further thought about which practical mechanisms might 
encourage the participation of less dominant citizens.  I demonstrate 
how collective identities can promote unity between adversarial groups 
in society, however, I argue that this understanding of identity does not 
account for diversity and fluidity.  Thus, here, I suggest that MouffeÕs 
account might be enriched if it were supplemented with either OwenÕs 
provision of a common quest, or Connolly and TullyÕs promotion of 
agonistic respect and mutual recognition.  Additionally, I reject the 
divide this requires between the realms of politics and the political, 
suggesting that political passion and competition can spill over into 
personal ethics and morality, and hostility can arise between citizens.  
Finally, I suggest that the common enemy could encourage adversarial 
unity if it is recognised as a distinct entity from the adversary group.  
However, I am concerned that, given the presence of passion and 
antagonism, such recognition might not emerge.  Yet, to employ a 
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stricter separation between the two, would, I suggest, be at odds with 
agonistic notions of contingency and contestation.   
 212
Chapter Eight: Analysing Connolly and Tully’s Inclusive 
Agonism 
 
In this chapter, I consider Connolly and TullyÕs inclusive concepts, 
combining theoretical discussion with an exploration of their 
operationalisation during the gay marriage discussion.  I established in 
Chapter Five that inclusive agonism is constituted by five fundamental 
concepts: intersubjectivity, citizens as the rulers and the ruled, 
overcoming domination, self-modification and challenge, and 
contestability.  I argue that emphasis on pluralistic interdependency can 
help to create more positive relations between conflicting citizens.  Yet, 
I suggest that polarisation might still arise, even when it is not 
promoted.  Subsequently, I suggest that, whilst inclusive agonism might 
effectively mediate the public sphere, it might be less successful in 
addressing underlying feelings of ressentiment.  Next, I show how 
collective decision-making and non-dominant leaders can arise 
spontaneously, whilst also considering the dangers posed by those who 
threaten the democratic contest.  I demonstrate the ways in which 
relations were more positive and inclusive during this discussion, as 
well as how regulatory institutions could be employed to empower less 
dominant citizens.  Next, I discuss how the promotion of self-
modification could encourage challenge, but that the transformation of 
values is a slow and complex process.  Finally, I explore how exhibiting 
contestability could improve relations between citizens, but 
acknowledge that for some citizens this principle may be in tension with 
their feelings of passion.  
Interdependency 
 
Connolly and Tully both promote an inclusive version of agonistic 
democracy through their notion of interdependency, which is 
demonstrated through their understanding of identity relations.  
Although, as Chapter Two demonstrates, Connolly places greater 
emphasis on self-challenge, whereas Tully focuses more on 
encouraging a diversity of voices to be heard, both thinkers promote a 
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more inclusive version of democracy.  In so doing, they highlight the 
way in which the existence of diverse identities is essential to the 
consolidation of oneÕs own identity.  Connolly asserts that each 
ethnicity, gender, nationality, and interest is rendered meaningful as a 
result of various alternatives,670 echoing FoucaultÕs discussion of Las 
Meninas, which illustrates the possibility of grasping an absent concept 
through interrelated concepts.671  Also drawing on Foucault to promote 
interdependency, Tully claims that citizenship is not granted to people 
through law and institutions, but instead arises from engagement with 
others.672  In addition to Foucauldian influences, such an understanding 
also highlights the Arendtian roots of TullyÕs work.  Arendt affirms that, 
in order to achieve their Ôfull reality,Õ men need not only be, but also 
publicly appear.673  Both Connolly and Tully reject the notion that one 
can truly exist in isolation from others, promoting the concept of 
interdependency in which all identities in society are entangled in a web 
of interrelationality.  I sought to promote interdependency during the gay 
marriage discussion by arranging a circular room layout whereby 
citizens were not organised according to their beliefs.  The circular 
layout strived to prevent polarised positions, enhance physical 
inclusion, and encourage participants to perceive one another as 
interdependent. 
 
Contrary to the adversarial nature of MouffeÕs account of identity, 
Connolly and Tully understand interrelationality as pluralistic, 
constituted by Ôthe interweaving of different threads.Õ 674   This is 
significant since the previous chapter concludes that adversarialism 
does not sufficiently account for the possibility of nuances and 
contingency within conflicting positions.  As Schaap demonstrates, 
ÔMouffe's hope to employ the Schmittian conception of the political in a 
way that is compatible with plurality appears problematic unless it can 
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account for the emergence of more than two perspectives out of a 
conflict that is initially dichotomous.Õ675  The previous chapter suggests 
that this understanding of identity has the potential to threaten diversity 
and enhance hostilities between conflicting citizens.  The pluralistic 
understanding, on the other hand, seeks to promote more positive and 
productive forms of conflict by encouraging citizens to Ômaintain a 
paradoxical tension between drawing upon their values and beliefs in 
the public realm of discussion and debate, and being receptive and 
respectful to other positions in order to avoid the temptations of 
fundamentalising their own position.Õ676   
 
The gay marriage discussion appears to suggest that, by moving away 
from oppositional, polarised forms of identity toward more 
interdependent ones, inclusive agonism might be more effective than 
adversarial agonism in producing more positive forms of conflict.  
Contrary to the abortion discussion, participants in the gay marriage 
discussion appeared to listen to one another more, use more sensitive 
language toward one another, and distance their arguments from others 
in the room.  For example, participants refrained from swearing, 
shouting over one another and using sarcastic and mocking tones.  In 
one instance, Arabella apologised to Nikolaos because her argument 
condemned an action of NikolaosÕ friend.  When making this argument, 
Arabella turned to Nikolaos and said ÔIÕm sorry, itÕs your friend, IÕm 
sorry.Õ  Similarly, when Ben was expressing an opinion, he avoided 
using an accusing tone.  In spite of already coming out as gay, he said 
Ôwe suppress themÕ of how society treats homosexuals.  By making 
himself part of the problem, he formed an argument without leading to 
accusations.  Likewise, when Erin accused those against gay rights as 
putting forward certain arguments, she explicitly stated that Ôno-one is 
saying that today, nobody in this room.Õ  This provided a contrast with 
the abortion discussion in which participants frequently used ÔyouÕ in an 
accusatory manner, and created parallels between violent extremists on 
                                                
675 Schaap, A. (2007), p. 64. 
676 Khan, G. (2008), p. 203. 
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the video and the participants arguing the other side.  Observers also 
unanimously described the discussion as Ômore respectfulÕ and ÔdecentÕ.  
One participant also noted in his questionnaire that the discussion was 
Ômore friendlyÕ because Ôthe format of the debate (chairs in the round) 
made it more comfortable for me.Õ  This supports ConnollyÕs view that Ôa 
lot can be held back much of the time.Õ 677   Relations between 
participants appeared friendlier with people joking with one another 
about the queue to use discussion tokens, referring back to one 
anotherÕs points, and even laughing with conflicting others following 
heated moments.  For instance, the group laughed when Sam said ÔI 
put [a token down] because I thought IÕd spoke too much.Õ  Additionally, 
when Erin followed one of FionaÕs arguments with ÔitÕs not your word,Õ 
Fiona replied Ôno, itÕs my opinionÕ and both of them laughed.  Connolly 
affirms that Ôthe idea is not to rise above faith, but to forge a positive 
ethos of public engagement between alternative faiths.Õ678  This ethos 
appeared to develop during the inclusive discussion, with participants 
such as Erin and Fiona continuing to conflict over their faiths, whilst also 
engaging positively with one another.  At first glance, then, this appears 
to support Connolly and TullyÕs claims that inclusive agonism can create 
a more productive and positive form of conflict that Ôenables individuals 
and groups with relatively established identities to respect other faiths in 
the public realm.Õ679  
 
In spite of this, I am concerned by two aspects of interdependency, 
which were highlighted during the gay marriage discussion.  First, I 
worry that Connolly and TullyÕs pluralistic understanding of identity, 
although seemingly effective in producing positive relations, may not 
fully account for the ever-present potential for beliefs to become 
polarised.  Second, and perhaps intertwined with this concern, is the 
                                                
677 Connolly, W. (2000), p. 9 
678 Connolly, W. (2005), p. 48. 
679 Khan, G. (2008), p. 203. 
It is important to consider the effects of history, here, in which participants had previously 
engaged in a heated discussion and some of them had therefore expressed a readiness to 
engage in a more friendly discussion.  However, throughout each repetition of these 
discussions, the ÔinclusiveÕ framework seemed to promote more friendly and productive 
conflict between participants. 
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worry that negative feeling and hostility Ð and hence the ressentiment 
which Connolly focuses on overcoming Ð have not been mediated, but 
rather have been removed from the public realm of discussion.  The first 
concern parallels MouffeÕs assumption that Ôdemocratic logics always 
entail drawing a frontier between ÒusÓ and ÒthemÓ.Õ680  Whilst, as the 
previous chapter demonstrates, I disagree with MouffeÕs promotion of 
identity as necessarily constructed in oppositional terms, I argue, with 
her, that the potential for antagonism and oppositional conflict is always 
present.  Although I want to reject MouffeÕs promotion of polarised 
positions, then, I am concerned that dichotomous positions may arise 
naturally in any case.  For instance, during the gay marriage discussion, 
in spite of providing a range of questions to reflect a spectrum of 
opinions, a clear divide surfaced between for and against positions.  
One observer supported this, commenting that Ôthere is a clear divide 
between for and against,Õ and another wrote that Ôonly Ben and 
Nikolaos have changed sides [from the previous discussion]Õ.  These 
remarks were supported by the video-analysis which demonstrated that 
Arabella, Fiona, Chris and Jakub were evidently against gay marriage 
and gay adoption,681 whilst Erin, Sam, Ben, Katayoun and Nikolaos 
were all in favour.  Thus, even though the discussion framework did not 
seek to create or promote collective oppositional identities, it appears 
as though such positions emerged naturally.682  This reminds us of 
MouffeÕs affirmation that Ôpluralism implies the permanence of conflict 
and antagonism.Õ683  Hence, although I suggest that the two sides are 
formed of a contingent spectrum of positions, rather than oppositional, 
unified groups, I assert that there is always the potential for positions to 
become dichotomous and oppositional.  This is echoed in MouffeÕs 
discussion of Arendt and Connolly in which she claims that Ôwhat is 
missing here are two dimensions which I have argued are central for 
                                                
680 Mouffe, C. (2000), p. 4. 
681 Although all, except Arabella, were in favour of civil partnerships. 
682 Indeed, by placing the adversarial discussion before the inclusive discussion, this might 
have influenced participants to view one another in dichotomous terms.  However, attempts 
were made to counter this, including the circular room layout and asking participants to sit 
next to different people from before. 
683 Mouffe, C. (2000), p. 33. 
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politics: antagonism and hegemony.Õ684  Thus, in presenting conflict as 
an entangled web of diverse positions, Connolly and Tully might not 
sufficiently emphasise the dichotomous potential of each.  Focusing on 
diversity and plurality seems to encourage more positive interactions, 
however it might prevent Connolly and Tully from considering how to 
mediate antagonistic, or even fundamentalist conflict.  As Deveaux 
affirms, ConnollyÕs agonism offers an Ôoptimistic view,Õ685  whilst, for 
Wenman, it is Ôwoefully inadequateÕ, nave and insufficient when we 
consider the conflict between liberals and fundamentalists such as the 
9/11 hijackers.686  In spite of this, though, as the last chapter argued, an 
alternative collective, adversarial interpretation cannot suffice in 
understanding identity relations, since it does not enable us to grasp the 
pluralistic nature of positions within each group.  Perhaps, then, an 
understanding of identity relations is required which acknowledges its 
pluralistic, nuanced, and contingent nature, whilst also recognising its 
potential to become oppositional, antagonistic and divisive.  
 
I am also concerned that, whilst interdependency appears effective in 
mediating relations in the public sphere, it may be less successful in 
addressing the underlying ressentiment between conflicting citizens. 
This is a concern for inclusive agonism, particularly for ConnollyÕs work, 
which requires citizens to work on themselves in order to enhance 
relations of interdependency: 
Working on yourself in relation to the cultural differences 
through which you have acquired definition.  Doing so to 
render yourself more open to responsive engagement with 
alternative faiths, sensualities, gender practices, 
ethnicities, and so on.  Doing so to render yourself better 
able to listen to new and surprising movements in the 
politics of becoming without encasing them immediately in 
                                                
684 Mouffe C. (2013), p. 14. 
685 Deveaux, M. (1999), p. 14. 
686 Wenman, M. (2003a), p. 173. 
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preset judgments that sanctify the universality or 
naturalness of what you already are.687   
In the gay marriage discussion negative relations still remained 
between participants, but seemed to take on a subtler form than in the 
previous discussion.  Observers noted that Ôlooks were exchangedÕ 
between Erin and Katayoun, as well as between Erin and Sam following 
ArabellaÕs comments, and that Katayoun is speaking in an Ôaccusing 
way.Õ  Additionally, Erin wrote in her questionnaire that Ôreligion moulds 
some peopleÕs values Ð because their religion says it is wrong, their 
minds are made up.  Like sheep.Õ  Similarly, in a discussion with the 
observers and me following the experiment, Sam and Ben expressed 
shock and anger at the beliefs held by those against gay marriage.  
This contrasted with the abortion discussion whereby participants 
expressed their ressentiment towards one another openly, rather than 
confining it to private conversations.  My apprehension, then, is that a 
pluralistic account of interdependency does not necessarily result in 
conflict mediation, but, rather, could transfer it from the public sphere of 
contestation into the private realm of subtle glances, questionnaires, 
and private discussions.688  Perhaps, there is the danger that if we 
focus too much on encouraging positive interactions, we might enhance 
antagonism in the non-political sphere. Alexander Livingston supports 
this concern, asserting that, Ôfolding the politics of affective infusion into 
an agonistic but respectful process of negotiation begins to look a lot 
more like the redescriptive politics of the public sphere proposed by 
deliberative democracy.Õ689   Antonio Vzquez-Arroyo also shares this 
view, stating that ConnollyÕs normative behaviours Ôare expectations 
that, in spite of the misleadingly modest tone in which Connolly 
formulates them, echo Rawlsʼs call for people to accept the primacy of 
justice as fairness.Õ690  Thus, just as the liberal sphere of politics has 
been criticised for moving conflict from the public sphere to the private, I 
                                                
687 Connolly, W. (2000), p. 146. 
688 Once again, history could be an important factor and such hostilities could be spillover 
effects from the previous discussions.  It would therefore be interesting, and valuable, to 
repeat these discussions in a different order.    
689 Livingston, A. (2012). Avoiding Deliberative Democracy? Micropolitics, Manipulation, and 
the Public Sphere. Philosophy & Rhetoric 45(3): 269-294, p. 278. 
690 Vzquez-Arroyo, A. (n.d.). Radical Phylosophy. [online] Radical.9k.com. 
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propose that, when endorsing Connolly and TullyÕs normative principles, 
we need to be careful not to overemphasise the importance of these 
since this could suppress conflict and aggravate it in the non-political 
realm.  Given the importance of political contestation for agonistic 
democracy, as outlined in Chapter One, this raises the concern that 
such normative principles might pose a barrier to overcoming 
domination and challenging ressentiment, thereby threatening the 
inclusive aspect of Connolly and TullyÕs work.  As a result, there is the 
possibility that 'if established parties do not offer agonistic alternatives, 
less democratic movements will offer alternatives that will mobilize 
passions of disconnected citizens.Õ691  As Mouffe argues, conflict is 
ineradicable, but also desirable since, if it is not provided with a 
democratic outlet for expression, it may result in more fundamentalist 
forms of engagement.  Hence, Connolly and Tully need to be careful to 
maintain the balance between, promoting more positive interactions on 
the one hand, whilst also providing outlets for agonistic expression on 
the other.  
Citizens as the Rulers and the Ruled 
 
As outlined in Chapter Two, both Tully and Connolly seek to promote 
greater inclusivity by rendering citizens both the rulers and the ruled.  
For Tully, this entails overcoming domination by involving citizens in the 
formulation of laws by including them in on-going democratic 
discussion, and not confining their participation to the decision-making 
process. 692   ConnollyÕs agonism echoes TullyÕs calls for a more 
inclusive politics by requiring citizens to engage more actively with one 
another in an ethos of engagement, which aspires to overcome 
ressentiment.693  Owen suggests ConnollyÕs work would be compatible 
with civic practices, such as participatory budgeting, citizens assemblies 
and juries, PR voting and preferenda.694  Once again, this involves 
reserving citizens a place to become involved with the discussion and 
                                                
691 Wingenbach, E. (2011), p. 125. 
692 Mouffe, C. (2000), p. 227. 
693 Connolly, W. (1993a), p. 381. 
694 Owen, D. (2008), p. 225.  
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formulation process, rather than confining them to the realm of decision-
making.  In order to represent the notion of citizens as the rulers and 
the ruled during the gay marriage discussion, I did two things.  First, 
although participants were provided with a list of discussion questions 
surrounding the topic of gay rights, I informed them that these were 
more of a platform for discussion, and that they should feel able to stray 
from these.  Additionally, in spite of giving participants speech tokens, I 
avoided intervening in the usage of these, granting the group autonomy 
over counter-questions or token borrowing.  Both of these components 
sought to grant participants greater autonomy throughout the 
discussion, encouraging them to act as the rulers and the ruled.  
 
KhanÕs view demonstrates the self-regulating ability of citizens in 
ConnollyÕs theory, affirming that Ôthere is no account of the necessity of 
the leader that stands in for or represents the whole but rather the 
emphasis is on the abundant multiplicity of groups and identities that 
are perpetually coming into being.Õ695  Thus, on this view, a leader is 
unnecessary to the regulation of group conflict since Connolly [and 
TullyÕs] work Ôshares important similarities with [John] Locke's 
conception of the state of nature as largely self-regulating.Õ696  Instead, 
for Connolly and TullyÕs theories, which focus on necessary 
interdependency, regulation Ôemerges though multiple lines of 
connection and bonds of interdependency between different groups, 
forces and constituencies.Õ697  Hence, like Locke, Connolly and Tully 
perceive society as a self-regulating entity in which leaders need not be 
imposed from above since they emerge spontaneously through 
relations of interdependency.698  The gay marriage discussion generally 
reflected these assumptions about self-regulating society.  For example, 
there were several instances in which participants wanted to ask follow-
up questions, and asked whether this required a speech token: Chris 
asked the group, Ôcan I answer [Erin] because sheÕs asked me a 
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question?Õ and Sam replied ÔweÕll let you off, weÕll let you off,Õ which was 
met with light-hearted laughter.  The group frequently made quick and 
easy decisions as to whether or not a token was required and such 
decisions appeared largely uncontroversial.  Additionally, there were a 
couple of moments where participants asked to respond immediately 
(rather than waiting in the queue) because their point was directly 
relevant to something another participant had just said.  Again, other 
participants appeared generally happy to suspend the regulation of the 
speech tokens in these instances.   
 
In addition to regulating themselves, the gay marriage discussion also 
demonstrated the spontaneous emergence of a leader.  As one of the 
observers noted, Sam took on the role of discussion regulator, 
reminding other participants of their order in the queue.  There are two 
things which appear significant about SamÕs role as regulator: first, he 
was not one of the dominant members in any of the discussions 
(Arabella was the most dominant member, as demonstrated by her 
borrowing of tokens).  Second, he regulated the discussion in a friendly 
manner, jovially reminding people of the order and ensuring that quieter 
members were recognised.  Although Sam was not one of the quietest 
members of the group, he was definitely not a dominant participant.  
This contrasts with Hobbesian concerns that when society is allowed to 
self-regulate, dominant citizens will seek to assert their power and 
authority.699  Echoing the analysis of OwenÕs perfectionist account of 
agonism, this suggests that self-regulation is possible, without either 
dominating the discussion, excluding certain people, or imposing too 
many restrictions on peopleÕs involvement.  This resonates with new 
institutionalist notions of demonstrated practices whereby the behaviour 
of citizens is influenced and ensured by that of others.  The discussion 
suggests that self-regulation can enhance inclusivity when the regulator 
represents the interests of the entire group, and encourages less 
dominant members of the group to participate.  Hence, this supports 
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Tully and ConnollyÕs calls for citizens to become the rulers as well as 
the ruled. 
 
However, there were a couple of instances during both the pilot study 
and the main experiment which suggested that, even though the 
regulator did not seek domination, the lack of an imposed leader might 
enable other members to attempt to dominate the discussion.  For 
example, during both the pilot study and the main experiment, one 
participant (Iris and Arabella respectively) ÔcheatedÕ with respect to the 
discussion tokens.  They both employed several tactics to continue 
engaging in the discussion once they had used all of their tokens, 
involving borrowing tokens from other members, speaking without 
tokens, and writing comments to show to the group.  Interestingly, these 
instances differed from the moments where the group collectively 
decided to allow someone an extra token, or to counter someoneÕs 
point.  This domination appeared to be particularly frustrating to other 
dominant members of the group who did abide by the rules.  For 
example, Stuart expressed his anger toward Iris in the gay marriage 
questionnaire, writing that ÔI felt less engaged with the discussion when 
I ran out of matchsticks; I felt some others were not always playing by 
the speaking rules.Õ  Dominant participants will be considered in more 
depth in the following section: overcoming domination, however these 
instances demonstrate the tension between self-regulation and 
autonomy on the one hand, and the possibilities of domination on the 
other, posing a potential obstacle to TullyÕs focus on promoting inclusion 
by overcoming domination.  The potential for such domination is 
addressed in MouffeÕs work in which she Ôidentifies with BerlinÕs anxiety 
about democracy as potentially authoritarian.Õ700  Wenman expresses 
similar worries in the affirmation that Ôwe meet the zero point of 
ConnollyÕs theorization in his recognition that the invitation to Òagonistic 
reciprocityÓ may ultimately be flatly refused…He is simply silent about 
what to do when the invitation to constructive agonism is rejected.Õ701  
                                                
700 Wenman, M. (2014), p. 204. 
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Hence, when considering the practical application of inclusive concepts, 
further thought may be needed about how to negotiate the balance 
between enabling autonomy on one hand, whilst preventing domination 
on the other.  Perhaps OwenÕs common quest is useful, here, in 
rendering citizens accountable to one another and reducing the risk of 
them seeking to dominate the group as a result. 
 
Overcoming Domination 
 
Interrelated to citizens as the rulers and the ruled, then, is Connolly and 
TullyÕs focus on overcoming domination.  Whilst Tully focuses on this 
more throughout his work, both thinkers strive to overcome domination 
through agonistic respect and mutual recognition respectively.  Connolly 
compares agonistic respect with liberal toleration, claiming that, 
whereas the dominant majorities choose whether or not to grant the 
latter to inferior minorities, the former creates a web of respect in which 
each identity is necessarily dependent on all others.702  Tully similarly 
calls for a more inclusive understanding of respect through mutual 
recognition, asking citizens not to recognise alternative cultures through 
prior assumptions, but to listen to others in their own terms and as they 
wish to be heard.703   As a result of agonistic respect and mutual 
recognition, Connolly and Tully aspire to encourage more inclusive 
forms of respect by challenging the power of the majority, thereby 
overcoming domination.  As Chapter Four outlines, I sought to 
represent the principle of overcoming domination in two ways.  First, I 
explicitly asked participants to listen to one another in their own terms, 
and respect other beliefs even if they disagreed with them.  Second, I 
aimed to encourage such behaviour by giving each participant an equal 
number of speech tokens to be used throughout the discussion.  These 
two elements of the discussion Ð combined with the aforementioned 
circular layout Ð aspired to overcome domination. 
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 224
 
In contrast with the previous discussion, the gay marriage discussion 
appeared generally successful in overcoming domination.  The 
questionnaires demonstrated that participants were unanimous in 
feeling that the gay marriage discussion contained a diversity of views, 
rather than being dominated by a couple of participants.  This was also 
supported by the video-analysis in which, contrary to the frequent toing 
and froing between two or three people in the previous discussion, 
everyone spoke multiple times.  This echoes TullyÕs discussion of The 
Spirit of the Haida Gwaii, which he employs to demonstrate the 
importance of listening to people from a diversity of cultural 
backgrounds. 704   Additionally, the comparative questionnaire also 
indicated that the gay marriage discussion provided the framework in 
which the majority of participants (six of eight)705  felt most able to 
express their opinions.  These questionnaires are supported by 
previously mentioned observer sheets and video-analysis which 
demonstrate the ÔfriendlyÕ atmosphere throughout the discussion in 
which participants appeared more respectful toward one another than in 
other discussions.  For example, participants listened whilst others were 
talking, which provided a contrast with the abortion discussion in which 
participants frequently spoke over one another.  Additionally, respect 
was evident in the manner in which participants took the views of others 
seriously.  This, again, differed from the abortion discussion in which 
examples were often dismissed and arguments were often mocked or 
greeted with sarcasm.  This resonates with ConnollyÕs affirmation that 
Ô[each perspective] provides a launching pad for pursuit of a political 
ethos in which alternative perspectives support space for each other to 
exist through the agonistic respect they practice toward one another.Õ706  
Hence, it appears that, in promoting listening and respect between 
participants, principles of audi alteram partem and agonistic respect can 
overcome domination and render democratic discussion more inclusive. 
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However, as noted in the discussion of citizens as the rulers and the 
ruled, it was also evident that the possibility for domination still 
remained, since there were moments when a couple of members 
dominated the discussion.  For instance, Iris (during the pilot) and 
Arabella (during the main experiment) continued to participate in the 
discussion despite having run out of tokens.  In these moments, it 
thereby appeared as though the tokens were ineffective in regulating 
the discussion.  Significantly though, there was one instance in which 
the tokens seemed to provide a channel into challenging the power of 
the more dominant members.  The exchange between Erin and 
Arabella had become heated, and they continued to argue with one 
another disregarding the discussion tokens and the resultant queue that 
had formed.  The heated exchange between them resembled the end of 
the abortion discussion in which passionate debate descended into 
participants shouting over one another.  At the end of the abortion 
discussion, it was necessary to intervene in order to regain control of 
what the observers described as Ôchaos.Õ  In the instance between Erin 
and Arabella during the gay marriage discussion, I was concerned that 
it would be necessary to intervene once again.  However, Fiona spoke 
up, reminding Erin and Arabella that they were not using their tokens.707   
 
Interestingly, Fiona was one of the quietest members of the group 
throughout the day.  Perhaps, then, regulatory mechanisms such as 
discussion tokens are of lesser importance when discussion is running 
smoothly, however they may have the potential to empower quieter 
members when it is necessary to challenge the dominance of other 
members.  This resonates with Lowndes and RobertsÕ claim that 
institutions can empower as well as constrain.  In this example, it seems 
as though, whilst simply relying on participants to adhere to guidelines 
of respect and recognition could prove insufficient in affecting the 
behaviour of some, the tokens may provide an additional channel for 
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others to reregulate the discussion.  This also happened during the pilot 
study in which Alan, who, again, was one of the quieter members during 
the discussions, reminded Iris about the discussion tokens.  This was 
different to the previous discussion in which participants were unable to 
stop everyone talking over one another at the end of the discussion and 
an observer noted that Ôthey even ignored Marie.Õ  This thereby 
suggests that domination can be curbed, but additional mechanisms 
may be useful in providing avenues to challenge power relations.  This 
reminds me of DeveauxÕs affirmation that agonistic democracy Ôwill 
remain an ineffectual bit of rhetoric in the absence of clearer ideas 
about how (or indeed whether) we can formalize such inclusion and 
recognition.Õ708  Hence, perhaps normative principles such as respect 
and recognition could be enriched further through supplementary 
mechanisms which empower the less dominant.   
Self‐Modification and Challenge 
 
Although this concept is most evident in ConnollyÕs work, both thinkers 
attempt to enhance the potential for greater future inclusivity by 
endorsing the concepts of self-modification and challenge.  For Tully, 
self-modification is encouraged through the principle of audi alteram 
partem in which citizens are asked to listen to minority voices, which 
have been misrepresented or excluded by the dominant.709   When 
listening to such voices, Tully requires us to Ôfurther enhance a critical 
attitude to oneÕs own culture and a tolerant and critical attitude towards 
others.Õ 710   Connolly similarly advocates self-modification through 
critical responsiveness, asking us to be more open towards others, and 
avoid comparing them to our prior judgments. 711   Through critical 
responsiveness, Connolly also asks us to challenge current norms and 
moral codes.712  As a result of such challenge, both thinkers seek to 
enhance pluralism by questioning our taken-for-granted 
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understandings. 713   During the experiment, I sought to encourage 
participants to challenge their own ideas by explicitly asking them to.   
 
By adopting an attitude of self-modification and challenge, Connolly 
asserts that citizens become Ômore open to responsive engagement 
with alternative faiths, sensualities, gender practices, ethnicities, and so 
on.Õ 714   There were several indicators during the experiment that 
participants were challenging the opinions of others and were open to 
the challenge of theirs.  First, Sam and Nikolaos, who started the 
discussion, finished their arguments by asking, Ôsomeone disagree with 
me.Õ  Unlike the previous discussion where participants were angered 
by disagreement, participants in the gay marriage discussion smiled 
and appeared ready to be challenged.  Additionally, they often posed 
questions to other participants in order to better understand conflicting 
opinions.  For instance, Arabella asked Erin about polygamy, Chris 
asked Ben about Ôin practical terms whatÕs the difference between gay 
marriage and civil partnerships?Õ and Arabella asked Sam and Ben Ôif 
itÕs so negative, that experience of being gay, why would you 
experiment?Õ   
 
This discussion appeared more of a sharing of perspectives, in which 
each side explained their views to the other side, rather than a 
contestation in which participants must defend their values.  Whereas 
the previous discussion resembled more of a debate in which Ôour 
interest in understanding is strategic: we want to win the debate, to 
understand our adversaries so we can find their weaknesses, so we 
can refute their arguments,Õ715 the gay marriage discussion appeared to 
provide a space in which Ôplayers reach an understanding by Òserving, 
returning and rallyingÓ with one another in conversation.Õ716  Thus, in 
promoting self-modification and challenge, it appeared to provide a 
platform on which participants willingly challenged one anotherÕsÕ views 
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through examples and alternate opinions, whilst also allowing others to 
question their viewpoints.  One participant even told the others that in 
spite of his views remaining unchanged, the discussion changed his 
prejudices toward the other side.  He wrote on his questionnaire that 
Ômy opinions formed before the discussion and they didnÕt change a lot, 
but it changed in the sense that I understand othersÕ views better.Õ  
Griggs et al. echo this in their discussion of participative politics, 
asserting that Ôactors who engage in this kind of interactive, 
participative politics discover that their interests are not fixed but 
shaped by the encounter with the realities of the problem at hand and 
the perspectives of other actors.Õ 717   Hence, it appears that the 
promotion of self-modification and challenge may be effective in 
promoting understanding between conflicting citizens.  Several 
participants also commented that it was necessary to think through 
ideas before speaking, hence suggesting that the discussion promoted 
the self-reflexivity which Connolly and Tully call for through critical 
responsiveness and audi alteram partem.  The predominant 
observation from students engaging in the seminar discussions was 
that this discussion promoted an enhanced quality of discussion since 
the token regulation increased the significance of each argument.  This 
contrasts to the abortion discussion in which responses often took the 
form of spontaneous and heated reactions.  Hence, perhaps a more 
regulated discussion framework could create space for citizens to both 
challenge one another and be more self-reflexive, leading to enhanced 
understanding and quality of discussion.   
 
Yet, in spite of the potential for self-modification and challenge to 
render conflict more positive, it is important to note that it may take 
longer to change perspectives.  This is affirmed by Connolly in A World 
of Becoming, whereby he describes change as a problematic and 
complex process.  He asserts that Ôa world of becoming is not a world 
of flux in which each force-field constantly morphs into something 
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radically different from its previous state.Õ718  This was mirrored during 
the experiment, for example, when participants wrote that their beliefs 
were actually challenged the least during the gay marriage 
discussion.719  Thus, perhaps the competitive nature of the previous 
two discussions enabled more challenge during the experiment.  As 
Owen claims, the argumentation process is important Ôsince it is 
through this process that our capacities for truthfulness and for justice 
are tested and cultivated.Õ 720   However, it is my contention that, 
although change may be slower and more gradual through the process 
of self-modification, it is not impossible.  Connolly, for instance, 
describes the process of change as a seed to be Ôcultivated,Õ Ôa 
durationÕ and something which Ôpersists, mutates, evolves or connects 
to other force-fields.Õ721  What is needed, then, is further thought about 
the types of institutions, which might facilitate the cultivation of this 
seed.  This might, for instance, include repeated emphasis on self-
modification, as well as encouraging a critical attitude to everyday 
practices.       
Contestability 
 
In addition to requiring citizens to acknowledge the interrelationality of 
their identities, and calling for them to listen to and respect one another 
in their own terms, both Connolly and Tully also advocate the principle 
of contestability.  The notion of contestability derives from their joint 
rejection of universalism, corresponding to the Foucauldian and 
Nietzschean assumption that any claim to truth is an expression of 
power.722  Both thinkers thereby argue that diversity is threatened by 
universalism since by claiming one identity as concrete it necessarily 
negates diverse others. 723   Tully argues that this prevents plural 
                                                
718 Connolly, W. (2010), p. 72. 
719 It should be noted, here, that participantsÕ passion for the topic could play a role in this 
outcome.  However, the ÔbeforeÕ surveys indicated that only 3 participants felt stronger about 
abortion than gay marriage (with four rating them equally and two rating gay marriage as a 
stronger concern than abortion). 
720 Owen, D. (1995), p. 146. 
721 Connolly W. (2010), pp. 70-79. 
722 Foucault, M. and Rabinow, P. (1984), p. 72. 
723 Connolly, W (2000), p. 58. 
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traditions from entering into an equal dialogue with one another,Õ724 
endorsing instead contestability through the principle of acting 
differently.  TullyÕs Ôacting differentlyÕ employs contestability by 
attempting to Ôshow what were the effects, show that there were other 
rational possibilities, teach people what they ignore about their own 
situation, on their conditions of work, on their exploitation.Õ725  Connolly 
also asks citizens to come to terms with the way in which oneÕs own 
beliefs are contestable, 726  arguing that, in so doing, we avoid 
oppressing alternate beliefs since we enable them to exist alongside 
our own.727  Furthermore, he claims that by expressing doubts and 
uncertainties about our views, our interactions with diverse others can 
become more positive. 728   Therefore, the goal of acknowledging 
contestability is to reduce the threat that each identity poses, thereby 
preventing suppression and marginalisation, encouraging inclusivity as 
a result.  The discussion format sought to promote contestability in two 
ways: the first was through the discussion guidelines, which asked 
participants to accept (and demonstrate acknowledgement to others) 
that not everyone will share the same views.  The second, and more 
subtle element, is the circular discussion layout.  Through a circular 
discussion layout, the gay marriage discussion sought to encourage the 
sharing of views, as opposed to a competition in defence of them (as in 
the previous discussion).   
 
Connolly tells us that contestability enables citizens to Ôwork upon your 
faith and start to curtail its drive to the negation of alternative faiths,Õ729 
and the language used by participants suggests that the promotion of 
contestability did help to reduce the negation of others.  For instance, 
Arabella and Erin, who were both dominant (and sometimes 
aggressive) during the abortion discussion, generally employed the 
language of contingency in this discussion.  Arabella, for instance, often 
                                                
724 Ibid., pp. 148-149. 
725 Bernauer, J. and Rasmussen, D. (1988), p. 15. 
726 Connolly, W. (2005), p. 32. 
727 Ibid., p. 64. 
728 Ibid., p. 125. 
729 Connolly, W. (2000), p. 36. 
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preceded her arguments with ÔI thinkÕ and ÔI believe,Õ whilst Erin posed 
her views as questions, saying ÔcouldnÕt you argue though…?Õ  As a 
result of this, relations between participants seemed to be more 
positive, with the discussion adopting the form of view-sharing, rather 
than a contest to be won.  In addition to promoting more positive and 
productive relations between participants during the discussion, the 
introduction of contestability also enabled participants to continually 
question one another.  For instance, the group decided amongst 
themselves that tokens were not necessary if someone wanted to ask 
another participant about an opinion they had just expressed.  As a 
result, participants frequently asked counter-questions (often providing 
examples or hypothetical scenarios) to further challenge the other 
personÕs opinion.  This is significant as it encouraged participants to 
keep the agon open.  This resonates with the Foucauldian emphasis on 
maintaining a Ôpermanent provocation.Õ 730  Unlike either the values 
discussion (in which the collective nature of the discussion often 
encouraged consensus), or the abortion discussion (which generally 
encouraged participants to defend their sideÕs views relentlessly), the 
gay marriage discussion provided space in which participantsÕ views 
could be probed further by others.   
 
However, the gay marriage discussion raised two difficulties with the 
concept of contestability.  The first was that, in spite of employing 
language, suggesting contestability, it was questionable as to whether 
all participants actually perceived their views as contestable.  Arabella, 
for instance, employed universalism to her interpretation of Catholicism.  
When she was arguing against childless marriages, she said Ôwell we 
would say that that is the wrong use, really, of marriage.Õ  In employing 
the term ÔweÕ, she presented her religious beliefs as generalisable to all 
Catholics.  This was echoed throughout the discussion in which several 
participants, such as Sam and Erin, claimed that the definition of 
marriage is open to interpretation, whereas Arabella, Fiona and Erin all 
                                                
730 Foucault, M. (1982), p. 790. 
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sought to give a single, undisputable definition of marriage.  For 
example, Fiona said Ômarriage is between a man and a woman,Õ Chris 
spoke of destroying the true meaning of marriage and Arabella used 
statistics to argue that children are better off with heterosexual parents.  
Additionally, Fiona and Chris verify their interpretations of the bible with 
Arabella as if she was the authority on Christianity.  The experiment 
supported Tully and ConnollyÕs affirmation that a lack of contestability 
can negate diverse others.  For example, ArabellaÕs claim that she 
ÔcanÕt support gay marriage because IÕm a Catholic,Õ automatically 
implies that Ben cannot identify as both a Catholic and a homosexual 
(as he does).  In contrast, by expressing contestability, Ôyou work upon 
your faith and state to curtail its drive to the negation of alternative 
faiths.Õ731  Thus, in spite of its admirable aspirations, it is apparent that 
contestability, like self-modification, is a complex goal, requiring time 
and practice.  As Connolly asserts, it is difficult for citizens to accept 
their contestability, and ultimately ÔrecomposeÕ their entrenched 
positions, since identities are Ôalready crystallized constituencies.Õ732  
Vzquez-Arroyo explains how, for many, contestability is an unattainable 
goal since, as soon as a citizen accepts the contestability of their view, 
Ôs/he ceases to be [a fundamentalist], and becomes a liberal who 
happens to have a different religious view.Õ733  Thus, just as inclusive 
agonism might benefit from further considerations of which institutions 
might support and encourage self-modification, it might also be helpful 
to explore ways in which contestability might be promoted through 
institutions.   
 
One danger of promoting contestability is that it could reduce the 
importance of citizensÕ beliefs.  Although Connolly explicitly argues that 
acknowledgement of contestability Ôdoes not mean that you must forfeit 
faith in a loving or commanding god, give up secular faith in reason (or 
one of its surrogates), or adopt my nontheistic faith in the plurovocity of 
                                                
731Connolly, W. (2000), p. 36.  
732 Ibid., xxviii. 
733 Vzquez-Arroyo, A. (n.d.). Radical Phylosophy. [online] Radical.9k.com.  
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being,Õ 734  I argue that this is in tension with the passionate, and 
potentially antagonistic, nature in which citizens hold these beliefs.  
Vzquez-Arroyo illustrates this through the example of an egalitarian, 
arguing that such a person Ôcannot accept that the presence of 
inequalities and domination is merely ÒcontestableÓ when these are part 
of the everyday life experiences of people who suffer these in their 
bodies and psyches.Õ735  At the same time, Ôordinary people, who are 
striving to open up space for political contestation to redress unequal 
access to power and status cannot afford to practise the kind of 
forbearance that Connolly prescribes.Õ736  Thus, enabling agonistic (and 
perhaps non-contestable) expression could help to overcome 
domination by acknowledging the importance of each position.  Hence, 
in spite of ConnollyÕs assertion that contestability does not affect the 
strength of oneÕs beliefs, Ôdoing so would lessen the critical import of 
their claims.Õ737  As a result, it is important to strike a balance between 
promoting contestability (and avoiding essentialism) on one hand, whilst 
making space for agonistic expression (and overcoming domination) on 
the other.  Here, inclusive agonism could be strengthened if it were to 
be supplemented with the adversarial approach. 
Conclusion 
 
By pulling together insights from the experiment with theoretical 
discussion, this chapter has evaluated Connolly and TullyÕs inclusive 
agonistic democracy.  I argue that their more pluralistic account of 
identity could enhance interactions between citizens, overcoming 
domination and rendering the contestation more inclusive.  However, I 
suggest that, even if a pluralistic understanding of identity is promoted, 
polarised positions and antagonism could still emerge.  I propose that, 
whilst respect and recognition might be effective in producing more 
positive relations in the public realm, it might be less successful at 
challenging engrained feelings of ressentiment.  My concern is that, if it 
                                                
734 Connolly, W. (2000), p. 8. 
735 Vzquez-Arroyo, A. (n.d.). Radical Phylosophy. [online] Radical.9k.com. 
736 Ibid. 
737 Ibid.  (Italics added). 
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is unable to challenge ressentiment, inclusive agonism might fail to 
engage citizens in democratic politics.  Additionally, I generally endorse 
the notion of society as self-regulating, demonstrating the possibility of 
the natural emergence of leaders, who do not dominate the process but 
actually enhance opportunities for inclusion.  However, I endorse this 
with a caution; there is always the possibility that powerful individuals or 
groups could hijack the discussion.  Further, I demonstrate that 
institutional mechanisms, such as discussion regulations, could 
empower less dominant citizens, providing opportunities to challenge 
power relationships.  I endorse the promotion of self-modification and 
challenge, suggesting that they promote democratic discussion as a 
view-sharing exercise rather than as a debate, or competition, to be 
won, increasing the quality of discussion and promoting greater 
understanding between citizens.  I propose that, whilst these principles 
seem effective in encouraging citizens to challenge their own beliefs, it 
might take slightly longer for them to actually change and transform the 
views of citizens.  Finally, I suggest that, by promoting contestability, 
citizens are encouraged to avoid essentialist and fundamentalist 
behaviour, thereby enhancing interactions.  However, I argue that this 
concept is in tension with passion and conflict, and therefore suggest 
that we think more about how institutions can maintain this balance.   
  
 235
Conclusion – Exploring Prospects for an ‘Agonistic Day’ 
 
I now want to question how effective each approach is at developing the 
three core themes of agonistic democracy as outlined in Chapter One; 
political contestation, necessary interdependency and contingency. I will 
then discuss how concepts from each approach might be 
operationalised into practical mechanisms.  I argue that, whilst each of 
the three approaches is essential to democratic mediation, on their own 
they only offer partial accounts, thus by combining them, I suggest that 
the strengths of one can counter the weaknesses of another.  Looking 
to Deliberation Day as an example, I will offer an account of a three-
stage Ôagonistic day,Õ which combines three approaches to agonistic 
democracy.  The first stage employs adversarialism to mobilise 
passions and provoke engagement, with the second seeking to 
enhance interactions and render the discussion more inclusive, whilst 
the third and final stage strives to unite citizens through perfectionist 
decision-making.  In sketching out this account of an Ôagonistic day,Õ I 
consider which theoretical concepts we might want to retain and which 
to abandon or rethink.  I also explore which mechanisms ought to be 
kept in order to operationalise the theoretical concepts, and which to 
reject or modify.  
Exploring prospects for the operationalisation of concepts which 
promote political contestation 
 
Let us begin with the agonistic notion of political contestation.  
Perfectionist agonism draws primarily on NietzscheÕs work, 
emphasising that citizens are dependent upon engagement in 
communal practices to obtain their autonomy.  Thus, one aim of OwenÕs 
account of political contestation is to encourage citizens to develop their 
own autonomy through communal engagement.  Drawing on 
NietzscheÕs example of the second Eris, an additional aim is to promote 
a better society by focusing on the competitive element of public contest 
in which citizens to strive to surpass one anotherÕs values.  The 
adversarial understanding of political contestation, on the other hand, 
 236
draws on SchmittÕs critique of the divide which liberals draw between 
state and society.  In order to overcome such depoliticisation, MouffeÕs 
adversarialism, following Schmitt, advocates an approach to political 
contestation whereby passion is reinstated into the political realm 
through strong identities, which are formed in relation to one another.  
This adversarial account perceives political contestation as a battle in 
which competing adversaries are provoked into defending their 
interpretation and implementation of values from the threat of those 
belonging to the other side.  Finally, inclusive agonistic democracy, 
influenced by Foucault, Nietzsche, and Arendt, employs the notion of 
political contestation in order to overcome domination and render 
politics more inclusive.  Asserting that each individual gains their 
meaning and significance as a citizen by engaging with a diversity of 
others, Connolly and Tully demonstrate the importance of normative 
behaviours in enhancing relations between citizens and encouraging 
challenge contestation, thereby focusing on an inclusive and diverse 
approach to political contestation.738  
 
As the three analysis chapters suggest, each of these agonistic 
approaches offers important suggestions as to how political 
contestation can encourage conflict mediation in diverse societies.  
However, it is also evident that each of these is only partial and entails 
a series of trade-offs.  OwenÕs notion of political contestation, for 
instance, in which conflicting citizens participate in a political 
contestation surrounding the ranking of societal values, appears to be 
highly effective in developing citizensÕ opinions, thereby enhancing their 
autonomy.  By requiring citizens to arrive at the best possible ranking 
order, it also seems to be significant in encouraging continual 
challenge, and a better society as a result.  However, I am concerned 
that this understanding of political contestation might not be successful 
in motivating all citizens to engage in this process.  For instance, it 
might privilege those who are already willing to cultivate their own 
                                                
738 For a more in-depth discussion of how each agonistic approach employs political 
contestation, see Chapter Two. 
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virtues, whilst excluding others.  This is significant when we consider 
NorvalÕs statement that post-structuralists have warned that some 
deliberative procedures Ôrun the risk of ignoring the presence of power 
relations in the development of such norms.Õ739  In order to enable 
agonistic accounts to recognise and challenge these power relations, it 
is essential to consider who is included in each approach, and who is 
excluded.  Thus it is important to note that, whilst this approach to 
political contestation might be effective in developing autonomous 
citizens and encouraging challenge and change which is progressive, it 
might also exclude certain citizens.  It might be helpful, here, to look to 
Connolly and TullyÕs normative principles of agonistic respect and 
mutual recognition in order to consider how to encourage a more 
inclusive discussion to emerge.  MouffeÕs concept of competition might 
also be valuable, in considering how to motivate conflicting citizens into 
discussion with one another. 
 
MouffeÕs adversarialism provides important thought about how to 
provoke conflicting citizens to engage with one another.  Her emphasis 
on competition appears significant to reviving passion into the political 
realm, and using such passion as a tool to convince citizens to engage 
with conflicting others.  However, just as I am concerned that OwenÕs 
approach might privilege those who already aspire to cultivate their 
virtues, I am equally concerned that MouffeÕs approach might privilege 
the participation of more dominant and competitive citizens at the 
detriment of quieter citizens, and those who frequently ÔloseÕ the 
contestation.  As Lowndes and Pratchett affirm, Ôpower relationships 
shape the way that institutions develop over time.  Institutions are 
inherently political, because rules create patterns of distributional 
advantage.Õ740  Thus, it is essential to consider which power relations 
are privileged and who is advantaged (as well as who might be 
excluded or disadvantaged), and perhaps rethink the hegemonic 
                                                
739 Griggs, S., Norval, A. and Wagenaar, H. (2014), p. 69. 
740 Lowndes, V. and Pratchett, L. ÔDesigning democratic institutions for decentred governance: 
the Council of Europe's acquisÕ in Griggs, S., Norval, A. and Wagenaar, H. (2014), p. 94. 
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terminology present in MouffeÕs account of political contestation, in 
addition to exploring which practical mechanisms might help to 
challenge the powerful and empower the powerless.  Once again, 
Connolly and TullyÕs agonistic respect and mutual recognition might 
help to keep quieter or less successful citizens engaged in the debate.   
 
The ÔinclusiveÕ approach to political contestation takes the form of an 
ethos, which is largely self-regulated, but guided by normative 
principles, such as agonistic respect and mutual recognition.  I suggest 
that these principles are invaluable in improving relations between 
conflicting citizens, enabling spontaneous and non-dominant leaders to 
emerge, and including a greater diversity of citizens in democratic 
discussion as a result.  However, my concern with the inclusive 
approach to political contestation is that its self-regulatory nature might 
allow for more powerful members to dominate the discussion.  When 
considering institutional design, Lowndes and Pratchett remind us that 
Ônew rules may be hijacked by powerful actors and adapted to preserve 
their own interests.Õ741   Thus, it might be useful to consider which 
institutional mechanisms could be effective in preventing dominant 
citizens from controlling the political contestation (whilst also refraining 
from imposing institutions which suppress contestation).  OwenÕs 
provision of a common quest could be helpful, here, in creating 
solidarity between citizens in order to highlight the importance of 
teamwork and lessen the risk of certain citizens dominating the process. 
Exploring prospects for the operationalisation of concepts which 
promote contingency 
 
On the perfectionist account, contingency is promoted during the 
process of political contestation.  Understanding democratic 
engagement as a collective ranking of values according to certain 
excellence criteria, Owen argues that citizens will challenge, not only 
one anotherÕs values, but also the current criteria of excellence against 
which such values are analysed.  For adversarial agonism, contingency 
                                                
741 Ibid., p. 95. 
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appears to arise following the formation of a consensus, which Mouffe 
emphasises as partial and contingent.  Adversarialism perceives 
exclusions as necessary for overcoming domination and ensuring 
democratic engagement.  Finally, for Connolly and Tully, contingency is 
promoted in two ways: first, through the notion of self-modification in 
which citizens are asked to challenge their own beliefs.  Second, it is 
promoted through the principle of contestability, which requires citizens 
to demonstrate to others that they acknowledge the arguable nature of 
their values as well as exhibiting their openness to new values and 
beliefs.  This entails avoiding essentialist language, constituting an 
attempt at overcoming domination and encouraging both pluralism and 
pluralisation.742   
 
The perfectionist understanding of contingency, in which citizens, not 
only challenge their values, but also the excellence criteria to which 
they refer, appears successful in demonstrating the importance of 
participation, forming strong views and encouraging citizens to 
challenge the views of others.  However, following my concerns about 
the potential of this approach to only motivate certain people to engage, 
I worry that contingency and challenge might be largely restricted to the 
consensus formed by more active members of the discussion.  Thus, I 
suggest that there is a tension between promoting unity on one hand, 
and limiting exclusion on the other.  However, given my discussion of 
the potential for apathy in this approach, which emphasises the 
importance of decision-making, I perceive this tension as a necessary 
one.  It is perhaps important to be aware of this tension in order to 
balance between the two goals.  A further concern about the 
perfectionist notion of contingency refers to OwenÕs promotion of an 
ÔhonestÕ testing of perspectives.  It strikes me that citizens cannot be 
honest about the extent to which their perspectives resonate with the 
excellence criteria since these perspectives are so engrained.  Thus, 
                                                
742 For a more in-depth discussion of how each agonistic approach employs contingency, see 
Chapter Two. 
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perhaps it would be helpful to abandon this terminology in order to 
reflect the agonistic and passionate nature of discussion. 
 
The adversarial understanding of contingency is that all consensuses 
are necessarily partial, contingent and based on exclusion.  In 
promoting contingency, Mouffe emphasises the importance of the 
revival of the Ôpolitical,Õ in which contest surrounds political, rather than 
nationalist, ethnic or religious identification.  This seems particularly 
effective in encouraging a lively, passionate discussion to emerge, and 
retaining citizensÕ interest in democratic politics.  However, I have two 
hesitations about MouffeÕs notion of contingency.  The first relates back 
to a previous observation about commonality in which it is only effective 
when it is perceived as such by citizens.  In defining those who are 
altogether excluded from the democratic consensus, Mouffe introduces 
the notion of the common enemy, those who, either do not adhere to 
the shared principles of liberty and equality, or who threaten the 
democratic process.  The common enemy is introduced to encourage 
unity between contending adversaries.  However, just as commonality 
is only effective if it is perceived, I am concerned that the enemy group 
is only useful in demonstrating adversarial legitimacy if it is 
distinguished from the adversarial group.  This leads me to consider 
whether there should be a sharper distinction between the adversary 
and the enemy.  Yet, this would be at odds with agonistic notions of 
contingency in which the excluded enemy always has the potential to 
become an included competitor.  However, I still find the notion of the 
common enemy problematic since it could easily be conflated with the 
adversary, increasing antagonism.  As a result, I suggest that 
adversarialism look to agonistic respect and mutual recognition to 
encourage adversarial legitimacy without requiring a strictly defined 
enemy.  The second concern about MouffeÕs notion of contingency is 
her prioritisation of the ÔpoliticalÕ over politics.  I argue that this requires 
an impossible divide, since the antagonistic potential of conflict blurs the 
boundaries between politics and ethics.  Thus, inclusive agonism is 
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useful, here, in drawing on FoucaultÕs assumption that politics is 
everywhere. 
 
The inclusive accounts of Connolly and Tully appear successful in 
encouraging citizens to challenge the beliefs of others and be open to 
having their beliefs challenged.  Overall, they also seem effective in 
preventing citizens from using essentialist terminology when sharing 
their views, leading to friendlier and more positive interactions.  
However, it is important to acknowledge that the process of self-
modification and challenge is a long and complex one, and that it might 
take time to transform the engrained perspectives of oneself and others.  
Thus, it might be useful to give further consideration as to which 
institutions might support this over time.  It is also significant that some 
citizens will struggle to both acknowledge and exhibit the contestability 
of their beliefs to others, given the engrained nature of these values.  It 
should therefore be noted that there is always the potential for tension 
to arise between holding oneÕs beliefs passionately, and acknowledging 
the contestability of those beliefs to others.  Thus, it might be valuable 
to think about which institutions might strike a balance between the two 
in order to avoid the suppression of passion and agonism, and to 
prevent essentialist behaviour.  
Exploring prospects for the operationalisation of concepts which 
promote necessary interdependency 
 
On the perfectionist understanding of necessary interdependency, it is 
imperative to tolerate the views of others, thereby adopting an Ôenlarged 
mentality,Õ as this is tied to oneÕs integrity.  Owen argues that we cannot 
honestly and justly test a range of perspectives if we cannot first 
entertain a plurality of different perspectives.  According to the 
perfectionist approach to necessary interdependency, unity arises 
between citizens as a result of being involved in a Ôcommon quest.Õ  
This is contrary to the adversarial approach in which Mouffe argues that 
identity is constructed in a relational, adversarial, and collective manner.  
Thus, citizens are united with others belonging to the ÔfriendÕ group, 
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who, unlike the adversarial group, share their interpretation and 
implementation of values.  In spite of their differences, they are also 
encouraged to perceive adversaries as legitimate by acknowledging 
their shared allegiance to the values of liberty and equality.  Once 
again, this assumes a relational, adversarial, and collective 
understanding of identity in which the legitimacy of the adversary is in 
contrast to the illegitimacy of the excluded enemy group.  It also places 
emphasis on the necessity of shared values, rather than a shared quest 
(as in Owen), or a shared ethos (as in Connolly and Tully) in promoting 
unity.  Inclusive agonists, Connolly and Tully, promote a more pluralistic 
understanding of identity in which necessary interdependency is 
promoted between conflicting individuals through lines of respect and 
recognition.  In so doing, they emphasise the importance of normative 
principles in challenging domination and enhancing diversity through 
respect, recognition, and listening.743 
 
The perfectionist understanding of necessary interdependency, as 
advocated by Owen, appears to promote Ôproductive conflictÕ in which, 
rather than seeking to prove their points, or win the argument, citizens 
enter into a view-sharing process.  In so doing, citizens appear to 
challenge one anotherÕs views, not to discredit them or persuade them 
otherwise, but, rather, to attempt to understand them better and to re-
evaluate the order of rank, thereby enriching their perspectives and 
enhancing the quality of the discussion.  During the perfectionist 
account of necessary interdependency, it appears as if citizens work 
together and continually check decisions with the rest of the group.  
However, my concern with this aspect of necessary interdependency is 
that, whilst such non-domination and inclusion are important for 
enhancing inclusion, they might be in tension with retaining 
engagement.  There is the potential that, if a common quest 
encourages citizens to continually check with others, such inclusivity 
might be intension with aims of productive change and societal 
                                                
743 For a more in-depth discussion of how each agonistic approach employs necessary 
interdependency, see Chapter Two. 
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improvement.  As a result, if citizens feel that the quest is futile, there is 
the potential for apathy and democratic disaffection to arise.  Thus, in 
order to prevent apathy and to keep citizens engaged in the democratic 
process, perfectionist agonism might be enriched by consideration of 
institutional limitations, such as time restrictions.  It might also be 
strengthened if it were supplemented with MouffeÕs emphasis on 
passion as a means to retaining engagement throughout the 
discussion. 
 
The adversarial account of necessary interdependency appears 
effective in demonstrating commonality between some citizens by 
distinguishing them from the adversarial group and enhancing unity.  
Similarly, it can be useful in promoting unity between adversaries by 
distinguishing them from the excluded enemy.  This can help to revive 
the political arena by channelling passion and conflict into democratic 
discussion, thereby provoking engagement.  However, I am concerned 
that this dichotomous account of identity cannot make space for its 
diverse and fluid nature.  I argue that contending positions are not 
always fixed and polarised entities, but rather resemble more of a 
changeable spectrum.  I worry that, by prioritising polarised positions, 
adversarialism may be less successful in engaging those who hold 
more nuanced and unstable positions, and thereby be unable to combat 
non-democratic expressions.  I also contend that commonality is only a 
useful concept in promoting unity between friends and respect between 
adversaries (in which they are perceived as legitimate and worthy 
opponents) when it is evident to citizens.  Considering the passionate 
nature of multicultural, pluralist conflict and the ineradicable potential for 
antagonism, it seems reasonable that such commonalities may not 
always be apparent.  Here, I suggest that MouffeÕs adversarialism 
would be enriched through further consideration of Connolly and TullyÕs 
approach in which identity represents a diversity and plurality of 
positions, and in which normative principles of agonistic respect and 
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mutual recognition can demonstrate legitimacy without requiring 
commonality to be evident.   
 
Connolly and TullyÕs understanding of interdependency, on the other 
hand, emphasises the pluralistic and diverse nature of identity.  By 
combining this account of identity with ethical guidelines of respect and 
recognition, it appears valuable in enhancing relations between 
conflicting citizens in society.  However, I propose that, even if we are to 
promote a pluralistic account of identity (and I argue that we ought to, in 
order to enhance relations and further inclusivity), dichotomous 
positions might arise anyway.  I follow Mouffe in claiming that there is 
always the potential for antagonistic relations to emerge.  However, I 
then reject her subsequent dichotomous account of identity.  Thus, I 
propose that inclusive agonism and adversarial agonism should look to 
one anotherÕs accounts of identity in order to account for possibilities for 
diversity and pluralism (and all of the associated nuances and fluidity) 
on the one hand, and the potential for polarised positions and 
antagonism on the other.  I also suggest that, whilst normative 
principles are important to mediating conflict during the discussion, they 
might be less effective at challenging underlying feelings of 
ressentiment toward conflicting others.  In this respect, I argue that 
OwenÕs common quest would be useful, since it promotes collective 
challenge, whilst also encouraging solidarity and cooperation.         
An ‘Agonistic Day’ – Combining the Three Approaches to Agonistic 
Democracy 
 
The previous discussions surrounding how effective each approach is in 
fulfilling the three core themes of agonistic democracy, suggest that 
each approach brings something significant to the field of agonistic 
democracy.  However, they also claim that no single approach can 
sufficiently embody all three of these themes.  Thus, on its own, each 
agonistic approach provides a useful, yet partial, account of how 
agonistic democracy could mediate societal conflict.  What I propose in 
this section of the chapter, then, is a combined approach, which seeks 
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to incorporate elements from each of the three agonistic approaches 
into an Ôagonistic day.Õ  Unlike the ÔDeliberation DayÕ proposed by 
Ackerman and Fishkin, the primary goal of discussions is not to educate 
citizens on political issues,744 rather, it entails reviving engagement and 
passion in politics, rendering it more inclusive, enhancing interactions 
between conflicting individuals, and striving toward productive and 
progressive challenge.  These aims seek to combine the fundamental 
aspirations of the three approaches to political contestation, 
contingency and necessary interdependency.  MouffeÕs emphasis on 
passion and conflict, for instance, are valuable in considering which 
institutions might motivate engagement in political contestation.  
Additionally, Connolly and TullyÕs promotion of normative behaviours, 
such as listening to and respecting others; particularly those who are 
marginalised or excluded, are important in helping to explore ways in 
which institutions can encourage more diverse participation.  The 
promotion of these behaviours, along with OwenÕs calls for a common 
quest, help to provide insights into the types of institution which can 
improve interactions between those holding conflicting, and potentially 
antagonistic views, in multicultural, pluralist society.  Finally, OwenÕs 
notion of collective competition is useful in thinking through which 
institutions might encourage continual challenge, whilst encouraging 
unity.   
 
As a result, it involves everyday citizens contesting one anotherÕs 
beliefs on significant and controversial topics, which divide society.  
Drawing on the Deliberation Day project, it entails calling together 
several groups of approximately 15 people once a year during a 
national holiday set aside for this purpose.  However, unlike the 
deliberative day, the Ôagonistic dayÕ does not restrict participation to 
registered voters, but includes all UK residents.  This is to reflect the 
Foucauldian assumption that power is everywhere, and thus, political 
discussion need not be limited to elections.  By involving a greater 
                                                
744 Ackerman, B. and Fishkin, J. (2004), p. 167. 
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diversity of citizens in the discussions, I attempt to reflect agonistic 
goals of overcoming domination, rendering society more inclusive, and 
enhancing relations between a vast web of interdependent citizens.  All 
of the 15 citizens from each discussion are asked to act to take 
responsibility for the chairing of their discussion.  They are required to 
decide amongst themselves who will read the introduction to each 
discussion, who will read the provided guidelines to the group, and who 
will keep time.  They are asked to intervene in the discussion in the 
case of aggressive language or violent behaviour.  Depending on the 
severity of aggression or violence, interventions might entail reminding 
other participants of the discussion guidelines, asking everyone to take 
a ten minute refreshment break, or, as a very last resort, asking another 
participant to leave the discussion.  However, the last option can only 
arise if at least eight participants agree.  The rationale for the joint 
chairing of the discussion is rooted in the assumption that citizens are 
generally effective at self-regulating.  As I argued in Chapter Three, if 
agonistic democracy is compatible with institutions (and I suggest that it 
is), then these institutions must enable citizens autonomy and empower 
them.  If the Ôagonistic dayÕ were to impose a chair on the discussion, or 
even ask citizens to elect their own, I am concerned that it would 
threaten the autonomous nature of the discussion, thereby limiting 
opportunities for contestation and challenge.  On the other hand, were 
the Ôagonistic dayÕ to altogether refrain from employing chairs, I suggest 
that more powerful citizens could use this to their advantage, 
dominating the discussion.  Lowndes and Pratchett highlight the 
dangers of this, asserting that Ônew rules may be hijacked by powerful 
actors and adapted to preserve their own interests.Õ745   This could 
undermine the potential for institutions to empower less dominant or 
marginalised citizens, by posing a barrier to contestation and 
contingency.        
An Adversarial Beginning 
 
                                                
745 Lowndes, V. and Pratchett, L. ÔDesigning democratic institutions for decentred governance: 
the Council of Europe's acquisÕ in Griggs, S., Norval, A. and Wagenaar, H. (2014), p. 95. 
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The Ôagonistic dayÕ I propose begins by drawing on the work of Mouffe 
and her adversarial approach.  As the thesis has argued, MouffeÕs work 
offers valuable insights into overcoming apathy toward democratic 
participation through the revival of passion and competition.746  This 
contrasts with the ÔinclusiveÕ approach, which repeatedly faces criticism 
for assuming that people are both willing and able to participate in an 
ethos of respect, thereby failing to consider those who might not be.747  
It also contrasts with the ÔperfectionistÕ account of Owen, which does not 
discuss how to motivate participants into engagement with one another, 
but instead relies on citizens to want to Ôstrive to develop their 
capacities for self-rule in competition with one another.Õ748 By way of 
contrast, MouffeÕs motivational narrative of ÔfriendsÕ and ÔadversariesÕ 
escapes this problem, not simply by inviting citizens into engagement 
with one another, but by provoking them into contestation in order to 
defend their interpretation and implementation of values.  The 
importance of this element of the Ôagonistic dayÕ cannot be 
underestimated when we consider that only 65.1% of UK citizens voted 
in the 2010 general election.749  Mouffe asserts that such apathy toward 
democratic politics needs to be addressed in order to prevent citizens 
from identifying with non-democratic positions, such as religious 
fundamentalist groups.  Hence, by beginning the day by igniting 
peopleÕs passions, I aspire to overcome such apathy and engage them 
in a passionate and conflictual political contestation surrounding their 
values.  In so doing, the Ôagonistic dayÕ will ask participants to sit at 
tables according to their stance on the issue. 
 
However, as Chapter Seven demonstrated, whilst MouffeÕs emphasis 
on passion and conflict are valuable to reviving political contestation, 
her dichotomous understanding of identity might not provide sufficient 
space to reflect multicultural, pluralist diversity.  This could undermine 
her attempt at preventing apathy and nonÐdemocratic identification, 
                                                
746 See Chapter Seven for a comprehensive account of this. 
747 See, for instance, Young, I., Schaap, A. and Wenman MÕs criticisms in Chapter Three. 
748 Owen, D. (2002), p. 126. 
749 Ukpolitical.info, (2014). Voter turnout at UK general elections 1945 Ð 2010 | UK Political 
Info. [online]. 
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since citizens might not be able to identify with either position.  It also 
might turn some citizens away from democratic participation if they are 
consistently part of the ÔlosingÕ group, and thereby excluded from the 
consensus.  This is important since MouffeÕs adversarialism is so 
valuable in thinking through how to revive the political arena and ensure 
that citizens engage in democratic politics.  Thus, to address this, and 
to better reflect the diversity within each end of the spectrum, 
participants will be provided with a list of examples affiliated with either 
side of the argument.  In the case of abortion, for instance, one example 
for the ÔagainstÕ camp might be Ôagainst the ending of potential human 
life,Õ whereas another might be Ôgenerally against abortion, except 
under particular circumstances.Õ  Likewise, the ÔforÕ group might range 
from Ôin favour of the womenÕs right to choose what happens to her 
body,Õ but another example might be Ôgenerally in favour of abortion as 
an option, except under certain circumstances.Õ   
 
By adding such examples to these groups, I hope to reflect the way in 
which binary identities appear to sometimes surface inevitably, whilst 
also promoting more pluralistic positions.  This is based on the 
assumption that MouffeÕs adversarial understanding of identity, in which 
one group defines itself in relation to another, cannot fully account for 
nuanced or changing positions in society.  Yet, it also assumes that the 
ÔinclusiveÕ understanding of identity cannot sufficiently account for the 
way in which dichotomous positions inevitably emerge, or the ever-
present potential for antagonistic relations to arise.  Hence, by 
combining the two accounts, it aspires to reflect the potential for 
dichotomous positions, whilst seeking to promote a more pluralistic 
account of identity.  In addition to preventing apathy and encouraging 
identification and engagement, this also constitutes an attempt at 
enhancing relations between conflicting citizens.  As Chapter Seven 
argues, even though dichotomous identities might sometimes arise 
naturally, if we actively promote these by asking citizens to define 
themselves in relation to one another, we risk both aggravating 
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antagonism and preventing conflicting adversaries from perceiving one 
another as ÔlegitimateÕ opponents.  The importance of transforming 
antagonism into agonism and promoting legitimacy is important in 
addressing the agonistic concept of necessary interdependency 
whereby citizens are necessarily interlinked.  
 
A further component of the Ôagonistic dayÕ entails consideration of how 
to encourage conflicting citizens to perceive one another as ÔlegitimateÕ 
in spite of their differences.  This is of great significance for all three 
agonistic approaches, with Mouffe promoting legitimacy and worthiness; 
Owen promoting enlarged mentality; and Connolly and Tully promoting 
agonistic respect and mutual recognition respectively.  One component 
of the adversarial attempt at demonstrating legitimacy is MouffeÕs notion 
of the common enemy, which is employed to highlight commonalities 
between adversarial groups.  I argue that the common enemy is 
problematic because citizens might struggle to distinguish between 
legitimate and worthy adversaries, and the illegitimate enemy who is 
necessarily excluded from democratic contestation.  Indeed, emphasis 
on the enemy could aggravate antagonism if conflicting citizens conflate 
one anotherÕs behaviours or values with those of the enemy.  Yet, as 
Chapter Seven demonstrated, it would not be desirable to strengthen 
the distinction between the included adversary and the excluded enemy 
since this would threaten the agonistic prioritisation of contingency and 
contestation.  These principles require that the frontiers between the 
included and the excluded, and the legitimate and the illegitimate are 
always contingent and open to further contestation.  If the distinction 
between the enemy and the adversary group was sharpened, the 
enemy group would be less able to challenge the dominant values and 
norms, and as a result antagonistic relations could be aggravated.  As 
Norval states, Ôwhat is important is our ability to criticize Ð so as to 
animate  - our institutions, and the imagination to change and challenge 
them, as crucial to the maintenance of our democratic institutions.Õ750   
                                                
750 Norval, A. ÔBeyond deliberation: agonistic and aversive grammars of democracy: the 
question of criteriaÕ in Griggs, S., Norval, A. and Wagenaar, H. (2014), p. 77. 
 250
 
Hence, in order to enable citizens to criticise, change and challenge 
their institutions, it is essential that the divide between the included and 
excluded is contingent and contestable.  Thus, the adversarial 
discussion will abandon the common enemy video, which was shown in 
the fieldwork experiments.  Instead, the concept of legitimacy will be 
demonstrated in the following ÔinclusiveÕ discussion, whereby citizens 
are asked to practice certain behaviours toward one another, such as 
agonistic respect and mutual recognition.  The rationale for not 
encouraging these behaviours in the adversarial discussion is that I 
endorse them with a slight hesitation.  As Chapter Eight affirms, the 
promotion of these principles, whilst important in mediating conflict 
during the discussion, might be less successful in addressing and 
challenging underlying ressentiment between citizens.  I am concerned 
that if the Ôagonistic dayÕ were to over-emphasise these, it might feel 
prescriptive and suppress, rather than mediate, relations of conflict 
between citizens.  Instead, I seek a balance between providing an outlet 
for passionate expression (the adversarial discussion) and encouraging 
enhanced inclusivity through normative behaviours (the inclusive 
discussion).  In this way, I aspire to combine the strengths of each of 
the three theories in to counter the potential weaknesses of others. 
 
Thus, phase one of the Ôagonistic dayÕ seeks to mobilise passion and 
create competition through the provision of collective identities, whilst 
also providing space for plurality within each position.  Furthermore, 
citizens will be given the option to change their positions during the 
discussion, resonating with the critique made in Chapter Seven, 
whereby Mouffe does not sufficiently account for the fluid and 
contingent nature of identity.  By enabling citizens to move between 
different positions, I aspire to reflect and promote the contingent nature 
of agonistic politics in order to encourage critique and challenge.  I also 
attempt to keep citizens engaged in the contest, and prevent them from 
feeling isolated from their group, and thereby apathetic toward 
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democratic identification.  As Chapter Seven discussed in greater detail, 
MouffeÕs adversarial account is significant to motivating citizens into 
engagement with conflicting others, and thereby preventing them from 
seeking non-democratic representation.  However, I suggest that 
conflicting positions resemble more of a spectrum than oppositional 
poles, and that each dichotomous position is supplemented with a 
range of nuanced stances.  I am concerned that when such diversity is 
not accounted for, citizens find it difficult to identify with their group, 
thereby threatening MouffeÕs aims at preventing apathy and non-
democratic identification.  I am also concerned that, for those citizens 
who are continually part of the ÔlosingÕ group, it might enhance 
democratic disaffection and encourage non-political identification.  I 
assert that, whilst some dichotomous positions might arise naturally, if 
we promote oppositions (in order to revive passion), then we might risk 
aggravating antagonism, rather than transforming it into agonism.  By 
accounting for diversity and fluidity within each adversarial position, 
then, I hope to encourage participation and unity, and avoid increasing 
antagonism.  Additionally, I abandon the notion of the common enemy, 
proposing that it might aggravate antagonism, rather than mediate it.  In 
order to demonstrate adversarial legitimacy to citizens without 
employing the common enemy, this discussion will be followed by an 
Ôinclusive view-sharingÕ one which encourages citizens to behave in a 
certain manner toward one another. 
Inclusive View‐Sharing 
 
I endorse MouffeÕs view that conflict cannot, and should not, be 
eradicated from politics since doing so can result in the creation of an 
instrumental public sphere and citizens turning to non-democratic 
representation.  However, Chapter Seven suggested a tension between 
the existence of conflict on the one hand, and ensuring that discussion 
is productive, on the other.  Connolly and Tully assert that agonistic 
engagement has the additional purpose of developing respect and 
understanding for conflicting others, whilst acknowledging our own 
views as one amongst several.  This is significant to promoting the 
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agonistic concept of necessary interdependency, in which all citizens 
are necessarily interconnected.  It is also important to ensuring that 
political contestation is enriched by a diversity of viewpoints, and 
enables less dominant citizens to challenge and critique norms and 
values, thereby promoting contingency.  As Chapters Seven and Eight 
discuss, inclusive agonism appears more successful than 
adversarialism in both enhancing relations of respect and 
understanding, and encouraging a diversity of views to be heard.  
Whilst the competitive nature of adversarialism appears generally 
successful in provoking agonistic discussion and mobilising passion 
toward democratic engagement, it also encourages citizens to try to 
ÔproveÕ their arguments, and ÔwinÕ the discussion.751  As a result, this 
detracts from listening to and respecting others, and challenging oneÕs 
own views, subsequently posing a barrier to demonstrating adversarial 
legitimacy and worthiness.  The competitive nature of adversarialism 
also tended to better suit more dominant participants, suggesting that 
adversarialism is less successful in challenging domination.  
 
In order to promote less antagonistic relations between conflicting 
citizens, and to enhance the diversity of the discussion, the second part 
of the Ôagonistic dayÕ will entail view-sharing.  Moving away from the 
debate-like nature of the previous discussion, view-sharing will be 
encouraged during the second phase of the day.  During this phase, 
citizens are asked to sit in a circle and are each provided with an equal 
number of tokens.  They are then asked to only speak when they have 
put their token in the middle, to remain quiet when someone else is 
using a token, and to stop participating in the discussion when they 
have used up all of their tokens.  By arranging the second phase of the 
day in a circle and by regulating the discussion with tokens, I aspire to 
promote view-sharing by demonstrating the necessary interdependence 
between all citizens.  This contrasts with the group layout of the 
previous discussion, which encourages competition between those 
                                                
751 See Chapter Seven for evidence of this. 
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holding each position.  By employing tokens to structure the discussion, 
I aim to supplement the previous discussion with several components.  
First, the tokens constitute an attempt at reflecting the focus inclusive 
agonism places on enhancing relations between conflicting citizens.  
For instance, they seek to realise the principles of respect and listening 
to the other side, by prioritising the person with the token and asking the 
others to be quiet and listen.  This is important in helping to overcome 
the exclusions that might arise from MouffeÕs approach.  For example, 
by creating space for every opinion to be heard and respected, quieter 
citizens might become more motivated and able to participate.  This 
reminds us of agonistic concerns about how inequality and power 
relations affect the autonomy of citizens.  Providing such regulatory 
institutions can empower those who are less educated or who come 
from minority cultures or religions to express their views.  This contrasts 
with OwenÕs approach, in which, as outlined in Chapter Six, authority 
derives from holding values which gather the most support.  Hence, the 
inclusive stage of the day seeks to supplement perfectionism with 
opportunities for a greater diversity of participation.  Additionally, as 
Fiona demonstrated by reminding Arabella and Erin of the queue to 
speak, the tokens can help to overcome domination by empowering 
less dominant citizens to challenge others.  In this way, as the opening 
quote to the thesis asserts, Ôpractices of governance and practices of 
freedom always go hand in hand.Õ752   Just as the tokens limit the 
capacities of citizens by regulating their speech, they also offer 
opportunities for freedom and empowerment by providing a tool with 
which less dominant citizens can challenge the more dominant.  A final 
reason for employing tokens during this phase of the day is to enhance 
the quality of discussion.  The experiment suggested that, because the 
tokens limit participation, people thought more about their arguments, 
and the quality of the discussion was enhanced.  This enriches 
perfectionist agonism, whereby Owen aspires to promote contingency 
as a means to reach better values and an improved society.  Thus, 
                                                
752 Griggs, S., Norval, A. and Wagenaar, H. (2014), p. 32. 
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phase two primarily uses tokens to encourage the emergence of more 
positive interactions between citizens in order to include and empower 
minority voices, and to enhance the quality of the discussion. 
 
They are also asked to follow several guidelines, including Ôtry to 
respect others, set aside prejudices, listen, reflect on your own beliefs 
and accept and demonstrate to others that not everyone will share your 
views.Õ  However, in order to avoid rendering the discussion overly 
prescriptive, these are suggested as guidelines, rather than enforced as 
strict rules.  As Chapter Eight demonstrated, whilst these principles are 
invaluable to promoting enhanced relations between conflicting citizens, 
over-emphasis on their specification can suppress conflict and 
eradicate it from democratic discussion, rather than mediating it.  This is 
dangerous since, as Mouffe highlights, if passion and conflict are not 
given democratic outlets, citizens might identify with non-democratic, 
fundamentalist positions instead.  Thus, the adversarial phase of the 
Ôagonistic dayÕ is important in creating space for democratic passion and 
conflict, whilst the inclusive phase is important in enhancing conflicting 
relations, so long as it provides guidelines rather than strict rules.  As 
Lowndes and Pratchett assert, the informal implementation of these 
need not undermine their importance: Ô[constitutions, directives and 
organisational structures] are consciously designed and clearly 
specified, while [informal norms and conventions] are unwritten codes 
and customs Ð but no less effective because of that.Õ753  Rather, this 
might remind us of Chapter ThreeÕs discussion of demonstrated 
practices in which citizens follow the behaviour of others.  Perhaps, 
then, over time, behaviours such as respect and listening will become 
norms, rendering the guidelines for the discussion insignificant, and 
therefore moving even further away from prescriptive politics.   
 
The final ethical guideline, of accepting (and demonstrating to others) 
that not everyone will share your beliefs, relates to Connolly and TullyÕs 
                                                
753 Lowndes, V. and Pratchett, L. ÔDesigning democratic institutions for decentred governance: 
the Council of Europe's acquisÕ in Griggs, S., Norval, A. and Wagenaar, H. (2014), p. 93. 
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emphasis on contestability.  This is a concept that I endorse with 
caution.  As Chapter Eight outlines, the promotion of contestability is 
important in reflecting the agonistic emphasis on contingency.  By 
asking people to demonstrate awareness that others will not share their 
views, it appears to encourage less essentialist language, whereby 
citizens question others or suggest alternatives, without needing to be 
Ôcorrect.Õ  This is important since it encourages more friendly relations 
between conflicting citizens, and thereby supplements adversarialism 
with enhanced interactions.  However, I argue that, given the 
ineradicable potential for antagonism, contestability is an impossible 
requirement for many.  As a result, the Ôagonistic dayÕ must ensure that 
there is a balance between promoting contestability (and preventing 
essentialism) and enabling passionate and agonistic expression (and 
overcoming domination).  Thus, as a result, the Ôagonistic dayÕ will 
suggest contestability as a guideline, whilst not enforcing it as a strict 
rule.  It will also be supplemented with the previous adversarial 
discussion, which provides space for agonistic behaviour and the 
expression of passions.   
 
Chapter Eight discussed another concern with regards to the ethical 
behaviour promoted by Connolly and Tully: ressentiment.  Whilst the 
promotion of these behaviours seems invaluable in enhancing relations 
between conflicting citizens, they appear less successful in challenging 
the complex and engrained feelings of ressentiment that might cause 
such conflict.  As a result, this discussion will be followed with a 
common quest whereby respect emerges between citizens who are 
united in a common quest.  It could also be encouraged through the 
repetition of agonistic practices.  As Lowndes and Pratchett highlight, 
Ônot only do formal rules have to be created, they also need to be 
recognised by the diverse political actors involved, and then embedded 
over time.Õ754  Thus, perhaps if the Ôagonistic dayÕ was to become an 
annual event, and if it were to encourage agonistic behaviours in 
                                                
754 Ibid., p. 93. 
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everyday life, then such ressentiment could slowly be challenged.  This 
could help to encourage contingency and mediate conflict in wider 
society.  
 
Hence, the inclusive, view-sharing component of the day aspires to 
supplement the passionate start to the day with enhanced relations, a 
greater diversity of voices, empowerment of minority citizens, and 
improved quality of discussion.  It employs a circular layout order to 
promote the necessary interdependency of all citizens, thereby 
encouraging greater inclusion.  Additionally, it uses the tokens as a tool 
to realise inclusive principles of listening and respect.  This strives to 
enhance the relations between conflicting citizens, as well as 
overcoming domination and challenging power relations.  The 
discussion also suggests a series of guidelines, including behaviours 
such as respect, listening and self-reflection.  Yet it is careful not to 
over-emphasis these principles, or propose a prescriptive account 
which altogether eradicates conflict from the political contestation.  It 
argues that when this occurs, citizens turn away from democratic 
politics and toward fundamentalist forms of expression.  Thus, ethical 
guidelines are held in necessary tension with the promotion of agonism, 
passion and conflict.  Finally, the framework strives to incorporate 
ConnollyÕs concept of addressing ressentiment.  It acknowledges that 
this is a slow process and, therefore, proposes that the Ôagonistic dayÕ 
become an annual event, whilst also encouraging citizens to practice 
agonistic behaviours in everyday life.  It also demonstrates the 
importance of following this discussion with a perfectionist one, 
informed by OwenÕs common quest, which highlights the importance of 
conflicting citizens in fulfilling a common quest. 
Unity through Decision‐Making as a Common Quest 
 
One of the weaknesses of both the first and second phases of the 
Ôagonistic dayÕ is that of unity.  Whilst the first discussion promotes unity 
between collective groups, there is an absence of unity between all 
participating citizens.  In the following discussion, in spite of emphasis 
 257
on respectful behaviour toward others, the focus is on individual citizens 
and how they choose to express their ideas and use their tokens.  Thus, 
the third and final stage of the day aspires to encourage unity between 
all citizens by proposing a common task in which citizens must make a 
collective decision.  The Ôagonistic dayÕ begins with a political 
contestation whereby passions were mobilised and citizens were 
encouraged to debate their values with conflicting others.  Then it opens 
up the discussion by making space for a diversity of views as well as 
promoting respectful, reflexive interactions, which enable 
interdependency and contingency.  Now, the political contestation 
involves engaging citizens in a common quest, which promotes unity 
and cooperation, in addition to challenge and discussion quality, 
through the process of decision-making.  This is important in giving 
meaning to agonistic discussion.  As Forester asserts, this is important 
because Ôyes, conflicts of constitutive identities will abide, and 
inequalities of power will virtually always provide a setting for and 
partially constitute relationships at hand, but nevertheless democratic 
actors will have choices to make and take.Õ755  Thus, in addition to 
providing an outlet for democratic passion and conflict, overcoming 
domination and transforming relations between conflicting citizens, 
agonistic democracy also ought to consider decision-making.  
 
In order to promote unity by involving citizens in a common quest, 
collective autonomy is significant to this discussion.  During this phase 
of the day, then, citizens will be ask to reach a decision about the 
particular discussion topic, which they have previously debated and 
then shared views on.  During the decision-making process, citizens will 
be asked to rank a series of preferences, rather than choosing between 
two options.  This constitutes an attempt at preventing adversarial 
competition, in which citizens strive to win a debate, and instead 
promotes the view-sharing element of the inclusive discussion.  This 
represents OwenÕs calls for more pluralistic conflict, such a PR voting, 
                                                
755 Forester, J. ÔLearning through contested governance: the practice of agonistic 
intersubjectivityÕ in Griggs, S., Norval, A. and Wagenaar, H. (2014), p. 150. 
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preferenda and citizensÕ juries. 756   Additionally, the discussion will 
refrain from telling citizens how to reach their decision, requiring them to 
work together in order to reflect perfectionismÕs emphasis on communal 
autonomy.  The Ôagonistic dayÕ provides a framework that moves away 
from polarised discussion in order to promote a more pluralistic form of 
conflict in which citizens are able and willing to challenge their own 
perspectives.  As Chapter Six discusses, since citizens do not identify 
with one side in relation to another (as in adversarialism), they are 
better able to challenge their own opinions against those of others.  This 
is important since it encourages the contingent element of agonistic 
democracy in which citizens challenge and critique each othersÕ values 
in order to come to new (and equally contingent) conclusions.  
However, in promoting challenge through the testing of perspectives 
against one anotherÕs, I abandon OwenÕs emphasis on honesty.  As 
Chapter Six explains, requiring citizens to test their perspectives 
ÔhonestlyÕ against those of others seems at odds with the conflictual and 
agonistic nature of discussion.     
 
Additionally, by promoting competition as a collective quest to strive to 
surpass one another, perfectionism appears to promote more positive 
interactions between citizens, where they listen and respect one 
another, and challenge their own perspectives accordingly.  This is 
significant to agonistic principles of necessary interdependency (in 
which all citizens are relational in spite of their disagreements), and 
contingency (in which citizens challenge their own views and those of 
others).  However, I suggest that this notion of competition does not 
have the same provocative potential as MouffeÕs adversarial 
competition and might, therefore, fail to motivate certain citizens to 
engage.  As Chapter Six outlined, OwenÕs perfectionism may prioritise 
participation from those who are already committed to virtue cultivation.  
This is where perfectionism can be enriched through the former 
                                                
756 Owen, D. (2008), p. 225. 
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discussion, inclusive agonism, which employs discussion tokens in an 
attempt at encouraging participation from those less likely to engage.   
 
Each time that this discussion framework was explored during the 
empirical work, several leaders emerged who guided the group through 
the process.  In spite of this, none of these leaders dominated the 
discussions and continually checked with other participants whether or 
not they were happy with the decisions being made by the group.757  As 
a result, it is important that this phase of the discussion is not managed 
from above, but that autonomy and regulation rest with the citizens 
themselves.  This is a significant feature of contingency as, without an 
imposed leader, perfectionism grants citizens the freedom to challenge 
and critique one another.  However, one danger of such contingency 
and challenge is that citizens might become apathetic.  As Chapter Six 
outlines, participants became apathetic to the discussion when it 
became cyclical.  Furthermore, passion was more evident during the 
decision-making stage of the discussion.758  This is significant to the 
agonistic notion of political contestation, which seeks to engage citizens 
in a vibrant contestation surrounding their values.  As Mouffe warns, if 
citizens are not engaged in democratic contestation, they may turn to 
other non-democratic forms of identification, threatening democratic 
politics as a result.  Hence, in order to retain interest, time constraints 
will be placed on this final phase of the Ôagonistic day,Õ which limit 
discussion time, placing emphasis on the necessity of reaching a 
decision in the allotted time.  Here, then, it is evident that autonomy is in 
tension with engagement, since time constraints and emphasis on 
decision-making are placed on citizens in order to avoid apathy.   
 
The collective nature of the discussion also requires citizens to reach 
some form of consensus, albeit contingent and contestable.  The 
perfectionist focus on engaging in a common quest and reaching 
decisions collectively is important in creating unity between citizens.  
                                                
757 See Chapter Six for further details. 
758 See Chapter Six for the detailed discussion of this. 
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The value of this cannot be underestimated when we consider the way 
in which agonistic democracy aims, not only to overcome the 
exclusionary potential of universalist or rationalist theories of 
democracy, but also the fragmentary potential of those focusing on 
groups and communities.  It also might be useful in encouraging 
citizens to follow the rules of the game and interact positively with 
others since, as Chapter Six outlines, the provision of a common quest 
can make citizens feel more responsibility for other members of their 
group.  This is in contrast to the previous inclusive discussion which 
focuses on citizens as individuals.  However, my concern with the unity 
that this quest offers, is the exclusions upon which this relies.  This 
follows MouffeÕs assertion that every consensus is necessarily based on 
certain exclusions.  Thus, I suggest that the focus on unity, collectivity 
and consensus in the final phase is in tension with inclusivity.  This is 
significant when we consider that one of agonistic democracyÕs aims Ð 
in comparison to the focus of deliberative democracy, for instance - is to 
acknowledge power relations and challenge domination.  Here, then, 
supplementing perfectionism by the second, inclusive, phase of the 
Ôagonistic dayÕ is essential to challenging domination and encouraging a 
greater plurality of views to be heard, respected and engaged with.   
 
Thus, the third and final phase of the Ôagonistic dayÕ is essential to 
promoting unity, and addressing the fragmentation that agonistic 
theories of democracy perceive as dangerous to democracy.  In 
drawing on perfectionism, I propose a decision-making phase that 
offers a plurality of choices to citizens and, therefore refrains from 
adversarial debate, and enables challenge and contingency.  This is 
significant to reflecting agonistic democracyÕs aims of reviving political 
contest and providing opportunities for continual challenge and 
contingency.  However, in advocating a discussion in which citizens test 
their perspectives against one another in order to reach better ones, I 
abandon OwenÕs notion of Ôhonesty,Õ claiming that it is an impossible 
goal.  The pluralistic nature of this discussion also strives to promote 
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more positive relations between conflicting individuals, thereby 
resonating with agonistic notions of necessary interdependency.  Yet, I 
suggest that this less provocative nature of competition may fail to 
motivate certain citizens into engagement, thereby demonstrating the 
importance of the inclusive phase of the day which encourages more 
citizens to engage.  I assert that emphasis on collectivity encourages 
citizens to have responsibility for one another, which might thereby 
reduce the risk of them breaking the rules, interacting negatively with 
others, or seeking to dominate the process.  However, I also show how 
such self-regulation might sometimes be in tension with the perfectionist 
emphasis on progress and, therefore, lead to apathy.  Thus, I seek to 
combat this by implementing time constraints.  I also show the 
importance of the adversarial framework in enhancing engagement.  
Finally, I demonstrate the importance of reaching decisions to 
preventing fragmentation, however I also suggest that this is in tension 
with inclusion since every consensus necessarily implies some forms of 
exclusion. 
How an ‘Agonistic Day’ can help to mediate value conflict 
 
In sum, then, the agonistic model of democracy could help to alleviate 
societal tensions by bridging the gap between the unity of rationalist, 
universalist theories of democracy on one hand, and the inclusive 
nature of communitarian and group rights theories of democracy on the 
other.  I suggest that it can do so through implementing institutions that 
constrain citizens, but also empower them.  Such a model focuses on 
the need for a revived political contestation of conflicting beliefs, which 
harnesses citizensÕ passions and prevents them from turning to 
alternative forms of identification.  It emphasises the importance of 
demonstrating necessary interdependency in which, in spite of their on-
going conflicts, citizens are necessarily interlinked to one another.  
Finally, it highlights the importance of granting citizens freedom to 
challenge and critique current norms and values, which are entangled in 
power relations.  Whilst this thesis has demonstrated that each account 
carries with it different strengths and weaknesses, I propose that by 
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operationalising the three, each oneÕs strengths can help to counter 
anotherÕs weaknesses.  It is my contention that agonistic democracy 
can mediate conflict by rendering democratic politics more engaging, 
inclusive, and unifying.     
What next? 
 
If we share FoucaultÕs view (and I do) that power and politics are 
everywhere, it seems logical to discuss which practices might 
supplement an Ôagonistic dayÕ.  I endorse an account of politics, which 
leaves much up to citizens.  For instance, grass roots politics, civic 
practices, and participatory activities enable citizens greater autonomy, 
promoting engagement, challenge and progress.  I also advocate a 
pluralistic approach to politics in which democracy is de-centralised and 
representation is diverse.  Local government and proportional 
representation voting systems offer two institutional practices with the 
potential to include more people in the discussion whilst engaging 
citizens in a common quest.  Additionally, circular seating, such as that 
employed in the European Parliament could help to render democratic 
discussions more inclusive.  That said, we ought to also be mindful of 
the potential threat which democratic apathy poses to the success of 
these practices.  It is thereby imperative that such diversity also makes 
space for the identification of potentially antagonistic positions.  By 
ÔagonisingÕ political practices, it is hoped that democratic society might 
promote the admirable aims of agonistic democracy: political 
contestation, necessary interdependency, and contingency. 
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Appendices: 
Appendix 1: Initial Participant Recruitment Target List 
 
Political Groups: 
Notts Labour:  
info@nottinghamlabour.org.uk 
Nottingham Labour, Unit 13a, John Folman Business Centre, Hungerhill 
Road, NG3 4NB 
 
Notts Libdems: 
info@nottinghamlibdems.org.uk 
The Piggery, 8 Rectory Avenue, Wollaton, Nottingham, NG8 2AL 
Anarchist Federation:  
nottingham afed.org.uk 
AF c/o The Sumac Centre 245 Gladstone Street, Nottingham, NG7 6HX:  
 
Rushcliffe Conservatives (and clubs within this Ð PatronÕs Club, 200 
club, Edwalton and Melton Coffee Club, Conservative Policy Forum): 
office@rushcliffeconservatives.com  
 
BNP  
nottingham@bnp.org.uk 
 
Religious Groups: 
 
Christian Centre, Nottingham: 
admin@christiancentre.org  
Christian Centre Nottingham, 104-114 Talbot Street, Nottingham, NG1 5GL 
Muslim Community Organisation (MCO) muslimcommorg@aol.com 
MCO, Willoughby St, Nottingham NG7 1RQ  
MCO Centre: 
Beaumont Street, Sneinton, Nottingham, NG3 7DN 
Progressive Jewish Congregation: 
norman_randall@ntlworld.com 
 
Notts YMCA international Community Centre: 
icc@nottsymca.org 
 
Nottingham Hebrew Congregation: 
info@officenhc.co.uk 
 
Nottingham Buddhist Centre: 
info@nottinghambuddhistcentre.org 
9 St Mary's Place, Nottingham, NG1 1PH  
Islamic Centre Nottingham: 
info@islamiccentrenottingham.org 
3 Curzon St, Nottingham NG3 1DG  
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Hindu Temple Notts: 
215 Carlton Rd, Nottingham, NG3 2FX 
 
Ethnic/nationality groups: 
African Caribbean National Artistic Centre):  
admin@acna.org.uk 
31 Hungerhill Road St AnnÕs Nottingham NG3 4NB 
 
Indian Community Centre: 
enquiries@theicca.co.uk 
99 Hucknall Rd  Nottingham, NG5 1QZ 
 
Ukrainian Cultural Centre:  
clawson_lodge@hotmail.com  
Clawson Lodge, 403 Mansfield Road, Carrington, Nottingham, NG5 2DP 
Pakistan Centre: 
admin@pakistancentre.org.uk 
163, Woodborough Road, St. Ann's, Nottingham, NG3 1AX 
Causal groups: 
 
Society for the Protection of Unborn Children: 
people@spucnottingham.org.uk 
Notts LGBT Rainbow Heritage: 
nottsrh@hotmail.co.uk 
 
Nottingham Community and Voluntary Service: 
7 Mansfield Road, Nottingham, NG1 3FB 
Notts WomenÕs Centre: 
admin@nottinghamwomenscentre.com 
30 Chaucer Street, Nottingham, NG1 5LP 
Class Groups: 
Notts Golf and Country Club: 
general@thenottinghamshire.com 
The Nottinghamshire Golf & Country Club, Stragglethorpe Road, NG12 3HB 
 
Notts unemployed workerÕs centre admin@nuwc.org.uk 
St John Street 
Mansfield 
Nottinghamshire 
NG18 1QH 
 
Sneinton Hermitage Community Centre: 
Sneinton Boulevard, Sneinton, NG2 4GN 
 
*If poor response, then ask students to fill spaces i.e. if missing a political 
group then ask the student union version of the group.  If missing 
everything then ask a whole diversity of students.  
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Appendix 2: Initial Email Contact 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am a PhD student at the University of Nottingham researching how 
peopleÕs interactions might change when they are encouraged to share 
their views on controversial issues in different ways.  I am writing to ask 
whether any of your members would be interested in participating in an 
experiment which looks at the different ways opinions on abortion, gay 
marriage, gender rights and immigration can be shared. 
 
The experiment is a one day event which will take place on Saturday 11th 
May 2013 at The University of Nottingham.  Coffee breaks and lunch will be 
provided, as well as a reimbursement of transport costs.  More details will 
be given to those who are interested. 
 
During the experiment, participants will be asked to discuss a range of 
topics affecting multicultural society - such as abortion, gay marriage, 
gender rights and immigration.  The experiment will enable citizens to 
explore three different ways of sharing views on these controversial issues.    
 
 
Could you please either reply to me with a list of contacts for those who 
are interested, or ask them to email me directly at 
ldxmp9@nottingham.ac.uk by Friday 15th March 2013. 
Thank you for taking the time to read this.  I would be extremely grateful 
to anyone who would be willing to take part in this experiment. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Marie  
 
_____________________ 
Marie Paxton 
PhD Candidate 
School of Politics & IR 
University of Nottingham 
ldxmp9@nottingham.ac.uk 
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Appendix 3: Participant Recruitment Poster 
 
 
Where?  The University of Nottingham
When? Saturday 11th May (10:30 until 4pm)
Compensation?  Transport costs of up to £20 will be 
compensated and lunch, refreshments and snacks 
will be provided.
If you would like to 
participate in these 
discussions, please email 
Marie Paxton on 
ldxmp9@nottingham.ac.uk 
(all lower case)
Are you interested in 
sharing your views on 
abortion, gay marriage and 
multicultural values?
On 11th May, there will be three 
discussions held at The University 
of Nottingham on abortion, gay 
marriage and multicultural values. 
These discussions form part of a 
PhD project which explores how 
peopleÕs interactions might change 
when the discussion framework 
changes.
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Appendix 4: Participant Recruitment Questionnaire 
 
Please fill in the following survey and return to 
ldxmp9@nottingham.ac.uk as soon as possible.  If you have any 
questions, please do not hesitate to email me.  
 
Name: 
 
Age: 
! Under 18 
! 18 Ð 24 
! 25 Ð 36 
! 37 Ð 48  
! 49 Ð 64 
! 65+ 
 
Gender: 
! Male 
! Female 
 
Ethnicity:  
 
White  
! English / Welsh / Scottish / Northern Irish / British 
! Irish 
! Gypsy or Irish Traveller 
! Other White background.  Please state 
here:_________________________ 
 
Mixed / multiple ethnic groups  
! White and Black Caribbean 
! White and Black African 
! White and Asian  
! Other Mixed / multiple ethnic background.  Please state 
here:________________ 
 
Asian / Asian British  
! Indian 
! Pakistani 
! Bangladeshi  
! Chinese  
! Other Asian background.  Please state 
here:_________________________ 
 
Black / African / Caribbean / Black British  
! African  
! Caribbean  
! Other Black / African / Caribbean background.  Please state 
here:_____________ 
 
Other Ethnic Group  
! Arab 
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! Other ethnic group.  Please state 
here:_________________________________ 
 
! Prefer not to say 
 
Education (please tick any and all that apply): 
! GCSEÕs 
! AS Levels 
! A Levels 
! University bachelorÕs degree 
! University masters degree 
! University research degree (i.e. MPhil, PhD, post-doc) 
 Occupation: 
Please state here: ______________________________ 
 
Political Affiliation: 
! Labour 
! Conservative 
! Liberal Democrat 
! Scottish National Party 
! Plaid Cymru 
! Green 
! UKIP 
! BNP 
! Other.  Please state 
here:________________________________________ 
! None 
! Prefer not to say 
Religion: 
! Christian 
! Buddhist 
! Hindu 
! Jewish  
! Muslim 
! Sikh 
! Atheist 
! Agnostic 
! Other.  Please state here: 
_______________________________________ 
! Prefer not to say 
 
Sexual orientation 
! Heterosexual 
! Homosexual 
! Bi-sexual 
! Prefer not to say 
 
Who contacted you about this research?  
_______________________________ 
 280
 
Thoughts 
 
Do you consider yourself to generally be pro or anti abortion? 
 
! Pro 
! Anti 
 
Any additional comments: 
______________________________________________ 
 
How important is this issue to you on a scale of 1 to 5? (with 1 being not 
important at all and 5 being most important) 
! 1 
! 2 
! 3 
! 4 
! 5 
 
Do you consider yourself to generally be pro or anti gay marriage? 
! Pro 
! Anti 
 
Any additional comments: 
_________________________________________________ 
 
 
How important is this issue to you on a scale of 1 to 5? 
! 1 
! 2 
! 3 
! 4 
! 5 
 
Many thanks for taking the time to complete this survey.   
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Appendix 5: Before and After Questionnaires 
 
Introductory Survey 
 
For each of the pairs of statements, please tick the box for the 
statement you most agree with.  Please only tick one statement for 
each number.  If you agree with more than one statement, please 
tick the one that you identify most with.   
 
Please write your name here: 
_____________________________________ 
(your name will be anonymised in the thesis or any further publications)  
 
 
When talking about controversial issues: 
 
1.  I understand people whose beliefs conflict with mine 
 I find it hard to understand those whose beliefs conflict with mine 
 
2.  I have the most respect for those who share my views 
 I have equal respect for everyone  
 
3.  My beliefs always remain the same during discussion with others 
 My beliefs often change as a result of discussions with others 
 
4.  My beliefs will become stronger as a result of discussions with 
others 
 My beliefs will become weaker as a result of discussions with 
others 
 
5.  I find it hard to understand that people do not share my views 
 I accept that other people may not share my views 
 
6.  I would rather keep my opinions to myself 
 I am willing to share my opinions with others 
 
7.  I become more interested when the discussion becomes heated 
 I lose interest when the discussion becomes heated 
 
8.  I view all views as equally worthwhile 
 I see some views as more worthy than others 
 
9.  I feel I have nothing in common with those I disagree with 
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 I feel you can still share common values with those you disagree 
with 
 
10.   Sharing common values with people is most important in 
bringing people together 
  Working towards a common goal is most important in bringing 
people together 
 
11.  Discussion with others gives me a better understanding of 
different viewpoints 
  Discussion with others does not help me to understand different 
viewpoints 
 
12.  My opinions are fully formed before the discussion 
I develop my own arguments by listening to others 
 
P.T.O. 
 
And finally: 
 
On a scale of one to ten (with one meaning that you have no interest in the 
following issues at all, and ten meaning that you are extremely interested), 
please circle the number which indicates your interest in the following 
issues: 
13. Abortion: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
 9 10 
 
14. Gay Marriage:       1      2     3    4   5   6   7   8
   9 10 
 
Please add anything you wish to here: 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
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Concluding Survey  
 
For each of the pairs of statements, please tick the box for the 
statement you most agree with.  Please only tick one statement for 
each number.  If you agree with more than one statement, please 
tick the one that you identify most with.   
 
Please write your name here: 
_____________________________________ 
(your name will be anonymised in the thesis or any further publications)  
NB: Please note that there are two sections for this survey.  The 
first part is a self-reflection.  The second is a comparison of the 
three discussions. 
 
When talking about controversial issues: 
 
11.  I understand people whose beliefs conflict with mine 
 I find it hard to understand those whose beliefs conflict with mine 
 
12.  I have the most respect for those who share my views 
 I have equal respect for everyone  
 
13.  My beliefs always remain the same during discussion with others 
 My beliefs often change as a result of discussions with others 
 
14.  My beliefs will become stronger as a result of discussions with 
others 
 My beliefs will become weaker as a result of discussions with 
others 
 
15.  I find it hard to understand that people do not share my views 
 I accept that other people may not share my views 
 
16.  I would rather keep my opinions to myself 
 I am willing to share my opinions with others 
 
17.  I become more interested when the discussion becomes heated 
 I lose interest when the discussion becomes heated 
 
18.  I view all views as equally worthwhile 
 I see some views as more worthy than others 
 
19.  I feel I have nothing in common with those I disagree with 
 I feel you can still share common values with those you disagree 
with 
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20.   Sharing common values with people is most important in 
bringing people together 
  Working towards a common goal is most important in bringing 
people together 
 
11.  Discussion with others gives me a better understanding of 
different viewpoints 
  Discussion with others does not help me to understand different 
viewpoints 
 
15.  My opinions are fully formed before the discussion 
 I develop my own arguments by listening to others 
P.T.O. 
 
And finally... Please only tick one box for each question.   
Comparing the discussions: 
 
16.  The discussion I found most engaging was: 
 The charity discussion 
 The abortion discussion 
 The gay marriage discussion 
 
17. I felt most able to express my opinions during: 
 The charity discussion 
 The abortion discussion 
 The gay marriage discussion 
 
18.  My beliefs were challenged the most in: 
 The charity discussion 
 The abortion discussion 
 The gay marriage discussion 
 
19.  The quality of opinions was best in: 
 The charity discussion 
 The abortion discussion 
 The gay marriage discussion 
 
20. I developed an understanding towards others in: 
 The charity discussion 
 The abortion discussion 
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 The gay marriage discussion 
 
21. I felt most passionate during: 
 The charity discussion 
 The abortion discussion 
 The gay marriage discussion 
 
22.  Group unity was strongest during: 
 The charity discussion 
 The abortion discussion 
 The gay marriage discussion 
 
P.T.O. to add additional comments: 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix 6: Participant Questionnaires 
 
Values Survey: 
 
For each of the series of statements, please tick the box for the 
statement you most agree with.  Please only tick one statement for 
each number.  If you agree with more than one statement, please 
tick the one that you identify most with.   
 
Please write your name here: 
_____________________________________ 
(your name will be anonymised in the thesis or any further publications)  
 
During the discussion:  
1.  I shared my beliefs with others 
 I kept my beliefs to myself 
 
2.   I respected everyoneÕs beliefs 
 I found it hard to respect some beliefs 
 
3.  Listening to others had no impact on my own beliefs 
 Listening to others made me challenge my own beliefs 
 Listening to others cemented my own beliefs 
 
4.  I respected some peopleÕs beliefs more than others 
 I respected everyoneÕs beliefs equally 
 
5.  In the discussion there were a couple of dominant views 
 In the discussion lots of perspectives were expressed 
 
6.  We mainly discussed which values were important to us as a 
group 
 We mainly discussed which values were important to us as 
individuals 
 
7.  I become more interested when the discussion becomes heated 
 I lose interest when the discussion becomes heated 
 
8.  The people who had most authority were those who expressed 
their views clearly 
 The people who had most authority were those who expressed 
wide-spread views 
 The people who had most authority were those who said very 
little 
 
9.  The group gained respect for me when I gave my views 
 The group lost respect for me when I gave my views 
 
10.  I found it difficult to set prior judgements aside during the 
discussion 
  I was open-minded during the discussion 
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11.  We criticised certain values and practices 
  We saw all values and practices as having equal worth 
 
23.  I felt like part of the group 
 I felt isolated from the group 
 
24.  My values were reflected by the final decision 
 The final decision did not reflect my values 
 
P.T.O. 
25.  I felt competitive about my values 
 I did not feel competitive about my values 
 
26.  I thought about which values are important to me 
 I did not think about which values are important to me 
 
27.  The discussion made me reconsider who I am 
 I already knew who I was before the discussion 
 
28.   We disagreed about which charities promoted the best values 
  We agreed straight away on which order to rank the charities 
 
29.   We disagreed on what makes a ÔgoodÕ or ÔbadÕ value 
  We all agreed on what makes a ÔgoodÕ or ÔbadÕ value 
  We did not discuss what makes a value ÔgoodÕ or ÔbadÕ 
 
30.   My reasons for my views developed throughout the discussion 
  I already knew the reasons for my views before the discussion 
 
31.   The group became a ÔgroupÕ through the common values we 
share 
  The group became a ÔgroupÕ through the collective decision we 
were asked to make 
  The ÔgroupÕ did not feel like a single, united group 
 
32.   I tolerated everyoneÕs views 
  Some views were intolerable 
 
33.   I responded to people whose views I disagreed with 
  I preferred to keep quiet when people said things I disagreed 
with 
 
34.   I view our order of rank for the values as permanent 
  I view our order of rank for the values as temporary 
 
Anything else you would like to add (for example, answers you want to 
expand 
on):________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________  
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Abortion Survey: 
 
For each of the series of statements, please tick the box for the 
statement you most agree with.  Please only tick one statement for 
each number.  If you agree with more than one statement, please 
tick the one that you identify most with.   
 
Please write your name here: 
_____________________________________ 
 (your name will be anonymised in the thesis or any further publications)  
 
NB: Please note that this survey is split into three parts: part one 
refers to the discussion in general.  Part two refers to the first half 
of the discussion i.e. before the video.  Part three refers to the 
second half of the discussion i.e. after the video. 
 
Part one Ð overall.  Please answer this section reflecting on the whole 
abortion discussion:  
2. Deciding which group to join for this discussion was: 
 Easy 
 Difficult 
 
3. When there were high levels of conflict, I found the discussion: 
 Less interesting  
 More interesting  
 
4. I see the disagreements with the other group as: 
 Temporary 
 Ongoing  
 
5. Now that I have tested them against the views of others, my 
opinions: 
 Are stronger  
 Are weaker 
 Have not been affected 
 
Part two Ð first half of the discussion.  Please answer this section 
reflecting on the abortion discussion which took place before the video:  
6. I felt that our groupÕs ideas were: 
 Of equal worth to the other groupÕs ideas  
 More worthy than the other groupÕs ideas 
 Less worthy than the other groupÕs ideas 
 
7. In terms of defending our ideas, I thought that our group had: 
 More right to do so than the other group  
 Less right to do so than the other group 
 Equal right to do so as the other group 
 
P.T.O. 
8.  I did not feel competitive towards the other group 
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 I felt competitive towards the other group 
 
9.  I felt a strong sense of identification with my group 
 I did not feel a strong sense of identification with my group 
 
10. During this task, the two groups: 
 Worked together  
 Formed two very distinct groups 
 
10. Generally, I felt that my groupÕs values were:  
 Similar to mine 
 Different to mine 
 
11. Disagreement between the two groups is a result of conflict over: 
 Which values are important 
 How to implement important values  
 Both which values are important, and how to implement these 
 
35.  I felt a sense of belonging to my group 
 I felt isolated from my group 
 
36. I felt a sense of belonging to: 
 Both groups  
 My own group 
 Neither group 
 
37. I found the discussion: 
 Interesting 
 Boring 
 
14 b.  Please give a reason for the above answer: 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
38.  During the discussion, most of the views were expressed by: 
 One or two people 
 A variety of people 
 
39.   All views were respect-worthy 
  Some views were not worthy of respect 
 
Part three Ð second half of the discussion.  Please answer this section 
reflecting on the abortion discussion which took place after the video:  
40. I felt that our groupÕs ideas were: 
 Of equal worth to the other groupÕs ideas  
 More worthy than the other groupÕs ideas 
 Less worthy than the other groupÕs ideas 
P.T.O. 
41. In terms of defending our ideas, I thought that our group had: 
 More right to do so than the other group  
 Less right to do so than the other group 
 Equal right to do so as the other group 
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42.  I did not feel competitive towards the other group 
 I felt competitive towards the other group 
 
43.  I felt a strong sense of identification with my group 
 I did not feel a strong sense of identification with my group 
 
44. During this task, the two groups: 
 Worked together  
 Formed two very distinct groups 
 
22. Generally, I felt that my groupÕs values were:  
 Similar to mine 
 Different to mine 
 
23. Disagreement between the two groups is a result of conflict over: 
 Which values are important 
 How to implement important values  
 Both which values are important, and how to implement these 
 
24.  I felt a sense of belonging to my group 
 I felt isolated from my group 
 
25. I felt a sense of belonging to: 
 Both groups  
 My own group 
 Neither group 
 
26. I found the discussion: 
 Interesting 
 Boring 
 
26 b.  Please give a reason for the above answer: 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
27.  During the discussion, most of the views were expressed by: 
 One or two people 
 A variety of people 
 
28.   All views were respect-worthy 
  Some views were not worthy of respect 
 
Please feel free to use the next page to add any additional 
comments: 
 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
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Gay Marriage Survey: 
 
For each of the series of statements, please tick the box for the 
statement you most agree with.  Please only tick one statement for 
each number.  If you agree with more than one statement, please 
tick the one that you identify most with.   
 
Please write your name here: 
_____________________________________ 
(your name will be anonymised in the thesis or any further publications)  
During the discussion:  
4. The opinions we came up with were: 
 All predictable 
 Sometimes unpredictable 
 
5. The views expressed were mostly given by: 
 One or two people 
 A variety of people 
 
5. When other people didnÕt share my views on gay marriage: 
 I accepted it 
 I found it difficult to accept 
 
6. When peopleÕs opinions differed radically from mine: 
 I found it hard to relate to them 
 I could still relate to them 
 
7. My opinions: 
 Were fully formed before the discussion 
 Formed throughout the discussion 
 
8.  Some views were more worthwhile than others 
 All views were equally worthwhile 
 
9. When I disagreed with someone: 
 I told them and explained the reasons why 
 I preferred not to respond 
 
10. After listening to opposing views: 
 I still find it hard to understand them 
 I understand them better 
 
11. Through engaging with others: 
 I understand better where they are Ôcoming fromÕ 
 I do not understand how people can hold such beliefs 
 
P.T.O. 
 
12. When people believed that not everyone would share their personal 
viewpoint: 
 Their viewpoint became less valid 
 Their viewpoint became more valid 
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 The validity of their viewpoint remained the same  
 
13. I felt most motivated to respond to those who: 
 Held views which made me angry 
 Accepted that not everyone would share their views 
 
45. I found it easiest to respond to those who: 
 Held views which made me angry 
 Held views which were similar to mine 
 Accepted that not everyone would share their views 
 Other.  Please state: 
______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________
________________________________________________ 
 
46. The quieter members of the group were: 
 Encouraged to speak by other members of the group 
 Not encouraged to speak by the others 
 
47. Listening to others: 
 Changed my opinions 
 Cemented the opinions I had previously held 
 Had no impact on my opinions 
 
48. This discussion showed me that it is better to: 
 Ignore people who hold opposing beliefs 
 Discuss with people who hold opposing beliefs 
 
49. In the discussion, I felt like: 
 An individual 
 A part of the group 
 
50.  I found it difficult to set aside prior prejudices and stereotypes 
about people  
 I tried to set aside prior prejudices and stereotypes about people  
 
Anything else you would like to 
add:______________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix 7: Drawing on Q Method to break down audi alteram 
partem 
 
Someone who practices audi alteram partem might say, I: 
 
¥ Listened to others 
¥ Listened particularly to those who were silenced, excluded or 
deemed ÔunreasonableÕ 
¥ Listened to others and, when I disagreed, I responded with reasons  
¥ Prevented dominant ideas from suppressing marginalised ones 
¥ Ensured everyone was recognised as worthy, and included in the 
discussion 
¥ Have a deeper understanding of those I disagreed with as a result 
of listening and exchanging views with them 
¥ Learnt things from listening to others 
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Appendix 8: Pre‐experiment Questionnaire from Pilot study 
 
Before Survey 
 
Please circle the statement which you agree with.  Please only 
circle one statement.  If you agree with more than one statement, 
please circle the one that you identify most with. 
 
 
When talking about controversial issues: 
 
1. I understand people whose beliefs conflict with mine/I find it hard to 
understand those whose beliefs conflict with mine 
 
2. I have the most respect for those who share my views/I have equal 
respect for everyone  
 
3. My beliefs always remain the same during discussion with 
others/my beliefs often change as a result of discussions with others 
 
4. My beliefs will become stronger as a result of discussions with 
others/my beliefs will become weaker as a result of discussions with 
others 
 
5. I find it hard to understand that people do not share my views/ I 
accept that other people may not share my views 
 
6. I would rather keep my opinions to myself/I am willing to share my 
opinions with others 
 
7. I become more interested when the discussion becomes heated/I 
lose interest when the discussion becomes heated 
 
8. I view all views as equally worthwhile/I see some views as more 
worthy than others 
 
9. I feel I have nothing in common with those I disagree with/I feel 
you can still share common values with those you disagree with 
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10. Sharing common values with people is most important in bringing 
people together/working towards a common goal is most important 
in bringing people together 
P.T.O. 
11. Discussion with others gives me a better understanding of different 
viewpoints/discussion with others does not help me to understand 
different viewpoints 
 
12. My opinions are fully formed before the discussion/I develop my 
own arguments by listening to others 
 
Please add anything you wish to here: 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
  
 296
Appendix 9: Example of Participant Uncertainty 
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Appendix 10: Observer Sheets 
 
Observer Sheet for Values Discussion 
Group Behaviour 10 
min 
20 
min 
30 
min 
40 
min 
50 
min 
60 
min 
70 
min 
80 
min 
90 
min 
1. People shared their 
beliefs with others 
 
         
2. People reflected on 
their own beliefs 
after hearing other 
peopleÕs (i.e. they 
thought back to what 
they had previously 
said) 
         
3. People became more 
sure of their own 
beliefs after hearing 
the arguments of 
others (i.e. they 
argued more 
strongly for their 
side) 
         
4. People changed their 
beliefs after hearing 
the arguments of 
others 
         
5. There was a range of 
beliefs given  
         
6. EveryoneÕs views 
were respected (i.e. 
people listened to 
them, empathised 
with them, did not 
interrupt them and 
did not swear, shout 
or turn discussion 
personal)  
         
7. People did not 
respect the views of 
others (i.e. they 
interrupted, shouted, 
swore, didnÕt listen, 
rolled their eyes, 
sniggered etc) 
         
8. There were only a 
couple of different 
views given about 
the different 
values/charities 
         
9. The most dominant 
people were those 
who were most 
ready to express 
their views 
         
10.  The most dominant 
people were those 
whose views had the 
most support in the 
group 
         
11. The group discussed 
which values should 
be encouraged (or 
included) 
         
12. The group discussed 
which values should 
be discouraged (or 
banned) 
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Code = Never (N), Rarely (R), Sometimes (S), Often (O), All of the time (A) 
This is reset at 10 minute intervals.  Each observer will also be given an additional sheet of 
paper for every 10 minutes in order to write down things that are particularly poignant or 
which require further explanation. 
 
  
 
13. There were lots of 
people involved in 
the discussion 
         
14. Conflict sent the 
discussion off track 
(i.e. descended into 
personal comments 
or off-topic 
discussions) 
         
15. Conflict resulted in 
people coming to 
new conclusions (i.e. 
modifying their 
original arguments to 
reach new 
conclusions Ð not 
simply to side with 
dominant members) 
         
16. Conflict resulted in 
people changing 
their views to share 
those of the most 
dominant members 
of the group 
         
17. People became very 
competitive about 
their beliefs (i.e. 
they showed passion 
and frustration, they 
compared their 
beliefs to those of 
others, they 
criticised views of 
others, they showed 
how their views were 
better) 
         
18. Participants 
discussed which 
values/charities 
should receive the 
money 
         
19. Participants 
discussed how to 
decide which values 
are most important 
         
20. People engaged with 
views they disagreed 
with (i.e. they gave 
reasons and 
arguments for why 
the other person is 
wrong) 
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Observer Sheet for Abortion Discussion 
Group Behaviour 10 
min 
20 
min 
30 
min 
40 
min 
50 
min 
60 
min 
70 
min 
80 
min 
90 
min 
1. People bursting to 
speak 
         
2. Lots of people 
involved in the 
discussion 
         
3. People listening to 
each other (i.e. 
looking at the 
speaker, nodding 
their heads, 
thinking) 
         
4. Fast pace of 
discussion (i.e. lots 
of back and forths) 
         
5. People having 
private 
conversations  
         
6. People staring into 
space  
         
7. Lots of awkward 
silences (donÕt count 
times when people 
are thinking about 
how to respond) 
         
8. Only a couple of 
people involved in 
the discussion 
         
9. Slow pace          
10. Participants 
agreeing with 
members of own 
group 
         
11. Participants 
supporting opinions 
of other group 
members (verbally 
or through body 
lang. i.e. 
nods/smiles) 
         
12. Participants saying 
positive things 
about own group 
         
13. Participants saying 
negative things 
about other group 
         
14. Competition 
between groups 
(i.e. lang. such as 
ÔwinÕ, ÔbestÕ, ÔworseÕ) 
         
15. Positive body lang. 
to own group (i.e. 
smiling, laughing, 
listening, sitting 
close to) 
         
16. Hostility towards 
other group (i.e. 
interrupting, not 
listening, swearing, 
shouting, turn 
discussion personal) 
         
17. Participants sitting 
apart from their 
own group 
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Code = Never (N), Rarely (R), Sometimes (S), Often (O), All of the time (A) 
This is reset at 10 minute intervals.  Each observer will also be given an additional sheet 
of paper for every 10 minutes in order to write down things that are particularly poignant 
or which require further explanation. 
Observers to place a star on the sheet to indicate at which point the video was 
showed.  
 
18. Participants arguing 
with other members  
of their group 
         
19. Hostility towards 
own group (i.e. 
interrupting, not 
listening, swearing, 
shouting, turn 
discussion personal) 
         
20. Not taking the 
discussion seriously 
(laughing at the 
content, rolling eyes 
at people, not 
listening to people) 
         
21. Positive behaviour 
towards other group 
(i.e. smiling, 
laughing, listening 
to them) 
         
22. Participants relating 
to the experiences 
of the other group 
         
23. Participants trying 
to understand the 
opinions of the 
other group 
         
24. Both groups trying 
to work together as 
a whole 
         
25. Participants 
comparing members 
of other group to 
the extremists in 
the video 
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Observer Sheet for Gay Marriage Discussion 
Group Behaviour 10 
min 
20 
min 
30 
min 
40 
min 
50 
min 
60 
min 
70 
min 
80 
min  
90 
min  
1. There was a range 
of beliefs given 
         
2. People reflected on 
their own beliefs 
after hearing other 
peopleÕs (i.e. they 
thought back to 
what they had 
previously said) 
         
3. People became 
more sure of their 
own beliefs after 
hearing the 
arguments of 
others (i.e. they 
argued more 
strongly for their 
side) 
         
4. People changed 
their beliefs after 
hearing the 
arguments of 
others 
         
5. People were okay 
with the fact that 
others might not 
share their beliefs 
(i.e. they listened 
to others, smiled at 
them, responded 
positively) 
         
6. EveryoneÕs views 
were respected 
(i.e. people 
listened to them, 
empathised with 
them, did not 
interrupt them and 
did not swear, 
shout or turn 
discussion 
personal)  
         
7. People did not 
respect the views 
of others (i.e. they 
interrupted, 
shouted, swore, 
didnÕt listen, rolled 
their eyes, 
sniggered etc) 
         
8. There were only a 
couple of different 
views given about 
the different 
values/charities 
         
9. One or two people 
dominated the 
discussion 
         
10. Quieter members 
were encouraged 
to speak 
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Code = Never (N), Rarely (R), Sometimes (S), Often (O), All of the time (A) 
This is reset at 10 minute intervals.  Each observer will also be given an additional 
sheet of paper for every 10 minutes in order to write down things that are particularly 
poignant or which require further explanation. 
  
11. There were lots of 
people involved in 
the discussion 
         
 
12. There was unity 
within the group 
(i.e. people were 
smiling and 
nodding, referring 
to previous 
opinions) 
         
13. The group 
challenged current 
moral standards on 
gay marriage (i.e. 
questioned their 
original beliefs, 
challenged current 
laws and/or 
current cases) 
         
14. People listened to 
others as 
individuals (i.e. 
they responded to 
the personal 
experiences, 
cultures, traditions 
and beliefs of 
others Ð they 
avoided pre-
formed religious or 
cultural 
stereotypes or 
generalisations) 
         
15. People relied on 
stereotypes when 
talking to people 
with             
different beliefs 
(i.e. 
generalisations, 
making 
assumptions about 
how people of a 
certain religion, 
culture or tradition 
would act) 
         
16. People engaged 
with views they 
disagreed with (i.e. 
they gave reasons 
and arguments for 
why the other 
person is wrong) 
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Appendix 11: Ethical Review Form 
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Appendix 12: Informative Email to Prospective Participants 
 
Dear X, 
 
Thank you so much for volunteering to participate in my pilot experiment Ð 
I am very grateful as I literally could not run it without you! 
 
HereÕs some more information about the day:  the day is set to start at 
10:30am and finish at 4:00pm on Saturday 11th May at The University of 
Nottingham.  The group will be between 10 and 15 people.  You will spend 
the day discussing different issues, such as abortion, gay marriage, and 
multicultural values.   
 
Since my research is looking at the interactions between people, there will 
be a couple of people watching the discussions, and there will also be a 
video camera so that I can watch the discussions afterwards (as I will most 
probably be busy sorting out your food and drink, and other issues 
throughout the day!)  If you have special dietary requirements, please let 
me know. 
 
You will be given consent forms before the experiment outlining that I will 
refer to the event in my PhD thesis, and that parts of it may be referred to 
in journal articles or further publications, however all names will be 
anonymised.  It will also state your right to opt-out of the discussions at 
any point. 
 
If you have any questions, then please donÕt hesitate to contact me. 
 
Thank you again for helping me out! 
 
Many thanks and best wishes, 
 
Marie 
 
_____________________________________ 
Marie Paxton, 
PhD Candidate, 
School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham, 
UK-Nottingham  NG7 2RD, 
Tel.: 0044 790 623 5450 
 
 
Time Event 
10:30 Ð 10:45 Intro + Consent forms 
10:45 Ð 11:00 Icebreaker Exercise 
11:00 Ð 12:00 Value Discussion  
12:00 Ð 1:00 Lunch 
1:00 Ð 2:15 Abortion Discussion  
2:15 Ð 2:30 Coffee 
2:30 Ð 3:45 Gay marriage discussion  
3:45 Ð 4 Conclusion 
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Appendix 13: Consent Form 
 
Informed Consent Form for Participants 
 
Please read the following and ask if you have any questions.  Please 
complete the forms and sign both copies Ð one will be collected in, and the 
other will be yours to keep. 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
I volunteer to participate in a research event conducted by Marie Paxton 
from The University of Nottingham.  I understand that the project is 
designed to gather information about how peopleÕs interactions might 
change when they are encouraged to share their views on controversial 
issues in different ways.  I will be one of approximately 15 people to take 
part in the discussions. 
 
 Please initial 
box 
1. I understand that participation in this event is 
voluntary.  I will not be paid for my participation.  I 
may withdraw and discontinue participation at any 
time without giving a reason and without penalty.  
2. I understand that if I feel uncomfortable in any way 
during the discussions, I have the right to decline to 
speak, or to leave the room at any time.  
3. I understand that participation involves a series of 
three discussions.  Three people will be taking notes 
throughout the discussions.  A video-camera will 
record the discussions.    
4. I understand that all videoed material and written 
documents will be used solely for research 
purposes, and will be destroyed on completion of 
the research.  
5. I understand that all information about me will be 
treated in strict confidence and that I will not be 
named in any written work arising from this study.  
6. I understand that this research study has been 
reviewed and approved by The School of Politics & 
IR Research Ethics Committee at University of 
Nottingham.  
7. I agree to take part in the study.  
8. I agree to being video-recorded.  
9. I agree to the use of anonymised quotes in 
publications  
 
____________________________              _______________________ 
Signature                                             Date 
 
____________________________              _______________________ 
Full name         ResearcherÕs signature 
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Appendix 14: Overview of the Empirical Research 
 
Overview of the Empirical Research 
The empirical work consists of three value discussions, one representing 
concepts from Perfectionist Agonism (David Owen), another from 
Adversarial Agonism (Chantal Mouffe) and a final from Inclusive Agonism 
(William Connolly and James Tully).  These discussions enable reflection on 
the research question of Ôwhether and how can theoretical concepts from 
agonistic democracy be operationalised in order to mediate conflict in 
multicultural, pluralist society?Õ 
 
 
 
 
Timetable of Research 
April 2013: pilot study.759  The purpose of this was for the observers and I 
to practice the experiment; to test (and sometimes modify) the activities 
and questionnaires; and to cross-reference with the main experiment.  The 
pilot study replicated the discussion format from the main experiment, 
although details such as timing and questionnaire layout were altered. 
 
May 2013: main experiment.  
 
December 2013: seminar discussions.  The purpose of these was to cross-
reference with the pilot and main experiment.  The discussion frameworks 
remained the same, but I explored doing them in various orders and using 
a range of different topics.   
 
                                                
759  
 Pilot study Main Experiment Student 
Seminars 
No. of 
participants 
10 9 6 groups of 
approximately 
25 
Age Range 18-24 to 37-48 18-24 to 37 Ð 48 Approximately 
20 years old 
Gender 4 females and 6 
males 
4 females and 5 males Approximately 
50% female 
and 50% male 
Students or 
Non-
students 
All undergraduate 
or postgraduate 
students from 
universities in 
Nottingham and 
Leicester 
5 non-students and 4 students All second 
year 
undergraduate 
students 
Diversity Mixture of 
nationalities, i.e. 
British, Chinese, 
Mexican, French 
and mixed.  
Christians and 
atheists 
3 members of the Society for the 
Protection of Unborn Children.  One 
member of the Greek Orthodox Church 
who identifies as a homosexual.  A 
participant who had previously been 
detained in Iran for promoting womenÕs 
rights.  One humanities student who 
identifies as a bisexual.  An active member 
of the University of Nottingham LGBT 
network, Buddhist Society, WomenÕs 
Network and Amnesty International.  A 
member of the University of Nottingham 
Czech and Slovak Society.  An active 
member of the Nottingham University 
Conservative Association and also 
identifies as a homosexual. 
Various 
nationalities 
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Employing a Quasi-Experimental Approach 
To explore how theoretical concepts from agonistic democracy might be 
operationalised and ways in which these might affect the discussion 
framework. 
 
¥ Discussion one (perfectionist agonism) involves providing 
participants with a range of sports charities, each representing one 
or two values, and asking participants to collectively allocate 
varying sums of money to the charities, according to their order of 
preference. 
 
¥ Discussion two (adversarial agonism) requires participants to take 
part in a ÔforÕ and ÔagainstÕ debate about abortion, using three 
scenarios as the basis for discussion.  Halfway through, participants 
are shown a video which uses pro-choice and pro-life extremism to 
demonstrate a common enemy to both sides. 
 
¥ Discussion three (inclusive agonism) asks participants to sit in a 
circle and use speech tokens to discuss questions about gay 
marriage.  Each participant must use one of their ten speech tokens 
whenever they wish to speak, and they can only contribute until 
their tokens have ran out.  They are also asked to follow a series of 
discussion guidelines, such as respecting everyone, even those with 
whom you disagree.  
 
 
The Participant Recruitment Process 
Purposive sampling -> snowball sampling. 
 
 
 
 
 
The Data Collection Process 
 
 
 
Participant 
Questionnaires 
Employed at the 
beginning and end of 
the day to explore 
whether participantsÕ 
perspectives changed. 
Completed after each 
discussion to explore 
effects of agonistic 
frameworks. 
Video Analysis 
Employed to explore 
interactions between 
participants, including 
non-verbal 
communication and 
behaviour.  Sought to 
counter effects of 
memory. 
Observer Sheets 
Employed to explore 
interactions between 
participants.  Sought to 
triangulate with video 
analysis and participant 
questionnaires to 
enrich the study with a 
diversity of 
interpretations. 
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Conceptual Operationalisation 
Discussion 1: Perfectionist Agonism 
 
Perfectionist Concept Operationalisation in Discussion 
Framework 
 
Perspectivism Provide participants autonomy over 
their room layout. 
 
Engage participants in a discussion 
with diverse others. 
Eternal Recurrence Require participants to allocate 
varying sums of money to a range of 
charities in an order of rank. 
Nietzschean Competition Encourage participants to test their 
perspectives against one another in 
a group discussion. 
Enlarged Mentality Require participants to engage with 
a plurality of perspectives. 
 
Require participants to organise 
their physical space together. 
 
Require participants to collectively 
decide how to arrive at their 
decision. 
 
Discussion 2: Adversarial Agonism 
 
Adversarial Concept Operationalisation in Discussion 
Framework 
The ÔPoliticalÕ Require participants to discuss 
controversial discussion topic of 
abortion. 
 
Arrange seating in oppositional 
layout. 
 
Require participants to discuss how 
they differ from the other group and 
what their opinions were of the other 
group and their values. 
Collective Identity Choose discussion topic of polarised 
nature, i.e. abortion. 
 
Arrange seating in oppositional 
layout. 
 
Require participants to discuss what 
brought them together as a group. 
Agonistic Struggle Require participants to discuss 
controversial discussion topic of 
abortion. 
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Require participants to choose 
between ÔforÕ and ÔagainstÕ group. 
 
Require participants to discuss how 
they differ from the other group and 
what their opinions were of the other 
group and their values. 
 
Show participants a video of 
extremism on both sides of the 
debate halfway through the 
discussion. 
Common Enemy Show participants a video of 
extremism on both sides of the 
debate halfway through the 
discussion. 
 
Discussion 3: Inclusive Agonism 
 
Inclusive Concept Operationalisation in Discussion 
Framework 
Intersubjectivity Providing a discussion topic which 
allows for a plurality of views, i.e. 
gay marriage and associated 
questions.  
 
Arranging the room in a circular 
layout. 
Citizens as the rulers and the ruled Providing participants with the 
autonomy to shape the content and 
focus of the discussion by  veering 
from the set questions. 
Overcoming Domination Arranging the room in a circular 
layout. 
 
Providing participants with ten 
discussion tokens each.  Participants 
must use one token each time they 
speak, and can only contribute until 
their tokens have ran out. 
 
Providing a guideline for the 
discussion, asking participants to 
respect others, even when their 
views conflicted, and asking 
participants to set aside prior 
prejudices and listen to the 
individual.  
Self-modification and Challenge Arranging the room in a circular 
layout. 
 
Providing a guideline for the 
discussion, asking participants to 
listen to others and reflect upon 
oneÕs own beliefs. 
Contestability Providing a guideline for the 
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discussion, asking participants to 
accept and demonstrate 
acknowledgement that not everyone 
will share oneÕs own view. 
 
 
Verbal and Behavioural Indicators of Concepts 
Discussion 1: Perfectionist Agonism 
 
Perfectionist 
Concept 
Operationalisation in 
Participant Questionnaires 
Verbal and Behavioural 
Indicators (used in 
observer sheets and video 
analysis) 
Perspectivism Discussion perceived to be 
around which values were 
important to the group 
(rather than the 
individual). 
 
Participants perceived 
themselves as criticising 
certain values and 
practices (rather than 
viewing them all as equally 
worthy). 
 
Participants felt that their 
values were reflected by 
the final decision. 
 
Participants felt that they 
reconsidered who they are 
(rather than already having 
been aware of this). 
 
Participants felt that their 
views developed 
throughout the discussion 
(rather than having already 
held these). 
Participants became more 
sure of their own beliefs 
after hearing the 
arguments of others (i.e. 
they argued more strongly 
for the other side). 
 
Participants changed their 
beliefs after hearing the 
arguments of others. 
 
Participants discussed 
which values should be 
encouraged (or included). 
 
Participants discussed 
which values should be 
discouraged (or banned). 
 
 
Eternal 
Recurrence 
Participants felt that they 
thought about which values 
were important to them. 
 
Participants felt that there 
was disagreement about 
the order of rank 
throughout the discussion. 
 
Participants felt that they 
considered what makes a 
value ÔgoodÕ or bad.Õ  
 
Participants felt that they 
disagreed on what makes a 
ÔgoodÕ or ÔbadÕ value. 
 
Participants shared their 
beliefs with others. 
 
There was a range of 
beliefs given. 
 
The dominant group 
members were those who 
were most ready to 
express their views. 
 
The dominant group 
members were those 
whose views had the most 
support in the group. 
 
Participants discussed 
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Participants perceived 
themselves as responding 
to those they disagreed 
with. 
 
Participants felt more 
respected after expressing 
their views. 
 
Participants perceived 
those with the most 
authority as those who 
expressed their views most 
clearly and who held the 
most wide-spread beliefs. 
which values/charities 
should receive the money. 
 
Participants discussed how 
to decide which values are 
most important. 
Nietzschean 
Competition 
Participants felt 
competitive about their 
values. 
 
Participants became visibly 
competitive about their 
beliefs (i.e. they showed 
passion and frustration, 
they compared their beliefs 
to those of others, they 
criticised views of others, 
they showed how their 
views were better). 
 
Conflict resulted in people 
coming to new conclusions 
(i.e. modifying their 
original arguments to 
reach new conclusions Ð 
not simply to side with 
dominant members). 
Enlarged 
Mentality 
Participants tolerated all 
views (rather than finding 
some intolerable). 
 
Participants felt like part of 
the group during the 
discussion. 
 
Participants felt as if the 
group became a single, 
united group. 
 
Participants felt as if a 
group formed through 
collective decision-making 
(rather than common 
values). 
EveryoneÕs views were 
respected (i.e. people 
listened to them, 
empathised with them, did 
not interrupt them and did 
not swear, shout or turn 
the discussion personal). 
 
Participants reflected on 
their own beliefs after 
hearing other peopleÕs (i.e. 
they thought back to what 
they had previously said). 
 
Negative indicators 
include: interrupting, 
shouting, swearing, not 
listening, rolling of eyes 
and sniggering. 
 
Discussion 2: Adversarial Agonism 
 
Adversarial 
Concept 
Operationalisation in 
Participant Questionnaires 
Verbal and Behavioural 
Indicators (used in 
observer sheets and video 
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analysis) 
The ÔPoliticalÕ Participants perceived 
disagreements with the 
opposing group as 
continual. 
Lots of participants 
involved in the discussion. 
 
Negative indicators 
include: only a couple of 
people involved in the 
discussion, or when people 
are not taking the 
discussion seriously (i.e. 
they are laughing, rolling 
their eyes or not listening). 
Collective 
Identity 
Participants found it easy 
to decide which group to 
join initially.   
 
Participants felt a strong 
sense of identification with 
their group. 
 
Participants did not feel a 
sense of belonging to the 
other group. 
 
Participants felt that their 
values were similar to 
those of their group. 
Participants agreeing with 
members of own group. 
 
Participants supporting 
opinions of other group 
members (verbally or 
through body language, 
i.e. nods/smiles). 
 
Participants saying positive 
things about own group. 
 
Competition between 
groups (i.e. language such 
as Ôwin,Õ Ôbest,Õ ÔworseÕ). 
 
Behaving positively 
towards oneÕs own group 
(i.e. smiling, laughing, 
listening to, sitting close 
to). 
 
Negative indicators 
include: sitting apart from 
oneÕs own group; arguing 
with members of oneÕs own 
group; and hostility 
towards oneÕs own group 
(interrupting, not listening, 
swearing, shouting, turning 
the discussion personal). 
Agonistic 
Struggle 
Participants found the 
discussion more interesting 
during high levels of 
conflict. 
 
Participants felt that the 
other groupÕs values had 
equal worth to theirs. 
 
Participants felt competitive 
towards the other group. 
 
Participants felt that 
disagreement with the 
Participants bursting to 
speak. 
 
Fast pace of conversation 
(i.e. lots of back and 
forths). 
 
Participants listening to 
one another (i.e. looking at 
the speaker, nodding their 
heads, thinking). 
 
Participants relating to the 
experiences of the other 
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other group arose from the 
implementation of values 
(rather than the values 
themselves). 
group. 
 
Participants trying to 
understand the opinions of 
the other group. 
 
Both groups trying to work 
together as a whole. 
 
Negative indicators 
include: private 
conversations; staring into 
space; experiencing 
awkward silences; and 
interacting at a slow pace. 
Common 
Enemy* 
*Rather than adding 
questions to explore the 
concept of common enemy, 
the survey was replicated 
before and after the 
Ôcommon enemyÕ video in 
order to explore whether 
there were any changes in 
participantsÕ responses. 
*Rather than adding 
additional behavioural 
indicators, the common 
enemy concept was 
explored by comparing the 
verbal and behavioural 
indicators after the video 
to those which were 
observed before.   
 
Negative indicator 
includes: associating 
members of the other 
group with the extremists 
in the video. 
 
Discussion 3: Inclusive Agonism 
 
Inclusive 
Concept 
Representation in 
Participant Questionnaires 
Verbal and Behavioural 
Indicators (used in 
observer sheets and video 
analysis) 
Intersubjectivity Participants felt that they 
could still relate to those 
with whom they 
disagreed. 
 
Participants felt like part 
of the group during the 
discussion. 
There was unity within the 
group (i.e. participant were 
smiling and nodding, 
referring to previous 
opinions). 
Citizens as the 
rulers and the 
ruled 
Participants felt that their 
opinions formed during 
the discussion. 
 
When participants 
disagreed with someone, 
they told them so, and 
explained the reasons 
why. 
 
Participants felt that the 
discussion showed that it 
There was a range of 
beliefs given. 
 
There were lots of 
participants actively 
involved in the discussion. 
 
Participants became more 
sure of their own beliefs 
after hearing the 
arguments of others (i.e. 
they argued more strongly 
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is better to discuss with 
people holding opposing 
beliefs. 
for their side). 
 
Participants engaged with 
views they disagreed with 
(i.e. they gave reasons and 
arguments for why the 
other person is wrong). 
 
Negative indicators 
include: one or two people 
dominating the discussion, 
and only a couple of views 
were expressed. 
Overcoming 
Domination 
Participants felt that a 
variety of people 
expressed views during 
the discussion. 
 
Participants felt that all 
views were equally 
worthwhile. 
 
Participants felt that the 
quieter members of the 
group were encouraged to 
speak by other members 
of the group. 
 
Participants felt that they 
tried to set aside their 
own prior prejudices and 
stereotypes about others. 
 
EveryoneÕs views were 
respected (i.e. participants 
listened to them, 
empathised with them, did 
not interrupt them and did 
not swear, shout or turn 
the discussion personal). 
 
Quieter members were 
encouraged to speak. 
 
Participants listened to 
others as individuals (i.e. 
they responded to the 
personal experiences, 
cultures, traditions and 
beliefs of others Ð they 
avoided pre-formed 
religious or cultural 
stereotypes or 
generalisations). 
 
Negative indicators 
include: those who 
disrespect others (i.e. 
interruption, swearing, 
shouting, not listening or 
rolling their eyes), and 
those who relied upon 
cultural stereotypes and 
generalisations to form 
their argument.   
Self-modification 
and Challenge 
Participants felt that the 
opinions the group came 
up with were sometimes 
unpredictable. 
 
Participants felt that they 
understood others better 
after hearing their views. 
 
Participants felt that they 
understood better where 
others are Ôcoming fromÕ 
Participants reflected on 
their own beliefs after 
hearing other peopleÕs (i.e. 
they thought back to what 
they had previously said). 
 
Participants changed their 
beliefs after hearing the 
arguments of others. 
 
The group challenged 
current moral standards on 
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after engagement with 
them. 
 
Participants felt that 
listening to others affected 
their beliefs in some way, 
i.e. by changing them, or 
by cementing them. 
gay marriage (i.e. they 
questioned their original 
beliefs, challenged current 
laws and/or current cases). 
Contestability Participants felt most 
motivated to engage with 
those who accepted that 
not everyone would share 
their views. 
 
Participants found it 
easiest to respond to 
those who accepted that 
not everyone would share 
their views. 
 
Participants accepted that 
other people didnÕt share 
their views on gay 
marriage.  
Participants were okay with 
the fact that others might 
not share their beliefs (i.e. 
they listened to them, 
smiled at them, responded 
positively). 
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Appendix 15: Charity Descriptions 
 
Sports Charities 
 
1. Universal Sports 
2. Equality Through Sport 
3. Sport for Soldiers 
4. Tolerance and Diversity Through Sport 
5. The Sporting Excellence Trust 
 
Participants will be given 5 cards Ð one for each of the charities.  On the 
cards will read: 
1. Universal Sports is a group of people who aim to involve 
every single member of the community in sport.  We believe that 
sport benefits everyone.  Our aim is to make sport fun, accessible 
and affordable.  The values this charity encompasses are:  benefit 
for all, universality. 
 
2. Equality Through Sport is a group of people worldwide who 
believe that poverty isn't inevitable - it is an injustice.  We aim to 
overcome global injustice by using sport to affect change and 
encourage development in impoverished communities.  We believe 
that every human life is of equal value and full of potential.  The 
values this charity encompasses are: justice and equality. 
 
 
3. Sport for Soldiers is a charity which provides rehabilitation 
for wounded soldiers.  We believe that these soldiers have given so 
much for us that in return it is our duty to provide assistance when 
they are in real need.  The values encompassed by this charity are: 
duty and responsibility. 
 
4. Tolerance and Diversity Through Sport is a youth-led 
organisation working with young people to address discrimination 
and hate crime issues through.  Our aim is to bring communities 
together through participation in sports teams and clubs.  The 
values this charity encompasses are: tolerance and respect. 
 
 
5. The Sporting Excellence Trust is a charity which aims to help 
elite athletes achieve their full potential in sport through the 
provision of excellent facilities and opportunities.  We are 
passionate about making the best better.  The values this charity 
embodies are:  excellence and accomplishment. 
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Appendix 16: Common Enemy Video 
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